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Abstract 
The mediation of the balance between vigilance and restraint is a fundamental feature of 
judicial review of administrative action in the Anglo-Commonwealth. This balance is realised 
through the modulation of the depth of scrutiny when reviewing the decisions of ministers, 
public bodies and officials. While variability is ubiquitous, it takes different shapes and forms. 
In this thesis I identify the main approaches employed in judicial review in England, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand over the last 50 years or so: 
(a) scope of review, based on an array of formalistic categories which determine whether judicial 
intervention is permissible;  
(b) grounds of review, based on a simplified and generalised set of grounds of intervention;  
(c) intensity of review, based on explicit calibration of the depth of scrutiny taking into account 
a series of constitutional, institutional and functional factors; and 
(d) contextual review, based on an unstructured (and sometimes instinctive) overall judgement 
about whether to intervene according to the circumstances of the case.  
This thesis has three dimensions. In the doctrinal dimension, I isolate the four schemata from the 
case law throughout the Anglo-Commonwealth. Professor Stanley de Smith’s acclaimed 
judicial review textbook – particularly its changing language and format – is used to provide 
structure for the study. In the conceptual dimension, I identify the conceptual foundations of the 
schemata, exposing their commonality and differences. I use the scholarly debate about the 
constitutional underpinnings of judicial review to provide insight into the justifications 
advanced for the different approaches. In the normative dimension, I evaluate the virtues of the 
different schemata. The qualities of the different approaches are drawn out, using Fuller’s rule-
of-law-based criteria to guide the assessment of efficacy. Overall, the grounds and intensity of 
review schemata generally display the most virtue when measured against these criteria. 
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1  
Introduction 
I Restraint and Vigilance and the Variation of the Depth of Scrutiny 
One of the key features of the system of judicial review is the variation of the depth of scrutiny 
by the supervising court when examining administrative decisions. The circumstances of 
different cases lead to different emphases being drawn between the competing notions of 
judicial vigilance and restraint.1 But the manner in which this balance is mediated and the depth 
of scrutiny is modulated differs across time and across jurisdictions. This thesis examines the 
methodologies used to vary the depth of scrutiny in English and other Anglo-Commonwealth 
(Australia, New Zealand and Canada) systems of judicial review over the last 50 years or so.2 
In this thesis I identify four schemata which are employed to organise the modulation of 
the depth of scrutiny:  
(a) scope of review, based on an array of formalistic categories which determine whether judicial 
intervention is permissible;3  
(b) grounds of review, based on a simplified and generalised set of grounds of intervention;4  
 
1  For the adopted language of  ‘vigilance’ and ‘restraint’, see Michael Fordham, ‘Surveying the Grounds’ in 
Peter Leyland and Terry Woods (eds), Administrative Law Facing the Future (Blackstone 1997) and Michael 
Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (5th edn, Hart 2008) [P12], [P13]. 
2  See text to n 60 for extended discussion of  the territorial scope of  this thesis, along with an explanation 
of  the jurisdictional descriptors used. 
3  See ch 2. 
4  See ch 3. 
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(c) intensity of review, based on explicit calibration of the depth of scrutiny taking into account 
a series of constitutional, institutional and functional factors;5 and 
(d) contextual review, based on an unstructured (and sometimes instinctive) overall judgement 
about whether to intervene according to the circumstances of the case.6 
These four schemata – loosely drawn from the language and structure of Professor Stanley de 
Smith’s acclaimed judicial review textbook as it changed over its seven editions – provide 
structure for the study. For each of the schemata, doctrinal, theoretical and normative 
dimensions are examined.  
The doctrinal dimension demonstrates that the modulation of the depth of scrutiny is 
ubiquitous in the Anglo-Commonwealth family of common law jurisdictions.7 The manner in 
which it manifests itself, however, is not constant or uniform; I identify the different ways the 
variation of the depth of scrutiny has been organised and given effect – distilling the four 
schemata described above. De Smith’s textbook on judicial review is used to frame this 
doctrinal study; as well as employing the language seen in the textbook over time to mark the 
different methodologies, the doctrinal study echoes the subject-matter, comparative approach 
and life-time of de Smith’s textbook.  
When identifying the different schemata, I describe the basic character of the different 
approaches and identify where these approaches are, or have been, deployed. While each 
method can be seen in a number of jurisdictions at different times, some associations of varying 
strength are identified. Australia remains strongly committed to the formalistic scope of review 
approach that was historically applied in English administrative law. English law today still 
founds itself on a grounds of review approach, but there is some pressure towards the more 
circumstantial approaches of intensity of review and contextual review particularly when 
human rights are engaged. Grounds of review also have strong currency in New Zealand, but 
the preference for methodological simplicity means contextual review also finds strong favour. 
Canada has long rejected approaches based on doctrinal categories or grounds and the 
modulation of the depth of scrutiny assumes a central role. However, the way in which the 
deferential forms of review have been expressed, in contradiction to correctness review, has 
varied between variegated forms of reasonableness (intensity of review) or a simplified, 
 
5  See ch 4. 
6  See ch 5. 
7  See further pt II. 
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umbrella form of reasonableness where the depth of scrutiny implicitly floats according to the 
circumstances (contextual review). 
 The conceptual dimension turns to the conceptual foundation and justification for each 
schemata.8 Doctrinal diversity is matched by conceptual diversity: scholars support different 
approaches to the mediation of the balance between vigilance and restraint. Through the lens 
of the debate on the constitutional underpinnings of judicial review, I draw out the relationship 
between the manner in which the depth of review is modulated and the constitutional dynamics 
of judicial review generally, that is whether the work of judges on judicial review is mandated 
by reference to legislative intent (the ultra vires school) or independently by the common law 
(the common law school). By seeking to associate a number of scholars with the different 
schemata I have identified, I seek to illuminate the conceptual basis of the schemata by 
inquiring into the scholars’ attitudes about the relationship between the administration, 
legislature and the courts. 
A number of general points are evident. The scope of review approach is favoured by 
formalists, who tend to support ultra vires as the constitutional justification of judicial review. 
They emphasize a strong linkage between judicial methodology and legislative mandate, and 
seek to minimise judicial discretion. Those supporting the grounds of review schema tend to 
be aligned with the common law school. They demonstrate more faith in the judicial role and 
are more open to normative argument by judges. However, they show a preference for 
substantive values to be translated into the architecture of judicial review doctrine, rather than 
deployed without structure or constraint. The intensity of review schema garners support from 
some in the ultra vires school. In a concession to the problems associated with the line-drawing 
of categorical approaches, a more open-textured approach based on the balancing of 
competing factors is supported. The overarching emphasis on legislative intent remains but, 
rather than effected indirectly through doctrinal proxies, it assumes a key role in the explicit 
calibration of the depth of review. Contextual review is anathema to those from the ultra vires 
school; it only finds support from some in the common law school or from those who seek to 
stand outside the ultra vires–common law contest. The centrality of judicial discretion to the 
contextual review method means those supporting it promote a rarefied role for judges within 
the constitutional order.  
Thus, the different schools of thought on the constitutional underpinnings debate do not 
map neatly onto the different schemata for modulation of the depth for scrutiny. But some 
 
8  See further pt III. 
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conceptual patterns relating to the nature of institutional relationships with the administrative 
system can be identified.  
Finally, the normative dimension evaluates the efficacy and virtue of each schema, assessing 
their strengths and weaknesses as mechanisms for mediating the balance between vigilance and 
restraint.9 I employ Fuller’s principles of legality/efficacy to guide this normative enquiry: 
generality, accessibility, prospectivity, clarity, stability, non-contradiction, non-impossibility, 
and congruence (with hortatory versatility added too). These principles are a useful means to 
interrogate the nature of power possessed by the courts in the supervisory jurisdiction and to 
assess the virtue of the different ways they modulate that power, through the variation of the 
depth of scrutiny. 
While the principles are not intended to operate as a summative checklist to determine an 
ideal-type schema, a number of more general conclusions are drawn. The scope of review 
schema tends to harness a two-track style. While ostensibly delivering the rule-structure 
encouraged by Fuller, closer analysis reveals latent judicial discretion and strong potential for 
doctrinal manipulation. Thus, its performance against most criteria is weaker than is apparent, 
particularly due to a lack of congruence between the expression and application of the rules 
and an overall lack of clarity and coherence. At the other end of the spectrum, contextual 
review’s rejection of doctrinal structure in favour of judicial judgement and instinct means it 
performs poorly against most criteria. The grounds and intensity of review schemata both 
perform admirably against Fuller’s virtues, although emphasizing different qualities. The 
distinction between the two turns on the extent to which calibration of the depth of review 
takes place directly, through a judgement based on enumerated conceptual factors, or 
indirectly, through the animation of doctrinal categories and vacillation between them. 
Notably, the doctrine–discretion dynamic is manifested differently. None performs perfectly, 
given the various trade-offs involved. However, the analysis allows us to recognise the 
strengths and weaknesses of the different schemata when deliberating on appropriate forms of 
mediating the balance between vigilance and restraint.  
In the sections that follow I outline my general approach in expanded detail. I explain more 
fully each of the analytical dimensions – doctrinal, conceptual and normative – and justify the 
methodology I adopt for each. 
 
9  See further pt IV. 
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II Doctrinal Manifestation: Organisational Schemata and Trends 
Variability has been an ever-present feature of judicial review method. While it may seem 
elementary, my study of the last half century or so seeks to put that proposition beyond doubt. 
The inherent variability of the supervisory jurisdiction is sometimes lost sight of, as 
administrative law discourse reacts adversely to particular doctrinal manifestations of 
variability.  
Deference: ‘That’s a dreadful word’, says New Zealand’s Chief Justice.10  
Anxious scrutiny: ‘[J]udges devise catch-phrases devoid of legal meaning’, a judge of the UK’s 
Supreme Court complains, ‘in order to describe concepts which they are unwilling or unable 
to define.’11  
Variegated standards of unreasonableness: An experience ‘marked by ebbs and flows of deference, 
confounding tests and new words for old problems,’ cautions Canadian Supreme Court judges, 
‘but no solutions that provide real guidance for litigants, counsel, administrative decision-
makers or judicial review judges.’12  
Jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error: ‘The old insistence upon preserving the chimerical 
distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error of law [should] be interred, 
without tears’, encourages an Australian High Court judge.13  
These remarks, all from judges drawn from final appellate courts in the Anglo-
Commonwealth, provide some insight into the strength of feeling exhibited towards some of 
the doctrines which have played key roles in modulating the depth of scrutiny in judicial review. 
A similar set of pejorative comments from scholars, lawyers and bureaucrats could readily be 
recited. The animated discourse about these doctrines, along with uncomplimentary views 
about the labels ascribed to them, suggest the modulation of the depth of review in judicial 
review remains controversial.  
The first part of the chapters that follow is devoted to a close study of the key doctrines in 
judicial review across the Anglo-Commonwealth over the last half-century. As well as 
demonstrating that variability is commonplace, the purpose is to elicit how the variation of the 
depth of scrutiny has been differently expressed and the schematic nature of the methodologies 
associated with that variation. The trends over time are captured, as mentioned earlier, by an 
 
10  Ye v Minister of  Immigration (NZSC, transcript, 21-23 April 2009, SC53/2008) 179 (Elias CJ). 
11  Lord Sumption, ‘Anxious Scrutiny’ (ALBA annual lecture, London, November 2014) 1. 
12  Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 (Bastarache and LeBel JJ) [1].  
13  Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Miah (2000) 179 ALR 238, [212] (Kirby J).  
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analysis of the language, structure and organising principles in de Smith’s distinguished 
textbook, Judicial Review of Administrative Action.14 De Smith’s textbook, while not assuming any 
exalted function in judicial review, provides a series of cues about the nature of the system of 
judicial review it expounds. It is a convenient entry-point for the examination of Anglo-
Commonwealth judicial review doctrine because it adopts a similar style and set of parameters 
to my study in this thesis (points I explain in more detail shortly).  
Over its seven editions, de Smith’s textbook contains a subtle linguistic change in the way 
in which the supervisory jurisdiction is explained and its principles organised. This study draws 
out the key shifts as they relate to the modulation of the depth of scrutiny. Most notably, the 
nomenclature adopted to denominate much of the nature and circumstances of judicial 
intervention has changed over time: from ‘scope of review’ to ‘grounds of review’ to – perhaps, 
at least formatively – ‘intensity of review’. Hinted at, but not yet prominently recognised, is a 
form of ‘contextual review’.  
The change in nomenclature, I argue, is not merely linguistic. The evolution in the 
denomination of judicial intervention speaks to change in the underlying style of review. The 
organisational transition – from scope to grounds to intensity, along with some limited 
recognition of context – points to a move away from legal formalism and categorical 
approaches towards more open-textured and explicitly circumstantial approaches. The 
linguistic developments are, I suggest, helpful to mark out the different judicial review 
methodologies and schemata employed over time and throughout the Anglo-Commonwealth, 
at least in general terms. The various schemata represent different ways to organise and execute 
the supervisory task. And, importantly, different ways to mediate the balance between restraint 
and vigilance. Each schema provides distinct ways to modulate the depth of scrutiny to take 
account of context and the limitations of judicial supervision.  
Some care needs to be taken in relation to the definition of these schemata, however. They 
are constructed in order to capture the dominant methodologies operating in systems of 
judicial review at different times and in different places. They are necessarily generalised précis, 
limited in the extent to which they can capture the vast and nuanced doctrines existing at any 
point in time. But the value lies in capturing the essence and emphasis of the different 
approaches. Inevitably, there is some overlap between the given schema and instances where 
underlying doctrines could plausibly be categorised under multiple schemata. Judgements have 
been required in a number of situations; I have tried to address the doctrine under the schema 
 
14  De Smith, Judicial Review of  Administrative Action (1st edn-7th edn, Stevens/Sweet & Maxwell, 1959-2013). 
The textbook is referred to as ‘de Smith’, along with the appropriate edition number. 
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which is most emblematic of the underlying methodology and explained my basis for doing 
so. In some cases, behind the prevalent methodology, some elements of the other approaches 
may also be seen. This does not compromise the analysis. The key concern is the dominant 
style and the nature of the methods that are foregrounded in the judicial analysis. A project 
with these parameters necessarily has a meta-level focus. The distinctive aspects are captured; 
outlying instances do not undermine the definition of the emblematic judicial style. 
The organisational framework for the doctrinal study, and ultimately the thesis as whole, is 
drawn, as mentioned, from de Smith’s textbook. The parameters of the study – subject-matter, 
timeframe and comparative focus – are cast relatively broadly, echoing the parameters of de 
Smith’s textbook and taking into account the meta-perspective adopted. Below, I rationalise 
the reliance on this work and justify the parameters employed for the doctrinal study. In doing 
so, I explain how my treatment engages with existing scholarship and how this thesis makes 
an original contribution. 
Organisational framework: de Smith’s textbook on judicial review  
The employment of de Smith to frame and organise the doctrinal study is useful in a schematic 
project of this kind. Judges are situated actors, called on to focus on individual cases. Under 
the common law style of reasoning, they rarely address the architecture of the system of judicial 
review or turn their attention to the overarching schema.15 As Galligan explains, the courts 
‘rarely make efforts to draw out the generalised features of their decisions’ or ‘attempt to 
construct a pattern of interlocking rules’; instead, ‘each decision is largely a fresh exercise of 
discretion according to the variables of the situation’.16 Administrative law textbook writers 
therefore have an important and palpable structuring and organising role. Taggart recognised 
the value of studying textbooks in order to chart an intellectual history of a discipline: 
‘textbooks [allow] us to draw textual and conceptual pictures, and to identify significant events 
and changing concepts’.17 Further, the assistance of a textbook makes this project possible. 
While I pay close attention to an extensive corpus of case law across the jurisdictions, the 
identification and tracing of general schematic trends sometimes requires a degree of 
approximation that can only be filled by reference to secondary, not primary, sources. It is 
simply not feasible otherwise. Indeed, the cataloguing project undertaken by de Smith 
 
15  Lord Diplock’s seminal speech in Council of  Civil Service Unions v Minister of  Civil Service [1985] AC 374 
(CCSU) and the Supreme Court of  Canada’s landmark decision in Dunsmuir (n 12) are two obvious 
exceptions. 
16  DJ Galligan, ‘Judicial Review and the Textbook Writers’ (1982) 2 OJLS 257, 268. 
17  Michael Taggart, ‘Prolegomenon to an Intellectual History of  Administrative Law in the Twentieth 
Century’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 224, 228. 
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represented a doctorate in its own right. Hence, reliance on secondary sources is, in some cases, 
essential to generate schemata, in order that the theoretical and normative dimensions of the 
schema can also be examined. 
De Smith’s textbook is, in particular, especially suitable for this task. Its lifespan, definition 
of subject-matter, comparative focus, style of exposition and overall standing mean it provides a 
convenient foundation for the doctrinal study.  
First, the lifespan of de Smith’s textbook is just over a half-century, with seven editions 
published between 1959 and 2013. Although the authorship, structure and organisational 
language changed over that period, de Smith’s original style was retained throughout. The 
original edition was a published version of a PhD thesis completed at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science in 1959.18 De Smith completed one further edition while 
occupying the Chair in Public Law at the LSE (1968) and another while holding the Downing 
Professorship of the Laws of England at Cambridge University (1973).19 After de Smith’s death 
in 1974, the fourth edition was updated by John Evans (1980), an academic who went onto an 
distinguished career at Osgoode Hall Law School and later served on the Canadian Federal 
Court of Appeal.20 The first four editions of de Smith’s text are very similar in character, 
continuing de Smith’s original structure and style throughout.  
The fifth edition of de Smith’s text (1995) was subject to substantial restructuring and 
rewriting.21 Most obviously, the text was rewritten under new guardianship: Lord Woolf and 
Professor Jowell took over as authors.22 The production of the fifth edition also followed a 
vigorous period of change within English judicial review.23 No longer was judicial review, as 
de Smith famously described it, ‘sporadic and peripheral’;24 instead, Woolf and Jowell argued 
that ‘the effect of judicial review on the practical exercise of power has now become constant 
and central’.25 Regardless of the restructuring and rewriting of the text, Woolf and Jowell 
 
18  SA de Smith, Judicial Review of  Administrative Action: A Study in Case Law (PhD Thesis, London School of  
Economics and Political Science 1959). 
19  ‘Professor SA de Smith’ (1974) 33 CLJ 177 (obituary) and ‘Professor SA de Smith’ (1974) 37 MLR 241 
(obituary). 
20  ‘The Honourable John Maxwell Evans’ <www.justice.gc.ca>. 
21  De Smith (5th edn) vii.  
22  ibid. Woolf  and Jowell were assisted in the 5th edition by Andrew Le Sueur. 
23  ibid, specifically noting the dramatic change. In the subsequent edition, Woolf, Jowell, and Le Sueur 
described the 1980s and early 1990s as involving a large increase in applications, increased ‘sophistication’ 
in grounds and judicial reasoning, and ‘burgeoning academic literature’; de Smith (6th edn) v.  
24  De Smith (5th edn) vii. 
25  ibid. 
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attempted to remain faithful to de Smith’s original style.26 De Smith’s method of crystallising a 
line of cases into a series of propositions remained, as did the commitment to a broad corpus 
of case law (both historic and international, particularly from the Commonwealth).27  
The sixth edition of the text (2007) was published over a decade after the fifth edition.28 It 
contained some significant changes, driven by changes within the system of judicial review.29 
The emblematic change was the revision of the title of the text, with ‘Judicial Review’ standing 
solitary without its former ‘of Administrative Action’ counterpart; this recognised a slightly 
broader focus also incorporating judicial review of legislation in some situations.30 There was 
also a minor change to the panel of authors, with Andrew Le Sueur joining Woolf and Jowell 
as a joint author.31 The seventh, and current, edition (2013) was published six years after the 
sixth.32 The final edition follows the same format and style as the sixth, largely enlarging aspects 
of the commentary and references.  
Secondly, the definition of the parameters of the textbook – its subject and comparative focus 
– is consistent with the general focus of this thesis. De Smith’s focus was conveyed by the 
original title: ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action’ (while the title of recent editions has 
been truncated, the principal focus on the role of judges in the traditional administrative law 
domain remains). This focus on supervision of administrative decision-making, broadly 
defined, is echoed in this thesis.33 The textbook is principally focused on English administrative 
law but also draws on Commonwealth case law. De Smith explained in the original edition: 
‘On some … matters we shall be able to find strong persuasive authority in the decision of the 
courts in Commonwealth countries’.34 This practice continued through the editions which 
followed.35 The current authors record their continuing commitment to ‘refer to the experience 
 
26  ibid vii-viii. 
27  ibid viii. 
28  De Smith (6th edn) v. A supplement was published 1998: de Smith (5th edn, suppl).  
29  ibid v-vi. 
30  ibid vii. The authors preferred the term ‘public functions’. The rise of  human rights and impact of  EC law 
led to primary legislation being brought into the province of  judicial review and thus ambit of  the text 
expanded slightly. 
31  Catherine Donnelly joined the 6th edition as an assistant editor. 
32  De Smith (7th edn). Catherine Donnelly and Ivan Hare joined the editorial panel. A further supplement 
was published in 2009: de Smith (6th edn, suppl) 
33  See text to n 46. 
34  De Smith (1st edn) 25. 
35  The current authors record their continuing commitment to ‘refer to the experience of  other jurisdictions 
… without any pretence at creating a work of  comparative law’ (de Smith (7th edn) vi). In latter editions, 
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of other jurisdictions … without any pretence at creating a work of comparative law’.36 This 
comparative focus coincides with the comparative brief of this study and my concern with the 
judicial methodology within a broader common law of judicial review.  
Thirdly, the textbook’s style of exposition was analytical and almost scientific in character. ‘It 
is about “the law” and touches only occasionally on the prophets.’37 De Smith was generally 
content to catalogue and describe the law as it was. ‘By gathering in the cases so assiduously,’ 
Harlow remarks, ‘in some senses [he] petrified the law, preserving it, like amber, with all its 
impurities.’38 His views were incisive but subdued; as Williams observed, ‘de Smith did not 
offer criticism in strident tones; he accepted the law as it stood and his criticisms and comments 
… are gently integrated into discussions’.39 That tradition continued throughout the first four 
editions, including the edition edited by Evans. The passing of the editorship to Woolf and 
Jowell in the fifth edition and significant restructuring perhaps signalled a more normative turn. 
However, the hallmarks of de Smith’s style continue to dominate. Indeed, in the seventh 
edition, the editors avowed their ongoing commitment to ‘meticulous coverage of the case law’ 
and ‘elucidation of principle’ that made the textbook distinctive.40 This tradition makes it more 
suitable for the doctrinal study than some of the other long-serving textbooks in the field, such 
the administrative law textbooks written by Wade and Craig.41 For example, Craig tends to 
adopt a more normative style and emphasis. Wade’s textbook, while assuming similar standing 
to de Smith, tends to more heavily reflect the predilections of the original (and successor) 
author(s) and lacks the analytical elegance of de Smith.42 
Finally, the textbook has particular standing: it is one of the most distinguished textbooks on 
judicial review in the Anglo-Commonwealth.43 De Smith’s ‘work in administrative law’, one of 
 
this non-English case law was grouped under the heading ‘Comparative Perspectives’, with Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia featuring prominently. 
36  De Smith (7th edn) vi. 
37  JAG Griffith (1960) 18 CLJ 228 (book review) 229. 
38  Carol Harlow, ‘Politics and Principles’ (1981) 44 MLR 113, 115. See also Galligan (n 16) 268 (‘a book for 
someone who wants to know what the law is’); Louis L Jaffe (1961) 74 Harv LR 636 (book review) 636. 
39  DGT Williams (1974) 33 CLJ 324 (book review) 325. 
40  De Smith (7th edn) vi. 
41  William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (1st-11th edn, OUP 1961-2014); PP Craig, 
Administrative Law (1st-7th, Sweet & Maxwell, 1983-2012). 
42  See eg Galligan (n 16); Martin Loughlin, ‘The Pathways of  Public Law Scholarship’ in GP Wilson (ed) 
Frontiers of  Legal Scholarship (Wiley 1995) 163, 169 fn 31. 
43  O Hood Phillips (1960) 23 MLR 458 (book review) (‘indispensable’; ‘may already be described as a standard 
textbook on the subject’); Griffith (n 37) (‘comprehensive scholarship’; ‘[n]o comparable book on this 
aspects of  English law exists’; ‘immeasurably the best book on its subject or any part of  it’); Jaffe (n 38) 
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his obituaries noted, ‘has been of seminal significance in the development of the principles of 
judicial review by courts throughout the Commonwealth’.44 Indeed, the textbook is famous for 
being the first substantial text with a focus on the judicial review of administrative action and 
is often accorded the tribute of legitimizing the field of study.45 
Subject-matter: judicial review of administrative action 
This doctrinal study, and thesis generally, explores the mediation of vigilance and restraint 
through the variation of the depth of scrutiny across the full ambit of judicial review of 
administrative action. It covers the judicial supervision of decisions of ministers, officials, 
public bodies and others subject to judicial review and not just in particular sectors of 
administrative law.46 As noted above, this ambit echoes the coverage of de Smith’s textbook.  
A number of caveats to this broad approach. First, I acknowledge that judicial review is 
only one feature of administrative law and not necessarily the most prevalent mechanism for 
addressing grievances against the administration.47 However, judicial review still has a 
preeminent status within administrative law; its formal role garners particular attention, 
especially in administrative law scholarship. Further, judicial review has a hortatory function, 
where the principles generated in the system resonate through the balance of the administrative 
law sphere.48 
 
(‘accepted in England as first rate and definitive’; ‘admirable instrument’); G Ganz (1969) 32 MLR 116 
(book review) (‘could not be bettered’; the textbook’s ‘depth of  analysis, breadth of  scholarship, unfailing 
accuracy and fluency of  style are beyond praise’); DGT Williams (1974) 33 CLJ 324 (book review) 
(‘unquestionably one of  the great legal works of  the twentieth century’); Harlow (n 38) (‘classic text’; 
‘admirably thorough’; ‘work of  immense scholarship’; ‘paramount positions as the standard work of  
reference for scholars’); Galligan (n 16) (together with Wade’s textbook, ‘the dominant influences on the 
development of  administrative law in modern Britain’); Cosmo Graham (1995) 3 EPL 150 (book review) 
(‘it is the best, most authoritative, book on judicial review in England’); Patrick Birkinshaw, (2009) 15 EPL 
279 (book review) (‘priceless value and inestimable importance’); Sir John Laws [1996] JR 49 (book review) 
(‘enormously scholarly’; ‘text of  major importance’; ‘truly excellent quality’); Fordham, Judicial Review 
Handbook (n 1) [11.2.3] (one of  the ‘leading textbook commentaries’). 
44  ‘Professor SA de Smith’ (n 19). 
45  Griffith (n 37); Hood Phillips (n 43); Harlow (n 38). 
46  Compare eg Jaime Arancibia, Judicial Review of  Commercial Regulation (OUP 2011); Piers von Berg (ed), 
Criminal Judicial Review (Hart 2014); Richard Moules, Environmental Judicial Review (Hart 2011). 
47  For justification of  a similar approach, see de Smith (7th edn) 8. De Smith famously described judicial 
review as ‘inevitably sporadic and peripheral’ (de Smith (1st edn) 3). More recent editions cast the effect 
of  judicial review in more significant terms: (de Smith (5th edn) vii, 19 (its influence is now ‘constant and 
central’; ‘caution is now needed before relegating judicial review to a minor role’); de Smith (6th edn) 4 and 
(7th edn) 8 (‘principles developed through judicial review have become central to all of  public 
administration’)). See discussions in Graham (n 43) 151 and Michael Taggart, ‘ “Australian Exceptionalism” 
in Judicial Review’ (2008) 36 FLR 1, 3 fn 11. 
48  See text to n 116. 
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Secondly, the focus on judicial review means judicial supervision of administrative action 
through statutory appeals is not directly covered. While there may be some convergence 
between the two forms of supervision, I have adopted a traditional approach by distinguishing 
between the two and only focusing on judicial review.49 Further, in the case of the appellate 
jurisdiction, the review methodology and mediation of vigilance and restraint is conditioned 
more heavily by statutory injunctions, which distinguishes it somewhat from the judicial review 
jurisdiction.  
Thirdly, my treatment of judicial review aims to be comprehensive and to engage with the 
overarching methodology and organisation of judicial review as it relates to the modulation of 
the depth of scrutiny. This contrasts with other scholarship which addresses these issues in 
confined areas of administrative law and judicial review.50 Notably, my examination addresses 
questions of variable intensity in both rights and non-rights cases. It is not restricted to the 
domain of human rights adjudication, where ‘deference’ has become fashionable and subjected 
to much analysis and discussion.51 A broader focus is important. On the one hand, some 
 
49  The extent on convergence between the appeal and review method varies across the Anglo-
Commonwealth: see eg Re J [2006] 1 AC 80 and E v Secretary of  State for the Home Office [2004] QB 1044 
(Eng); Austin Nichols & Co v Stiching Lodestar [2008] 2 NZLR 141 (NZ); Dr Q v College of  Physicians and 
Surgeons of  British Columbia [2003] 1 SCR 226 (Can); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 
44 FLR 41 (Aus).  
50  Daly’s examination of  deference is narrower than it first appears (Paul Daly, A Theory of  Deference in 
Administrative Law (CUP 2012)). First, his study is restricted to deference in the exercise of  statutory powers 
and excludes non-statutory, executive and prerogative powers; secondly, it is only attentive to formal and 
explicit judicial recognition of  deference. In contrast to my study, therefore, it omits areas where the 
modulation of  intensity is rife and underplays the extent of  deference found in Anglo-Australasian 
jurisdictions. Arancibia only addresses deference and the modulation of  the depth of  scrutiny in particular 
contexts, in his case, commercial regulation (Arancibia (n 46)).  
51  See eg Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Judicial Deference’ [2003] PL 592; Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Judicial Deference and Human 
Rights’ in Paul Craig and Richard Rawlings (eds), Law and Administration in Europe (OUP 2003) 73; Alison 
Young, ‘In Defence of  Due Deference’ (2009) 72 MLR 554; Murray Hunt ‘Sovereignty’s Blight’ in Nicholas 
Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), Public Law in a Multi-layered Constitution (Hart 2003); Richard Clayton, 
‘Judicial Deference and Democratic Dialogue’ [2004] PL 33; Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the 
UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2009); Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Deference or Defiance?’ in Grant Huscroft (ed), 
Expounding the Constitution (CUP 2008) 346; Lord Steyn, ‘Deference: A Tangled Story’ [2005] PL 346; TRS 
Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review’ [2006] CLJ 671; Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Judicial Restraint in the 
Pursuit of  Justice’ (2010) UTLJ 23; Richard A Edwards, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act’ 
(2002) 65 MLR 859; Tom Hickman, Public Law after the Human Rights Act (Hart 2010); Alan DP Brady, 
Proportionality and Deference under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2012); Ian Leigh, ‘The Standard of  Judicial 
Review after the Human Rights Act’ in Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson (eds), Judicial Reasoning under 
the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2007); Julian Rivers ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of  Review’ 
(2006) 65 CLJ 174; Mark Elliott, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard of  Substantive Review’ 
(2001) 60 CLJ 301; Gavin Phillipson, ‘Deference, Discretion, and Democracy in the Human Rights Act 
Era’ (2007) 60 CLP 40; David Dyzenhaus, ‘Proportionality and Defence in a Culture of  Justification’ in 
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solidarity can be seen between the role of deference in the human rights domain and its more 
traditional administrative law partner (judicial review of ‘public wrongs’, as it has been 
described);52 modulation of the depth of scrutiny is common to both and is often informed by 
similar conceptual drivers. On the other hand, the notion of deference is, in my view, a 
particularised and specialised form of modulation of depth of scrutiny. Despite its prominence, 
deference in the human rights context arises in a subordinate fashion, in the context of whether 
administrative (and sometimes legislative) action is legally compliant with human rights 
instruments. In other words, it arises in the context of a particular ground of review or aspect 
of legality. This specialised and myopic focus means deference scholarship tends to miss the 
broader and schematic aspects of the modulation of the depth of judicial scrutiny. That said, 
the methodology and style adopted in human rights cases are explored in a general sense, to 
the extent that they are evident in different schemata. 
Because I am not drawn into a specialised account of deference in human rights cases, I 
remain agnostic on the ‘bifurcation’ debate that others have framed within administrative law; 
that is, the question of whether different methodologies are required in human rights and non-
human rights cases.53 My broader focus means this question becomes less important and 
questions of bifurcation are subsumed within it. Notions of ‘deference’ – whether explicitly 
calibrated or accommodated in a more unstructured fashion – feature in the schematic analysis. 
This assumes, therefore, that bifurcation is unnecessary and the modulation of the depth of 
scrutiny to take account of human rights dimension is possible under all the different schemata. 
But I leave open the question of whether differentiated methodologies might be justified 
because of the engagement of human rights. That question is secondary to the principal and 
higher-order focus on the efficacy and virtue of the methodology themselves. I return to this 
point in more detail, following the examination of the different schemata.54 
 
Grant Huscroft, Bradley W Miller and Grégoire Webber (eds), Proportionality and the Rule of  Law (CUP 2014) 
234. 
52  Michael Taggart, ‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ [2008] NZ Law Rev 424, 448. See also R (Dixon) 
v Somerset CC [1998] Env LR 111, 112 (judicial review ‘is about wrongs – that is to say misuses of  public 
power’).  
53  See eg Taggart, ‘Proportionality’ (n 52) 477 (for bifurcation); Murray Hunt, ‘Against Bifurcation’ in David 
Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Grant Huscroft (eds), A Simple Common Lawyer (Hart 2009) 99 (against 
bifurcation, with unifying doctrine of  deference); Paul Craig, ‘Proportionality, Rationality and Review’ 
[2010] NZ Law Rev 265 (against bifurcation, with unifying doctrine of  proportionality); Dyzenhaus, 
‘Proportionality and Deference’ (n 51) (against bifurcation).  
54  See ch 6 pt IV. 
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Timeframe: last half Century and more 
The timeframe adopted for the doctrinal study opens with the publication of de Smith’s 
textbook on judicial review in 1959 and continues to the present day.55 This coincides with the 
lifespan of de Smith’s textbook and reflects the generations in which English-style judicial 
review matured into a recognised and distinct discipline. The timeframe also captures great 
periods of change in (especially English) judicial review, variously characterised as including a 
‘revitalisation’ period where courts tended to adopt a more assertive role (1960s and 1970s),56 
the ‘systematisation’ of judicial review doctrine (particularly notable in the mid-1980s),57 a 
human rights ‘revolution’ (especially in the latter part of the 20th century and beyond),58 and 
the ‘multi-streaming’ of judicial review as transnational, state and sub-state systems are all 
blended into administrative law cases.59 
The schematic focus and attention to dominant methodologies, in part through the lens of 
a secondary source, means the historical parameters are not exact or rigid. In some cases, it 
draws in cases from earlier in time; however, the relevance of these lies in framing a particular 
style or methodology from a particular generation in Anglo-Commonwealth judicial review.  
The ultimate ambition of the thesis is more contemporary, addressing the normative 
question of how the courts should modulate the depth of scrutiny in judicial review nowadays. 
Thus, it is not my intention to construct a comprehensive historiography of Anglo-
Commonwealth judicial review over its lifetime. Beyond identifying general trends over time, 
the main purpose of the historical aspects of the study is to generate schemata and 
methodologies to analyse. Greater emphasis is therefore placed on more recent developments 
over the lifetime of the study (particularly in the contest between grounds of review and 
intensity of review – two schemata which sometimes overlap and have some parallel 
manifestation).  
 
55  For accounts of  earlier periods, see WA Robson, ‘Administrative Law in England, 1919-1948’ in Lord 
Campion and others (eds), British Government Since 1918 (George Allen and Unwin 1956) 85; WA Robson, 
‘Administrative Law’ in Morris Ginsberg (ed), Law and Opinion in England in the 20th Century (Stevens & Sons 
1959) 193; Sir Stephen Sedley, ‘The Sound of  Silence’ (1994) 110 LQR 270; Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Administrative 
Law’ in Vernon Bogdanor (ed), The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century (OUP 2003) 373.  
56  See eg Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Administrative Law’ (n 55) 373; Carol Harlow, ‘A Special Relationship?’ in Ian 
Loveland (ed), A Special Relationship? (OUP 1995) 79. 
57  See eg Sian Elias, ‘Administrative Law for Living People’ (2009) CLJ 47. 
58  See eg Michael Taggart ‘Reinventing Administrative Law’ in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), 
Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart 2003) 311; Hickman, Public Law (n 51). 
59  Richard Rawlings, ‘Modelling Judicial Review’ (2008) 61 CLP 95. 
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Comparative focus: Anglo-Commonwealth 
As explained above, this thesis is situated within Anglo-Commonwealth administrative law 
jurisprudence; it draws on English, Australian, New Zealand and Canadian approaches to the 
modulation of the depth of scrutiny and related scholarship.60 The comparative focus on these 
jurisdictions is adopted for a number of reasons. 
First, these jurisdictions share a strong common law heritage, especially in administrative 
law.61 A common law tradition and commitment is evident and they are often described as 
being members of a ‘common law family’.62 These Commonwealth jurisdictions have been 
characterised as having ‘a significant degree of doctrinal and institutional similarity, overlying a 
substratum of considerable cultural difference’.63 These shared origins are especially strong in 
relation to administrative law, as was noted by de Smith in his first edition.64 That historical 
anchor remains, even as the jurisdictions adopt indigenous approaches: ‘While doctrine is now 
diversifying’, Saunders says, ‘it is doing so from a common base.’65 Secondly, in the latter 
decades, the adoption of human rights instruments – in Canada, England, New Zealand and 
in some state jurisdictions in Australia – has profoundly influenced administrative law in these 
 
60  For the purposes of  simplicity, I use the terms England and English to capture the system of  judicial 
review in England and Wales. See generally Richard Ireland, ‘Law in Wales’ in Peter Cane and Joanne 
Conaghan (eds), The New Oxford Companion to Law (OUP 2008) 1231; Timothy Jones and Jane Williams, 
‘Wales as a Jurisdiction’ [2004] PL 78. The distinct jurisdictions of  Scotland and Northern Ireland are not 
addressed. Scotland’s system of  judicial review has, amongst other things, different origins, different 
procedural rules and different jurisdictional ambit. Judicial review in Northern Ireland is similarly 
distinctive. See generally Lord Clyde and Denis Edwards, Judicial Review (W Green 2000); Gordon Anthony, 
Judicial Review in Northern Ireland (2nd edn, Hart 2008); de Smith (7th edn) 8. For the purposes of  
consistency, I also use the description of  English courts to capture the Appellate Committee of  House of  
Lords and UK Supreme Court when adjudicating on English appeals and other matters which are relevant 
to the English system, such as cases brought under the Human Rights Act 1998. I first came across ‘Anglo-
Commonwealth’ label in Taggart’s work: see eg Taggart, ‘Prolegomenon’ (n 17). 
61  Cheryl Saunders, ‘Constitution as a Catalyst’ (2012) 10 NZJPIL 143, 147. 
62  Cheryl Saunders, ‘Apples, Oranges and Comparative Administrative Law’ [2006] AJ 423, 427; Susan Rose-
Ackerman and Peter L Lindseth, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’ (2010) 28 Windsor YB Access Just 
435, 444. See also Lord Cooke on the strength of  the common law tradition and the mutual influence of  
English and other Commonwealth case law: The Turning Points of  the Common Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1997) 
2; see also ‘The Road Ahead For the Common Law’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 273, 273. 
63  Saunders, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’ (n 62) 427.  
64  De Smith (1st edn) 25 (Commonwealth countries generally applied ‘the same fundamental body of  
principles’). See also Saunders, ‘Catalyst’ (n 61) 147 (‘Until somewhere towards the end of  the 1960s, 
administrative law doctrine, such as it was, was much the same across Commonwealth countries.’); Philip 
A Joseph, ‘The Contribution of  the Court of  Appeal to Commonwealth Administrative Law’ in Rick 
Bigwood, The Permanent New Zealand Court of  Appeal (Hart 2009) 41, 41. 
65  Saunders, ‘Catalyst’ (n 61) 146. 
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jurisdictions.66 This has brought renewed comparative interest, particularly in the nature and 
form of devices moderating the extent of judicial scrutiny in human rights adjudication.67 
Thirdly, there continues to be a reciprocity of interest in evolution and developments amongst 
these Anglo-Commonwealth jurisdictions. The sharing of ideas and doctrines – ‘legal 
transplants’,68 as it has been described – is ‘largely uncontentious’.69 Comparative analysis and 
cross-fertilisation is evident in the judicial process,70 as well as in the scholarly community.71 
Finally, the Anglo-Commonwealth ambit is consistent with de Smith’s treatment in his 
distinguished textbook.72 
While there is a strong comparative practice in public law in the Anglo-Commonwealth, 
this thesis adds a distinctive contribution to the question of the modulation of the depth of 
scrutiny in these common law jurisdictions. Canadian law features prominently in comparative 
public law scholarship. However, much of the comparative focus is restricted to deference in 
human rights adjudication and there is less attention to the more general modulation of the 
 
66  See generally Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of  Constitutionalism (CUP 2013). 
67  In this context, the variation is usually described in terms of  the role of  ‘deference’ in human rights 
adjudication: see ch 4 pt IIC. 
68  Alan Watson, Legal Transplants (University of  Georgia Press, 1974) and Comparative Law (2nd edn, 
Vandeplas 2008). See also JWF Allison, ‘Transplantation and Cross Fertilisation in European Public Law’ 
in Jack Beatson and Takis Tridimas (eds), New Directions in European Public Law (Hart 1998). 
69  Saunders, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’ (n 62) 426. 
70  Taggart, ‘Exceptionalism’ (n 47) 2; Saunders, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’ (n 62) 426; Joseph, 
‘Commonwealth Administrative Law’ (n 64) 49 (role of  Privy Council in facilitating ‘ongoing transnational 
conversations’ and move from an English-centred monologue to more diverse dialogue). 
71  For a discussion of  the connections and interactions, see eg Michael Taggart, ‘The Tub of  Public Law’ in 
David Dyzenhaus (ed), The Unity of  Public Law (Hart 2004) 455; Taggart, ‘Prolegomenon’ (n 17) 233; 
Thomas Poole, ‘Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea’ in Linda Pearson, Carol Harlow and Michael 
Taggart (eds), Administrative Law in a Changing State (Hart 2008) 15; Hugh Corder, ‘Comparing 
Administrative Justice across the Commonwealth [2006] AJ 1; Saunders, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’ 
(n 62). For some notable examples of  the comparative work, see Michael Taggart, ‘Outside Canadian 
Administrative Law’ (1996) 46 UTLJ 649; David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Michael Taggart, ‘The 
Principle of  Legality in Administrative Law’ (2001) 1 OUCLJ 5; David Dyzenhaus (ed), The Unity of  Public 
Law (Hart 2004); David Mullan, ‘Judicial Review of  the Executive’ (2010) 8 NZJPIL 1; (2010) NZ Law 
Rev, pt 2 (‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ (special issue)); (2006) AJ (‘Comparative Administrative 
Justice’ (special issue)); PP Craig, ‘Judicial Review of  Questions of  Law’ in S Rose-Ackerman and P 
Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2011). Also notable are the numerous 
festschrift honouring key scholars within the Anglo-Commonwealth: see eg Grant Huscroft and Michael 
Taggart (eds), Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law (University of  Toronto Press 2006) (Mullan, 
Canada); Linda Pearson, Carol Harlow and Michael Taggart (eds), Administrative Law in a Changing State 
(Hart 2008) (Aronson, Australia); Dyzenhaus, Hunt, and Huscroft (eds), A Simple Common Lawyer (n 53) 
(Taggart, New Zealand). 
72  See text to n 34. 
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depth of scrutiny in the traditional administrative law domain.73 My study aims to more strongly 
connect the Canadian approach and experience in the broader context of traditional 
administrative law throughout the Anglo-Commonwealth. The system of judicial review in 
Australia is also underexplored in this context, again in contrast to its place in Anglo-
Commonwealth comparative public law. Much of the comparative work focuses on isolating 
Australian judicial review and highlighting its difference only.74 There seems to be an aversion 
to Australia’s commitment to legal formalism and a rush to condemn its failure to keep pace 
with the ‘progressive’ path elsewhere in the Anglo-Commonwealth. However, my approach is 
more benevolent and seeks to locate the Australian approach and methodology within a 
broader frame. In particular, I aim to align the current Australian experience with the scope of 
review approach also seen in English administrative law and explain how variation of the depth 
of scrutiny is still achieved, albeit more covertly. 
My restriction to Anglo-Commonwealth jurisdictions means I do not address administrative 
law systems such as the United States or those in continental Europe. While deference doctrine 
is apparent in these jurisdictions too (and have been subjected to much study),75 they lack the 
same English law anchor and traditions found in the jurisdictions I study. To a certain degree, 
too, Canadian law has absorbed aspects of the United States law, ensuring the emphatic North 
American style of deference on some questions of law is reflected in my doctrinal 
examination.76 European law – both Community law and Convention rights – has undoubtedly 
profoundly influenced English law.77 Where it has directly affected the method or style of 
domestic law, this is acknowledged; however, it is not feasible to separately address the original 
jurisprudence. The definition of jurisdictions in my doctrinal study aims to find a logistical 
 
73  See eg the literature at n 51 above. Notable exceptions include Daly (n 50) and Mullan (‘Deference: Is it 
Useful Outside Canada?’ (2006) AJ 42). Daly’s study contains a number of  limitations which I have noted 
earlier (n 50) and Mullan’s work is modest and limited in scope. See also David Mullan ‘Proportionality’ 
(2010) NZ Law Rev 233 (whether English and New Zealand style proportionality should be adopted in 
Canada). 
74  See, especially, Taggart, ‘Exceptionalism’ (n 47). 
75  See eg Chevron USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council 467 US 837 (1984); Gary Lawson and Stephen 
Kam, ‘Making Law Out of  Nothing at All’ (2013) 65 Admin LR 1; Daly (n 50) 17 (US); PP Craig, EU 
Administrative Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012); ‘Judicial Review, Intensity and Deference in EU Law’ in 
Dyzenhaus, Unity of  Public Law (n 71) 335 (EU). 
76  Taggart, ‘Tub’ (n 71) 472; Michael Taggart, ‘Outside Canadian Administrative Law’ (1996) 46 UTLJ 649, 
650.  
77  See eg Allison (n 68); Carol Harlow, ‘Export, Import: The Ebb and Flow of  English Public Law’ [2000] 
PL 240; Hickman, Public Law (n 51). 
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balance between commonality and difference, in order to be able to undertake a meaningful 
normative assessment.  
Against that backdrop, I note some limitations of this comparative treatment. First, I 
acknowledge the limitations of a comparative study of public law questions, when these 
questions are ultimately rooted in each jurisdiction’s social and political history and settings.78 
As mentioned above, I am not attempting to explain or justify the different approaches by 
reference to each jurisdiction’s legal and political culture, history or infrastructure. It is not the 
main purpose of this thesis to account for the particularised origins of the development; rather, 
the focus is on distilling different approaches, explaining their conceptual foundations, and 
evaluating their efficacy and virtue. Secondly, I do not claim that these jurisdictions necessarily 
exhibit a common or unified jurisprudence, as some others have argued.79 In order to validate 
such a claim, a much more comprehensive and systemic study is required – something that is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. My concern is solely the manner by which variability is 
manifest, whether shared or distinct. 
The familial similarity and collegial interest means these Anglo-Commonwealth 
jurisdictions represent a suitable group for the present study. While sharing some 
commonalities, they manifest doctrinal differences: each jurisdiction presents different 
approaches – and, in some cases, different approaches over time – to the mediation of vigilance 
and restraint. This provides a rich domain for studying the modulation of the depth of scrutiny, 
allowing the identification and explanations of those doctrinal differences, as well as tracing 
conceptual patterns and language. There is a natural but slight bias towards English judicial 
review: English law has been a lynchpin of the common law style and it is the principal focus 
of de Smith’s textbook. The comparative analysis aims to thoroughly engage with the 
methodologies for mediating vigilance and restraint throughout all these Anglo-
Commonwealth jurisdictions, but inevitably English law represents the anchor-stone of the 
analysis. Finally, the order for addressing each jurisdiction within the different schemata 
reflects, to some degree, the dominance of the different methodologies within the jurisdictions. 
 
78  Taggart, ‘Tub’ (n 71) 461; Saunders, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’ (n 62); Rose-Ackerman and 
Lindseth (n 62) 436. 
79  David Dyzenhaus, ‘Baker: Unity of  Public Law’ in Dyzenhaus, Unity of  Public Law (n 71); Dyzenhaus, Hunt 
and Taggart, ‘The Principle of  Legality’ (n 71). 
26 
 
III Conceptual Underpinnings: Constitutional Foundations and 
Methodology 
The conceptual dimension turns to the scholarly accounts of judicial review and their 
relationship with the schemata and models of variable intensity identified in the doctrinal 
dimension. The aim is to draw out the various conceptual foundations of each schema, by 
reference to the work of a number of different scholars who have championed different 
models or whose scholarship is predicated on them. Particular attention is paid to the 
contribution of the different scholars to debates about the purpose or foundations of judicial 
review and their attitudes towards the methodology administrative law requires.  
The purpose of this dimension is twofold. First, the analysis seeks to expose and explain 
the conceptual assumptions that underpin the different models, building on doctrinal analysis. 
Secondly, the analysis seeks to connect the doctrinal landscape about the modulation of the 
depth of scrutiny with the scholarly debates that run through administrative law.  
The debate about the conceptual underpinnings of judicial review provides useful material 
from which to interrogate the differing accounts of the modulation of the depth of scrutiny in 
judicial review. The debate is about the underlying source of the authority for the courts to 
engage in judicial review and, consequently, the source of the values and principles which 
fashion the content of judicial review, particularly the grounds and remedies of judicial review. 
In general terms, the debate divides into two different schools. First, there are those who 
contend that the system of judicial review must refer back to, and always reflect, the legislative 
intent of Parliament (the ultra vires school). Secondly, there are others who contend that the 
courts’ supervisory jurisdiction on judicial review is inherent, not delegated to the courts by 
Parliament, and the principles and grounds applied in judicial review are developed by the 
courts under the rubric of the common law. As well as these two main schools, there are some 
scholars who argue that this basic dichotomy is flawed. 
The positions adopted by the leading scholars are explored under the same taxonomy 
applied to the doctrinal study. That is, the scholars are grouped according to whether they 
exhibit a preference for the scope of review, grounds of review, intensity of review, or 
contextual review schemata. As with the doctrinal study, there are some overlaps. While I have 
been able to align each of the scholars (except for one) with one particular schema, the 
scholarship of some display multiple tendencies. For example, Craig’s scholarship is generally 
predicated on a framework of grounds of review, but he is also attentive to explicit variation 
of intensity. Similarly, Aronson’s scholarship is located within a scope of review paradigm but 
aspects of a grounds of review approach occasionally appear. However, a dominant orientation 
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is usually obvious. As for the doctrinal study, a degree of judgement has been required when 
aligning the scholars with the different schemata. The only exception has been Hickman, where 
this type of parsing has not been possible, and his different orientations feature under the 
rubric of two different schemata.80  
Within this basic grouping there are some concentrations analogous to the conceptual 
underpinnings debate. For example, those favouring an ultra vires justification of judicial 
review tend to exhibit a preference for formalism seen in the scope of review schema. On the 
other hand, those emphasising the common law school and the deployment of value-based 
adjudication in judicial review generally group towards the contextual review end of the 
spectrum. However, there is not necessarily a simple correlation between the position on the 
conceptual underpinnings debate and the position adopted on the modulation of the depth of 
scrutiny. The conceptual underpinnings debate can be read as collapsing into near consensus, 
at least when viewed from an instrumental perspective; that is, the schools generally agree on 
the nature of the doctrinal content of judicial review but differ on the label to be attached to the 
origin of this content. Furthermore, the debates are not perfect proxies for questions about 
modulation. For example, proponents of some schemata rationalise the methodology by 
reference to different conceptual schools. The usefulness of exploring the conceptual 
underpinnings debate comes from the insight it provides into different scholars’ positions on 
the nature of judicial adjudication and judicial review, along with the theory of government 
that underpins their scholarship. In other words, it is a fruitful way to capture their perspectives 
on the inter-relationship between the legislature, judiciary and administration. 
As well as exploring the scholars’ different positions on the conceptual underpinnings 
debate, I also build in their direct contribution to the debate on the modulation of the depth 
of scrutiny and the different normative frameworks they promote to organise a judicial review. 
What schemata does their scholarship generally support? Attention is also paid to the 
appropriate drivers for the modulation of the depth of scrutiny. Although the principal 
question being explored in this thesis is the manner by which the depth of review is modulated, 
this question does require an appreciation of the types of factors which should be influential 
in this process. On this question there is more agreement between many of the scholars. To 
differing degrees, scholars draw out factors such as institutional autonomy, relative expertise, 
magnitude of the decision (including whether human rights are impugned), and the availability 
of other mechanisms through which to hold the administration to account.  
 
80  See ch 3 pt IIIC and ch 5 pt IIIC. 
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The scholars I discuss are, of course, only representative of the conceptual debates. The 
ones selected are those that are emblematic of the different positions, within the schemata and 
jurisdictions being examined.81 I have generally favoured those that have presented a normative 
model for modulating the depth of scrutiny or have otherwise made their preferences clear. In 
addition, the extent to which the different scholars have taken a position on these questions 
varies. In some cases, particularly on the conceptual underpinnings debate, some scholars have 
not directly engaged in the debate. In these cases, I have sought to identify the likely position 
they adopt based on their writing generally.  
IV Normative Assessment: Principles of Efficacy and Virtue 
The normative dimension, building on the doctrinal study and conceptual discussion, assesses 
the respective merits of each schema. As mentioned at the outset, I employ Fuller’s principles 
of legality or efficacy as a tool to examine the virtue of the different approaches.82 Fuller 
identified eight criteria. First, laws ought to be general, in the sense that there must be rules of 
some kind. Secondly, laws ought to be promulgated and publicly accessible. Thirdly, laws should 
be prospective. Fourthly, laws should be clear. Fifthly, laws should be non-contradictory. Sixthly, laws 
should not require the impossible. Seventhly, laws should be relatively stable. Finally, there should be 
congruence between law and official action applying that law. To that I have added one further 
criterion, hortatory versatility, to also recognise the wide functions of judicial review in 
administrative law. 
These criteria are used to focus the normative assessment in the following chapters. Shortly, 
I introduce the criteria adopted, explain the gist of Fuller’s concern in relation to each, along 
with the particular issues each criterion raises in the particular context. Before doing so, I 
explain the purpose of adopting Fuller’s criteria for this analysis. 
The various schemata modulating the depth of scrutiny exhibit both commonality and 
individuality. On the one hand, all the schemata enable significant variability in the supervisory 
 
81  The authors of  de Smith’s textbook are not included, in part because their attitudes are generally evident 
in the doctrinal study. Jowell is the one author that has mostly directly engaged with questions of  
modulation of  the depth of  scrutiny and deference. His position generally accords with Hunt’s (see ch 4 
pt IIIC). Dawn Oliver, one of  the key catalysts of  the constitutional underpinnings debate, is also not 
included because variability of  the depth of  review in administrative law has not been a key feature of  her 
scholarship. 
82  Lon L Fuller, The Morality of  Law (Yale UP, 1964). See generally Colleen Murphy, ‘Lon Fuller and the Moral 
Value of  the Rule of  Law’ (2005) 25 Law & Phil 239; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Why Law – Efficacy, Freedom, or 
Fidelity?’ (1994) 13 Law & Phil 259; Martin Loughlin, Foundations of  Public Law (OUP 2012) 333-335. 
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task. On the other hand, the manner in which this variability is expressed by each schema differs. 
Isolating the former allows us to focus the normative assessment on the efficacy of the latter; 
the principal concern is with the means by which the depth of scrutiny is modulated, not the fact 
of modulation per se. The assumption that judicial review is variable in nature – corroborated 
in the doctrinal study and not seriously contended otherwise by scholars in the conceptual 
debates – allows us to turn our attention to the way the modulation takes place.83  
How, then, do we assess the merits of the means of modulation? Some measure is needed 
to guide the assessment. It is insufficient to merely assert that one means is, for example, more 
‘robust’ than others, without dissecting why that is so.84 One perspective, and the one I employ 
here, is to treat the schemata as rule-regimes which regulate the exercise of power and 
discretion of judges in the supervisory jurisdiction. In other words, judicial review of 
administrative decision-making is not merely the judicial supervision of the application of rules 
by the administration but also involves the creation and deployment of rules about the exercise of 
judicial power. Judges are agents of public power too.  
Viewed in this way, we can then draw on rule of law scholarship addressing the 
appropriateness and efficacy of rule-regimes in order to assess the merits of the different 
schemata. Fuller’s principles of legality are well regarded as a set of standards for examining 
rule-based systems for their value and virtue. His criteria have been echoed by a number of 
others writing on the rule of law.85 There has been some debate about their jurisprudential 
quality (expressions of morality or otherwise) but this characterisation is not important for 
present purposes.86 Their value lies in the expression of these qualities as standards against 
which to evaluate rules and regimes.  
My goal here is relatively modest; the focus is on the efficacy of the modulation of the depth 
of scrutiny, as one way to assess the normative value of the schemata. It assumes the judicial 
 
83  For others squarely recognising the ubiquity of  variability in judicial review, see eg Taggart, ‘Proportionality’ 
(n 74) 150; DGT Williams. ‘Justiciability and the Control of  Discretionary Power’ in Michael Taggart (ed), 
The Province of  Administrative Law (Hart 1997) 103, 106; Philip A Joseph, ‘Exploratory Questions in 
Administrative Law’ (2012) 25 NZULR 75, 75. 
84  See eg Daly (n 50). Daly makes this claim a number of  times speaking to his normative preference for 
‘doctrinal’, not ‘epistemic’, deference; however, the orientation of  his project is more towards the drivers 
of  deference, rather than the means by which it is manifest. 
85  See eg Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of  Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 LQR 195; Tom Bingham, The Rule of  Law 
(Penguin 2011). 
86  Fuller’s original claim was these qualities of  law have ‘moral virtue’ (Fuller, Morality of  Law (n 82) 53, 204. 
Others  particularly Raz  doubted this and argued the criteria were more instrumental in nature (Raz (n 
85) 226). It has been argued that they stand more as ‘functional or prudential criteria’, in that the ‘serious 
failure to comply with these criteria would make it impossible to subject human conduct to rules, thereby 
rendering the rule system ineffective’ (Loughlin, Foundations (n 82) 334).  
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methodology in the supervisory jurisdiction has a rule-based character, which therefore justifies 
a rule of law style of analysis. Others may emphasize the achievement of administrative justice, 
through whatever means, as a measure of the normative value of each schema. However, my 
normative assessment does not prejudge that evaluation. Rather, my assessment assumes that 
the ubiquity of variability throughout the different schemata supports the goals of 
administrative justice. The fact the supervisory jurisdiction is a check or review function does 
not prevent scrutiny of its internal morality and how it explicates methodological rules. I am 
not unconcerned with the delivery of administrative justice (however that is to be defined), but 
I say that the achievement of that ultimate objective is left open by the different schemata 
because of the inherent variability of, and discretion that imbues, them all. My normative 
analysis does draw out the extent and nature of discretion within the rule-regimes, and may 
speak, at least briefly, to whether the ability to achieve those objectives is loosely or tightly 
encumbered. But this is of only limited salience because the overriding conclusion is that all 
the different schemata enable variability.  
I return now to the criteria themselves, briefly explaining the nature of Fuller’s concern in 
relation to each and how each fits in the present context of assessing methodologies in the 
supervisory jurisdiction. In the normative assessment that follows in each chapter, I elaborate 
on aspects of Fuller’s articulation of these criteria, where further explanation is needed. As will 
be apparent, the criteria tends to overlap at times and sometimes converge. Further, it is 
important to note that these criteria are aspirational in character; even Fuller did not 
characterise them as absolute duties.87 They are useful, though, in exposing lines of analysis. 
Inevitably there are trade-offs that must be made between the different criteria when evaluating 
schemata for normative purposes. The criteria are intended to help guide that assessment and 
to illuminate the trade-offs that are involved.  
Fuller’s explanation of generality focuses on the need for rules. A preference is expressed for 
‘general declarations’ of rules, over other forms of commanding compliance.88 The faithful 
application of previously declared rules – combining the idea of generality with congruence – 
is seen to be an essential feature of social ordering through law; a functioning legal order 
demands ‘the existence of a relatively stable reciprocity of expectations between lawgiver and 
 
87  Fuller, Morality of  Law (n 82) 43. The only one he marks out as essential is promulgation (public accessibility 
of  law to those affected). 
88  ibid 210. 
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subject’.89 Fuller recognises the preference for rules is only aspirational; he speaks of a ‘struggle’ 
between ‘broad freedom of action’ and declared general rules.90 This recognises an important 
trade-off when assessing generality – between flexibility and responsiveness on the one hand, 
and consistency and predictability on the other.91 The normative analysis under this criterion 
therefore focuses on the role rules play within each schema and the balance drawn between 
rule and discretion. 
The virtue of public accessibility has a number of aspects. First, from an instrumental 
perspective, openness helps expose the legal regime and power exercised to scrutiny and 
critique.92 Secondly, the promulgation of publicly accessible rules is an essential ingredient to 
understanding a legal regime (viz clarity) and being able to predict the outcome of cases.93 
Thirdly, public promulgation has a non-instrumental aspect in the way it enhances the 
legitimacy and ‘basic integrity’ of the legal regime.94 Rule-making and rule-application are both 
undertaken by the courts when exercising their supervisory jurisdiction and are inevitably 
intertwined; furthermore, judicial discretion assumes a powerful role. Thus it is also necessary 
under this criterion to be attentive to transparency in the judicial reasoning process. Fuller 
highlighted the importance of reason-giving as an aspect of accessibility (and clarity); it is 
properly taken for granted, he says, that the courts ‘must explain and justify their decisions 
[and] that they must demonstrate that the rules they apply are “grounded in principle”’.95 This 
criterion therefore values the public articulation of principles or rules governing the courts’ 
supervisory jurisdiction, along with the reasoned elaboration of the basis on which those 
 
89  ibid 209. 
90  ibid 213. 
91  On equality and consistency, see ibid 211. See also John Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (Belknap 1971); Karen 
Steyn, ‘Consistency’ (1997) 2 JR 22; Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Is Equality a Constitutional Principle?’ (1994) 47 CLR 
1. 
92  Fuller, Morality of  Law (n 82) 51. 
93  ibid 50. See further text to n 102. 
94  Fuller, Morality of  Law (n 82), 212, 214 and 222. 
95  Lon L Fuller, Anatomy of  Law (Greenwood Press 1976) 91. See also John Rawls, The Law of  Peoples (Harvard 
UP 2001); Jon Elster, ‘Deliberation and Constitution Making’ in Jon Elster (ed), Deliberative Democracy (CUP 
1998) 97, 111 (‘the civilizing force of  hypocrisy’); Francisco J Urbina, ‘A Critique of  Proportionality’ (2012) 
57 Am J Juris 49, drawing on Mattias Kumm, ‘The Idea of  Socratic Contestation and the Right to 
Justification’ (2010) 4 Law and Ethics of  Human Rights 147 (by demanding justification, ‘Socratic 
contestation … increase[s] rationality’). 
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principles or rules are applied in particular cases. This is consistent with the ‘culture of 
justification’ which the courts tend to expect of administrative decision-makers nowadays.96 
A retroactive law is, in Fuller’s account, a ‘monstrosity’ – objectionable in terms of both 
morality and efficacy – and thus prospectivity is seen as an important virtue.97 However, Fuller 
was also prepared to admit that, in the context of a system of generally prospective laws, laws 
with retroactive effect may in some circumstances be tolerable.98 Notably, he acknowledged 
that judicial adjudication of disputes inevitably has some retroactive effect, so deeper analysis 
is required to parse and condemn any retroactivity.99 In the present context, with a focus on 
regime design, retrospectivity in the pure sense does not arise; however, the nature of any 
retrospective effect arising from the application of the rules can be assessed.100 Again, the 
virtues of clarity, legal certainty and predictability have been acknowledged by the courts in the 
context of administrative decision-making. 101  
Clarity is described by Fuller as ‘one of the most essential ingredients of legality’.102 This 
criterion condemns vagueness and obscurity in legal rules.103 Much of the underlying rationale 
for this principle is legal certainty. Laws should be clear in meaning so that they are capable of 
being obeyed and in order that people can live their lives conscious of the legal consequences 
which may flow from their actions.104 Thus, this principle factors in concerns about 
predictability within the legal regime. Fuller is also concerned that lack of clarity  regimes that 
are vague, indefinite and favour governmental discretion – may ‘rob’ the regimes of their 
 
96  Etienne Mureinik, ‘A Bridge to Where?’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31; David Dyzenhaus, ‘Law as 
Justification’(1998) 14 SAJHR 11; Taggart, ‘Proportionality’ (n 74) 461. On reason-giving, see generally PP 
Craig, ‘The Common Law, Reasons and Administrative Justice’ [1994] CLJ 282; Le Sueur, ‘Legal Duties to 
Give Reasons’ (1999) 52 CLP 150; Mark Elliott, ‘Has the Common Law Duty to Give Reasons Come of  
Age Yet?’ [2011] PL 56. 
97  Fuller, Morality of  Law (n 82) 53. 
98  ibid 53. 
99  ibid 56. See also Fuller, Anatomy of  Law (n 95) 100. 
100  Fuller, Anatomy of  Law (n 95) 101. 
101  See eg the treatment of  legitimate expectations (R (Coughlan) v North and East Devon HA [2001] QB 213 
and R (Preston) v IRC [1985] AC 835) and vagueness (Black Clawson Ltd v Papierwerke AG [1975] AC 591 and 
R v Misra [2005] 1 Cr App R 328). See generally Robert Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in 
Administrative Law (Hart 2000); Soren Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (OUP 2000); 
Timothy AO Endicott, Vagueness in Law (OUP 2001). 
102  Fuller, Morality of  Law (n 82) 63. 
103  ibid 63, 212 and 213. 
104  ibid 209 and 212. See also Friedrich von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (University of  Chicago Press 1944); 
Joseph Raz, The Authority of  Law (Claredon 1979); Jeremy Waldron, The Law (Routledge 1990); May Weber, 
Economy and Society (University of  California Press 1978) (‘legal guaranty’); Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts 
and Norms (MIT Press 1996). 
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legitimacy.105 In the particular context of judicial review schemata, this criterion addressed how 
clearly the principles governing the deployment of the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction are 
expressed, whether they are understandable, and whether they unduly rely on standards which 
are vague or indeterminate.  
Stability, in the sense employed by Fuller, requires that laws not change too frequently.106 
The objection, like for retrospective rules, is that instability makes the law unpredictable and 
difficult to comply with. Hence, there is a degree of overlap between this criterion and the 
criteria looking at clarity, prospectivity and non-impossibility; they all address the predictability 
of laws and the ability to comply with laws. As the different legal regimes and methodologies 
have been isolated, the focus under this criterion is the treatment of change and evolution within 
each schema, rather than changes from one schema to another.  
The focus of non-contradiction and coherence is the schematic unity of the system and the extent 
to which it is bound together by principle.107 Coherence contrasts law as a seamless web with 
law as a patchwork quilt. Although consistent treatment contributes to coherence, coherence 
raises broader questions about the meta-architecture of a schema, that is, its organising theory 
or manner in which it is systematised. The focus extends to matters such as its 
comprehensiveness, connectedness, and internal unity.108 Fuller commends coherence, not just 
in rule-making but in rule-application too. This he describes as a ‘problem of system’, where 
the ‘rules applied to the decision of individual controversies cannot simply be isolated exercises 
of judicial wisdom’; even when deployed, they must maintain ‘some systemic interrelationship’ 
and display ‘some coherent internal structure’.109 Coherence and non-contradiction are 
enhanced by ‘principles that transcend their immediate application’ and ‘bind the elements of 
law into a coherent system of thought’.110  
In Fuller’s original account, non-impossibility is focused on the (in)ability to achieve 
compliance with rules. In other words, concern is expressed about standards set by rules that 
 
105  Fuller, Morality of  Law (n 82) 212. 
106  ibid 79. 
107  See also Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard UP 1988) 134, 167 (‘integrity’) and Neil MacCormick, 
Rhetoric and The Rule of  Law (OUP 2009) 189 and 193 (‘normative coherence’ is a ‘commonly accepted 
criterion’ of  the soundness of  judicial rulings; legal norms ‘should be rationally related as a set, 
instrumentally or intrinsically, to the realization of  some common value or values’ or as ‘fulfilling some 
more or less clearly articulated common principle or principles’). 
108  Ken Kress, ‘Coherence and Formalism’ (1993) 16 Harv J L & Pub Policy 639. 
109  Fuller, Anatomy of  Law (n 95) 94. 
110  ibid 94. 
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cannot be achieved. While this principle has virtue, its concern does not directly arise in this 
context because the rules and methodology deployed by judges are self-created and judges are 
unlikely to fashion totally unachievable rules to regulate their own behaviour. However, the 
gist of this principle is the practicality of compliance. Indeed, Fuller also expresses this principle 
in terms of the ‘possib[ility] of execution’;111 further he acknowledges that ‘no hard and fast 
line’ could be drawn and the virtue was more a question of degree.112 In this context, this 
principle therefore speaks more squarely to the practicality of the different schemata. In 
particular, this criterion looks at their effect on the litigation and supervision process.113 It is 
attentive to any procedural consequences and how the schemata might affect advocacy and 
deliberation in judicial review hearings and decisions.  
Congruence insists that official action is faithful to declared rules.114 This criterion seeks to 
bind the other criteria with a focus on operation and implementation. Fuller is quick to rebut 
the idea that the merger of law-maker and law-applier, as is the case here, necessarily brings 
congruence. First, the nature of the judicial hierarchy means congruence may still be impaired 
because the making of law by judges is always subject to higher court (dis)approval. Secondly, 
there remains room for dissonance between the declaration and application of law, even by the 
same actor.115 In the context of evaluating the different judicial review schemata, this principle 
allows us to examine the fidelity between the rule and regime expressed by judges and applied 
by judges. This aspiration for congruence, fidelity and candour is based on the same impulse 
that has driven the courts to develop similar expectations of administrative decision-makers. 
The courts expect administrators to faithfully apply the law. This principle expects the same of 
the judges. 
The final criterion – hortatory versatility – is not found in Fuller’s account but is an important 
dimension of judicial review. While judicial review’s immediate role is the policing of 
administrative legality, it also has an important collateral role in articulating and elaborating the 
principles of good administration that ministers, public bodies and officials ought to honour. 
 
111  Fuller, Morality of  Law (n 82) 208. 
112  ibid 79. 
113  The practical analysis is based on logical deductions about the effect of  different schema on procedure, 
advocacy, and deliberation. It is not feasible in the context of  this thesis to undertake empirical work to 
further test these assumptions. 
114  Fuller, Morality of  Law (n 82) 81. 
115  ibid 82 (‘the tune called may be quite undanceable by anyone, including the tune-caller’). King echoes this 
concern, when he worries about the gap between ‘what judges say and do’: Jeff  King, ‘Proportionality’ 
(2010) NZ Law Rev 327, 334. 
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These principles of good administration have currency both within and beyond the system of 
judicial review itself – described by Harlow and Rawlings as its ‘hortatory function’.116 While 
my predominant concern in this thesis is the system of judicial review itself, the utility of the 
principles of review beyond the system and in administrative law generally should not be 
ignored when evaluating different schema. 
V Summary 
This thesis interrogates the different approaches employed, in schematic terms, to modulate 
the depth of scrutiny in judicial review, in order to identify their virtue when judged in terms 
of the efficacy of the rule-systems and methodologies. Of the four schemata – scope, grounds, 
intensity, context – the grounds and intensity of review approaches are strongest. In the 
chapters that follow, each of the schemata are examined, drawing out their doctrinal 
manifestation, conceptual underpinnings and normative value. 
  
 
 
116  Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, CUP 2009) 669. Harlow and Rawlings 
say the goal of  the hortatory or educative function is ‘ultimately the internalising by administrators of  legal 
values’ (728). The establishment of  general principles for the proper exercise of  discretion helps promote 
good decision-making on a prophylactic basis (‘fire-watching’) rather than merely addressing deficiencies 
after the fact (‘fire-fighting’) ([728]). See also David Feldman, ‘Judicial Review’ (1988) 66 Pub Admin 21 
(role of  law in structuring, not just directing and limiting, discretion); Simon Halliday, Judicial Review and 
Compliance with Administrative Law (Hart 2004) 15 (judicial review’s messaging role and the way general 
principles influence bureaucratic values and decision-making); Marc Hartogh and Simon Halliday, Judicial 
Review and Bureaucratic Impact (CUP 2004). 
  
 
2  
Scope of  Review 
I Introduction 
The scope of review schema exhibits the characteristics of legal formalism. The depth of 
scrutiny is modulated indirectly, by the classification of a decision or function into a category 
which determines whether the decision or function is capable of being reviewable or not. 
Multifarious, often complexly drawn, categories are the main feature of the doctrinal landscape. 
The language of jurisdiction is particularly prominent, as is a (purportedly) sharp distinction 
between legality and merits. The approach dominates Australian administrative law today, but 
was also the prevailing style of English judicial review at the opening point of this study when 
de Smith penned his first edition. This style of judicial method continued, I argue, throughout 
the period of reinvigoration of judicial review in the 1960 and 1970s; even though the categories 
were often recast to enable more intensive review, the formalistic categorical approach still 
assumed importance until more a more generalised and systematised approach was adopted in 
the mid-1980s.  
The scope of review approach is generally synonymous with a strong ultra vires conception 
of judicial review and steadfast commitment to formalist – not value-laden – legal method and 
finds only limited support in the scholarship. From a normative perspective, this schema 
performs poorly against the principles of efficacy, largely due to its complexity and a lack of 
congruence between rule-expression and rule-application. While rules dominate the schema, 
they are open to manipulation and tend to assume a ritualistic role, expressing conclusions 
based on more normative – but latent – judicial assessment of whether to intervene or not.  
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II Doctrinal Manifestation  
The scope of review label is drawn from the early editions of de Smith’s textbook, where it was 
associated with a complex and formalistic style of legal method. After tracing its recognition in 
de Smith’s textbook, I describe its operation in modern Australian law, before returning to its 
historical deployment in English law.  
A De Smith derivation 
‘Scope of review’ is employed frequently by de Smith through the first four editions to 
showcase the analysis of the circumstances of judicial intervention. While lucid in exposition, 
de Smith did not incorporate an explicit organising device for the analysis; the striking feature 
of the book is the vast morass of case law it incorporates. As Harlow notes: ‘The framework 
is the traditional framework of remedies and its emphasis is the case law emphasis of the 
common lawyer.’1 Vires and jurisdiction are loose themes are evident throughout the text, but 
the language of scope of review is a significant feature. 
De Smith’s introductory exposition was dotted with references to ‘scope of review’. ‘Scope 
of review … may vary’ according to the form of the proceeding;2 no uniformity ‘characterises 
the scope of review’;3 ‘scope of review often depends upon’ the classification of the impugned 
function.4 Scope of review was a phrase used as an analogue for the circumstances in which 
judicial relief was available. The phrase also appeared in the scene-setting chapter where de 
Smith undertook an in-depth study of the classification of functions (as ‘legislative, 
administrative (or executive), judicial or ministerial’).5 ‘The scope of judicial review of 
administrative action…’, de Smith said, ‘frequently depends upon the classification of a 
particular statutory function.’6 However, his critical eye recognised that generating definitions 
of each was ‘exceedingly difficult’ and that the judicial approach adopted is ‘riddled with 
ambiguities’, a point discussed further later.7 
 
1  Carol Harlow, ‘Politics and Principles’ (1981) 44 MLR 114, 115. 
2  De Smith (1st edn) 15; (2nd edn) 22; (3rd edn) 22; (4th edn) 27. 
3  De Smith (1st edn) 15; (2nd edn) 22; (3rd edn) 22; (4th edn) 27. 
4  De Smith (1st edn) 17; (2nd edn) 25; (3rd edn) 26; (4th edn) 29. 
5  De Smith (1st-4th edn) ch 2. 
6  De Smith (1st edn) 29; (2nd edn) 54. 
7  De Smith (1st edn) 29; (2nd edn) 54. He observes that ‘where a definition formulated by the courts for a 
particular purpose has appeared to them to be unserviceable for a different purpose, they have shown no 
hesitation in disregarding it and adopting another definition’. 
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Elsewhere throughout the text, the phrase ‘scope of review’ operated as a common label 
for exposition of the circumstances in which administrative action could be impugned by 
judicial review. The heart of de Smith’s examination was undertaken under the part heading 
‘Principles and Scope of Judicial Review’.8 The scope of review was explored in two different 
contexts: review of ‘vires, jurisdiction, law and fact’,9 and ‘discretionary power’.10 The former 
was characterised by an account of various distinctions which determined whether a matter 
was reviewable or not, in particular, distinctions between: (a) law, fact and discretion;11 (b) 
ministerial, legislative, executive, and judicial functions;12 and (c) jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional matters.13 The combination of various classifications were explained as affecting 
the scope of review, a number of which are instanced and explained shortly.14 At this stage, the 
critical points are that, first, scope of review language was adopted to convey whether or not 
impugned decisions or actions were reviewable and, secondly, reviewability was determined by 
classification into different categories.  
The chapter which addressed the review of discretionary power also employed the language 
of scope of review.15 Scope of review of discretionary power was said to be ‘conditioned by a 
variety of factors’, including statutory wording and purpose, subject-matter, character of the 
relevant authority, form of proceedings,16 materials available to the reviewing court, and, 
ultimately, ‘whether a court is of the opinion that judicial intervention would be in the public 
interest’.17 Here, the scope of review was explained in terms of a series of principles governing 
the exercise of discretionary power:18 
 
8  De Smith (1st edn) 54; (2nd edn) 81; (3rd edn) 79; (4th edn) 91. Scope of  review is not specifically 
mentioned in the chapters dealing with natural justice. 
9  De Smith (1st-4th edn) ch 3. 
10  De Smith (1st-4th edn) ch 6. 
11  De Smith (1st edn) 60-61 (law and fact vs discretion) and 83-92 (law and fact) (2nd edn) 89-90 and 113-
126; (3rd edn) 84-85 and 111-122; (4th edn) 96-97 and 126-141. 
12  De Smith (1st edn) 61-65; (2nd edn) 90-94; (3rd edn) 92-94; (4th edn) 106-108. 
13  De Smith (1st edn) 65-83; (2nd edn) 94-113; (3rd edn) 94-110; (4th edn) 108-126. 
14  See pt IIC. 
15  De Smith (1st-4th edn) ch 6. 
16  De Smith (1st edn) 169-170; (2nd edn) 267-269; (3rd edn) 249-251; (4th edn) 281-283. A particular 
contradistinction is made between review under the prerogative writs and statutory appeals.  
17  De Smith (1st edn) 169; (2nd edn) 267; (3rd edn) 249; (4th edn) 281.  
18  De Smith (1st edn) 172; (2nd edn) 271; (3rd edn) 252; (4th edn) 285. The text was equivocal on whether 
or not these grounds of  invalidity were examples only or whether they ‘heads of  invalidity’ in their own 
right, but de Smith noted that the latter approach would tend to enlarge the scope of  review: de Smith (1st 
edn) 189; (2nd edn) 302; (3rd edn) 282; (4th edn) 323. 
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In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. The 
authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation 
of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the 
purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it 
do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all 
relevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the spirit of the legislation 
that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. 
The scope of review language continued to be employed throughout the analysis of the 
unreasonable exercise of power.19 De Smith’s analysis separated questions of reasonableness, 
where reasonableness was specified in the empowering legislation, and those situations where 
it was not. Against a general backdrop of a judicial reluctance to allow free-standing challenges 
on the basis of unreasonableness, de Smith’s account was characterised by the identification of 
a series of formal distinctions conditioning whether review was more likely or not. In particular, 
he addressed distinctions based on the form of the proceedings (unlikely for declaratory, 
prohibitory and mandatory orders and most unlikely for certiorari); form of the discretion 
(available where reasonableness enjoined in statute but unlikely for a wide, unqualified 
discretion); nature of the decision-maker (less likely for ministerial decisions than for judicial 
decisions or decisions of licensing bodies like local authorities); and type of decision (for 
legislative decisions, likely in relation to bylaws but unlikely in relation to statutory instruments 
made by ministers). 
‘Scope of review’ was, in summary, a significant feature of the language of the early editions, 
reflecting the formalistic and categorical nature of judicial review at the time. The supervisory 
jurisdiction was characterised by classification of decisions and errors into different categories: 
some reviewable, others not. The concept of modulation of depth of review was not expressed 
explicitly. However the discussion of the regime was frequently characterised by unstable 
definitions and porous boundaries; the corollary – often expressed explicitly – was that this left 
the decision to intervene or not able to be manipulated by judges.  
From the fifth edition onwards, scope of review, and associated features of this strongly 
formalist and categorical approach, were downplayed and consigned to more minor roles 
within the text.20 The language of ‘scope of review’ was refined and heavily circumscribed. The 
phrase was adopted as the headline for the part of the text addressing ‘questions relating to the 
 
19  De Smith (1st edn) 214-221; (2nd edn) 330-337; (3rd edn) 303-311; (4th edn) 346-354. 
20  See eg de Smith (5th edn) 299 (nature of  review under statutory appeal rights). 
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jurisdiction of the court to be seized of a matter to which an application for judicial review’,21 
namely, standing,22 and the bodies against whom judicial review may be brought.23 Also 
assigned to this part, somewhat awkwardly, was a significantly abridged version of the previous 
chapter on vires and jurisdiction, blended with the previous chapter on the statutory restriction 
of review.24 Woolf and Jowell acknowledged that the ‘reduced significance’ of jurisdictional 
error necessitated this dramatic pruning.25 ‘The concept of jurisdictional error is no longer the 
organising concept of judicial review’, they said.26 This is seen particularly in the relegation of 
the former chapter on the classification of functions that served as an entry-point for de Smith’s 
analysis. No longer meriting placement with the main body of analysis in the fifth and sixth 
editions, an abridged version was reproduced as an appendix instead.27 
B Australia: abstract formalism 
Australian administrative law today bears the hallmarks of the scope of review schema seen in 
de Smith’s textbook in the early editions. It continues to echo the abstract formalism that was 
once replete – but has since dissipated – in English administrative law.28 
Prerogative writs and a remedial focus provide the foundation of much of the system of 
judicial review in Australia.29 However, a number of legislative and institutional features also 
contribute to its peculiarity and somewhat disjointed nature.30 Federalism provides plural 
administrative law systems, but tied together by a unified common law under the guardianship 
of the High Court of Australia.31 The authority to engage in judicial review is attributed to a 
 
21  De Smith (5th edn) ix. 
22  De Smith (5th edn) ch 2. 
23  De Smith (5th edn) ch 3.  
24  De Smith (5th edn) ch 5. 
25  De Smith (5th edn) ix. 
26  De Smith (5th edn) 97. 
27  De Smith (5th-7th edn) app (‘Classification of  Functions’). Despite its demotion, the authors suggested 
the topic may still be of  some ‘analytical and historic interest’ (de Smith (5th edn) ix).  
28  The term ‘abstract formalism’ is borrowed from Thomas Poole, ‘Between the Devil and the Deep Blue 
Sea’ in Linda Pearson, Carol Harlow and Michael Taggart (eds), Administrative Law in a Changing State (Hart 
2008) 15, 42. England’s historic experience is address below: pt IIC. 
29  For a brief  sketch of  the general path of  Australian administrative law, relative to English developments, 
see Peter Cane, ‘The Making of  Australian Administrative law’ (2003) 23 Aust Bar Rev 114. See also 
Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of  Migration Law on the Development of  Australian Administrative Law’ (2010) 
17 AJ Admin L 92. 
30  See generally Saunders, ‘Constitution as a Catalyst’ (2012) 10 NZJPIL 143, 153-157; Peter Cane and 
Leighton McDonald, Principles of  Administrative Law (OUP 2008) 34. 
31  While the federal system enables, strictly speaking, different systems of  administrative law, the fact that the 
High Court is mandated as a final court of  appeal for state and federal judicial systems means there is a 
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number of different sources: constitution, statute and common law.32 The procedure and 
grounds of judicial review are partly codified.33 On a non-comprehensive basis, the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) provides a codified regime for the 
review of federal administrative decisions made under statute. Some, but not all, states have 
similar partial codified regimes.  
Doctrine is strongly focused on matters jurisdictional, with this classification generally 
dictating whether matters are subject to review or not. This is underscored by a strong 
commitment to the legality–merits dichotomy. The factors combine to inhibit the reach of 
reasonableness and other substantive review. These doctrinal features, together with the 
fastidious manner in which they are applied, have led to Australian administrative law being 
described as ‘exceptional’ amongst its Anglo-Commonwealth brethren.34 
 
universal common law, with the High Court operating as guardian: see Kirk v Industrial Court of  New South 
Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531, [99]. 
32  The High Court obtains its mandate to engage in judicial review from s 75(v) of  the Constitution, with 
‘original’ (viz inherent) jurisdiction in relation to the prerogative writs (except for certiorari, which is only 
available as an ancillary remedy). The Federal Court does not have inherent jurisdiction and acquired its 
jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act 1903 (mirroring the High Court’s mandate under s 75(v) of  the 
Constitution, and developing by reference to the common law) and ADJR. In addition, the Federal Court 
has (quite limited) jurisdiction to review immigration decisions under the Migration Act 1958 with such 
decisions otherwise being excluded from review under the ADJR by a privative clause. State courts acquired 
their jurisdiction from the common law (as modified by statutory codification), although the High Court 
recently indicated aspects of  state judicial review also had a constitutional dimension (Kirk (n 31) [55]). See 
generally Peter Cane and Leighton McDonald, Principles of  Administrative Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) ch 3; 
Mark Aronson and Matthew Groves, Judicial Review of  Administrative Action (5th edn, Thomson Reuters 
2013) 7. 
33  The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act) codifies the procedure and grounds 
for review of  most decisions of  Commonwealth bodies. Some states (ACT, Qld, Tas) also have similar 
codified regimes addressing the procedure and grounds of  review; other state courts retain the common 
law procedure and grounds. The codified grounds in the ADJR Act are generally taken to reflect, with 
some exceptions, the common law grounds: see Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 576 and Cane and 
McDonald, Principles of  Administrative Law (OUP 2008) 111. See generally Cheryl Saunders, ‘Constitution, 
Codes, and Administrative Law’ in Christopher Forsyth and others (eds), Effective Judicial Review (OUP 2010) 
61; Saunders, ‘Catalyst’ (n 30); Timothy H Jones, ‘Judicial Review and Codification’ (2006) 20 LS 517; Mark 
Aronson, ‘Is the ADJR Act Hampering the Development of  Australian Administrative Law?’ (2004) 15 
PLR 202. 
34  Cane, ‘Australian Administrative Law’ (n 29) 133 (the removal of  Australia from ‘the mainstream of  
developments in the rest of  the common-law world’); Michael Taggart, ‘“Australian Exceptionalism” in 
Judicial Review’ (2008) 36 FLR 1; Anthony Mason, ‘Mike Taggart and Australian Exceptionalism’ in David 
Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Grant Huscroft (eds), A Simple Common Lawyer (Hart 2009) 179; Mark 
Aronson ‘Process, Quality and Variable Standards’ in Huscroft, Dyzenhaus and Hunt (eds), A Simple 
Common Lawyer, 5; Alan Freckelton, ‘The Concept of  Deference in Judicial Review of  Administrative 
Decisions in Australia – Part 1’ (2013) 73 AIAL Forum 52. 
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Centrality of Jurisdictional Error 
Jurisdictional error is the centrepiece of Australian administrative law.35 In general terms, 
jurisdictional errors are reviewable; non-jurisdictional errors are not, unless they appear ‘on the 
record’ (narrowly conceived). This is, in part, driven by the fragmented nature of the regime; 
some remedies are only available for jurisdictional errors. In particular, jurisdictional error must 
be established for the writs of prohibition and mandamus; however, certiorari is not so limited. 
First, while jurisdictional error has been prevalent in Australia for some time, the 
emblematic case entrenching its dominant role is Craig.36 The prosecution in a criminal trial 
sought to review the decision of the District Court judge to stay the trial until the defendant 
was granted legal aid, arguing the judge had misunderstood the law governing the trial of 
defendants in the absence of legal aid. In doing so, the High Court rejected the claim for 
certiorari on the basis that if there was any legal error, it was neither jurisdictional nor apparent 
on the face of the record. Notably, it also firmly reinforced the primacy of jurisdictional error 
in Australia.  
The Court identified the different categories of error which are treated as jurisdictional.37 
Jurisdictional error arises when an inferior court ‘mistakenly asserts or denies the existence of 
jurisdiction or if it misapprehends or disregards the nature or limits of its functions or powers 
in a case where it correctly recognises that jurisdiction does exist’; when it ‘makes an order or 
decision … which is based upon a mistaken assumption or denial of jurisdiction or a 
misconception or disregard of the nature or limits of jurisdiction’; or when it ‘purports to act 
wholly or partly outside the general area of its jurisdiction in the sense of entertaining a matter 
or making a decision or order of a kind which wholly or partly lies outside the theoretical limits 
of its functions and powers’.38 The Court went on to also catalogue ‘less obvious’ instances of 
jurisdictional error where the inferior court ‘while acting wholly within the general area of its 
 
35  Cane and McDonald (n 30) 111; Saunders, ‘Catalyst’ (n 30) 148 and Mark Aronson, ‘Jurisdictional Error 
without the Tears’ in Matthew Groves and HP Lee (eds), Australian Administrative Law (CUP 2007) 330, 
330; Taggart, ‘Exceptionalism’ (n 34) 8; JK Kirk ‘The Concept of  Jurisdictional Error’ in Neil Williams 
(ed), Key Issues in Judicial Review (Federation 2014) 11. For the pedigree of  the term ‘jurisdictional error’ in 
Australia, see Gageler, ‘Migration Law’ (n 29) 95. 
36  Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163. For earlier background see eg Public Service Association of  South 
Australia v Federated Clerks' Union of  Australia (1991) 173 CLR 132; Aronson and Groves (n 32) 13-19; John 
Gilmour, ‘Kirk: Newton's Apple Fell’ (2011) 34 Aust Bar Rev 155. 
37  ibid [11]-[12]. 
38  ibid. For an attempt at a simplified, but still lengthy, summary, see Aronson, ‘Jurisdictional Error’ (n 35) 
335. 
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jurisdiction … [does] something which it lacks authority to do’.39 This includes acting in 
circumstances where factual pre-conditions expressed in the statute are not satisfied, 
disregarding relevant considerations, taking into account irrelevant considerations or 
misconstruing the empowering statute or other instrument. The Court’s explanation of each 
category was long, convoluted and imbued with the language of authority and jurisdiction.  
The Court also recorded the types of errors made by administrative tribunals and other 
decision-makers that are treated as jurisdictional:40 
If such an administrative tribunal falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong 
issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, 
at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, 
and the tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its 
authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or 
decision of the tribunal which reflects it. 
Notably, the categories of jurisdictional errors for administrative tribunals and other decision-
makers were cast more broadly. It is presumed that any error of law made on the part of a 
tribunal or other decision-maker is a jurisdictional error, whereas in the case of inferior courts 
it is presumed non-jurisdictional.41 A breach of the rules of natural justice was also subsequently 
declared to be a jurisdictional error.42  
More recently, the High Court in Kirk returned to the definition of jurisdictional error, in a 
case quashing the decision of an inferior court for jurisdictional error.43 It maintained the 
centrality of jurisdictional errors and reiterated the procedural, institutional and constitutional 
factors which led to Australia’s retention of jurisdictional error.44 These factors ‘point to the 
continued need for, and utility of, the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional 
error in the Australian constitutional context’.45 Referring to the enumerated categories, the 
High Court said: ‘It is neither necessary, nor possible, to attempt to mark the metes and bounds 
of jurisdictional error.’46 It refuted the notion that the categories of jurisdictional error in Craig 
 
39  Craig (n 36) [11]-[12]. 
40  ibid [14]. 
41  The distinction was cast as a presumption, implicitly rebuttable, although the strength of  the presumptions 
have been debated: Aronson and Groves (n 32) 221. However, see the softening of  this distinction in Kirk 
below (text to n 49). 
42  Re Refugee Review Tribunal, ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82.  
43  Kirk (n 31). 
44  ibid [66]-[70]. 
45  ibid [100]. 
46  ibid [71]. 
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provide ‘a rigid taxonomy of jurisdictional error’; they were merely examples of such an error.47 
Despite that, it ruled that the two errors alleged in Kirk (misconstruction of the breadth of a 
criminal offence and non-compliance with a fundamental rule of criminal procedure regarding 
the giving of evidence by an accused) did fall within the exemplar categories of jurisdictional 
error.48 Further, in the course of its reflection on Craig, it doubted the strength of the distinction 
between inferior courts and other tribunals or decision-makers in a formal sense; this suggests 
that the broader and narrower conceptions of jurisdictional error depend more on the nature 
and function of the decision-making body, rather formal description.49  
Secondly, the parsing of fact-finding in jurisdictional terms is well illustrated by the Enfield 
case.50 The case concerned whether a proposed development was a ‘special industry’ (in this 
case, principally whether the waste management development generated offensive odours or 
not). This statutory precondition affected the extent of public notification and consequential 
determination of the planning application. The Development Assessment Commission 
determined it was not a special industry but on review the Supreme Court of South Australia 
disagreed and declared the consent ultra vires. On appeal, the Full Court quashed the Supreme 
Court’s ruling, saying that the judge ought to have deferred to the judgement of the 
Commission and, in the absence of ‘clear and obvious’ departure from planning rules, should 
have avoided descending into merits review.51 However, the High Court strongly rebuked any 
attempt to incorporate notions of deference into the review task and overturned the Full Court. 
Whether or not the proposed development was a special industry was a jurisdictional fact and 
therefore a question for the reviewing court to ‘determine independently for itself’.52 This 
different treatment of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facts was, the Court said, ‘the 
product not of any doctrine of ‘deference’, but of basic principles of administrative law 
 
47  ibid [73]. 
48  ibid [74] and [76]. 
49  ibid [70]. See Cane and McDonald (n 30) 151 and John Basten, ‘The Supervisory Jurisdiction of  the 
Supreme Court’ (2011) 85 ALJ 273, 293. 
50  City of  Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135. See Margaret Allars, ‘Chevron in 
Australia’ (2002) 54 Admin LR 569; Freckelton, ‘Deference – Part 1’ (n 32). See also M70/2011 v Minister 
for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] HCA 32, [57]. 
51  Enfield (n 50) [24].  
52  ibid [48]. The Court said, though, that in the course of  independently determining the whether the factual 
condition existed, judges may in appropriate cases give weight to the factual determinations of  the original 
decision-maker ([45]). This sits uncomfortably with the notion of  de novo review. For criticism see Cane 
and McDonald (n 30) 157. 
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respecting the exercise of discretionary powers’.53 In other words, it was animated by the 
distinction between legality and merits.54 So, while fact-finding relating to a jurisdictional issue 
is characterised as raising questions of legality and subjected to de novo review,55 fact-finding 
relating to a non-jurisdictional issue is characterised as forming part of the merits and is not 
subjected to extremely deferential review.56 Again, as with errors of law, the crux is therefore 
the determination of whether the precondition is jurisdictional or not. 
One further dimension applies to jurisdictional facts. The Australian courts have adopted a 
different approach to review in relation to a particular class of jurisdictional facts. Where the 
statutory precondition has a subjective character (such as if the decision-maker is ‘satisfied’ or 
‘believes’), the courts have still treated the existence of state of mind as a jurisdictional fact but 
have not engaged in the same de novo review adopted for objective jurisdictional facts.57 
Instead, the courts are entitled to test the rationality and logic of the finding.58  
Legality–Merits dichotomy 
‘To judges the law; to others the merits.’59 A strong dichotomy between legality and merits is 
also evident in Australian administrative law. The remarks of Brennan J in Quin are frequently 
repeated:60 ‘[T]he merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished 
from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for 
the repository alone.’ The impact of this distinction on the scope of review is explained by 
Saunders:61 
Australian doctrine limits the appropriate scope of judicial review by drawing a sharp distinction 
between questions of lawfulness on the one hand and questions of merit on the other, 
understood to encompass considerations of policy, fact and the exercise of discretion within 
lawful parameters. 
 
53  Enfield (n 50) [44]. See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, 640. 
54  Enfield (n 50) [44], endorsing AG (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1; R (NSW Plumbers & Gasfitters Employees’ 
Union) v Alley (1981) 153 CLR 37; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24. See 
Aronson, ‘Jurisdictional Error’ (n 35) fn 92 for doubts about the determinacy of  the term ‘merits’. 
55  This is subject to the subjective/objective gloss below: see text to n 57. 
56  Enfield (n 50) [44], endorsing Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54. 
57  Cane and McDonald (n 30) 157-162. 
58  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) CLR 611, 625 and 643. See text to n 69. Cane and 
McDonald suggest the precise nature of  the basis of  review is still in a state of  flux; Cane and McDonald 
(n 30) 157. 
59  Gageler, ‘Migration Law’ (n 29) 104.  
60  Quin (n 54) 36. 
61  Saunders, ‘Catalyst’ (n 30) 148. 
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The term ‘merits’ is admittedly somewhat circular; it has been described as ‘that diminishing 
field left after permissible judicial review’.62  
Most significantly, the legality–merits distinction reinforces the role of jurisdictional error, 
seeking to legitimate intervention under the guise of jurisdictional error. However, it also had 
the effect of significantly quelling the development of other substantive grounds of review of 
the kind seen in other Anglo-Commonwealth jurisdictions. Doctrines which potentially adopts 
more intensive review of the merits, such as variegated forms of unreasonableness, 
proportionality and legitimate expectation, have been roundly rejected by the Australian courts. 
The strict approach to the separation has, Cane and McDonald argue, emphasized ‘the 
importance of leaving some latitude for administrators to get this “wrong”’ and ‘the wariness of 
Australian judges about enforcing so-called “substantive” versions of the “rule of law”, which 
explicitly invite judges to make value judgements on the fairness of outcomes.’63 
The old-fashioned (highly deferential and residual) Wednesbury formulation of 
unreasonableness dominates Australian jurisprudence; the courts have generally resisted moves 
elsewhere to fashion variable forms of unreasonableness.64 ‘Australian judicial review doctrines 
is indeed exceptionalist,’ Aronson says, ‘particularly in its failure so far to have countenanced 
any relaxation in the strictness of unreasonableness review.’65 The commitment to the 
Wednesbury can be seen in Peko-Wallsend Ltd.66 As well as endorsing Wednesbury’s test, Mason J 
echoed its deferential formulation, in a passage which has been frequently cited:67  
The limited role of a court in reviewing the exercise of a discretion must constantly be borne in 
mind. It is not the function of the court to substitute its own decisions for that of the 
administrator by exercising a discretion which the legislature has vested in the administrator. Its 
role is to set limits on the exercise of that discretion, and a decision made within those boundaries 
cannot be impugned. 
The belief that the reach of the Wednesbury test was ‘extremely confined’ was later reiterated by 
Brennan J in Quin.68 Wednesbury’s deferential approach has also been mimicked in a companion 
 
62  Greyhound Racing Authority (NSW) v Bragg [2003] NSWCA 388, adopted in Cane and McDonald (n 30) 42. 
63  Cane and McDonald (n 30) 42. 
64  See generally Geoffrey Airo-Farulla, ‘Rationality and Judicial Review of  Administrative Action’ (2002) 
MULR 543; Aronson and Groves (n 32) ch 5; Cane and McDonald (n 30) 167-176. 
65  Aronson, ‘Variable Standards’ (n 34). 
66  Peko-Wallsend (n 54). 
67  ibid 40; See also Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379; Kruger v The 
Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; Eshetu (n 53). For earlier endorsement, see Parramatta CC v Pestell (1972) 
128 CLR 305. See generally Airo-Faulla, ‘Rationality’ (n 64) 559.  
68  Quin (n 54). 
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test of ‘serious irrationality or illogicality’, applied in relation to jurisdictional facts that have a 
subjective character.69  
The High Court’s recent decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li suggests, 
perhaps, some weakening in this stringent approach to reasonableness review.70 Without 
disavowing Wednesbury or its endorsement in a line of Australian cases, the High Court said the 
standard should not always be equated with ‘an irrational, if not bizarre, decision’; the standard 
takes its colour from the (legislative) context.71 This hints at a more contextual approach to the 
reasonableness threshold, although the methodology for determining it – and particularly the 
role of statutory construction in this – was not developed.72 
Particularly notable in the Australian context is the absence of any variegated, intermediate, 
or sliding scale of unreasonableness, particularly when fundamental human rights are 
impugned.73 Other than continuing to entrench reasonableness or irrationality equivalent to 
Wednesbury’s high standard, the High Court has not been called on to directly engage with 
similar developments in other jurisdictions; however, the Federal Court has expressly repelled 
attempts to seed variable standards of unreasonableness.74 As Aronson and Groves record 
bluntly: ‘“Anxious scrutiny” is not part of Australia’s judicial review language.’75 Proportionality 
has also failed to gain any traction in traditional administrative law cases.76 While it is 
 
69  Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59; Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 and SZMDS (n 58). 
McHugh and Gummow JJ in S20/2002 characterised Wednesbury unreasonableness as only applying to 
review of  statutory discretion; the ‘newly-blessed close relation’ of  serious irrationality, applying to fact-
finding, therefore enabled the Court to circumvent a privative clause preventing review for 
unreasonableness: see Aronson and Groves (n 32) 256. Aronson has doubted whether the different tests 
actually pose different standards: ‘Variable Standards’ (n 34) 11. 
70  (2013) 249 CLR 332. 
71  ibid, 67-68 (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (‘The legal standard of  reasonableness must be the standard 
indicated by the true construction of  the statute’). However, French CJ and Gagelar J found no need to 
depart from the traditionally stringent Wednesbury formulation ([30], [113]).  
72  See Leighton McDonald, ‘Rethinking Unreasonableness Review’ (2014) 25 PLR 117, 132 suggesting the 
reference to context is an ‘awkward fit with Australia’s broader judicial review jurisprudence’ and thus 
‘Wednesbury may continue to be applied as a default positions – at least in most cases’. 
73  Taggart, ‘Exceptionalism’ (n 34) 12; Mason (n 34) 183; Alan Freckleton, ‘The Concept of  Deference in 
Judicial Review of  Administrative Decisions in Australia – Part 2’ (2013) 73 AIAL Forum 48, 52. 
74  See eg SZADC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1497; SHJB v 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 134 FCR 43. See Aronson, ‘Variable 
Standards’ (n 34) 19, fn 63. 
75  Aronson and Groves (n 32) 367.  
76  Although it was once mentioned as a possible candidate for a basis for review (Australian Broadcasting 
Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, 367) it has been rejected as an ground or basis for review (see eg 
Cunliffe v Commonwealth (Migration Agents case) (1994) 182 CLR 272, 178; Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163, 
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occasionally mentioned in passing, Saunders notes ‘[t]here are no signs of its adoption in the 
administrative law context’.77 Similarly, the principle of substantive legitimate expectations has 
not gained any purchase.78 
Finally, the legal and judicial culture appears to entrench the formal, categorical and 
ritualistic approach. The dominant judicial sensibility in Australia has been described as 
‘esoteric and abstract formalism’ or ‘devotion to legalism’.79 In other words:80 
[A] highly technical approach to problems; the employment of formal, conceptual and logical 
analysis, often related to literalism and sometimes originalism; a belief that law is an inductive 
science of principles drawn from the cases, rather than the application of broad, overarching 
principles to particular disputes; a downplaying of the role of principle, policy, values and justice 
in adjudication; and in extreme forms a denial of judicial law-making. 
A number of factors are cited as reasons for this legalistic judicial psyche, the centrality of 
jurisdictional error and the potent legality–merits demarcation: the strong commitment to the 
separation of powers, fortified by its constitutional entrenchment;81 the disjointed and 
fragmented regimes;82 partial, but perhaps unfruitful, codification;83 the existence of a non-
specialist merits review tribunal (the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) with co-extensive 
jurisdiction, coupled with a desire to preserve its different mandate in relation to merits 
review.84 Others have suggested the commitment to legal formalism is more cultural; that is, it 
 
185; Andary v Minister of  Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCAFC 211). Proportionality does, 
however, feature in human rights adjudication in states with human rights instruments: see eg Momcilovic v 
The Queen (2011) 280 ALR 221. 
77  Saunders, ‘Catalyst’ (n 30) 148, fn 26.  
78  Quin (n 54); Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193; Re 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1. See Matthew Groves, ‘Treaties and 
Legitimate Expectations’ [2010] JR 323 for an explanation of  why the initial promise provided in Minister 
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 was not realised. 
79  Poole, ‘Deep Blue Sea’ (n 28) 42 and Taggart, ‘Exceptionalism’ (n 34) 7 respectively. See also Owen Dixon, 
‘Upon Taking the Oath of  Office as Chief  Justice’ in Owen Dixon, Jesting Pilate (Law Book Co 1965) 245, 
247 (‘strict and complete legalism’). For a spirited defence of  aspects of  the formalistic culture, see 
Aronson, ‘Variable Standards’ (n 34). 
80  Taggart, ‘Exceptionalism’ (n 34) 7. See also Poole, ‘Deep Blue Sea’ (n 28) 25.  
81  See eg Lam (n 78) [76]. See generally Cane and McDonald (n 30) 42; ‘Catalyst’ (n 30). Compare Mason (n 
34) 182 (‘limiting review to jurisdictional errors does not rest on the Constitution; its stance rests on the 
common law’).  
82  See text to n 30 above. 
83  Cane, ‘Australian Administrative Law’ (n 29) 133. See also n 33 above. 
84  Peter Cane, ‘Merits Review and Judicial Review’ (2000) 28 Fed L Rev 213; Peter Cane, Administrative 
Tribunals and Adjudication (Hart 2009); Saunders, ‘Catalyst’ (n 30) 157. 
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is embedded in the psyche of leading law schools and state bars and has been the raison d’être 
of a number of senior, influential judges.85 
C England: (historic) classic model 
At the time de Smith first compiled his work on judicial review, formalistic and deferential 
supervision and was the dominant approach in judicial review in England (and was echoed 
throughout the Anglo-Commonwealth jurisdictions).86 The judicial method had a technical and 
formalistic character where the courts’ ability to intervene was conditioned according to rigid 
categories of analysis. This style of legal reasoning is described by Harlow as the ‘classic model’ 
of judicial review.87 Judicial review doctrine was rigid and circumspect. ‘The grounds for review 
were restricted’, Harlow explains, ‘and a strict interpretation of the doctrine of precedent 
inhibited rapid changes of direction’.88 Critical distinctions – Harlow instances distinctions 
between rights and privileges, and between judicial and administrative acts – were central to 
whether a decision was reviewable.  
While judicial restraint characterised the early and middle parts of the twentieth century,89 
the supervisory jurisdiction began to be reinvigorated in the 1960s, with a ‘trilogy of great cases’ 
– Ridge v Baldwin, Anisminic, and Padfield – marking a transition into what has been described as 
‘a new activist era’.90 However, the approach marked by scope of review continued to 
dominate. Depth of review continued to be determined by a process of doctrinal classification. 
 
85  Taggart, ‘Exceptionalism’ (n 34) 7. 
86  Sian Elias, ‘Righting Administrative Law’ in Dyzenhaus, Hunt, Huscroft (n 34) 57 (NZ); Philip A Joseph, 
‘The Contribution of  the Court of  Appeal to Commonwealth Administrative Law’ in Rick Bigwood (ed), 
The Permanent New Zealand Court of  Appeal (Hart 2009) 41 (NZ); Michael Taggart, ‘The New Zealandness 
of  New Zealand Public Law’ (2004) PLR 81 (NZ); PW Hogg, ‘The Supreme Court of  Canada and 
Administrative Law, 1949-1971’ (1973) 11 Osgoode LJ 187 (Can); Audrey Macklin, ‘Standard of  Review’ 
in Colleen Flood and Lorne Sossin (eds), Administrative Law in Context (2nd edn, Emond Montgomery 
2012) 279 (Can); Michael Taggart, ‘Prolegomenon to an Intellectual History of  Administrative Law in the 
Twentieth Century’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 224 (Can); Cane and McDonald (n 30) 15 (Aus). 
87  Carol Harlow, ‘A Special Relationship?’ in Ian Loveland (ed), A Special Relationship? (OUP 1995) 79, 83. See 
also Michael Taggart ‘Reinventing Administrative Law’ in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), 
Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart 2003) 311, 312. See also Richard Rawlings, ‘Modelling Judicial 
Review’ (2008) 61 CLP 95, 98. 
88  Harlow, ‘A Special Relationship?’ (n 89) 83. Other features identified by Harlow include the absence of  a 
strong distinction between public and private law; the insistence on injury to interests to justify 
reviewability; a system which was markedly remedial in nature and orientation. 
89  ibid 83; Michael Taggart, ‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ [2008] NZLR 424, 429; Rodney Austin, 
‘Administrative Law’s Reaction to the Changing Concepts of  Public Service’ in Peter Leyland and Terry 
Woods (eds), Administrative Law Facing the Future (Blackstone 1997) 30. 
90  Harlow, ‘A Special Relationship?’ (n 89) 84 and 87. See also William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, 
Administrative Law (9th edn, OUP 2004) 16 and Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration 
(3rd edn, CUP 2009) 100-102. Two major ‘territorial claims’ – the royal prerogative and decisions subject 
to privative clauses – were also settled in favour of  the courts, ‘effectively opening all issues of  
administrative law to legal scrutiny’: Stephen Sedley, ‘Foreword’ in Leyland and Woods (n 89) xi.  
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The judicial reinvigoration enlarged the ambit of some of the categories which were subjected 
to judicial scrutiny and made some particular distinctions obsolete. But it did not repudiate the 
essential style of legal analysis: depth of scrutiny – expressed in binary terms – continued to be 
set indirectly through a process of categorisation.  
For present purposes, it is sufficient to identify a number of threads which help illustrate 
the character of legal analysis involved: 
(a) the pre-eminence of the concept of jurisdiction; 
(b)  a strong distinction between law, fact and discretion (including deferential review in 
relation to the latter); 
(c) functional dichotomies (particularly distinctions between matters judicial and 
administrative). 
The focus I have adopted here is on those classifications which address matters which 
nowadays are addressed under grounds or intensity of review. As Harlow notes, the classic 
model adopted numerous other classifications affecting, for example, the entitlement to seek 
particular writs or relief and other procedural matters. While these other distinctions augment 
the categorical and formalistic character of the legal reasoning under the scope of review model, 
the focus adopted enables the methodological changes to be more readily identified.  
Jurisdiction 
The concept of jurisdiction was deeply imbedded in the scope of review methodology. 
Jurisdiction was a key dividing line for determining whether administrative matters were 
reviewable or not. As noted earlier, the later editions of de Smith suggested that jurisdictional 
error might have been the ‘organising principle’ of these editions.91 
The development of judicial review in terms of jurisdiction is traced by de Smith back to 
the seventeenth century.92 From a historic perspective, the case of Terry v Huntington is 
commonly cited as one of the earliest instances of jurisdiction dictating the reviewability of a 
matter.93 Hale CB drew a distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors, when 
 
91  De Smith (5th edn) 97. 
92  De Smith (1st ed) 65. 
93  (1668) Hardr 480, 145 ER 557. See de Smith (1st edn) 65 and Wade and Forsyth (n 90) 252, fn 9. See also 
PP Craig, Administrative Law (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 452-454. 
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ruling that commissioners of excise had unlawfully levied duty on ‘low wines’ when their 
authority only related to ‘strong wines’:94 
[T]he matter here is not within their jurisdiction, which is a stinted, limited jurisdiction; and that 
implies a negative, viz that they shall not proceed at all in other cases. But if they should commit 
a mistake in a thing that were within their power, that would not be examinable here. 
A similar distinction was drawn in relation to review of inferior courts by certiorari, although 
the courts also asserted the power to quash errors on the face of the record.95 
The distinction continued into the first part of the twentieth century.96 For example, in 
R v Nat Bell Liquors Ltd, the Privy Council rebuked a Canadian superior court for overreaching 
the jurisdictional boundary when reviewing by way of certiorari a conviction for liquor 
possession:97 
[The superior Court’s] jurisdiction is to see that the inferior Court has not exceeded its own and 
for that very reason it is bound not to interfere in what has been done within that jurisdiction 
for in so doing it would, in turn, transgress the limits within which its own jurisdiction of 
supervision, not of review, is confined. 
Likewise, Lord Denning in R (Shaw) v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal said:98 
No one has ever doubted that the Court of King’s Bench can intervene to prevent a statutory 
tribunal from exceeding the jurisdiction which Parliament has conferred on it: but it is quite 
another thing to say that the King’s Bench can intervene when a tribunal makes a mistake of law. 
A tribunal may often decide a point of law wrongly whilst keeping well within its jurisdiction. 
While recognising this jurisdictional demarcation, Lord Denning is attributed with reviving the 
‘face of the record’ gloss,99 the exception allowing a reviewing court to quash by certiorari ‘any 
determination by the tribunal which, on the face of it, offends against the law’.100 Again, the 
power to intervene is cast in categorical terms, with the consequence that the matter is either 
subjected to correctness style review or it is treated as being a matter for the decision-maker 
and not subjected to review. 
 
94  Terry v Huntingdon (93) 483. 
95  De Smith (1st ed) 65. See eg Walsall Overseers v London & North Western Railway Co (1878) 4 App Cas 30. 
96  Craig, Administrative Law (n 93) 454. 
97  [1922] 2 AC 128, 156. 
98  [1952] 1 KB 338, 346.  
99  Craig, Administrative Law (n 93) 486. While the doctrine was historically significant, it oddly fell from 
prominence in the first half  of  the twentieth century. 
100  Although the scope of  the ‘record’ been debated, Denning LJ then said it included ‘at least the document 
which initiates the proceedings, the pleadings, if  any, and the adjudication, but not the evidence, nor the 
reasons, unless the tribunal chooses to incorporate them’ (Shaw (n 98) 131).  
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The distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of law was famously 
extinguished as a result of Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission.101 The House of 
Lords undermined the previous distinction by effectively ruling that all errors of law made by 
an administrative body or official were capable of being treated as jurisdictional, in a rather 
contorted effort to circumvent a privative clause which would have otherwise applied. While 
this significantly broadened the scope of matters subjected to review, it did not amount to the 
abandonment of the categorical method synonymous with the scope of review model. First, 
all errors of law were treated as being jurisdictional and subject to review. In that sense, 
jurisdiction continued to be a key feature, but its definition was extended and more matters 
were therefore exposed to review. A formalist approach still remained, but it was powered by 
an ‘activist’, rather than ‘inactivist’, orientation.102 The change was significant in terms of the 
way that it heralded a more vigilant supervisory jurisdiction, but the categorical methodology 
remained. Secondly, review of factual errors still continued to be parsed according to their 
jurisdictional character.103  
Law-Fact-Discretion 
Under a scope of review approach, whether matters were subjected to review depended on 
their classification as a matter of law, fact or discretion, and usually in combination with the 
jurisdictional overlay. As mentioned earlier, distinctions between law, fact and discretion were 
prominent in de Smith’s account of the scope of review.104 While recognising the doctrinal 
significance of these distinctions, de Smith also displayed some scepticism about the robustness 
of the distinctions drawn between law, fact and discretion, and thus the potential judicial 
manipulation of the scope of review.105  
 
101  [1969] 2 AC 147. The effect of  the ruling took some time to realise: Lord Diplock, ‘Administrative Law’ 
(1974) 33 CLJ 233 (distinction ‘obsolete’); Racal Communications [1981] AC 374 (‘for practical purposes 
abolished’); O’Reilly v Mackman [1983 2 AC 278 (English public law now liberated from ‘drawing esoteric 
distinctions’). See also Pearlman v Harrow School Governors [1979] QB 56 (Denning LJ). See Craig, 
Administrative Law (n 93) 456; William Wade, ‘Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of  the Anisminic 
Case’ (1969) 85 LQR 211; Ivan Hare ‘The Separation of  Powers and Judicial Review for Error of  Law’ in 
Christopher Forsyth and Ivan Hare (eds), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord (OUP 2008) 113.  
102  For the identification of  different strategies in terms such as this, see Martin Loughlin, ‘Procedural 
Fairness’ (1978) 28 UTLJ 215, 220. 
103  Wade and Forsyth (n 90) 252, 263 and 272. See also ch 3 text to n 59. 
104  De Smith (1st ed) 60-61 (law and fact vs discretion) and 83-92 (law and fact). 
105  See eg de Smith (1st ed) 60-61.  
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The line-drawing had two complementary purposes. First, it demarcated those matters 
which the courts were prepared to review, and review on a strict basis. Secondly, the line-
drawing had an allocative aspect, signalling that certain matters remained the responsibility of 
the original decision-maker. The former has been addressed in the previous section. The latter 
is the residual area of freedom – the ‘four corners’ of discretion – into which the courts would 
not enter.106 Based on a formalist conception of the separation of powers, the courts regarded 
it as improper to interfere in the executive’s policy-making function within this sphere.107 A 
number of examples illustrate the effect of the nature of the matter on the style of review 
applied by the courts.  
First, the doctrine now known as Wednesbury unreasonableness operated to regulate the law–
discretion divide.108 For matters of discretion or other matters falling outside the rubric of 
jurisdiction, Lord Greene’s stated the test for intervention in very deferential terms: ‘if a 
decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever 
have come to it, then the courts [can] interfere’.109 Warning against judicial intervention, the 
well-known effect of this test was to immunise the merits from review except in the most 
egregious cases.110 The Wednesbury case, Taggart argues, exemplifies the classic model of judicial 
review sketched by Harlow.111 The rigid and constrained approach ‘purported to keep the 
judges’ noses out of the tent of politics’.112 The Wednesbury test survives today, but its role is 
clouded nowadays by competing doctrines, attempts at re-definition, and new concepts 
(discussed in later chapters).113  
 
106  Taggart, ‘Proportionality’ (n 89) 430. 
107  Harlow, ‘A Special Relationship?’ (n 89) 85. See also Harlow and Rawlings (n 90) 95. 
108  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. It is trite to say the principle 
had been exercised well before Wednesbury itself, but it became high authority for the principle: see John 
Laws, ‘Wednesbury’ in Christopher Forsyth and Ivan Hare (eds), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord 
(Claredon 1998) 185 and TR Hickman, ‘The Reasonableness Principle’(2004) 63 CLJ 166. 
109  The term ‘unreasonableness’ is used in two different ways in the case: as a synonym for various other bases 
for intervention such as relevancy and bad faith, and in the pure unreasonableness sense quoted. The latter 
formulation is the one that has generally endured. See generally Craig, Administrative Law (n 93) 532; Paul 
Craig, ‘Unreasonableness and Proportionality in UK Law’ in Evelyn Ellis (ed), The Principle of  Proportionality 
in the Laws of  Europe (Hart 1999) 85, 94; Harlow and Rawlings (n 90) 43; Taggart, ‘Proportionality’ (n 89) 
427. 
110  A rare exception from before Wednesbury’s time was Roberts v Hopwoods [1925] AC 578. 
111  Taggart, ‘Reinventing’ (n 87) 312. 
112  ibid. 
113  See ch 3 pt II. 
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Secondly, the seminal case of Padfield also highlights the distinction that was historically 
taken between law and discretion, as well as the way the scope of review could be changed by 
redrawing the categories of intervention.114 The case focused on the grant of power to a 
minister to determine (‘if the Minister in any case so directs’) whether a complaint about the 
operation of a price-fixing regime should be directed to a committee of investigation. The 
referral of the complaint would have set off a chain of consequences that would have been 
politically unpalatable for the Minister, so he declined to refer it.  
When this refusal to refer was subjected to review, the traditional approach was elaborated 
by Lord Morris in dissent. ‘The Minister was given an executive discretion’, said Lord Morris.115 
Citing Wednesbury, ‘it is no part of the duty of any court to act as a Court of Appeal from his 
decision or to express any opinion as to whether it was wise or unwise’.116 Similar sentiments 
were expressed by Lord Diplock, speaking for the majority of the Court of Appeal below. The 
matter was a policy decision and, subject to the Minister’s accountability to Parliament, ‘it is 
for him and no one else to decide to what extent he should exercise his limited powers of 
control’.117  
But the majority of the House of Lords treated the question as raising a legal question, not 
framing an area of discretion which could not be scrutinized. Rejecting a literal approach to 
statutory interpretation, Lord Reid employed a purposive construction, noting that ‘Parliament 
must have conferred the discretion with the intention that it should be used to promote the 
policy and objects of the Act’.118 And the question of whether the Minister’s motives not to 
refer the complaint ‘thwarted’ or ‘ran counter to’ the policy and objects of the Act was a legal 
matter for the courts to determine (in this case, concluding they did). The matter was reframed 
as a matter of law, not discretion, thereby changing the scope of review that applied. 
Thirdly, the much maligned decision in Liversidge v Anderson during World War II was based 
on a judicial view that the statutory precondition ‘reasonable cause to believe’ signalled a zone 
of executive discretion.119 Therefore the basis of the Secretary of State’s grounds for believing 
 
114  Padfield v Minister of  Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food [1968] AC 997. 
115  ibid 1040. 
116  ibid. 
117  ibid 1012.  
118  ibid 1030. 
119  [1942] AC 206. 
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that a person was ‘of hostile origins or associations’ was not capable of being reviewed by the 
courts. Viscount Maugham said:120 
[T]his is so clearly a matter for executive discretion and nothing else that I cannot myself believe 
that those responsible for the order in council could have contemplated for a moment the 
possibility of the action of the Secretary of State being subject to the discussion, criticism and 
control of a judge in a court of law.  
Lord Atkin’s famous dissent in the case was based on a different conception of the nature of 
the pre-condition, preferring to treat it as a matter which touched on jurisdiction and law:121  
If its meaning is the subject of dispute as to legal rights, then ordinarily the reasonableness of the 
cause, and even the existence of any cause is in our law to be determined by the judge and not 
by the tribunal of fact if the functions deciding law and fact are divided. 
De Smith suggested that in cases such of this, the ‘scope of review is conditioned by practical 
realities’; he questioned the majority’s characterisation of the power as subjective and 
discretionary, and doubted that such classification would be repeated except in extraordinary 
circumstances.122 Ultimately, years later, Lord Atkin’s dissenting view was to prevail; the 
majority restrained classification was treated as an aberration and eventually condemned by the 
House of Lords in Rossminster.123 In any event, the point presently important is how 
dichotomies underscored the judicial views: notions of discretion vs law were in play and 
dictated whether or not the matter was subjected to review. The majority treated the 
requirement as posing a question of administrative discretion in relation to which judicial 
restraint applied; Lord Atkin, in the minority, preferred to read it as a legal issue, in relation to 
which assessment of compliance was capable of being determined by the courts. 
Functional Dichotomies  
The formalistic scope of review model placed significant weight on the nature of the power 
being exercised to determine the applicable scope of review. Doctrines often treated legislative, 
judicial, and executive/administrative functions differently, varying the extent to which 
 
120  ibid 220. The only constraint remaining was that the decision-maker acted in good faith. 
121  ibid 228. 
122  De Smith (1st ed) 216 and 241. 
123  R (Rossminster) v IRC [1980] AC 952, 1011. In Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, Lord Atkin referred to Liversidge 
as a ‘very peculiar’ decision and the Privy Council adopted an approach consistent with Lord Atkin’s 
dissenting approach in Nakkuda Ali v Jayaatne [1951] AC 66.  
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different functions were exposed to judicial scrutiny. As de Smith said, the classification of 
these functions was ‘of particular importance’.124  
A number of other examples help demonstrate the role functional dichotomies took under 
the scope of review approach. First, different treatment of inferior courts and administrative 
tribunals or officials has already been alluded to in the context of jurisdictional errors of law.125 
For a period following Anisminic, it was uncertain whether the collapse of the distinction 
between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of law was also applicable to inferior courts 
as well as administrative tribunals and officials.126 
Secondly, one of most notable functional dichotomies of part of this era – until it was re-
framed in Ridge v Baldwin – was the proposition that procedural fairness only applied to 
decision-makers exercising ‘judicial’, rather than ‘administrative’, functions.127 Although, strictly 
speaking, this addressed the nature of obligations imposed on the administration by the courts, 
rather than directly addressing the nature of judicial scrutiny that applied to compliance with 
those obligations, the doctrine still mimics the latter.  
 Thus, for instance, the House of Lords in Local Government Board v Arlidge took the view 
that the adjudicative model of natural justice was not applicable to the Board’s administrative 
decision-making in relation to house closure orders, warning that ‘[j]udicial methods may, in 
many points of administration, be entirely unsuitable, and produce delays, expense, and public 
and private injury.’128 Similarly, in Franklin v Minister of Town and Country Planning, the House also 
held the procedural standards modelled on the judicial process (bias, in this case) were 
inapplicable to bodies required to act in a purely administrative fashion.129 During this period, 
Loughlin explains, ‘the courts adopted a formal classificatory approach to implying procedural 
safeguards’, based on the judicial–administrative dichotomy.130  
 
124  De Smith (1st ed) 17. The judicial–administrative distinction was particularly acute in their interaction with 
remedial and procedural matters, eg judicial acts could only be challenged in some writs and not others. 
125  See text to n 91 above. 
126  See Craig, Administrative Law (n 93) 458. See particularly Racal Communications (n 101).  
127  Mark Elliott, Beatson, Matthews and Elliott’s Administrative Law (4th edn, OUP 2011) 348; HWR Wade, ‘The 
Twilight of  Natural Justice’ (1951) 67 LQR 103. A broader view of  natural justice, based on effect, was 
adopted in the nineteenth century: see eg Cooper v Board of  Works for Wandsworth District (1863) 143 ER 414. 
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128  [1915] AC 120. See also Board of  Education v Rice [1911] AC 179 where the House of  Lords, while 
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Again, during the reinvigoration of judicial review in 1960s, the House of Lords resiled from 
this restrictive approach in the landmark Ridge v Baldwin decision.131 Lord Reid adopted a 
broader conception of natural justice or fairness, disapproving its restriction to those bodies 
required to act judicially; instead, its applicability should turn on the nature of the power and 
effect on the individual.132  
Thirdly, some classes of administrative acts and decisions (classes that were ‘perhaps more 
extensive than in most foreign systems’) were said to be unreviewable because of their subject-
matter.133 For example, for a significant period, the royal prerogative was treated differently 
than other exercises of power; when the source of administrative power was monarchical, its 
exercise was treated as being immune from review, thus continuing a categorical approach 
based on institutional character.134  
Finally, in relation to the review of subordinate legislation, a distinction was drawn based 
on the character of the law-making body. The scope of review depended on whether the 
subordinate legislation was made by a minister or sub-national body. While bylaws or 
regulations made by both were reviewable for jurisdictional questions, unreasonableness review 
was only permitted in relation to local authority bylaws, not regulations or other subordinate 
instruments made by ministers.135 
D Conclusion 
Categorical formalism prevails under scope of review. This approach dominated English law 
before it was systematised in the mid-1980s and continues today in Australia. It is a method 
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For subsequent and incremental circumscription of  the non-justiciability of  the prerogative, see eg R (Lain) 
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for the Home Office [1994] QB 349; R (Fire Brigades Union) v Secretary of  State for the Home Office [1995] 2 AC 
513; R (Abbasi) v Secretary of  State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1598.  
135  Compare Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91 (local authority bylaw) and Sparks v Edward Ash Ltd [1943] KB 
223. See also Taylor v Brighton Corporation [1947] KB 736. 
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grounded in categorical distinctions – such as law–fact–policy, process–substance, judicial–
administrative–legislative, jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional. This, as Dyzenhaus explains, is 
the method of formalism:136 
Formalism is formal in that it requires judges to operate with categories and distinctions that 
determine results without judges having to deploy substantive arguments that underpin the 
categories and distinctions. 
That is the essence of the style of method under the scope of review method.  
III Conceptual Foundations 
I turn now to the theoretical basis for this style of methodology and schema. It is rare nowadays 
to find continuing commitment to the scope of review model. Categorical formalism has 
largely gone out of fashion. Notable exceptions include Christopher Forsyth’s defence of 
formalism in administrative law, and the work of Australian scholars, such as Aronson, who 
seek to rationalise the continuing application of abstract formalism in that jurisdiction. 
The formalism of scope of review shares its ethos with the ultra vires or legislative intent 
school. The definition of the role of the judiciary is cast in technical terms, giving effect to the 
will of Parliament. While conceding some need for the judiciary to fashion principles of judicial 
review, the cues are said to be found in the product of (the sovereign) Parliament, not by resort 
to independent substantive values. The constitutional order is kept stable through the 
maintenance of a separation of powers based on law-making, law-applying, law-interpreting 
model of the legislature, administration and judiciary respectively.  
A Christopher Forsyth: passionate formalism and ultra vires 
Forsyth is stringent in his defence of formalism.137 He continues to echo the Diceyan 
sentiments of his former colleague and co-author, Sir William Wade.138 He explains the 
formalist’s approach in terms of permissible and impermissible sources of law.139 Answers to 
administrative law questions are to be found, he says, in legislation and judicial decisions and 
should not be based on substantive reasoning. Statutes are to be applied based on their face, 
based on text, without reference to background motivations and so forth. The system of 
precedent is the ‘great engine of certainty in the legal system’ and the identification of ratio 
 
136  David Dyzenhaus, ‘Constituting the Rule of  Law’ (2002) 27 Queens LJ 445, 450. 
137  Christopher Forsyth, ‘Showing the Fly the Way Out of  the Flybottle’ (2007) 66 CLJ 325. 
138  From the 7th edition on, they penned the famous administrative law textbook together (Wade and Forsyth 
(n 90)) until Wade’s death in 2004; Forsyth continues to author the textbook today. 
139  Forsyth, ‘Flybottle’ (n 137) 328. 
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decidendi continues to be ‘a meaningful endeavour’.140 In contrast, substantive reasoning based 
on moral, economic, political, institutional or other social considerations is ‘simply 
irrelevant’.141 This formal reasoning, he argues, is a ‘virtue’; it is ingrained in the English 
common law method, it buttresses (a formal conception of) the rule of law, and it promotes 
certainty.142 He criticises those who argue judicial discretion should subsume these ‘stark 
categories’.143 Categories serve to ‘structure and constrain the judicial role’; judges are subject 
to law and the law must continue to be their master.144  
Hand-in-hand with Forsyth’s spirited defence of formalism comes his commitment to the 
ultra vires or legislative intent theory of judicial review (albeit, in the end, modified from its 
original direct legislative intent formulation).145 Forsyth argues that those who doubt the ultra 
vires justification of judicial review undermine ‘the proper balance of powers between the 
elected and non-elected parts of the constitution’.146 Ultra vires proponents and judges who 
apply it fulfil the legislature’s intention and are ‘guardians’ of the constitutional order; naysayers 
who challenge the intention of parliament are ‘subverters’ of this order.147 While he 
acknowledges that principles and grounds of judicial review are judicial creations, he links the 
authority to do so back to the presumed or implied intention of the legislature. ‘[T]he legislature 
is taken to have granted an imprimatur to the judges to develop the law in the particular area’.148 
His reliance on the implied or general intent of the legislature avoids the insurmountable defect 
of the traditional ultra vires or specific legislative intent theory, namely that it is impossible to 
characterise judicial intervention as the delegated enforcement of boundaries set by the 
legislature when the legislature does not concern itself with or legislate the detailed principles 
of judicial review that are applied by the courts. Despite the modified ultra vires theory 
admitting the responsibility for articulating the principles of good administration lies with the 
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courts, Forsyth (subsequently) fortifies the connection back to legislative intent.149 He argues, 
writing with Mark Elliott, that when fashioning these principles, the courts ‘rely frequently and 
closely upon an analysis of the relevant statute’.150 So, it need not be merely assumed that the 
legislature intends power should be exercised in accordance with the rule of law as elaborated 
by judges. The limits can instead be justified as a matter of inference: ‘judges determine the 
boundaries of the decision-makers’ power by inference drawn from the relevant statute’, 
usually without ‘reliance upon the common law or any other extra-statutory source of law’.151 
The primacy of the ultra vires doctrine follows in Forsyth’s view: ‘the courts’ one and only task 
to determine whether the administrative action in question is intra vires or ultra vires’.152 
Ultra vires therefore continues to be the ultimate organising principle for Forsyth and his 
position in the debate on the constitutional underpinnings directly manifests itself in his 
favoured operational schema for judicial review. His take on the systemisation of judicial review 
grounds and principles is overlaid with an ultra vires gloss.153 For example, Forsyth commends 
as ‘orthodox’ Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s tripartite recital of the grounds of review but 
emphasizes that if any of the grounds are made out the decision-maker is ‘acting ultra vires his 
powers and therefore unlawfully’.154 And these heads of judicial review come not from the 
common law; rather ‘the existence and development of the heads of review … involves the 
application of general principles of good administration through an explicitly constitutional 
mode of statutory construction’.155 In Forsyth’s world, everything must be linked back to the 
legislature and statute. 
Forsyth therefore promotes legal reasoning that is attentive to the form, not substance, of 
administrative decisions and circumstances; in doing so, he seeks to defend the role of strict 
categories in administrative law.  
B Mark Aronson: (reluctant) bottom-up formalism 
Aronson’s native jurisdiction is dominated by abstract formalism and he appears content, 
perhaps a little reluctantly, to work within that paradigm. In particular, he is anxious to deflect 
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condemnatory claims of formalism and sees formalistic schema as still being capable of 
addressing the issues arising in a modern administrative state, just like other schema.156  
First and foremost, Aronson, like Forsyth, objects to formalism’s negative connotations. 
He suggests the central accusations from its critics are a lack of style and lack of transparency 
in the judicial reasoning process, neither of which he regards as particularly problematic. 
Instead he treats the accusations of formalism as a claim that Australian law ‘should be more 
directly normative and principles-based’.157 On this point, he appears somewhat ambivalent, a 
point discussed below.  
Secondly, in terms of the debate on the constitutional foundations of judicial review, 
Aronson has not signalled a definitive position. In his text, he characterises it – perhaps 
pejoratively – as a ‘British debate’.158 His account of the debate indicates he has little interest in 
engaging with it and he suggests it has little to offer in Australia, particularly with its different 
constitutional setting. Instead, the theoretical debate in Australia is drawn as a contest between 
‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’.159 That is, whether the grounds of judicial review are to be 
developed by reference to overarching or abstract principles (top-down) or whether a more 
incremental and conservative approach should be adopted (bottom-up). While not strident 
about a bottom-up approach – grounded in the tight application of precedent and incremental 
development – Aronson seems comfortable working within that framework. Aronson suggests 
judicial review probably needs a bit of both.160 Sceptical about abstract legal principles being 
applied in their own right, he also suggests the development of rule-based legal reasoning is 
enhanced if coordinated by principles and values.161 
Thirdly, the key dichotomy employed by Aronson, in terms of an organising schema, is 
between process and quality.162 A formal, categorical distinction – resonant of the scope of review 
schema – reigns. He treats process grounds – grounds like error of law, relevancy, non-
satisfaction of pre-conditions and so forth – as being equivalent to matters of jurisdiction. 
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When viewed abstractly these grounds, he argues, ‘mark out the limits of and boundaries to an 
administrative decision-maker’s powers (almost in a spatial sense), and ... dictate the procedures 
to be observed’.163 In his view, these grounds do not raise any questions about the legitimacy 
of judicial review because their application ‘usually do[es] not turn on the degree to which (if 
at all) the court’s view of the process requirements differs from the decision-maker’s view’.164 
There are typically right answers to these questions and the courts are entitled to express their 
view on these matters; any margin or latitude arises only indirectly, he argues. The corollary is 
that the balance – the quality of a decision or its merits – is not so straightforward and second-
guessing such balance is generally to be avoided by the courts. This is the binary approach 
which has dominated Aronson’s home jurisdiction.  
Aronson is not dogmatic about the demarcation but he is wary of the consequences of 
engaging in qualitative review. ‘Judicial review “shifts gears” when it engages in qualitative 
review.’ 165 For instance, he argues that qualitative review entails a greater evidentiary corpus 
and more work on the part of judges. One senses that Aronson may entertain greater 
deployment of qualitative grounds, albeit on a cautious and reserved basis. He wonders if this 
would be preferable to the current practice of covertly stretching process grounds in order to 
address qualitative concerns – an admission of the manipulability of this formalist schema. And 
he worries that the strict adherence to the process–quality distinction in order to avoid adverse 
consequence of judicial discretion on the part of the supervisory court leaves administrative 
discretion too unconstrained, at least as it relates to the merits. Addressing uncertainty in one 
creates uncertainty in the other. 166 
Although he hints at being open to more qualitative review, including in the context of 
reasonableness review, he stops short of recommending explicit doctrinal variability. On the 
matter of the modulation of the depth of review, Aronson comes across as agnostic on the 
question of whether the legal principles and grounds should be explicitly variable.167 He records 
the fact that Australia, unlike its Anglo-Commonwealth siblings, has not deployed variable 
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grounds and is content to identify the Australian resistance to such a move.168 For him, 
reasonableness is inevitably ‘variable in its application … [e]ven if the standard were to remain 
the same’.169 More important, he suggests, is the question of whether the standard should be 
more ‘demanding’ in cases where human rights are engaged (on which he expresses no view).170 
Seeds, perhaps, of some interest in escaping the confines of the bottom-up or scope of review 
approach.  
C Conclusion 
Those who exhibit support for scope of review schema tend to have a formalist orientation. 
Forsyth actively promotes a commitment to the formalist agenda; Aronson comes across more 
as a passive participant. Framed in terms of the King’s models of judicial restraint, this is the 
domain of the formalist institutionalists.171 Judicial restraint manifests itself through formal but 
abstract distinctions based on the formalist separation of power between legislatures, the 
executive and the courts. Judicial restraint is governed by allocative distinctions between law 
and politics, principle and policy, justiciable and non-justiciable, and so forth.172  
Much of this is consistent with the position adopted on the constitutional underpinnings of 
judicial review. Forsyth has been one of the main protagonists behind the ultra vires or 
legislative intent theory. Aronson identifies a divide in Australian jurisprudence between ‘top-
downers’ and ‘bottom-uppers’, which has some analogue to the ultra vires debate, and seems 
(mostly) content to continue to work with the incremental and subordinate judicial role 
presented by the latter.  
IV Normative Assessment 
The scope of review schema is characterised by its formal and categorical approach to the 
modulation of the depth of scrutiny, based on a suite of complex rules. The method is 
synonymous, particularly in Australia, with an abstract and technical judicial mentality. On the 
one hand, its embrace of general rules means it performs well in terms of many of the principles 
of efficacy. On the other hand, it still enables variability and judicial discretion, but does so 
indirectly and latently. Its reliance on categorical proxies to determine the depth of review and 
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corresponding propensity for manipulation means the veneer of rules cloaks significant judicial 
discretion. Thus, the performance of the schema – when viewed more closely and critically – 
is less favourable. 
Generality 
The scope of review methodology is heavily doctrinal and grounded in categorisation, as the 
earlier doctrinal study demonstrates. On its face, therefore, it is the most rule-bound and least 
flexible schema and therefore satisfies the expectations of generality. However, the latent 
judicial discretion and potential for manipulation significantly diminishes the role of rules and 
thus the generality of the schema. 
In formal terms, the rigid categories and formal boundaries of the scope of review 
methodology aim to emphasize consistency and order, at the expense of adaptability and 
flexibility. The attention to form seeks to avoid normative, value-based considerations. The 
English experience with this style of supervision was marked by distinctions between law, fact 
and discretion, between the character of the power under review, and distinctions between 
error within jurisdiction and errors going to jurisdiction. These distinctions, when drawn in 
combination, affected whether a power was open to challenge or not. The distinctions 
employed were multifarious and complex. In Australia today, jurisdictional error manifests an 
all-important boundary for the scope of review.173 In general terms, matters jurisdictional are 
subject to close judicial scrutiny; matters not are not (with only a few exceptions). Similarly, the 
legality–merits dichotomy assumes a prominent role. Supervision is dependent on a process of 
‘very fine line-drawing’.174 It is this process of classification or allocation to different classes 
which dictates the depth of scrutiny (even though the language of depth of scrutiny and 
intensity is not employed).175  
Under a scope of review method, law stands at the centre of the deliberative task, with 
categories structuring and constraining the judicial role.176 The scope of review schema presents 
itself as deductive and mechanical. This style of reasoning and adjudication, with formal 
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categorisation at its core, is grounded in the notion of rules; it is based around a settled 
catalogue of categories operating as a blue-print of the depth of judicial scrutiny. The rules 
generally adopt a binary approach to the depth of scrutiny and, although typically equated with 
judicial restraint, are agnostic as to the depth of review. 
The predominant question under a scope of review approach is whether a matter is capable 
of being reviewed by the courts. The depth of judicial scrutiny is generally binary, in the sense 
of the issue being exposed to review or not, and is conditioned by the nature of the decision, 
decision-maker and so forth. The judicial approach commended by the schema has a 
mechanical flavour: identification of the applicable categories; classification of impugned 
decision into those categories; resultant conclusion about whether the decision is subjected to 
review or not; in the case of those decisions exposed to review, evaluation of whether the 
decision was adequate. The categories delineate whether review of certain matters is 
permissible, thereby effectively dictating whether or not the supervising court should intervene 
or not.177 There is an absence of any intermediate options or a range of possibilities. This is 
especially notable in Australia, where the prevalent depths of review are a form of correctness 
review or a very deferential opposite, with no middle ground or sliding scale of intensity 
occupying the space between the two extremes. Any residual variability or methodological 
nuance is subordinate to the dominant question of whether a matter is reviewable or not. 
Although this restrained and exclusionary approach gives an impression of judicial 
conservatism and restraint, the categorical style of legal reasoning is more agnostic to the depth 
of review. It can be deployed to dictate restrained judicial supervision; it can also be deployed 
to dictate more vigilant judicial supervision. Categorical formalism still endured after the 
reinvigoration of judicial review, even though the definition of the categories was re-drawn to 
mandate more intensive review. As Poole observes, ‘methodological formalism does not 
necessarily equate to conservative outcomes’.178 He rightly points to Australia’s rejection of 
deference in Enfield and the more intensive review that then followed – something normally 
associated with the embrace of a doctrinal deference. A similar point is made by Cane, who 
notes the irony that the expansion in the concept of jurisdiction has actually led to increased 
judicial control over the merits.179 
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Thus, on its face, the scope of review schema scores well in terms of generality. Although the 
catalogue is multifarious and complex, in theory, the schema enables those affected and the 
administration to determine the courts’ expected approach to the review of particular decisions. 
Despite being deeply rooted in formal distinctions and rhetoric, categorical complexity 
enables variability and judicial discretion – albeit on an indirect and latent basis. The rule-based 
nature of the scope of review schema is therefore undermined and the generality of the regime 
significantly compromised. Modulation of the depth of scrutiny is not explicit. The judicial 
ability to vary the depth of review occurs indirectly, based on the complexities of the 
categorisation task. The definitions that characterised the doctrinal approach are often unstable 
and the distinctions porous. This brings with it the latent ability to modulate the depth of 
review through manipulation of the classification task.  
Similarly, while the strict approach to jurisdictional error in Australia purports to leave no 
room for any latitude, Aronson observes that this may still be achieved indirectly: ‘There is 
considerable debate, for example, as to whether … a factual prerequisite is jurisdictional or 
non-jurisdictional’.180 Although there is strong hostility to the language of deference,181 the 
notion of deference is still central to the judicial methodology. Rather than being embraced 
overtly, it is fashioned by line-drawing based on jurisdictional error, which as a consequence 
leaves autonomous space for decision-makers. The ubiquitous ‘legality–merits’ dichotomy also 
has judicial restraint or deference at its core.182 This approach to judicial restraint has been 
described as ‘exclusionary deference’ (in contradistinction to ‘standard of review’ deference); 
in other words, deference arises by the exclusion of certain decisions from review.183 The 
combination of abstract and imprecise criteria combined with the need for judicial judgement 
means the jurisdictional error methodology is undoubtedly ‘manipulable’.184 Cane and 
McDonald say the ‘legality/merits distinction is flexible enough for judges to pay considerable 
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deference to decision-makers.’185 More pointedly, Taggart argues forcefully that the 
jurisdictional error label ‘can mask the degree of judicial discretion involved and obscure the 
reasons for intervening or not in a particular case’.186 
The schema is unable to suppress normative considerations; these considerations remain 
covert and the methodology is cloaked with fictional formal discourse and deliberations. These 
accusations are well rehearsed in the literature. As de Smith said in the first edition of his text: 
‘[I]n many cases the truth of the matter is that the mode of classifying is determined by the 
scope of review that the courts deem to be desirable and practicable’ or ‘is often nothing more 
than a rationalisation of a decision prompted by considerations of public policy’.187 In a similar 
vein, Aronson has characterised Australia’s jurisdictional error lodestar as ‘conclusory’.188 
Others have described it as ‘manipulable’189 or ‘flexible’,190 and suggested the doctrine ‘masks’ 
judicial discretion.191 Poole, one of the stronger critics of the Australian jurisprudence, 
describes this abstract legalism as a ‘parody’ – a ritual that the participants acknowledge seeks 
to disguise the underlying normative assessment that occurs:192 ‘Judges revel in the opaque and 
obscurantist quality of their judgments. Law becomes ritual. And no-one is remotely convinced 
that any of it is apolitical.’193  
Thus, the scope of review schema, in reality, disappoints in terms of generality. It is plagued 
by a two-track style. It is a formal, ruled-based system. But one that is prone to manipulation 
and dissonance in application. 
Public accessibility and transparency     
Seemingly grounded in legal methodology – detached and deductively logical – the schema 
appears to be relatively accessible and transparent. However, the potential for, and practice of, 
judicial manipulation of the formal categories and distinction means accessibility and 
transparency are undermined.194  
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We expect that the obligation to elaborate the basis for a decision improves the quality of a 
decision or outcome.195 But if the reasoning required, as here, is restricted to formal 
categorisation, then the prophylactic aspects of open reasoning are not fully reached. The 
discourse of justification does not connect with the conceptual basis for review, risking lack of 
attention to conceptual considerations. The use of formal categories and distinctions to give 
effect, by proxy, to conceptual values has dangers though. As Dyzenhaus points out, the 
categories and distinctions are slated to operate in a ‘detached’ manner, however, ‘they are 
capable of determining results that contradict the very arguments for these categories and 
distinctions’.196 
Indirect and categorical legal reasoning is less problematic where the conceptual and 
normative basis for review align with established legal categories. However, where the 
normative force for vigilance or restraint does not match the depth of scrutiny that a particular 
category implicitly delivers there is an incentive to manipulate the classification process. As the 
distinctions framing the categories are often able to be overcome with relative ease, this 
encourages dissonance and leads to lack of congruence in application. Scope of review has a 
particularly poor record of ensuring alignment between the conceptual and the doctrinal.  
It may be argued that when judges approach individual cases, they do so against the 
backdrop of received wisdom on these conceptual dimensions. That is, the categories serve as 
shorthand responses for this broader suite of conceptual factors and it can be assumed that 
the doctrinal response in an individual case can be read together with its generic conceptual 
underpinnings. However, this is still unsatisfactory. The nature of doctrinal argumentation and 
reasoning can easily overshadow the conceptual and instrumental basis for review. There is no 
guarantee that connections between the doctrinal and conceptual will be made; it can only be 
hoped that conceptual underpinnings will be inculcated into the deliberative process. 
Moreover, while affected people may be able to fill in the gaps and interpret the doctrinal 
approach in the light of the conceptual underpinnings, the partial approach undermines the 
deliberative value of transparency and reasoning.  
Prospectivity 
Scope of review, as with all the schema, is prospective in operation, given it is generally based 
on doctrinal rules promulgated in advance. However, the extent of (covert) judicial discretion 
and lack of congruence means there is some potential for the regime to have some 
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retrospective effect as the content of rules are not controlling. The lack of predictability and 
clarity undermines legal certainty and adds some concern about prospectivity.  
Clarity 
The scope of review approach performs poorly in terms of clarity. The dominance of abstract 
legalism and complex classification tasks contribute to a lack of guidance, consistency and 
understandability.  
The language associated with this schema is typically dominated by abstract legal concepts, 
such as jurisdiction, nullity, ultra vires, and so forth. It also involves a complex classification 
based on various combinations of the nature of alleged error, the nature of the decision-maker, 
the nature of the statutory power in question and, in some cases, the nature of the remedy 
sought. The process of categorisation is not straightforward. It cannot, as Spigelman observes, 
be reduced to a ‘single test or theory or logical process’.197 The account from the judiciary is 
that this is principally a process of statutory interpretation.198 Notably, the determination turns 
on the nature and form of the decision, not its effect. As Brennan J in Quin said: ‘[T]he scope 
of review must be defined not in terms of the protection of individual interests but in terms of 
the extent of the power and the legality of the exercise.’199  
Its opacity is frequently acknowledged though. For example, jurisdictional error has been 
described by judges as a ‘slippery term’.200 Kirby J lamented that the distinction in 
contemporary Australian law was ‘uncertain’ and ‘often extremely difficult to find’.201 Despite 
the acknowledgment of this complexity and uncertainty, the High Court has remained 
trenchant about its utility. For example, Hayne J in Aala said ‘difficulty of drawing a bright line’ 
should not ‘obscure the difference that is illustrated by considering clear cases of each species 
of error’.202 Similarly, Glesson CJ said the difference between legality and merits ‘is not always 
clear-cut’; but so too, he said, is the difference between night and day: ‘[t]wilight does not 
invalidate the distinction’.203 Regardless, the central doctrinal tests under the scope of review 
approach are undoubtedly complex and uncertain. Moreover, the methodology inevitably 
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incorporates normative dimensions, despite its appearance otherwise. As mentioned earlier, 
jurisdictional error tends to operate as a conclusory label, when other – often undisclosed – 
errors are identified.204 
The language of scope of review is hollow and inaccessible, even for those conversant in 
law. Moreover, this jargon disguises the basis for intervention and seeks to cloak the task in 
law-like ‘detached’ language, in order to improve its legitimacy. But these terms convey little to 
participants or affected people about the expectations the law places on decision-makers or the 
approach the courts adopt when policing them.  
Stability 
The scope of review schema is generally stable but is not immune from evolution and change. 
Rather than evolution being expressly contemplated by the regime, doctrinal change has 
generally taken the form of recasting or reformulating existing categories.  
The redefinition of matters of jurisdiction in England following Anisminic is a notable 
example, along with other cases such as Padfield and Ridge v Baldwin, which signalled a more 
vigilant era on the part of the courts. On my account, though, the more vigilant turn did not 
involve the repudiation of the underlying methodology. A scope of review schema continued 
to be employed, where the depth of review was determined indirectly through a process of 
classification. The key difference was that casting the boundaries provided scope for intensive 
judicial scrutiny.205 This was, in Loughlin’s language, a shift from ‘inactive formalism’ to ‘active 
formalism’.206  
Similarly in Australia, the concept of jurisdictional error has been recast over time. The 
shape of the doctrinal categories has adapted over time as the judicial philosophy about what 
matters should be subjected to review has changed. A number of aspects have expanded or 
contracted over time: for example, jurisdictional error used to be more narrowly defined in 
relation to inferior courts, scope for jurisdictional factual error has expanded, and the face of 
the record exception for non-jurisdictional errors has enlarged.207 Indeed, some of these 
developments are essentially activist in nature, as they have been used to deflect attempts by 
the legislature to restrict the reach of judicial review over some matters.208  
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For present purposes, these evolutionary type of changes tend to be generational and 
relatively benign. They do not present the volatile instability that is of particular concern under 
the rubric of instability, as identified by Fuller.  
On a more micro level, though, the openness of the scheme to judicial manipulation does 
challenge the ideal of stability. The covert ability of judges to vary the depth of review through 
classification process means that, in effect, outcomes are more fluid than the formal regime 
admits. Thus, overall, the schema can present a degree of instability, due to the latent judicial 
discretion involved.      
Non-contradiction and coherence 
The scope of review approach is characterised by its doctrinal morass and the lack of any 
organising theory. Multifarious categories implicitly determine the depth of scrutiny but the 
distinctions often overlap and intersect. No schematic harmony is evident. Conclusory labels 
such as jurisdictional error or ultra vires merely signal judicial intervention, rather than 
providing shape for the underlying doctrine. The covert role of discretion and dissonance 
between the potential formal and tacit judicial methodologies exacerbates the lack of doctrinal 
coherence. De Smith lamented that ‘no uniformity characterises the scope of review’ in English 
law and said this necessitated the articulation of the circumstances of judicial intervention 
‘either in minute detail or at a high level of generality’.209 It was, as Gageler described, ‘just a 
mass of case law’, without any organising theory.210 Similarly, Australian judges display a 
preference for ‘bottom-up’, rather than ‘top-down’, legal reasoning.211 Gageler captures the 
distinction as follows:212 
In ‘top down’ reasoning the judge or legal analyst adopts a theory about an area of law. The 
theory is then used to organise and explain the case; to marginalise some and to canonise others. 
In ‘bottom up’ reasoning the judge or legal analyst starts with a mass of cases or the legislative 
text and moves only so far as necessary to resolve the case at hand. 
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Rather than adopting ‘an open-textured, common-law approach to administrative law’, Cane 
speaks of Australian judges deploying ‘a more technical style of reasoning focused on statutory 
interpretation’.213 The centrality of jurisdictional error also discloses a ‘preference to work 
within existing historic or doctrinal categories’.214 It emphasizes the Australian aversion to 
overarching and generalised principles and preference for incremental doctrinal development 
based on previous cases and categories.215  
Coherence requires a degree of doctrinal unity and harmony, a feature generally lacking 
under the scope of review approach. 
Non-impossibility and practicality     
On its face, the scope of review schema also presents itself well in terms of practicality. The 
maintenance of a strong distinction between law on the one hand, and fact and policy on the 
other, makes the litigation process relatively straightforward. Its less intrusive style and focus 
on law means the evidential corpus required is modest. Questions of law can be resolved 
without resort to extensive evidence. Highly deferential approaches to fact-finding, substance, 
and the quality of the decision mean little evidence or context is required. Intervention on such 
matters is only justified when it is manifest or readily apparent from the decision itself, avoiding 
the need for close forensic examination. This focus colours the style of advocacy required. The 
categorisation focus foreshortens the style of argumentation. The language and logic of law is 
encouraged, rather than more normative and value-laden debate. To this extent, it is convenient 
and expedient.  
The potential for covert judicial discretion and manipulation in order to achieve normative 
outcomes places a significant gloss on this, however. The true motives and basis for 
intervention are not readily transparent and makes the focus of cases unpredictable. This makes 
it risky for litigation to presume the case will only be decided on formal terms and based on 
the restricted set of material mandated by the simplified form of procedure.  
Congruence and candour 
This schema is particularly prone to judicial manipulation, as is evident from much of this 
analysis. For example, many of the rules have a conclusory character. And the key distinctions 
 
213  Cane, ‘Australian Administrative Law’ (n 29) 133. Cane attributes this, in part, to the ADJR Act. 
214  Taggart, ‘Exceptionalism’ (n 34) 9. 
215  Aronson identifies an increasingly preference on the part of  the High Court to ‘fine tune’ existing 
principles rather than reshaping general ones: Aronson, ‘Variable Standards’ (n 34) 22. 
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are porous and depend on judicial judgement. The judicial process of classification is often 
contrived – with tacit sanction – in order to ameliorate the short-comings of a framework 
constructed on strict categories and bright line distinctions.216 Thus, there is discord between 
rule-expression and rule-application and a lack of candour is exhibited. 
Hortatory versatility 
The absence of clarity means the schema is ill-suited as a hortatory device. It is difficult to 
detect from it a series of norms which can readily be utilised beyond judicial review in any 
collateral or educative role. The catalogue of situations where the courts will intervene or not 
is too technical – and, at times, too inconsistent – to provide instructive messaging for the 
bureaucracy. Moreover, the emphasis on matters jurisdictional, as seen especially in Australia, 
as a generalised overarching principle is too abstract and conclusory to have meaningful 
educative or structuring value. It is barely sustainable for those operating with knowledge and 
expertise within the system; it is, inevitably, a mystery for those outside it. As Harlow and 
Rawlings note, vires-based explanations of judicial review tend to emphasize the directing and 
limiting functions of judicial review, rather than the hortatory or educative aspects.217 
V Conclusion 
The language of scope of review was noticeable in the first four editions of de Smith’s text, 
recognising the then dominance of categorical formalism in English law. That style of review 
continues to this day in Australia, where jurisdiction operates as the lodestar of the judicial 
method. Those scholars supporting it generally profess a conservative vision for judicial review: 
influenced heavily by the distinction between law and merits, and anxious to ensure the courts 
honour and give effect to signals from the legislature. 
From a normative perspective, the virtues of the scope of review schema are off-set by its 
two-track nature: that is, where the overt and covert are intertwined. Ostensibly, the formality 
of the method and emphasis on general rules provides value in terms of the efficacy of the 
scheme, particularly in terms of generality, prospectivity, stability and practicality. But the 
complexity of the promulgated rules means clarity and coherence suffer, and the schema fails 
therefore to exhibit hortatory versatility. The virtue of the rule-based system is undone by the 
failure of the rules to capture and express the underlying normative principles of administrative 
justice and good governance, leaving open, and perhaps condoning, the covert influence of 
judges’ normative instincts. 
 
216  Sian Elias, ‘Righting Administrative Law’ in Dyzenhaus, Hunt, Huscroft (n 34) 71. 
217  Harlow and Rawlings (n 90) 728. 
  
3  
Grounds of  Review 
I Introduction 
The grounds of review schema is based, as the label suggests, on a few generalised ‘grounds’ 
or ‘heads’ of review. The most famous formulation is the tripartite statement of illegality, 
procedural impropriety and irrationality, with the potential for further grounds to be added.1 
The grounds are designed to capture, in systematic and simplified form, the circumstances in 
which the courts are prepared to intervene. This continues the indirect and categorical 
approach to the determination of the depth of scrutiny but with a different emphasis. The 
depth of review is captured by a few grounds, more generalised and expressed with a degree 
of abstraction. But, as with the scope of review approach, classification – in this case, based on 
which ground is engaged – dominates the mediation of the balance between vigilance and 
restraint. In some cases the grounds manifest a depth of scrutiny which is strict; in others it is 
deferential.  
 The grounds of review schema was adopted as the organisational framework for much of 
de Smith’s text from the fifth edition onwards. Since Lord Diplock’s seminal speech in Council 
of Civil Service Unions (CCSU), a grounds of review approach continues to be the prevailing 
method in England and New Zealand.2 In contrast, grounds do not occupy such a preeminent 
role in Canada and Australia, although grounds expressed in this style are not unknown.  
The abstracted approach to the expression of the circumstances of intervention finds 
support amongst some from the common law school. The judge-created grounds express a 
series of generalised norms about how public power ought to be exercised; a number of 
 
1  See pt IIB. 
2  [1985] AC 374. 
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scholars champion the articulation of common law values in this generalised way, without the 
need to (torturously, they say) link the basis of intervention back to legislative intent and 
notions of vires. Notions of legality, rationality and justice, drawn from the common law, 
provides sufficient foundation.  
The guidance provided by generalised grounds exhibits a degree of rule-structure, which 
means the approach measures up well against Fuller’s principles of efficacy. The systemisation 
of the circumstances of intervention into simplified form aids clarity, practicality, coherence 
and congruence in application. However, pressures to evolve additional grounds of review, in 
order to express more nuanced degrees of scrutiny, undercut these virtues to some extent. The 
indirectness by which the depth of review is calibrated – both in relation to the traditional and 
emergent grounds – also places a gloss on the performance of the schema.  
II Doctrinal Manifestation 
The ‘grounds of review’ label, while not unique, is drawn particularly from the fifth and later 
editions of de Smith’s textbook, following Lord Diplock’s tripartite expression of grounds in 
CCSU. After tracing the language and role in de Smith’s textbook, I explain the currency of 
grounds in the English and New Zealand systems of judicial review. I also briefly explain how 
any limited appearance of grounds in Australian and Canadian law is overshadowed by other 
techniques.  
A De Smith derivation 
The framework of grounds of review became prominent in the fifth edition of de Smith 
following a major reorganisation of the text. The language of scope of review was replaced 
with ‘grounds of review’. Lord Diplock’s tripartite statement of grounds of review from CCSU 
is adopted as its organising principle for much of the fifth and sixth editions.3 The grounds of 
review identified by Lord Diplock were conscripted as chapter headings in the heart of de 
Smith’s text.4  
Initially, the new authors referred to the language of grounds of review somewhat 
equivocally; Woolf and Jowell said the part of the text in the fifth edition elaborating the 
 
3  Five chapters were devoted to ‘procedural fairness’ (chs 8-12) and one each to ‘illegality’ (ch 7) and the 
‘unreasonable exercise of  power’ (ch 13). For a contemporaneous endorsement of  this reorganisation, see 
Cosmo Graham (1995) 3 EPL 149 (book review). 
4  The suitability of  the grounds of  review for ‘chapter headings’ has been noted some years before by Lord 
Donaldson: see de Smith (5th edn) 294, citing Lord Donaldson in R (Brind) v Secretary of  State for the Home 
Department [1991] 1 AC 696, 722. 
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circumstances in which judicial intervention may arise ‘deals with what are loosely called 
“grounds” of review’.5 Any tentativeness about the language was not matched by the 
pervasiveness of their deployment though. Lord Diplock’s grounds of review were said to 
provide ‘a useful structure to help delineate the bounds of the unlawful decision’.6 And the 
seven chapters in the part entitled ‘Grounds of Review’ that followed adopted Lord Diplock’s 
structure and formulation, with only minor modifications to the language. They pointed to the 
growing mainstreaming of this tripartite schema, a decade after its genesis in CCSU, to justify 
its adoption: ‘This classification has been generally adopted in practice and usefully provides 
three distinct ways in which decisions may fall short of lawful standards’.7 This tripartite 
structure found favour in other texts and treatise on judicial review,8 and it has been suggested 
that the tripartite grounds are ‘[u]sually cited as the basis of the modern doctrine of judicial 
review’.9 Woolf and Jowell cautioned, however, against interpreting the framework too rigidly. 
‘Adopting this classification does not mechanically assign any particular administrative offence 
to any one of the categories’, they said.10 Overlap and classification under multiple grounds 
were acknowledged. It was also conceded that the judicial dicta acknowledging the grounds 
were not exhaustive.11 
Lord Diplock’s grounds of review were entrenched in the sixth edition, with them 
continuing as the organisational backbone of the text, without any of the earlier tentativeness 
about their currency.12 The caveat that the grounds were ‘by no mean self-contained’ 
continued, and the possibility of the emergence of other grounds – then particularly, ‘abuse of 
power’ – was noted.13 Some chapters in the sixth edition were, however, recast to reflect 
contemporary developments. Most notably, the chapter entitled ‘The Unreasonable Exercise 
of Power’ was anointed with a much broader label, ‘Substantive Review and Justification’ – 
 
5  De Smith (5th edn) ix. 
6  ibid ix and 293, adopting the grounds from CCSU (n 2) 410. See text to n 21. 
7  De Smith (5th edn) 293. Woolf  and Jowell said they started revising the textbook 5 years after CCSU was 
decided, even though the edition was not published until 1995; de Smith (5th edn) viii. 
8  See nn 34 and 35. 
9  Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, CUP 2009) 10. 
10  De Smith (5th edn) 294. 
11  ibid 294. The authors pointed to Lord Scarman’s caveat in R (Nottinghamshire CC) v Secretary of  State for the 
Environment, [1986] AC 240, 249 (‘valuable, and already ‘classical,’ but certainly not exhaustive’). Lord 
Diplock’s itself  speech also left the door open for the development of  other grounds: CCSU (n 2) 410. 
12  De Smith (6th edn) vii; (7th edn) viii. 
13  De Smith (6th edn) vii; (7th edn) viii.  
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thereby encompassing irrational, unreasonableness and disproportionate decisions.14 The 
authors expressed surprise about the extent of developments under this ground, but boldly 
asserted:15 
Substantive review is now fully recognised, prompted in particular by the more intense scrutiny 
that has been accorded to cases where human rights (or ‘constitutional rights’ as they are now 
explicitly called) are engaged, and where the concept of proportionality is applied. 
The consolidation of commentary on legitimate expectations, blending legitimate 
expectations either triggering procedural fairness or protecting substantive outcomes, saw 
some departure from Lord Diplock’s tripartite schema. The authors were vague about whether 
this change was a consequence of the recognition of legitimate expectation as a self-standing 
ground of review or was adopted merely for pragmatic purposes; they hinted at both.16 
Proportionality is also marked out for extensive treatment, but again its potential status as a 
ground as review in its own right was left open. Proportionality, in the sense of both ‘a test of 
fair balance’ and ‘a structured test of justifiability’,17 is addressed under the more general rubric 
of substantive review and justification.18 The authors identify the established, but 
circumscribed, role for proportionality when reviewing directly effective European 
Community law and human rights adjudication under the Human Rights Act 1998;19 the 
unresolved question of whether it should be mandated as a ground of review (either in addition 
to, or in substitution for, the unreasonableness ground) was also highlighted.20 The treatment 
of these emergent grounds is, we will see, consistent with the evolutionary aspects of the 
grounds of review schema. 
 
14  De Smith (6th edn) ch 11. 
15  De Smith (6th edn) ix; (7th edn) ix. 
16  De Smith (6th edn) ix; (7th edn) ix. They noted they had previously discussed substantive legitimate 
expectations in the context of  unreasonable decisions, ‘where it was then just emerging as a substantive 
ground’. 
17  De Smith (6th edn) 543, 585 and 586; (7th edn) 588, 629 and 630. 
18  See text to n 100. 
19  De Smith (6th edn) 584; (7th edn) 627. 
20  De Smith (6th edn) 585; (7th edn) 628. Particular reference was made to Dyson LJ’s dicta in R (Association 
of  British Civilian Internees) v Secretary of  State for Defence [2003] QB 1397 ([33]-[35]) questioning whether 
Wednesbury should be given its burial rights. 
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B England: Lord Diplock’s CCSU grounds 
As mentioned, the grounds of review schema became the dominant organising framework in 
English judicial review since Lord Diplock’s speech in CCSU:21  
[O]ne can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action 
is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality,’ the second 
‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety. 
Lord Diplock had been instrumental in the development of, as he put it, ‘a comprehensive 
system of administrative law’.22 His tripartite statement of the grounds of judicial review – 
‘illegality’, ‘procedural impropriety’, and ‘irrationality’ – represented an important move in the 
systemisation of judicial review. Lord Diplock also acknowledged his tripartite statement 
should not fetter the development of further grounds on ‘a case by case basis’ (a point returned 
to in detail later).23 Somewhat overshadowed by Lord Diplock’s speech, Lord Roskill also 
echoed the tripartite formulation of grounds in CCSU;24 he endorsed the ‘new nomenclature’ 
adopted by Lord Diplock, noting that the ‘words … have the great advantage of making clear 
the differences between each ground’.25 
Lord Diplock’s statement of grounds has since assumed a certain cachet in administrative 
law, although there is nothing special about it being cast in tripartite form. As Forsyth notes, 
the threefold formula ‘immediately went canonical’.26 The grounds were endorsed and adopted 
as a doctrinal framework in numerous cases, including at the highest level in Brind,27 Wheeler,28 
Boddington,29 and Nottinghamshire CC.30 Years after their exposition, Fordham argues the 
 
21  CCSU (n 2) 410. See also the modulation of  heightened scrutiny, light touch review and doctrinal deference 
in England (ch 4 pt IIC), along with instances of  contextual review and non-doctrinal deference (ch 5 pt 
IID).  
22  R (National Federation of  Self  Employed and Small Businesses Ltd) v IRC [1982] AC 617, 641. Indeed, Lord 
Diplock described these developments as ‘the great achievement’ of  the English courts in his judicial 
lifetime. For an account of  his influence, see Lord Woolf, ‘The Role of  the English Judiciary in Developing 
Public Law’ (1986) 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 669. 
23  CCSU (n 2) 410.  
24  ibid 414 (‘three separate grounds’: ‘error of  law’, ‘exercises a power in so unreasonable a manner that the 
exercise becomes open to review upon what are called, in lawyers’ shorthand, Wednesbury principles’, ‘acted 
contrary to [the] ‘principles of  natural justice’). 
25  ibid. 
26  Christopher F Forsyth, ‘Council of  Civil Service Unions v Minister of  Civil Service (1985)’ in Peter Cane and 
Joanne Conaghan (eds), The New Oxford Companion to Law (OUP 2008) 245.  
27  Brind (n 4) 722, 750. 
28  Wheeler v Leicester CC [1985] AC 1054, 1078. 
29  Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143, 152. 
30  R (Nottinghamshire CC) v Secretary of  State for the Environment [1986] AC 240, 249 (‘valuable, and already 
“classical”’), 
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threefold classification appears ‘largely intact’ (despite other significant change in public law) 
and ‘remains the most helpful outline’, even if some ‘trendier’ labels have continued to 
emerge.31 Many English administrative law texts also adopt or endorse the authoritative nature 
of the statement. De Smith’s text was reorganised around these grounds of review, as outlined 
earlier. Harlow and Rawlings contend the tripartite statement is ‘[u]sually cited as the basis of 
the modern doctrine of judicial review’.32 Wade and Forsyth included the famous passage from 
the speech in a separate appendix, acknowledging the frequent reference throughout their text 
to Lord Diplock’s ‘exposition of the principles of judicial review.’33 Similar acknowledgement 
of the special status of the statement is found in a number of other academic textbooks.34 In 
addition, the grounds permeate academic and practice texts and guides, with the tripartite 
grounds adopted as a framework for analysing the basis on which judges will impugn decisions 
of public bodies and officials.35 
While Lord Diplock’s tripartite statement is generally regarded as the leading expression of 
the grounds of review, it is by no means the only one. Other English judges have also sought 
to summarise the grounds of review, sometimes expressing them with slightly different 
variants. For example, Lord Templeman in Preston identified the grounds of review as when a 
decision-maker ‘exceeds its powers, commits an error of law, commits a breach of natural 
justice, reaches a decision which no reasonable tribunal could have reached or abuses its 
powers’.36 More recently, Lord Bingham in Corner House Research expressed the grounds of 
review in more positive terms.37 
 
31  Michael Fordham, ‘Surveying the Grounds’ in Peter Leyland and Terry Woods (eds), Administrative Law 
Facing the Future (OUP 1997) 184, 185 (notably, ‘want of  due process’ for procedural impropriety and ‘abuse 
of  power’ for irrationality). 
32  Harlow and Rawlings (n 9) 107.  
33  William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (9th edn, OUP 2004) 999. 
34  See eg John Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law (6th edn, Palgrave 2007) 379 (‘I shall organise the 
grounds of  judicial review on the basis of  Lord Diplock’s classification in CCSU’); AW Bradley and KD 
Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (14th edn, Pearson 2007) 727; Jeffrey Jowell, ‘The Rule of  Law 
and its Underlying Values’ in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (6 edn, OUP 
2007) 5, 226 (‘We have followed the well-known division of  grounds of  review enunciated by Lord Diplock 
in the GCHQ case’).  
35  See eg Michael Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (5th edn, Hart 2008) [P45] (‘unlawfulness’, 
‘unreasonableness’, ‘unfairness’); Treasury Solicitor, The Judge Over Your Shoulder (4th edn, 2006) [2.5]; 
Halsbury’s Laws of  England, ‘Administrative Law’, [1238] and ‘Judicial Review’ [602]; Lord Neuberger and 
others Civil Court Practice 2009 (the Green Book) (LexisNexis 2009-) [CPR 54.1[3A]]. 
36  R (Preston) v IRC [1985] AC 835, 862. 
37  R (Corner House Research) v Director of  Serious Fraud Office [2009] 1 AC 756, [32]. 
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Occasionally, some judges have also sought to articulate a singular overarching principle of 
judicial review, in combination with the identification of particular instances of intervention 
analogous with Lord Diplock’s grounds of review. For example, Lord Brightman in Puhlhofer 
articulated a single ground of ‘abuse of power’, but explained its constituent elements in similar 
terms to Lord Diplock: ‘bad faith, a mistake in construing the limits of the power, a procedural 
irregularity, or unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense – unreasonableness verging on an 
absurdity’.38 
Alternative judicial expression of the grounds does not take away from the general scheme 
of categorical grounds of review. Variation in how the grounds is expressed are not always 
material. As explained earlier, the case-by-case nature and instrumentalism of the common law 
means judges are rarely called on to address the overarching doctrinal schema of judicial 
review.39 Their focus is usually on one or two particular grounds of review, not their universal 
expression. Any comprehensive statement of the grounds of review is often dictum, made in 
passing. Certainly, none of the alternative expressions purport to represent the systemisation 
of the discipline that coloured Lord Diplock’s exposition.  
While marginal differences do not undercut the role of grounds of review as a schematic 
framework, deviations within the framework itself may be significant in themselves. They may 
be the realisation of the evolutionary dimension of the grounds of review framework, including 
lexical changes which signal substantive changes to the grounds themselves.40 The extent to 
which the grounds of review have evolved beyond the traditional three grounds is addressed 
in detail later. For present purposes, the important point is that none of the evolutionary 
developments have seriously repugned the framework of the established grounds. 
Similarly, the schematic approaches of textbooks are not uniform, even when organising 
their analysis around grounds of review. ‘Unfortunately, there is no general agreement on how 
to classify the grounds of review and textbooks take different approaches’, Le Sueur laments.41 
‘[T]he same material is divided up in quite different ways, with different chapter headings and 
 
38  R (Puhlhofer) v Hillingdon LBC [1986] AC 484, 518. See also Nottinghamshire (n 30), 250 (‘abuse of  power’); 
R (Bancoult) v Secretary of  State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2008] QB 365 (Sedley LJ) [60]-[61] 
(‘abuse of  power’). See TRS Allan, ‘The Constitutional Foundations of  Judicial Review’ (2002) 61 CLJ 87, 
113-115. For further discussion of  a singular abuse of  power standard, see ch 5 pt II. 
39  See ch 1 pt II above. 
40  Andrew Le Sueur, Javan Herberg and Rosalind English, Principles of  Public Law (2nd edn, Cavendish 1999) 
226.  
41  Le Sueur, Herberg and English (n 40) 226. 
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subheadings.’42 As identified, it is quite common to adopt Lord Diplock’s tripartite statement; 
however, a range of other approaches are also adopted. For example, Craig’s substantive 
analysis of judicial review is crafted around a series of chapters, the topics of which emulate an 
expanded set of grounds of review.43 Wade and Forsyth commend Lord Diplock’s statement 
of grounds, but diffuse the circumstances of judicial intervention throughout the text; again, 
though shades of the tripartite grounds are evident.44 While some variation is evident amongst 
textbook writers and commentators, this does not unduly undermine the nature of grounds of 
review as a doctrinal framework. As Le Sueur notes, to some degree, differences may be ‘merely 
terminological and organisational’.45 The grounds of review are amalgamations of various bases 
of intervention; the alternative expressions are typically disaggregated versions of the tripartite 
grounds. 
Turning to the operation of the schema and its mediation of vigilance and restraint, the 
depth of scrutiny is modulated in four different ways: 
(a) selection of the applicable grounds of review, through a process of classification, from the 
potentially overlapping tripartite grounds; 
(b) evolution, through the recognition of alternative grounds of review manifesting different 
degrees of intensity; 
(c) reformulation of the traditional grounds (albeit such efforts have been largely 
unsuccessful); and 
(d) circumscription of the ordinarily available grounds of review. 
Classification 
First, the grounds of review tend to overlap, potentially allowing errors to be classified under 
multiple grounds. Indeed, many judges, including the architects of the tripartite grounds, have 
warned about approaching the three-fold division too clinically.46 As will be shown, though, 
the distinctions on which these grounds are based tend to break down.47 This style of 
 
42  ibid 226. 
43  PP Craig, Administrative Law (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) ch 12-21.  
44  Wade and Forsyth (n 33) ch 7-14.  
45  Le Sueur, Herberg and English (n 40), 226. 
46  See eg Boddington (n 29) 152, 170 (‘the grounds ‘are not water tight compartments’; ‘different grounds of  
review “run into one another”’); Wheeler (n 28) 1078 (‘nor are they mutually exclusive’). See also R 
(Oladenhinde) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [1991] 1 AC 254, 280.  
47 Michael Taggart, ‘Administrative Law’ [2006] NZ Law Rev 75, 83.  
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modulation is best illustrated by reference to some of the key dichotomies in judicial review: 
law vs fact and law vs discretion. 
Turning first to the dichotomy between law and fact. Under the grounds of review schema, 
an alleged error may be classified as one of law or fact, enabling different depth of review.48 If 
the error is one of law, then the court can express its own view on whether the decision is 
correct; if it is a factual error, the deferential Wednesbury standard of unreasonableness would 
ordinarily apply. The commentary in de Smith reflects this unstable division between law and 
fact. As in earlier editions, Woolf and Jowell spend some time addressing the boundary 
between law and fact, which they repeat, ‘is not easy to perceive’.49 While noting that the courts 
generally leave the assessment of fact to the primary decision-maker, Woolf and Jowell note 
that factual error ‘can just as easily be absorbed into a traditional legal ground of review’.50 
Other commentators are similarly sceptical, doubting whether there is a sound analytical 
approach to the distinction and suggesting that pragmatic considerations must be in play. For 
example, Williams explained that the use of the terms ‘law’ and ‘fact’ in this context are ‘simply 
flexible concepts that can be used to contain or conceal more pragmatic reasoning’.51 Even 
more manipulable is the classification of a question as a mixed question of law and fact. This 
conjugated label has been described as ‘one of the baffling gadgets in the judicial toolbox’.52 It 
allows vigilant or restrained review, depending on judicial preference.  
Two particular examples illustrate this type of modulation of intensity, in the context of the 
law–fact dichotomy. The first, illustrated by the Puhlhofer case, demonstrates the difficulty in 
determining whether a particular administrative finding is based on any (mis-)understanding of 
law or factual judgement.53 In Puhlhofer, the entitlement to government housing assistance 
depended on being homeless, that is, whether the couple had ‘no accommodation’. The local 
 
48 Timothy Endicott, ‘Questions of  Law’ (1998) 114 LQR 292; Paul Craig, ‘Judicial Review, Appeal and 
Factual Error’ [2004] PL 788; Rebecca Williams, ‘When is an Error not an Error?’ [2007] PL 793; HWR 
Wade, ‘Anglo-American Administrative Law’ (1966) 82 LQR 226. 
49  De Smith (5th edn) 277, 277-289.  
50  De Smith (5th edn) 288; (6th edn) 562-569.  
51  Williams (n 48) 798. See also Endicott (n 48) 320 (‘must be pursuing some sort of  inarticulate pragmatic 
approach, which leads to the all sorts of  inconsistency because its motivating principles are silent and 
undeveloped’); Craig, ‘Factual Error’ (n 48) 788. 
52  Endicott (n 48) 301. 
53 Puhlhofer v Hillingdon London BC [1986] AC 484. See Jones v First Tier Tribunal (Rev 1) [2013] 2 AC 48 (Lord 
Carnwath) for recent judicial acknowledgement of  the fact that ‘the division between law and fact … is 
not purely objective’ ([46]) adopting his extra-judicial comments that the classification need also take into 
account expediency and policy (‘Tribunal Justice’ [2009] PL 48, 63). 
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authority declined assistance because the couple were living temporarily in a bed and breakfast 
– without cooking or laundry facilities – and were therefore not homeless. But was the alleged 
error on the part of the local authority an error of law (the local authority misinterpreting the 
meaning of accommodation) or one of fact (the bed and breakfast was wrongly classified as 
accommodation)? Ultimately, the House of Lords ruled the critical determination was a factual 
one; thus intervention was only justified under the irrationality ground if the determination was 
manifestly unreasonable. But it was also plausible for the determination to be classified as a 
question of law, which would have entailed more vigilant review.54 The uncertainty in 
classification leaves it open to the courts to deploy differing degrees of scrutiny, ostensibly on 
normative, not descriptive, reasons. 
Secondly, factual findings not normally subject to close scrutiny under the irrationality 
ground may be treated as giving rise to an instance of illegality.55 Sometimes justified under the 
‘jurisdictional or precedent fact’ principle, if a factual finding is a statutory pre-condition to the 
exercise of power the courts sometimes (but not always) subject the factual circumstances or 
criteria to closer review, assessing whether, in their view, it is satisfied.56 The reasoning goes as 
follows. Where the legislative framework dictates that the presence of a particular fact is a 
precondition to the exercise of a statutory power, certain administrative action is only permitted 
if a particular fact is established. Acting in the absence of the fact being established would be 
acting without any legal authority or jurisdiction, thereby justifying the greater scrutiny seen 
under the unlawfulness ground of review. But, as will be shown, the syntactical nature of a 
precondition is not always determinative and the courts are still sometimes reluctant to apply 
an exacting eye to certain factual preconditions.  
The exemplar case is R (Khawaja) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, where immigrants 
successfully challenged moves to deport them.57 The power to deport was conditional on a 
factual determination that the immigrants were ‘illegal entrants’. Because the contested 
determination – that the immigrants were ‘illegal entrants’ – was a ‘precedent or jurisdictional 
fact’, the House of Lords was prepared to assess itself whether the factual precondition existed 
or not. This vigilant approach has not been replicated, however, where the factual pre-
 
54  Endicott (n 48) 298. 
55  Mark Elliott, Beatson, Matthews and Elliott's Administrative Law (4th edn, OUP 2011) 61. 
56  See ch 2, text to n 103 for earlier treatment in the scope of  review era. 
57  [1984] AC 74, overruling R (Zamir) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [1980] AC 930. See also R 
(Zerek) v Fulham, Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal [1951] 2 KB 1.  
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condition is slightly indeterminate or involves a degree of evaluation and judgement. While 
these factual preconditions present the same jurisdictional problems as more objective or 
determinate facts, the courts have shown greater reticence and reverted to supervising by the 
more deferential Wednesbury unreasonableness approach.58 For example, in South Yorkshire 
Transport, the House of Lords declined to treat the factual determination of whether or not a 
transport company was operating in ‘a substantial part of the United Kingdom’, when that 
determination operated as a threshold for investigation by a fair trading commission.59 Lord 
Mustill said a ‘clear-cut approach’ cannot be applied in every case of jurisdictional pre-
conditions, especially where the relevant criterion is imprecise.60 In such cases, the court can 
intervene ‘if the decision is so aberrant that it cannot be classed as rational’.61  
The flexible nature of this style of categorisation is therefore obvious. In some cases, 
statutory preconditions are treated as touching matters of law; in others, they are treated in the 
same way as ordinary fact-finding and only subjected to deferential review under the 
irrationality ground. The elastic nature of the classification problem is seen vividly in the recent 
case of R (A) v London Borough of Croydon,62 where the Supreme Court decided different elements 
within the same factual precondition should be subject to different degrees of scrutiny. The 
critical provision required a local authority to provide accommodation for any ‘child in need 
within their area’. The Supreme Court ruled that if there was a dispute about a local authority’s 
factual finding about whether a person was actually a ‘child’ (based on doubts about official 
documents), it was for the courts on judicial review to ‘determine where the truth lies on the 
evidence available’, with ‘no margin of discretion’ applying.63 However, this strict standard of 
scrutiny did not apply to the corresponding element ‘in need’, which would continue to be 
challengeable only on Wednesbury grounds.64 The approach ultimately turned on the objective 
character of the term ‘child’, in contrast to the evaluative nature of the balance of the 
precondition. 
This distinction between law and discretion also presents a subtle re-classification choice to 
judges. The intensity applied by the courts to legal questions is strict, in contrast to the 
 
58  Elliott (n 55) 77. 
59  R (South Yorkshire Transport) v Monopolies and Mergers Commission [1993] 1 WLR 23. 
60  ibid 32. 
61  ibid. 
62  [2009] 1 WLR 2557. 
63  R (A) (n 58) [46] and [54]. While the Court did not formally resolve whether the precondition amounted 
to a jurisdictional or precedent fact, Lady Hale made her views plain in her concluding obiter remark: ‘If  
ever there were a jurisdictional fact, it might be thought, this is it.’ ([32]). 
64  ibid [26]. 
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deferential approach adopted to reviewing the exercise of discretion. Therefore, treating the 
influence of an external norm such as human rights as speaking to questions of legality – rather 
than as a factor which must be taken into account in the exercise of discretion – affects the 
depth of review applied. Both courses remain open to a supervising court under common law 
review, and the choice between both allows the significant modulation of the intensity of 
review.  
The best example of this is the principle of legality, which adopts a strict approach to 
compliance with human rights norms under the illegality ground.65 The courts read down legal 
powers to avoid conflict with (so-called) ‘fundamental’ or ‘constitutional’ rights except where 
legislation necessarily authorises the rights being limited.66 The judicial method applied is a 
strict one, in contrast to the soft-edged evaluation that would otherwise take place under the 
unreasonableness ground (under either the Wednesbury test or, arguably, any stricter 
formulation).67 The application of the principle, under the guise of the legality ground rather 
than irrationality, produces ‘high-intensity review’.68 Indeed, the principle of legality is 
occasionally identified as a sibling to the principle of anxious scrutiny under the 
unreasonableness ground, because both have been deployed by judges to enable more intensive 
protection of human rights.69  
Notable cases where this methodology was adopted include R (Pierson) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department70 and R (Simms) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.71 In Pierson, a 
prisoner serving a life sentence had been told he would serve a tariff period of at least 15 years 
in prison before being considered for parole but the Home Secretary subsequently raised the 
 
65  See generally Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (n 35) [46.2]; Michael Fordham and Thomas De La Mare, 
‘Anxious Scrutiny, the Principle of  Legality and the Human Rights Act’ [2001] JR 40; David Dyzenhaus, 
Murray Hunt and Michael Taggart, ‘The Principle of  Legality in Administrative Law’ (2001) 1 OUCLJ 5, 
20; Philip Sales, ‘A Comparison of  the Principle of  Legality and Section 3 of  the Human Rights Act 1998’ 
[2009] LQR 598; Thomas Poole, ‘Justice, Rights, and Judicial Humility’ [2000] JR 106.  
66  These adjectives remain ambiguous. Hickman attributes the advent of  the adjective ‘fundamental’ in 
relation to rights to Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446, where Lord Scarman noted that the modifier was 
‘unfamiliar to common lawyers’ due to the absence of  written constitutional rights: Tom Hickman, Public 
Law after the Human Rights Act (Hart 2010) 17. See also Laws LJ’s remarks in International Transport that ‘the 
common law has come to recognise and endorse the notion of  constitutional or fundamental rights’ 
(International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728, [71]).  
67  The nature of  the deferential standard under the unreasonableness ground, including its variegated and 
stricter formulations, is discussed below: see ch 4 pt IIC. 
68  Fordham and de le Mare (n 65) 45. 
69  De Smith (6th edn) 242-247, 569-570, and 594-595 and Fordham and de le Mare (n 65). 
70  [1998] AC 539.  
71  [2000] 2 AC 115.  
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tariff period to 20 years. In ruling the Home Secretary’s actions unlawful, two Lords referred 
to a general interpretative principle that general legislative wording should be read subject to 
human rights. Lord Browne-Wilkinson articulated the interpretative approach as a general 
principle:72  
A power conferred by Parliament in general terms is not to be taken to authorise the doing of 
acts by the donee of the power which adversely affect the legal rights of a citizen or the basic 
principles on which the law of the United Kingdom is based unless the statute conferring the 
power makes it clear that such was the intention of Parliament.  
Describing it as a ‘spirit of legality’, Lord Steyn drew an analogy with the long-standing 
presumption that powers granted to public bodies and officials must be exercised consistently 
with the common law principle of procedural fairness.73 The principle also gained support in 
Simms, when the House of Lords overturned a blanket ban on prisoners giving interviews to 
journalists. Lord Hoffmann said: ‘In the absence of express language or necessary implication 
to the contrary, the courts … presume that even the most general words were intended to be 
subject to the basic rights of the individual.’74 Lord Steyn echoed these sentiments, expressing 
a ‘presumption of general application operating as a constitutional principle’ that if a 
‘fundamental or basic right’ was at stake the provisions should where possible be interpreted 
consistently with those rights.75  
The translation of the interplay between rights norms and other factors from discretion to 
law, gives rise to potential variability, enabling judges to deploy greater scrutiny if they consider 
the human rights dimensions or higher level norms justify it. The conditions under which this 
maximum intensity can be deployed are not definitive. First, conflict with a ‘fundamental 
human right’ must be identified; however, as these human rights norms are by definition 
unenumerated, the set of recognised rights is pliable. Secondly, it must be established that it 
was not the express or implied legislative intent of Parliament to mandate restrictions on those 
rights when conferring the discretionary power. The threshold for reliance on the principle of 
legality is therefore versatile, giving the doctrine the character of variable intensity.  
Evolution 
When the grounds were encapsulated in their tripartite formulation, the door was also left open 
for other grounds of review to develop.76 These emergent grounds present different depths of 
 
72  Pierson (n 70) 573.  
73  ibid 575. 
74  Simms (n 71) 131.  
75  ibid 130. 
76  CCSU (n 2) 410. 
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scrutiny – usually more vigilant intensity – to the traditional tripartite grounds. The recognition 
of potential development of other grounds of review brings other dimensions of variability to 
the judicial method. This variability is both immediate (where a ground has been recognised 
within the overall schema) and longer-term (where a ground is able to be explored as 
prospective ground). Moreover, the emergent grounds tend not to have the universal 
application of the traditional tripartite grounds; the narrower gateways to reliance on them adds 
another layer of classification, which further augments the variability associated with them.  
Lord Diplock acknowledged further grounds may develop on ‘a case by case basis’, noting 
particularly the possibility of that proportionality might be recognised as a ground of review.77 
The possibility that the suite of grounds might be enlarged was also noted in a number of cases 
that endorsed the tripartite formulation. While acknowledging the value of the tripartite 
statement, Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire was quick to note that it was ‘certainly not 
exhaustive analysis of the grounds upon which courts will embark on the judicial review’.78 
Similarly, Lord Roskill in Wheeler repeated the three grounds were not exhaustive and ‘further 
grounds may hereafter require to’;79 subsequently in Brind he stressed that ‘any such 
development would be likely to be on a case by case basis’.80  
 A number of additional or alternative grounds have been promoted; some grounds have 
achieved some recognition, although none seem to have yet achieved the same exalted status 
of the traditional tripartite grounds. The slightly opaque status of grounds of review make it 
difficult to definitively assess whether and when a basis for judicial intervention is sufficiently 
recognised so as to be regarded as a ground of review. First, as explained earlier, the focus on 
individual cases means judges are often agnostic to the overall schema of judicial review and 
may not herald such developments, beyond identifying an error as a justifiable basis for 
intervention. 
Secondly, the overlapping and multi-dimensional nature of grounds of review mean their 
genesis is often interwoven with an existing ground of review. Potential grounds of review are 
sometimes adopted merely as touchstones which may indicate another ground of review has 
been established. For example, unjustified inconsistent treatment may be reason why a court 
 
77  ibid.  
78  Nottinghamshire County Council [1986] AC 240, 249. 
79  Wheeler (n 28) at 1078. 
80  Brind (n 4) 750 (then rejecting proportionality as a ground of  review). 
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holds administrative action to be invalid under the unreasonableness ground.81 Similarly, the 
failure to honour a legitimate expectation has sometimes been treated as giving rise to a breach 
of the unfairness or procedural impropriety grounds.82 Indeed, Lord Diplock’s seminal speech 
systemising the grounds of review noted that previously intervention for irrationality was 
justified by relying on ‘an inferred though unidentifiable’ error of law.83  
Thirdly, the recognition of a new ground of review need not await the imprimatur of final 
appellate courts. The common law may develop within lower courts and become sufficiently 
imbedded – whether or not final appellate courts have had the opportunity or inclination to 
comment on the development.84 As a consequence, some emerging grounds are suspended in 
a sort of twilight zone. The looseness of stare decisis principle in judicial review and the large 
doses of discretion available to a reviewing judge means it is still possible for some emergent 
grounds to be adopted in occasional cases, even though the ground does not then, or 
subsequently, command wide-spread support.  
A number of substantive grounds of review have been promoted and, in some cases, appear 
to have assumed new status as potential grounds of review, at least in some circumstances. As 
Rawlings remarks: ‘Future historians will record that, in the shadow of the ECHR, the pace of 
development in the grounds for review quickened in the late 1980s and 1990s.’85 The most 
prominent emergent grounds include substantive legitimate expectation, mistake of fact, and 
proportionality. A further set of other grounds have also been promoted, such as inconsistent 
treatment, substantive fairness, and the innominate ground, but have gained less traction.  
Substantive protection of legitimate expectations was recognised in English law in the seminal 
Coughlan case in 2001 and is often regarded as a separate ground of review.86 As noted earlier, 
 
81  See eg R (Middlebrook Mushrooms Ltd) v Agricultural Wages Board of  England and Wales [2004] EWHC 1447.  
82  R (Coughlan) v North and East Devon HA [2001] QB 213, [57].  
83  CCSU (n 2), 410, attributing this ‘ingenious explanation’ to Viscount Radcliffe in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] 
AC 14.  
84  See eg discussion of  Coughlan (text to n 86) below, where the seminal decision about legitimate expectation 
as a ground of  review was given by the Court of  Appeal. Final appellate courts, of  course, retain the power 
to disapprove of  any developments. Further, developments which seek to substitute a new ground for a 
ground previously recognised by final appellate courts need approval at the highest level; see eg the Court 
of  Appeal’s hesitation to substitute proportionality for irrationality: British Civilian Internees (n 20) [33]-[35].  
85  Richard Rawlings, ‘Modelling Judicial Review’ (2008) 61 CLP 95, 105. 
86 Coughlan (n 82). This development was endorsed by the House of  Lords in R (Reprotech) v East Sussex County 
Council [2003] 1 WLR 348, [34] and the Privy Council in Paponette v AG of  Trinidad and Tobago [2012] 1 AC 
1. The possibility that legitimate expectations might be afforded some substantive protection was 
foreshadowed particularly in Preston (n 36) although the circumstances for protection were not made out 
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the sixth edition of de Smith addresses legitimate expectations in a separate chapter; the authors 
implicitly treat substantive legitimate expectation as having the status of a self-standing ground 
of review, but are coy in making any formal pronouncement to that effect.87  
Substantive legitimate expectation mandates judicial intervention where an assurance or 
other action of the administration induce ‘a legitimate expectation of a benefit which is 
substantive’ and the frustration of such expectation ‘is so unfair that to take a new course will 
amount to an abuse of power’.88 While expressed as a general ground of review, the ground is 
only engaged in ‘limited conditions’; ‘[n]o magic formula’, de Smith’s sixth edition notes, but a 
range of contextual factors which seek to balance the ‘relative virtues and defects of certainty 
and flexibility’.89  
Presented with an assurance or other conduct inducting an expectation, the courts must 
assess the ground(s) most applicable to the circumstances. The Court of Appeal in Coughlan 
identified three alternatives.90 First, the court may determine that it is appropriate only to assess 
the relevance and weight under the illegality and irrationality grounds, to ensure the assurance 
has been taken into account and the weight given to it relative to other grounds is not 
unreasonable. Secondly, under the procedural impropriety ground, a requirement to consult 
before reneging on the assurance may be imposed. Finally, the court may afford the expectation 
some substantive protection and assess whether departing from it is unfair as to amount to an 
abuse of power. The Court conceded that the ‘difficult task will be to decide into which 
category the decision should be allotted’.91 Little guidance was given about criteria influencing 
this assessment, apart from noting that, in the particular case, the importance of the promise 
and fact it was made to only a few people were significant factors, along with the limited 
(financial only) consequences for the administration if it was required to honour the 
 
in that case. Notably, Australia administrative law has resisted moves to recognise substantive legitimate 
expectation: see ch 2, text to n 78 above. 
87  See text to n 16 above. Fordham also hedges on this point, adopting legitimate expectation (both 
procedural and substantive) as a ground of  review and later adopting substantive legitimate expectation as 
‘[o]ne species of  substantive fairness’: Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (n 35) [41.1] and [54.2]. 
88  Coughlan (n 82) [57]. 
89  De Smith (6th edn) 613. See also Elliott, Administrative Law (n 58) 199. 
90  Coughlan (n 82) [57]. 
91  ibid [57]. Laws LJ later suggested, obiter, that ‘the first and third categories explained in Coughlan are not 
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assurance.92 This has been taken to require an assessment in other cases of the nature of the 
express or implied representation or promise, the legitimacy, in the circumstances, of relying 
on the representation or promise, and the absence of any public interest supporting the 
administrative change of position.93  
If the expectation makes it through the gateway and is assessed to be worthy of substantive 
protection, then the administration’s failure to honour that assurance or expectation is 
subjected to more intensive review than applied that under the traditional grounds of review, 
especially in relation to the assessment of weight under the irrationality ground of review.94 The 
substantive protection path allows the courts ‘to determine whether there is a sufficient 
overriding interest to justify a departure from what has been previously promised’;95 in contrast, 
the default ‘conventional’ or Wednesbury ground focuses solely on ‘rationality and whether the 
public body has given proper weight to the implications of not fulfilling the promise’.96 The 
mandate to assess whether the departure is justified has been equated to high-intensity or 
correctness review.97  
Since its recognition, the grounds continues to be successfully relied on intermittently.98 In 
other instances, review based on the ground failed because the qualifying conditions were not 
made out or departing from the assurance was justified in the public interest.99  
 
92  Coughlan (n 82) [60]. 
93  De Smith (6th edn) 612-630. On the opaqueness of  the standard see particularly Begbie (n 91); R (Abdi & 
Nadarajah) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363. See further Mark Elliott, 
‘Legitimate Expectations and the Search for Principle’ [2006] JR 281. 
94  De Smith (6th edn) 630, drawing on Coughlan (n 82). The authors initially suggest this amounts to 
correctness review; however, later they ponder, based on Begbie, whether the degree of  scrutiny might be 
better treated as a ‘sliding scale of  review’, depending on the particular circumstances: de Smith (6th edn) 
631 and 632. 
95  Coughlan (n 82) [58]. 
96  ibid [58]. 
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unqualified assurance); R (London Borough of  Lewisham) v Assessment and Qualifications Alliance [2013] EWHC 
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Proportionality is often marked out as a candidate for another ground of review.100 Despite 
some strong proponents, it has failed to yet crystallise as a ground of universal application. 
However, it has been endorsed in particular spheres within administrative law; most obviously 
in the domain of human rights adjudication, but also in relation to the review of excessive 
penalties and sanctions and directly effective European Community law. The nature of the 
deployment of proportionality within the schema of judicial review remains unclear, though. 
On one account, proportionality is a ground of review of limited application; an alternative 
account treats proportionality merely as an interpretative test or calculus to determine 
compliance with human rights instruments under the illegality ground of review. As with other 
emergent grounds, proportionality has the potential to mandate greater depth of review than 
the traditional irrationality ground allows, although this is not always the case necessarily, given 
the tractable nature of proportionality review. 
The possibility that proportionality might be adopted as an additional ground was 
foreshadowed in CCSU. However, such a development was subsequently forestalled by the 
House of Lords in Brind, with judges then expressing concern that adoption of proportionality 
would amount to an inappropriate move towards merits review.101 The question has since been 
left open. The Court of Appeal in R (Association of British Civilian Internees) v Secretary of State for 
Defence suggested proportionality should be substituted for Wednesbury unreasonableness, but 
accepted that any such change could only be made by a court at the highest level.102 While the 
possibility has been acknowledged, the House of Lords and Supreme Court have left the 
question open.103 Debate continues about whether proportionality ought to supplant 
irrationality as the leading substantive ground of review. Craig continues to be one of the 
leading advocates for the embrace of proportionality as a universal ground.104 Others have 
joined in his promotion of proportionality but on a more limited basis. For example, Taggart 
argued in favour of an enhanced role for proportionality for all cases addressing human rights 
 
100  CCSU (n 2) 410. 
101  Brind (n 4). See also R (International Traders’ Ferry Ltd) v Chief  Constable of  Sussex [1999] 2 AC 418.  
102  British Civilian Internees (n 20) [34]-[37].  
103  Somerville v Scottish Ministers [2007] 1 WLR 2734, [55] (HL); Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] 2 WLR 808, 
[54] (SC). For other tentative endorsement see R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of  State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 AC 295, [51] (Lord Slynn); R (Nolan) v Manchester Metropolitan 
University [1994] ELR 380 (Sedley LJ).  
104  Craig, Administrative Law (n 43). 
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(including rights beyond those recorded in statutory bills of rights), but also argued for the 
retention of reasonableness review for the remaining cases addressing ‘public wrongs’.105 
While not assuming status as a universal ground of review, the language of 
disproportionality has, however, still been relied on in (non-human rights) cases to quash 
disproportionate or excessive sanctions or penalties.106 Lord Denning’s remarks in Hook stating 
the courts can intervene if ‘punishment is altogether excessive and out of proportion to the 
occasion’ is often highlighted.107 Following the systemisation of the grounds in CCSU, other 
judges have adopted similar language suggesting proportionality might be regarded as a ground 
of review in a particular set of circumstances.108 However, the magnitude of disproportionality 
required for intervention is generally analogous to the threshold for intervention under the 
irrationality ground. The degree of coincidence suggests disproportionality may operate merely 
as an indicator of unreasonableness under the rubric of the established irrationality ground, 
rather than an independent ground in its own right.109 In any event, the expression of a different 
basis of intervention may still allow judges to avoid the demands of the Wednesbury irrationality 
test and rely on disproportionality to modulate the supervisory intensity (albeit any difference 
may be marginal).  
Further, a structured form of proportionality has been established as the dominant method 
of review under bills of right, such as the Human Rights Act 1998. Indeed, the adoption of the 
proportionality doctrine has been described as ‘one of the most profound changes to judicial 
reasoning brought about by the [Human Rights Act]’.110 Proportionality is not referred to in 
the Human Rights Act or European Convention; however, the English courts have, 
consistently with the approach in other jurisdictions, interpreted limitations clauses as involving 
 
105  Michael Taggart, ‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ [2008] NZ Law Rev 424. See also Jeff  King, 
‘Proportionality’ (2010) NZ Law Rev 327. 
106  See generally Michael Fordham, ‘Common Law Proportionality’ [2002] JR 110, [16]-[17] and Fordham, 
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108  See eg Ghosh v General Medical Council [2001] 1 WLR 1915; Dad v General Dental Council [2000] 1 WLR 1538; 
R (X) v London Borough of  Newham [1995] ELR 303; R (Hall) v Eastbourne Magistrates Court [1993] COD 140; 
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(1992) 157 JP 545; R (A) v Head Teacher of  P School [2002] ELR 244; Dad v General Dental Council [2000] 1 
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a proportionality assessment.111 The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the phrase 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ in the European Convention requires the court to assess the 
proportionality of the rights-infringing measure.112 A similarly styled test has been adopted 
under the Human Rights Act 1998, assessing whether the government objective is ‘sufficiently 
important’ to justify limiting rights, whether measures adopted are ‘rationally connected’ to that 
objective, whether the impairment of rights is ‘no more than necessary’ to achieve that 
objective, and whether a ‘fair balance’ was struck.113  
For present purposes, our interest in the deployment of this particular form of 
proportionality lies in its relationship with the traditional grounds of review. As outlined earlier, 
reliance on proportionality in the human rights domain can be explained in different ways. The 
first account is evolutionary. That is, the courts have modified the substantive grounds of 
review when human rights instruments such as the Human Rights Act 1998 are directly 
impugned. In other words, rather than subjecting decisions to scrutiny under the irrationality 
ground of review, the courts have endorsed, to a limited extent, proportionality as a ground to 
review the substance of a decision. Under this account, administrative law is effectively 
bifurcated and cases where human rights instruments are engaged are subjected to different 
principles of review. The second account addresses proportionality in the colours of (il)legality. 
The judicial enquiry is on the lawfulness of the actions of the administration, given the 
legislative decree in s 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 that it is ‘unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right’. Thus, proportionality 
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is the interpretative method for assessing whether a statutory obligation has been violated, not 
a freshly endorsed substantive ground of review. In other words, whether or not, as a matter 
of law, interference with rights is incompatible is settled through the proportionality calculus 
(at least for those cases where limitation clauses apply).  
This point has received limited attention. Much of the discussion about the place of 
proportionality identifies a contrast with the Wednesbury unreasonableness ground.114 Indeed, 
Lord Steyn’s endorsement of proportionality in Daly compared proportionality to the 
‘traditional grounds of review’.115 Framing proportionality in this way – ‘through the lens of 
administrative law’, as Hickman put it – points to proportionality operating as a new ground 
of review.116 Others characterise proportionality as an aspect of the illegality ground of review. 
For example, Leigh suggests ‘a new form of over-arching illegality – in the sense that Lord 
Diplock used that term in [CCSU]’ – is created.117 In particular, the obligation to act compatibly 
with Convention rights enables legality review, noting that ‘there is nothing which suggests that 
its sole effect is to modify the Wednesbury ground of review, as seems universally to be 
assumed.’118 Craig similarly acknowledges that proportionality under the Human Rights Act 
operates as a ‘legal test’ but, at the same time, also tends to speak of proportionality as a new 
ground of review.119 ‘Section 6(1) creates a new statutory head of illegality for breach of a 
Convention right’, Craig says. ‘It is a free-standing ground of challenge.’120 On the one hand, 
this is consistent with Leigh’s illegality formulation. On the other hand, it also tends to mark a 
breach of Convention rights (along with the proportionality test implicitly involved) as an 
independent ground of review; this is reinforced by Craig’s treatment elsewhere of 
proportionality, where he analyses its status in tandem with the existing Wednesbury ground.121 
In any event, this structured form of proportionality potentially mandates depth of review 
that is more intense compared to substantive review under the Wednesbury standard (regardless 
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of whether deployed under the guise of illegality or as an alternative substantive ground). It has 
generally been understood and applied by judges as involving close scrutiny of the 
governmental action.122 This point is often overstated because proportionality does not, in 
itself, dictate the depth of scrutiny and is better understood as a relational concept which relies 
on other factors to settle the depth of scrutiny that is applied. Indeed, it is increasingly 
acknowledged that proportionality inquiry necessarily operates in tandem with notions of 
deference or intensity.123 The modulation implicit in proportionality therefore enables greater 
variability, over and above the evolutionary dimension. Further, the components of the 
proportionality review – particularly the touchstones of ‘sufficiently’, ‘rationally’, ‘necessary’, 
and ‘fair balance’ – provide ample room for judicial discretion.124  
Mistake of fact has also received some recognition as a ground of general application, beyond 
the limited circumstances in which fact finding could traditionally be challenged.125 In E v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Court of Appeal recognised that ‘a mistake of fact 
giving rise to unfairness is a separate head of challenge’.126 The factual mistake must be 
‘established’ (that is, shown ‘by objective and uncontentious evidence’), must have played a 
‘material’, albeit not decisive, part in the reasoning, and the claimant must not have been 
responsible for the error.127 The linkage with fairness casts some doubt on its status as a free-
 
122  See Daly (n 113); Denbigh High (n 113); A v Secretary of  State (n 113); Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Judicial Deference and 
Human Rights’ in Paul Craig and Richard Rawlings (eds), Law and Administration in Europe (OUP 2003) 67, 
79; Elliott, Administrative Law (n 58) 288. Compare Kavanagh (n 110) 243. 
123  See eg Murray Hunt, ‘Against Bifurcation’ in David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Grant Huscroft (eds), 
A Simple Common Lawyer (Hart 2009) 99, 111 (‘complain[ing] that a decision is disproportionate, without 
more, would be like complaining that a decision is too big’); Rivers (n 111) 202-203. Craig, one of  
proportionality’s key proponents, concedes this: Paul Craig, ‘Unreasonableness and Proportionality in UK 
Law’ in Evelyn Ellis (ed), The Principle of  Proportionality in the Laws of  Europe (Hart 1999) 85, 100 and 
‘Rationality’ (n 120) 287-292. See recent endorsement of  this point in Kennedy (n 103) [54] and the emphasis 
of  proportionality’s flexibility and nuance in Nicklinson (n 113). 
124  Thomas Poole, ‘The Reformation of  English Administrative Law’ (2009) 68 CLJ 142, 146 (‘plastic’, can 
be applied ‘almost infinitely forcefully or infinitely cautiously’, can produce ‘an area of  discretionary 
judgement that can be massively broad or incredibly narrow’). See also Grégoire CN Webber 
‘Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of  Constitutional Rights Scholarship’ (2010) 23 CJLJ 179. 
125  Christopher Forsyth and Emma Dring, ‘The Emergence of  Material Error of  Fact as a Ground for Judicial 
Review’ in Christopher Forsyth and others (eds), Effective Judicial Review (OUP 2010) 245.  
126  [2004] QB 1044, [66]. The question arose in an appeal on a point of  law, where the principles mimic judicial 
review principles. Although not yet addressed by the Supreme Court, other courts have followed the 
approach: see eg R (Iran) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2005] Imm AR 535, [95]; MT (Algeria) 
Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2008] QB 533, [67]. 
127  ibid [63]. 
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standing ground of review; it is unclear whether the reference stands merely as a conclusion or 
whether the mistake is merely a touchstone within the broader rubric of unfairness.128 
Finally, a range of other possible substantive grounds have been proposed as counterpoints to the 
Wednesbury unreasonableness ground, but their impact on judicial doctrines has been quite 
mixed. These include potential grounds like inequality or inconsistency,129 substantive 
fairness,130 and the so-called ‘innominate’ ground.131 These grounds either have assumed a 
subsidiary role informing the assessment under other grounds or appear to have been 
overtaken by other developments (such as substantive protection of legitimate expectations 
and variegated forms of unreasonableness). While their impact on judicial review doctrines 
nowadays is therefore limited, dalliances with these alternative grounds speak to the judicial 
penchant for promoting alternative doctrinal grounds to circumvent Wednesbury’s deferential 
degree of scrutiny.  
Reformulation 
In addition to the development of novel or emerging grounds, there has been some attempt 
to recast the grounds of review in a way which would affect the depth of review. The most 
obvious example is the attempt to simplify the irrationality or unreasonableness ground. That 
is, rather than seeking to variegate unreasonableness into differing degrees, a number of judges 
and scholars promoted the idea that the deferential Wednesbury unreasonableness ground ought 
to be given unified and simplified expression.132 These attempts can be viewed in different 
ways. On the one hand, they potentially represent a ground of unreasonableness which has a 
 
128  Craig, Administrative Law (n 43) 484. 
129  There are some examples of  inequality or inconsistency forming a basis for judicial intervention. It is 
doubtful, though, whether this has crystallised into a basis for intervention in its own right as a common 
law ground; Matadeen v Pointu [1990] AC 98. Compare R (Gurung) v Minister of  Defence [2002] EWHC Admin 
2463; R (Urmaza) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [1996] COD 479. See Craig, Administrative Law 
(n 43) 694. 
130  The courts have, at times, explored the adoption of  a ground which involves an enquiry, in the round, 
about the overall fairness of  the case. For cases employing the language of  substantive fairness, see eg 
Pierson (n 70); R (Hindley) v Secretary of  State for the Home Office [2000] QB 152 (CA), [2001] 1 AC 410 (HL); 
R (Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd) v Ministry of  Agriculture Fisheries and Food [1995] 2 All ER 714. Nowadays 
the idea of  substantive fairness has largely been overtaken by variegated and more intense forms of  
unreasonableness or more specific grounds such as substantive legitimate expectation. See generally 
Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (n 35) [54.1]. 
131  R (Guinness plc) v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers [1990] 1 QB 146, 159-160. See discussion of  contextual 
review (ch 5; text to n 52). 
132  See especially Lord Cooke’s views (n 153) including comments in International Traders’ Ferry and Daly while 
sitting as a member of  the House of  Lords. 
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greater vigilance than is apparent under its original Wednesbury formulation. To this extent, these 
efforts can be explained as the revision of an existing ground of review, hence their mention 
at this point. On the other hand, they potentially signal a new – more contextual – style of 
review. Their emphasis on context and circumstance, teamed with the mandate of significant 
judicial discretion, tends towards a departure from the categorical approach which underlies 
the grounds of review schema. These developments are therefore discussed under contextual 
review later.133  
Circumscription 
Access to the traditional grounds of review may be circumscribed through the application of 
the principle of non-justiciability. In its strongest formulation, review may not be permitted at 
all – that is, none of the grounds of review are treated as being applicable.134 In its softer 
formulation, the suite of grounds of review may be circumscribed or modified to take account 
of the context of particular cases. Harris has described these two different techniques as 
exhibiting ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ non-justiciability respectively.135 In doing so, greater weight 
is placed on judicial restraint and more deferential supervision results. 
The principle of primary non-justiciability is well recognised. The courts may decline to 
review a matter, as a preliminary or jurisdictional matter, on the basis that it is non-justiciable. 
It is perhaps most famously seen in the House of Lords in CCSU where their Lordships ruled, 
on the one hand, the Royal prerogative was not automatically non-justiciable but, on the other 
hand, the national security issues raised by the application for review were not suitable for 
judicial determination.136 The case is also notable for Lord Roskill’s categorical list of certain 
types of decisions which would be non-justiciable.137 The categories of cases which are non-
justiciable under English law has been whittled down over time.138  
 
133  See ch 5 pt II. 
134  It is possible to frame non-justiciability in terms of  explicit variable intensity; however the courts have 
been slow to connect this methodology with other developments in variable intensity and usually deploy 
it as a stand-alone doctrine. For the identification of  the linkages, see Taggart, ‘Administrative Law’ (n 47) 
84; Andrew Le Sueur, ‘The Rise and Ruin of  Unreasonableness?’ [2005] JR 32. King goes further and 
suggests the justiciability principles has now been overtaken by the notion of  deference: Jeff  A King, ‘The 
Justiciability of  Resource Allocation’ (2007) 70 MLR 197, 198. 
135 BV Harris, ‘Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Prerogative of  Mercy’ (2003) 62 CLJ 631. 
136  CCSU (n 2). See also Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777.  
137  CCSU (n 2) 418.  
138  See eg Bancoult v Secretary of  State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] 3 WLR 955; ch 2, n 134; Thomas 
Poole, ‘Judicial Review at the Margins’ (2010) 60 UTLJ 81. Compare R (Gentle) v The Prime Minister [2008] 
1 AC 1356. 
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The principle of secondary non-justiciability – ‘modified review’, as Fordham puts it139 – 
draws a stronger connection with the traditional grounds of review. The traditional grounds of 
review are modified, either substituting more deferential grounds of review or by disapplying 
particular grounds. A number of examples illustrate the circumscription or adaptation of the 
usual suite of grounds of review. 
First, the basis for reviewing prosecutorial discretion is narrowly limited in England. Once 
entirely non-justiciable,140 nowadays decisions to prosecute are reviewable only for dishonesty, 
bad faith and other exceptional circumstances – not the traditional CCSU grounds. Lord Steyn 
said in Kebilene, ‘absent dishonesty or mala fides or an exceptional circumstance, the decision 
of the Director to consent to the prosecution of the applicants is not amenable to judicial 
review’.141 Secondly, English courts have adopted a similar circumscribed approach when 
reviewing of commercial decisions.142 
Thirdly, the UK Supreme Court in R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal recently adopted a form of 
secondary non-justiciability in relation to the judicial review of the Upper Tribunal’s refusal to 
grant permission to appeal decisions of lower tribunals.143 Presented with a specially-developed 
tribunals system, with its own provision for appeal and review by appellate bodies comprised 
of superior court judges, the Supreme Court was reluctant to allow review on ‘the full panoply 
of grounds’, largely for reasons of comity and pragmatism.144 Instead, the Court ruled that 
judicial review would only be allowed where the criteria for making a second-tier appeal from 
the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal is made out (namely, if the matter raises an 
important point of principle or practice or there is some other compelling reason for the court 
 
139  Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (n 35) [P32]. Fordham also includes under this label the principle of  
anxious scrutiny and related developments. I have addressed the latter under the rubric of  intensity of  
review (see ch 4 pt II), although it is plausible to conceive of  the more intense expressions of  
unreasonableness as the articulation of  alternate grounds of  review. 
140  See eg Gouriet v Union of  Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435. 
141  R (Kebilene) v DPP [2000] 2 AC 326. See also Sharma v Antoine [2007] 1 WLR 780, [14]. 
142  See eg Mass Energy Ltd v Birmingham CC [1994] Env LR 298; Ealing Community Transport Ltd v Council of  the 
London Borough of  Ealing [1999] All ER (D) 953; R (Cookson) and another v Ministry of  Defence [2005] EWCA 
Civ 811; R (Gamesa Energy UK Ltd) v National Assembly for Wales [2006] EWHC 2167; Supportways Community 
Services Ltd v Hampshire County Council [2006] LGR 836. This is broadly consistent with Aranciba’s account 
that a ‘light touch’ approach is generally adopted for the review of  commercial decisions (although he does 
not draw a strong distinction between Wednesbury unreasonableness and modified review); Jaime Arancibia, 
Judicial Review of  Commercial Regulation (OUP 2011) 56. See also discussion in the New Zealand context (text 
to n 203). 
143  [2012] 1 AC 663; Eba v Advocate General for Scotland [2012] 1 AC 710 (companion case). 
144  Cart (n 143) [33]. 
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to hear it).145 This approach was seen to represent a half-way house between the usual grounds 
that would be available and an even narrower set of grounds proposed by the Court of Appeal 
below.146 
Finally, the English courts have circumscribed the grounds available to review the decisions 
made within visitatorial jurisdiction. In R (Page) v Hull University Visitor, for example, a majority 
of the House of Lords ruled that the long-standing exclusive jurisdiction of visitors on internal 
affairs of charitable or academic foundations mean that their decisions could not be impugned 
on the basis of the standard error of law ground.147 Only errors falling outside their jurisdiction 
(in the narrow sense) were reviewable. However, review for breaches of other grounds such as 
procedural impropriety remained. 
Before leaving the circumscription of the grounds of review, it is important to note the set 
of cases manifesting a ‘super-Wednesbury’ – that is, more deferential – form of unreasonableness 
could be conceived as circumscription of the grounds of review akin to the other instances 
discussed.148 However, I prefer to analyse these developments under the rubric of intensity of 
review because the theme of the different approach has been more strongly connected to the 
variegation of the unreasonableness ground.149  
C New Zealand: Lord Cooke’s simple trio of grounds 
Judicial review in New Zealand also centres on a tripartite expression of grounds of review, 
although the prevailing nomenclature is a simplified version of Lord Diplock’s recitation in 
CCSU.150 Contemporaneous with the systemisation of the grounds in CCSU, Lord Cooke 
propounded a similar tripartite statement of grounds of review:151 
[T]he substantive principles of judicial review are simply that the decision-maker must act in 
accordance with law, fairly and reasonably. 
 
145  ibid [104]. 
146  Cart v Upper Tribunal [2011] QB 120, [36], namely, restricted to pre-Anisminic excess of  jurisdiction and the 
denial of  fundamental justice. 
147  [1993] AC 682. See, similarly, R (Calder & Persaud) v Visitors to the Inns of  Court [1994] QB 1. 
148  Nottinghamshire (n 78) and R (Hammersmith and Fulham London BC) v Secretary of  State for the Environment [1991] 
1 AC 521. 
149  See ch 4 pt C. 
150  See also the rise of  intensity of  review in New Zealand (ch 4 pt IID) and the simplified and instinctive 
forms of  contextual review (ch 5 pt IIB). 
151  Robin Cooke, ‘The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law’ in Michael Taggart (ed), Judicial Review 
of  Administrative Action in the 1980s (OUP 1986) 1, 5.  
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The threefold classification mimics Lord Diplock’s categorisation, although Lord Cooke 
observed that he expressed these principles in similar form some five years before CCSU.152 
The grounds articulated are similar in nature, except for their simplified language and 
expression as positive norms or standards to be complied with by administrators. While Lord 
Cooke contemplated a more aggressive simplification project for the underlying doctrine,153 
the simplified version of the grounds still map onto Lord Diplock’s threefold set of principles 
and are generally regarded as mirroring the English principles.154  
The extra-judicial statement of the grounds was subsequently confirmed in decisions which 
followed. Lord Cooke repeated his simple statement of the grounds of review in New Zealand 
Fishing Industry Association Inc v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, a case now frequently cited as 
authority for the threefold formulation.155 The tripartite identification of the grounds of review 
have been repeated and endorsed in numerous other cases; Lord Cooke’s simplified version,156 
Lord Diplock’s formulation,157 and analogous versions.158 As an example, one High Court 
judge recently recorded that the recognised grounds of review ‘remain firmly those stated by 
Lord Diplock in CCSU’ and also ‘are captured in Cooke J’s wonderfully succinct statement in 
NZ Fishing’.159 As with Lord Diplock’s statement, cautionary comments about potential overlap 
and merger are also prominent.160 
 
152  ibid 6, referring to ‘Third Thoughts on Administrative Law’ [1979] NZ Recent Law 218, 225.  
153  In particular, Lord Cooke favoured a simplified and non-exaggerated standard of  reasonableness: see eg 
Cooke, ‘Simplicity’ (n 151) 15; ‘The Road Ahead For the Common Law’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 273, 285; 
International Traders’ Ferry (n 101) 452; Daly (n 113) 549.  
154  Taylor notes some uncertainty arising from inconsistency is the use of  ‘unreasonableness’, ‘Wednesbury 
unreasonableness’, and ‘irrationality’: GDS Taylor, Judicial Review (LexisNexis 2010) 435. However, this was 
shared in the English expression of  the grounds. 
155  [1988] 1 NZLR 544, 552. See also Minister of  Energy v Petrocorp Exploration Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 348, 352; 
Jenssen v Director-General of  Agriculture and Fisheries (CA313/91, 16.9.92) 3.  
156  See eg Peters v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164, 208; BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of  Inland Revenue (2007) 
23 NZTC 21,078, [15]; Osbourne v Chief  Executive of  the Ministry of  Social Development [2010] 1 NZLR 559, 
[54]. See also Matthew Smith, New Zealand Judicial Review Handbook (Thomson Reuters 2011) [4.1.2]. 
157  See eg University of  Auckland v International Education Appeal Authority (No 1) [2010] NZAR 1, [35]; Adlam v 
Stratford Racing Club Inc [2007] NZAR 543; NZI Financial Corporation Ltd v NZ Kiwifruit Authority [1986] 1 
NZLR 159, 172. See also Smith (n 156) [4.1.3]. 
158  See eg Pring v Wanganui DC [1999] NZRMA 519, [7]; Official Assignee v Chief  Executive of  Ministry of  Fisheries 
[2002] 2 NZLR 222 [85]; Brierley Investments Ltd v Bouzaid [1993] 3 NZLR 655, 660. See also Smith (n 156) 
[4.1.4] and [4.1.5]. 
159  Powerco v Commerce Commission (HC, CIV-2005-485-1066, 9.5.2006) [21]. The question arose in the context 
of  whether proportionality was a recognised ground of  review, which Wild J held it was not. 
160  See eg NZ Fishing Industry (n 155). See generally Smith (n 156) [4.2]. 
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As in England, a number of judges have adopted similar but marginally different 
formulations of the grounds of review. For example, Keith J in Peters v Davison adopted the 
language used by Lord Templeman to described the grounds of review in Preston.161 Similarly, 
Richardson J used the shorthand of ‘familiar Wednesbury grounds’ in Mackenzie DC and 
Woolworths – grounds, though, which echo the tripartite formulations of Lord Diplock and 
Lord Cooke.162 Chief Justice Elias recently spoke extra-judicially of overarching requirements 
of ‘reasonableness, fairness, [and] legality’, to which she also added ‘consistency, and equal 
treatment’.163  
The tripartite expression of the grounds is also recognised as the prevailing orthodoxy in 
textbooks and practice guides. Joseph’s leading textbook on constitutional and administrative 
law speaks of Lord Diplock’s threefold formulation as the ‘principal grounds of review’, 
adopting each as chapter headings for his detailed exposition.164 Taylor describes the tripartite 
classification as ‘conventional’ and ‘the “firmly” recognised current description’ of New 
Zealand’s grounds of review.165 However, recognising the expectation that the text would be 
organised under these grounds, Taylor mounts an extended defence of his alternative 
structure.166 The tripartite statement is entrenched in a number of other practice guides and 
texts,167 including Smith’s handbook on judicial review.168  
One recent attempt to recast the principles of judicial review in New Zealand deserves 
particular mention. In his separate reasons delivered in Lab Tests, Hammond J took the 
opportunity to reflect on the general shape of judicial review. He is critical of the established 
 
161  Peters v Davison (n 156) 180. See also Miller v CIR [1995] 3 NZLR 664, 668. 
162  Mackenzie DC v ECNZ [1992] 3 NZLR 41, 43; Wellington CC v Woolworths NZ Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 
537, 545 (although expressed in a more disaggregated fashion). 
163  Sian Elias, ‘National Lecture on Administrative Law (AIAL conference, July 2013) 9.  
164  Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law (3rd edn, Brookers 2007) 816, chs 22, 23, 24. 
165  Taylor (n 154) [11.01], adopting the adverb from Wild J in Powerco (n 159) [21]. 
166  Taylor (n 154) [11.01] and [11.02]. Taylor instead borrowed the framework adopted by Sir Kenneth Keith 
in his teaching: Who? How? What? Why? 
167  McGrath (ed), The Laws of  New Zealand (LexisNexis 2004) ‘Administrative Law’, [6] (‘Major grounds of  
review’); Crown Law Office, A Judge Over Your Shoulder (2005) [14] (‘The grounds of  challenge can be 
broadly divided into: illegality (acting outside the scope of  the power; getting the law wrong); unfairness 
(sometimes referred to as procedural impropriety); unreasonableness.’); Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew 
Palmer, Bridled Power (4th edn, OUP 2005) 292-295 (identifying illegality, breach of  the rules of  natural 
justice, irrationality or unreasonableness, along with legitimate expectations). 
168  Smith (n 156) [4.1], recognising the threefold summary formulations, but later also identifying 26 ‘separate 
but overlapping’ individual grounds of  review. 
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doctrinal grounds of review.169 However, his alternative approach to judicial review – proposed 
tentatively – in many respects reprises the current threefold statement. At the outset, he 
identifies a tension between two schools of thought on judicial review. On the one hand, a 
‘traditional’ or ‘orthodox’ camp which emphasizes the role of supervisory courts ensuring that 
administrators ‘remain within the powers granted to them by law’;170 on the other hand, a ‘more 
modern’ camp promotes more aggressive intervention to ‘restrain the abuse of power and to 
secure good administration’.171 He suggests this leads to confusion about the circumstances in 
which the courts will intervene:172  
[W]hen fundamental disputes about ‘purpose’ are leavened with confusion as to the principles 
on which courts will intervene (often called the ‘grounds for review’), the state of the law is 
rendered distinctly problematic. 
Hammond J notes the judicial efforts to formulate ‘a unified theory of judicial review’, 
particularly Lord Cooke’s threefold statement. However, he dismisses this type of taxonomy 
because ‘grand theorem approaches fail’, he says, ‘to drill down far enough to enable 
respectable advice to be given to parties who are supposed to abide by the law’.173 Further, he 
points to the lack of an agreed schematic:174  
As far as the grounds of review are concerned, the difficulty stems partly from the lack of an 
agreed classification or taxonomy, accompanied by properly developed substantive principles as 
to when a court will intervene by way of judicial review, particularly in ‘merits’ cases. 
Instead, Hammond J promotes a ‘functional rather than doctrinal’ approach to the grounds 
of review. On this basis, he suggests the grounds of review be grouped according to procedural 
grounds of review (‘the conduct of the decision-maker and include procedural fairness 
requirements, fair hearing rules, and rules against bias’), the decision-maker’s reasoning 
processes (‘things like misappreciation of the law; unauthorised delegation; and the perennial 
problem of control of the exercise of a discretion’), and grounds relating to the decision itself, 
not the procedures adopted or reasoning process (‘substantive grounds of review, even where 
a decision-maker has assiduously followed all required procedures and has made no errors of 
 
169  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2009] 1 NZLR 776 (CA). Leave for appeal was, 
oddly, declined: (2009) 19 PRNZ 217 (SC) (‘ultimately turns on its own facts’ and no arguable question of  
public or general importance). 
170  Lab Tests (CA) (n 169) [363]. 
171  ibid [367]. 
172  ibid [370]. 
173  ibid [378]. Notably, he dismissed ‘spectrums of  response’ or ‘deference’ as ‘quite unhelpful, and even 
unworkable’ ([379]). 
174  ibid [380]. 
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reasoning’).175 Acknowledging confusion – fog of the ‘pea souper’ kind – in relation to 
substantive grounds of review, he latches onto the concept of abuse of power and suggests 
substantive principles on which the merits of a decision can be challenged could be developed 
under this rubric. But he leaves the articulation of those principles for another day, noting only 
that proportionality and substantive fairness are two possibilities which have particular 
currency nowadays.176  
While Hammond J appears to berate the traditional doctrinal approach to grounds of review 
and a tripartite formulation, his own formulation maintains a commitment to a grounds of 
review schematic. In many respects, his recital of the grounds of review in functional terms 
merely redraws the traditional grounds with a slightly different emphasis. His taxonomy simply 
recreates groups which mimic the chapter divisions of Lord Diplock and Lord Cooke, albeit 
with new chapter headings: procedural grounds rather than procedural impropriety/fairly; 
reasoning process grounds rather than illegality/in accordance with law; and substantive or 
abuse of power grounds rather than irrationality/reasonably. Subtle differences may lie in the 
allocation of some specific grounds (for example, it is unclear where Hammond J sees 
relevancy principles being located; whether as reasoning or substantive grounds). And he seems 
to anticipate that substantive grounds would have many threads, under a general rubric of 
abuse of power. But this, too, is consistent with the notion that the suite of grounds may be 
enlarged over time; the fact that the space most ripe for development relates to merits review 
is not seriously in question. In general terms, Hammond J’s attempt to reinvent the principles 
of judicial review is large on rhetoric but short on substance. While he made a plea for ‘better 
charts’ to map judicial review principles and warned against ‘simply exchanging one shibboleth 
for another’, his own analysis risks doing exactly that. 
In summary, like its English parent, New Zealand’s jurisprudence is generally structured 
around well-entrenched grounds of review, expressed in tripartite form. While other 
formulations have been promoted, a categorical approach to the intensity of review continues 
to dominate.  
The modulation of the depth of scrutiny in New Zealand echoes the English experience, 
with classification, evolution, reformulation and circumscription being utilised to provide 
variability within the schema. Here, I focus on some particular instances of the style of variation 
which have particular resonance in the New Zealand context.  
 
175  ibid [382]-[384]. 
176  ibid [391]-[392].  
104 
 
Classification 
The judicial discretion as to the process of classification is acknowledged in New Zealand. As 
discussed above, there is a strong recognition of the overlapping character of the grounds and 
the consequential effect of classifying justiciable matters in each category. 
An increasingly common technique in New Zealand is the reliance on the principle of 
legality which moves matters from the realm of discretion, where deferential grounds apply, 
into the realm of legality, where strict scrutiny is applied.177 One particular instance of this – 
the development of the presumption of consistency in relation to the influence of international 
instruments on domestic administrative law – acutely demonstrates the particular significance 
of the classification technique in the distinction between law and discretion.178 The depth of 
judicial review differs, depending on whether the challenge is mounted under the illegality 
ground (under the presumption of consistency, a doctrine which mimics the principle of 
legality) or the irrationality ground. The presumption of consistency requires any administrative 
power to be read consistently with international law obligations, except where the statutory 
matrix is otherwise inconsistent.179 Framed in this way as a matter of law, this approach allows 
the courts to assess whether or not international law obligations have been correctly applied 
and effectively circumscribes the discretion available to any public body or official. In contrast, 
the relevancy approach treats the impact of international instruments as a matter of substance 
or discretion. As long as the administration has turned its mind to the relevant legal 
instruments, the weight given to those international law norms can only be impugned under 
the irrationality ground.180 
Another example of the process of classification determining the depth of review is the 
approach to statutory preconditions. Following the English approach to jurisdictional facts, 
the New Zealand courts scrutinize the presence of some – but not all – factual preconditions 
 
177  See eg Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008] 3 NZLR 774, [26]; Canterbury RC v Independent Fisheries Ltd [2013] 2 
NZLR 57, [140]; Claudia Geiringer ‘The Principle of  Legality and the Bill of  Rights Act’ (2008) 6 NZJPIL 
59; Taggart, ‘Proportionality’ (n 105) 431. 
178  See generally Claudia Geiringer ‘Tavita and All That’ (2004) 21 NZULR 66 and ‘International Law through 
the Lens of  Zaoui’ (2006) 17 PLR 300. The presumption operates more strongly in New Zealand than in 
England: see Philip Sales and Joanne Clement, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts’ [2008] LQR 388, 
393.  
179 Puli’uvea v Removal Review Authority [1996] 3 NZLR 538; Zaoui v AG (No 2) [2006] 1 NZLR 289; Ye v Minister 
of  Immigration [2010] 1 NZLR 104. 
180 See Ashby v Minister of  Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222; Tavita v Minister of  Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257. 
See also Geiringer, ‘Tavita’ (n 177). 
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closely. For example, the courts have mandated close supervision of ‘gate-keeper’ fact-finding 
that a development proposal has no adverse environmental effects such that public 
participation can be dispensed with.181 In contrast, a statutory precondition requiring a factual 
finding that it was desirable to protect shareholders and the public interest before placing a 
company into statutory administration was not treated as a jurisdictional fact and was only 
subjected to reasonableness review.182 
Reformulation 
Efforts to recast the grounds of review in order to modify their depth of scrutiny have been 
notable in New Zealand, particularly in relation to irrationality and reasonableness review.183 
Evolution 
Like England, some emergent grounds have crystallised, although their application remains 
narrow and restricted to particular circumstances. 
The recognition of substantive legitimate expectation as a ground of review in New Zealand is 
somewhat unsettled.184 While the ground has not received the same degree of approval as in 
England, there is some support (largely within the lower courts) for this ground. The Court of 
Appeal foreshadowed that intervention may be justified, under the more general rubric of 
abuse of power or unfairness, where the administration reneges on an assurance or promise.185 
A number of decisions in the High Court have also, in principle and in accordance with 
Coughlan, indicated an expectation may be afforded substantive protection in some situations.186 
Other courts have been more equivocal and, occasionally, hostile;187 further, the courts have 
sometimes ruled that particular statutory schemes (notably, tax and revenue collection 
schemes) are incompatible with the substantive protection of expectations.188 In any event, 
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most cases fail on the facts at the first stage, failing to demonstrate a clear and unambiguous 
assurance deserving of protection.  
The limited embrace of proportionality is mirrored in New Zealand. There has been reluctance 
to embrace proportionality as a universal ground of review, but the courts have been prepared 
to intervene to address (excessive) disproportionality in penalties and sanctions. For example, 
the Court of Appeal in Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand v Bevan recognised the 
courts may intervene to quash penalties which were excessive and disproportionate.189 
However, the Court was not prepared to enter ‘the broader question, raised for instance by 
Lord Diplock as long ago as 1984, whether proportionality is a distinct head of review’, Keith 
said. ‘Rather, we limit ourselves to the penalty cases such as Hook and take comfort from 
commentary on proportionality which, while recording the controversy about its separate 
existence, singles out the penalty area as established’.190  
In the human rights domain, the New Zealand courts have also endorsed proportionality, 
like their English counterparts, as the test to determine whether government action abridging 
rights is justified and therefore lawful. Proportionality has been used to assess whether 
government action amounts to a ‘reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society’ under the general limitation provision in the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990.191 Just as the text of the NZ Bill of Rights Act was drawn from the Canadian 
experience, so too was the associated proportionality calculus.192 
The possibility of a free-standing mistake of fact ground of review was also floated in New 
Zealand by Lord Cooke in the 1980s in Dagayanasi v Minister of Immigration, but he failed to 
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secure the support of his then fellow judges for such a development.193 He was prepared to 
rule that a ministerial decision to deport an overstayer was ‘invalid on the ground on mistake 
of fact as well as on the ground of procedural unfairness’ because it was based on an inaccurate 
conclusion in a medical report about the overstayer’s unwell child to obtain adequate treatment 
overseas.194 Subsequently, several other cases at appellate level have left the door open for its 
recognition but have not definitively ruled on its status.195 Despite its tenuous acceptance 
amongst higher courts, this ground has been successfully relied on in a number of High Court 
decisions.196 One other instance of intervention for factual error is notable. The Privy Council 
in Erebus Royal Commission ruled the decision-makers must base their decision ‘upon evidence 
that has some probative value’, but characterised any failure to do so as a breach of the natural 
justice ground.197 (Again, this re-iterates the role of classification and preconception of errors 
under different grounds in order to attract deeper scrutiny.)  
Other substantive grounds, such as unequal treatment,198 substantive fairness,199 and the 
innominate ground,200 have had limited success, despite some strong efforts to have them 
recognised.  
Circumscription 
Circumscription of the grounds of review, under the guise of non-justiciability, is seen in New 
Zealand jurisprudence too. For example, non-justiciability, in its absolute sense, was deployed 
in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Curtis v Minister of Defence.201 The Court avoided the question 
of the legality of the disbanding of the air strike force, reasoning that it was a political question 
which the government of the day should be held accountable for through political – not legal 
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– processes. Partial non-justiciability is also evident in similar areas to England. Prosecutorial 
decisions are only subject to limited review.202 Commercial decisions of quasi-public bodies are 
subjected to a circumscribed set of grounds; a particularly notable instance is Mercury Energy 
where the Privy Council, hearing an appeal from New Zealand, doubted that decisions of State-
owned Enterprises were reviewable in the absence of ‘fraud, corruption or bad faith’.203 
D Australia: multifarious and formalistic grounds only  
As explained earlier, the Australian regime features grounds of review, both under common 
law review and within the (non-comprehensive) codified regimes.204 In particular, the categories 
of jurisdictional error are sometimes described as grounds of review,205 and the ADJR (Cth) 
and some other state legislation purport to codify lists of grounds of review.206  
These grounds are, however, more synonymous with the tight categorical approach 
employed under the scope of review model. First, they do not operate as monolithic and 
generalised grounds of review like Lord Diplock’s CCSU tripartite grounds. The ADJR 
effectively sought to take a (‘largely formulaic’) snap-shot of the common law grounds available 
at the time of codification (1977) – well before Lord Diplock’s systemisation of judicial review 
in CCSU.207 Codification is multifarious, comprising 17 different grounds.208 The grounds 
therefore have a ‘bottom up’ character, reflecting the categorical bases on which the then 
common law enabled review – rather than purporting to introduce ‘top-down’ general 
principles.209 This is consistent with their application. They have not been applied benevolently; 
the argumentation about them and their scope has been described as ‘arcane and technical’.210 
Secondly, the common law grounds – again, which are multifarious and reflective of old-
fashioned English categories – are not monolithic and are ultimately subordinated to the more 
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dominant jurisdictional error doctrine and the legality–merits dichotomy. For present 
purposes, therefore, the Australian methodology has been discussed under the rubric of ‘scope 
of review’; the language of grounds of review is used in a differently to other Anglo-
Commonwealth jurisdictions and the grounds themselves have different content and character.  
Before leaving the Australian jurisdiction, it needs to be noted that there may be some 
appetite for the articulation of a series of top-down principles which have similar content to 
the grounds of review. Kirby J was a well-known and outspoken critic of the rigid approach 
and lack of more generalised principles seen in other jurisdictions.211 More recently, French CJ 
referred to general principles of administrative justice, echoing the generalised grounds of 
review seen elsewhere, although acknowledging they do not have direct purchase in Australian 
administrative law. In Li, he described the concept of administrative justice as requiring 
compliance with the ‘criteria of lawfulness, fairness and rationality’.212 However, he also 
intimated that these principles are not directly expressed in Australia; instead their content is 
elaborated in ‘provisions of the Act and the corresponding regulations and, subject to the Act 
and those regulations, the common law’.213  
E Canada: partial and overshadowed grounds of review for abuse of 
discretion 
While Canadian jurisprudence is nowadays characterised by an explicit approach to intensity 
of review,214 some general grounds of review were evident during the latter part of the twentieth 
century in relation to some parts of the supervisory jurisdiction. Prior to the landmark Baker 
decision in 1999, Canadian administrative law adopted a two-track approach to judicial 
review.215 Issues of law were governed by what would come to be known as the ‘pragmatic and 
functional framework’, where different standards of review were deployed to give effect to the 
appropriate degree of discretion required in the circumstances (explained in more detail 
later).216 This general framework has come to dominate Canadian jurisprudence over the last 
three decades (albeit subject to some modification) and continues today. However, for a period, 
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a different approach was employed in relation to review of discretion. The exercise of 
discretion was then governed by a number of specific grounds, deployed under the general 
ground of abuse of discretion. The specific grounds included matters familiar elsewhere in the 
Anglo-Commonwealth, such as improper purpose, bad faith, abdication of discretion, and 
unreasonableness.217 Indeed, Mullan suggests the restrained attitude mandated by these 
grounds had its origins in the English common law.218 However, objection to the always 
vigilant approach to questions of law meant the Supreme Court of Canada ‘never considered 
seriously’ adopting a simplified tripartite statement of grounds seen in England and New 
Zealand.219  
The deployment of some grounds of review was founded on the law–discretion dichotomy. 
The grounds applicable to the exercise of discretion ‘sought to preserve the freedom of the 
decision-makers to decide on substance and to limit judicial intervention to policing the legal 
limits within which such freedom was exercised.’220 However, review of legal questions 
authorised ‘intrusive judicial control on the substance’ (although this was later moderated by 
the adoption a more deferential attitude on such matters). L’Heureux-Dubé J explained that 
the abuse of discretion grounds reflected two key ideas:221  
[D]iscretionary decisions, like all other administrative decisions, must be made within the bounds 
of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute, but that considerable deference will be given to 
decision-makers by courts in reviewing the exercise of that discretion and determining the scope 
of the decision-maker’s jurisdiction.  
In the late 1990s, however, the Supreme Court collapsed the distinction between law and 
discretion and folded review for abuse of discretion into the pragmatic and functional 
framework.222 In Baker, a unified theory and approach was adopted for substantive review of 
all decisions.223 L’Heureux-Dubé J said:224  
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 It is, however, inaccurate to speak of a rigid dichotomy of ‘discretionary’ or ‘non-discretionary’ 
decisions. Most administrative decisions involve the exercise of implicit discretion in relation to 
many aspects of decision-making. … In addition, there is no easy distinction to be made between 
interpretation and the exercise of discretion; interpreting legal rules involves considerable 
discretion to clarify, fill in legislative gaps, and make choices among various options. 
Instead, review of discretion was to be subjected to the same three standards of review 
applicable to questions of law and interpretation: patent unreasonableness, 
reasonableness simpliciter, and correctness. This did not, though, signal reduction of the degree 
of deference to be afforded to such matters:225 
Incorporating judicial review of decisions that involve considerable discretion into the pragmatic 
and functional analysis for errors of law should not be seen as reducing the level of deference 
given to decisions of a highly discretionary nature. 
Canada’s deployment of grounds of review was therefore partial and temporary. It applied 
only to review of the exercise of discretion and was over-shadowed by the pragmatic and 
functional framework that applied to review of issues of law. The grounds of review approach 
was eventually subsumed into the pragmatic and functional framework, with its prescribed 
standard of review.226  
F Conclusion 
The essence of the grounds of review approach is lucidly captured by Fordham:227 
The grounds for judicial review are court-recognised rules of good administration: the judges’ 
way of explaining when a public authority has overstepped the mark and when judicial 
intervention is warranted. They reflect a careful balance between appropriate vigilance and 
appropriate restraint. 
Their expression of standards form a ‘framework’ for judicial analysis but also permit ‘flexibility 
of response’.228 This framework has reigned in English and New Zealand law since it was 
heralded by Lord Diplock in CCSU. This type of framework has not infiltrated Australia and 
Canada, with a more formalistic method being favoured by the former and a more openly 
circumstantial approach being favoured by the latter.  
III Conceptual Underpinnings 
The grounds of review schema is treated by many scholars as the current orthodoxy and their 
scholarship is implicitly predicated on its continuing operation. That is, categorical solutions to 
questions about the nature and shape of judicial review are presented, typically through the 
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invention or redefinition of different grounds of review (witness the debate about the adoption 
of the proportionality ground). Craig and Taggart are two scholars with a general commitment 
to doctrinal grounds of review, framed in a general but evolutionary fashion. Both exhibit 
support for a role for proportionality as a new ground of review, albeit with differing ambits. 
Hickman also expresses some support for the categorical method seen in the grounds of review 
schema. His discussion of the maintenance of a number of discrete ‘standards of legality’, as 
he describes them, is discussed in this section.229 He also strays into contextual review, as he 
promotes a model of non-doctrinal deference in human rights adjudication, and his 
contribution on this point is addressed later.230 
A striking feature of this group of scholars is their commitment to the common law school 
on the question of judicial review’s conceptual underpinnings. Although convergence of the 
schools makes the distinction a little clouded, Craig, Taggart and Hickman all embrace the 
power of the courts to fashion (and re-fashion) the principles of judicial review – and their 
scholarship is designed to tap into that evolutionary character as they promote new and 
modified grounds of review. And this endeavour is not hindered by the need to link these 
developments back to a legislative source, indication or hint; the independent values of the 
common law dominate. That said, they also acknowledge the ultimate trump that the legislature 
retains even under the common law theory (a position contested by a number of scholars 
supporting contextual review).231 
 There are some caveats to note in the discussion in this section, due to a reasonable degree 
of potential overlap at the margins in these scholarly accounts. First, some scholars propose – 
explicitly or implicitly – a mixture of categorical grounds of review and explicit modulation of 
intensity. Others propose variable intensity in some areas or in relation to some grounds. A 
judgement has been made about where they best fit for analytical purposes, based on whether 
greater or lesser emphasis is placed on indirect categorical grounds or explicit modulation of 
intensity. For example, Craig promotes a general ground of proportionality, which he 
acknowledges would have a degree of flexibility to modulate the depth of intensity in order to 
take account of differing contexts. However, first-and-foremost, Craig’s vision of judicial 
review is built on various grounds of review and explicit variability is secondary – hence his 
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discussion in this section. Secondly, I treat those scholars, such as Taggart, promoting a 
bifurcated vision of judicial review – with different principles and methodologies as between 
traditional judicial review and human rights adjudication – as also falling within this camp 
(where they have addressed both).232 Bifurcation is based on a categorical distinction; in other 
words, different ground(s) or methodologies of review apply in different classes. While the 
methodology usually proposed for human rights adjudication – proportionality – is often 
treated as being flexible in nature, the entry point for the methodology is a ground of review 
of circumscribed, not general, application. Finally, I acknowledge that some scholars I have 
addressed under scope of review also seem supportive of the grounds of review schema. Again, 
as mentioned earlier, any distinction between scope of review and grounds of review tends to 
be a fine one due to common reliance on doctrinal categorisation; I generally treat the 
conservatism vs generosity distinction when applying the categories as a stronger ingredient 
for the purposes of this taxonomy.  
A Paul Craig: generalised but conceptually-precise categorical grounds 
Craig is one of the most vocal champions of the common law theory, arguing that the courts 
should be properly understood to be applying substantive values – distilled independently – 
when fashioning the principles of judicial review. These common law values translate into 
categorical grounds of review, although Craig’s vision for these grounds is generalised, 
nuanced, and (to the furthest extent possible) faithful to the grounds’ underlying conceptual 
basis.  
First, Craig’s account of judicial review is grounded in the common law. Judicial review is 
‘a creature of the common law’ and the principles that shape it represent the controls which 
the courts believe are ‘normatively justified on the grounds of justice and the rule of law’.233 He 
is a vocal opponent of the ultra vires or legislative intent theory of judicial review.234 It is, he 
says, ‘indeterminate, unrealistic, beset by internal tensions, and unable to explain the application 
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of public law principles to those bodies which did not derive their power from statute’.235 Craig 
says there is not ‘a single doctrinal rule in over four hundred years of judicial review that owes 
its origin to the existence of the assumed general legislative intent’.236  
Craig’s common law approach is anchored in a judicial assessment of the conceptions of 
justice or rule of law. It is this, he says, that frames the principles of judicial review and on what 
the legitimacy of judicial intervention hinges:237 
The reality is that the legitimacy of the principles of judicial review at any point in time can only 
be determined by argument as to whether the conception of justice/rule of law applied by the 
courts is warranted in normative terms. 
He goes on to say:238 
The common law model is not based solely on the proposition that the courts have developed 
general heads of review. It is premised on the assumption that the more detailed principles within 
the heads of review have most commonly been developed by the courts from the rule of law, 
justice and the like, while accepting also that Parliament can and has made contribution to these 
principles. 
Accordingly, Craig aligns himself with the Dworkinian interpretivist camp.239 That is, as he 
explains it, ‘propositions of law are true if, subject to questions of fit, they follow from the 
principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive 
interpretation of the community’s legal practice’.240  
While grounded in the common law model, Craig accepts that the legislature retains the 
authority to trump the common law. Although the courts are the ‘creative “drivers” of the legal 
norms’ in judicial review, this does not mean that the courts ignore legislative will when 
fashioning them.241 Craig explains that where legislature has manifested a ‘specific intent’ as to 
the grounds of review, the courts ought to respect and apply this, just as the courts do in other 
common law domains where the legislature speaks specifically.242 The common law model is 
therefore based, he says, on ‘shared power’ and does not represent a strong challenge to 
sovereignty.243 He argues:244  
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The fact that Parliament might enact an unequivocal provision that runs counter to pre-existing 
judicial doctrine concerning the intensity of review, or the consequences of invalidity in a 
particular area, might simply reflect legitimate disagreement as to what the rule of law requires, 
not some “crude” triumph of sovereignty over judicial principle. 
Craig explains the basis of limits of judicial intervention in the context of the review of 
discretion. The principle that the courts should not substitute their view about how a discretion 
should be exercised for that of the primary decisions is informed by ‘basic conceptions of 
political theory and the allocation of governmental function’; in other words, doing so would 
undermine the principle that political and social choices are for the legislature or its delegate, 
and substitution would amount to a reallocation of power from the legislature and 
administration to the courts.245 However, on the other hand, he records that there is also 
recognition of the fact that administrative discretion should not be uncontrolled. This leads to 
‘the desire to fashion a criterion that will allow judicial control, without thereby leading to the 
substitution of judgement or too great an intrusion on the merits’.246  
Secondly, Craig’s scholarship is generally predicated on the existence of doctrinal grounds 
of review, expressed in their modern, systematised fashion. For example, he is renowned for 
his promotion of proportionality as a ground of review;247 similarly he presents legitimate 
expectation as a separate and free-standing ground of review.248 Craig is not, however, sanguine 
about variable intensity. He recognises the role that variable intensity plays within a doctrinal 
schema; in his account, it operates as a gloss or modifier on particular grounds of review. For 
example, his argument in favour of proportionality acknowledges that the ground of review 
operates with different intensities of review in different contexts.249 While he acknowledges the 
influence of the modulation of the intensity of review, it does not feature directly in the 
doctrinal schema on which his scholarship is predicated. That continues to be grounded in a 
series of grounds of review – or categories where judicial intervention is justified.250  
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Craig is content for judicial review and the circumstances of judicial intervention to depend 
on categories and distinctions, although he seeks to resist claims that this is unduly 
formalistic.251 Boundaries and question-marks about categorisation are, he says, inherent in 
such an approach. However, he argues, this does not make the methodology or the existence 
of categories formalistic:252  
We use categories and distinctions within the entire body of law, both public and private. It is 
inherent in the deployment of such categories or distinctions that there will be boundaries, and 
question marks as to whether a particular case should fall within the relevant category. That does 
not render the existence of the categories formalistic.  
But as noted before, categorical methodology is necessarily attentive to form and it is difficult 
for Craig to escape such characterisation. His better defence is that his vision of the categorical 
methodology is not abstract, the categories are generally faithful to their conceptual 
underpinnings, and the system is alert to, and seeks to resolve, dissonance between the 
conceptual and doctrinal.253 In order to avoid denunciation as formalistic, Craig actively works 
to expose instances of lack of alignment. For example, he recently dissects the nature of 
reasonableness review.254 Not content with the mantra that suggest that the assessment of 
weight and balance has no place in reasonableness review, Craig demonstrates compellingly 
that the judicial assessment of weight and balance are, in fact, an essential aspect of 
reasonableness review. Reasonableness review is inescapably tied to the review of relevancy 
and purpose; ‘reasonableness review entails’, he says, ‘a judicial decision as to whether the 
weight and balance ascribed by the primary decision-maker to consideration that have been or 
can be deemed relevant was reasonable.’255 A good illustration for his desire to expose any 
conceptual-doctrinal dissonance. 
Finally, Craig’s commitment to a grounds methodology sees him rebuff criticisms from 
those who favour non-doctrinal, fully contextual approaches to substantive review. In 
particular he does not accept Allan’s claim that the grounds of review are ‘empty vessels’ which 
only assume any meaning when applied in a particular context.256 Craig says the grounds of 
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review are effectively representative of more detailed principles of review and ‘[t]hese more 
detailed principles … then frame the way in which judicial decisions are made in a particular 
context’.257 The fact that the applicable statutory matrix may form a part of the particular 
context is not a concession to the legislative intent theory. Nor does the fact that the detailed 
principles may counsel different treatment because of the context mean the grounds 
themselves lack independent normative force. 
In summary, Craig is emblematic of the common law school, committed to the judicial 
expression (and active re-expression) of the basis for judicial intervention in terms of grounds 
of review; a task which, for him, channels common law values and morality, while not being 
ignorant of the statutory setting.  
B Michael Taggart: (grudgingly bifurcated) suite of common law grounds 
Taggart appeared ambivalent towards the debate about the constitutional foundations of 
judicial review and generally sought to resist philosophical categorisation.258 However, his work 
hinted most strongly at the common law model. As a traditional common lawyer,259 he was also 
in his element working within a grounds of review schema. While alert to the variable 
methodologies driven from the human rights domain, he was worried about their effect on 
traditional administrative law methodology and eventually conceded that each should be 
compartmentalised.  
First, as mentioned, Taggart was not drawn to debate the conceptual underpinnings judicial 
review. His early work on theories of invalidity (published before the ultra vires debate took 
off) skirted around the issue. On the one hand, he described ultra vires as, up to then, operating 
as the ‘organizing principle’ in Anglo-Australian administrative law; on the other hand, he 
noted in a footnote at that time that it was ‘challenged by the “error of law” standard’.260 In his 
only short piece directly addressing the debate, written for the seminal symposium on the issue, 
he described it as a ‘distraction’.261 He doubted there was much difference between each side 
of the debate, especially in practical terms. However, he recognised the significance of a 
judicially-elaborated rule of law – ‘a coat of many colours, ... contain[ing] many principles, ideas, 
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values, and conventions’.262 At the same time, he saw that the rule of law ‘envelopes and 
subsumes’ the ultra vires doctrine; that is, ultra vires represents the ‘rule of law, not men’ strand 
of the rule of law.263 The invocation of intent of Parliament, while an artificial fig-leaf, added 
some democratic pedigree to judicial intervention and dodged criticism about judicial over-
reach. But he seemed content to leave unresolved this tension between the rule of law and 
democracy; the rights-revolution, internationalisation and privatisation were more pressing. 
While personally coy about which school he subscribed to and the merits of each, his 
scholarship had a distinctly common law flavour.264 
Secondly, in terms of the role of deference within the administrative law schema, Taggart 
argued deference was an essential feature of administrative law, but accepted that it manifest 
itself in different ways. Indeed, he noted that, until recently, the doctrine of deference had little 
or no formal recognition in Anglo-Australasian systems – even though ‘if you look at what 
judges did, as well as at what they said they were doing, there was a good deal of deference’.265 
He saw this as a product of contextualism: ‘[I]n judicial review contextualism and deference 
mean much the same thing. You really cannot have one without the other’.266 
Fuelled by a desire for transparency, predictability and a culture of justification, Taggart 
argued that, if a deference-device was adopted, it was incumbent on judges to articulate and 
explicitly weigh up relevant deference factors in the particular context of the case.267 Taggart 
was very sceptical about abandoning efforts to articulate these principles in doctrinal form. For 
example, he described Allan’s non-doctrinal approach as ‘utterly implausible, to say nothing of 
undesirable’.268 He regarded it as mandating the courts as ‘independent scrutineer[s]’ and 
imposing correctness review across the board.269 
 
262  ibid. 
263  ibid. 
264  His focus was often on the judicial supplementation of  the statutory scheme and development of  
principles governing non-traditional public decision-making without any direct statutory mandate. For 
various accounts of  his work, see Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Huscroft (n 123). 
265  Taggart, ‘Proportionality’ (n 105) 454. 
266  ibid 450. 
267  ibid 460. 
268  ibid 456. 
269  ibid. 
119 
 
But Taggart was also reluctant to abandon the traditional common law framework in favour 
of deploying a grand schema of deference. He saw the expression of deference more as the 
incremental development of common law principles:270 
It is impossible to articulate a clear set of rules in relation to deference. All attempts degenerate 
into lists of factors, with contestable weights. … [A]ll factorial tests are ultimately indeterminate, 
because the result is not determined necessarily by a majority of factors pointing one way. Some 
factors in the circumstances count for more in the balancing. There are no rules, and sometimes 
precious little guidance or certainty. 
This preference for traditional methodologies ultimately led to Taggart conceding to the 
bifurcation of judicial review – consistent with his commitment to a refined categorical 
approach. For many years Taggart promoted a unified vision of administrative law and judicial 
review, along with an openness to variable and flexible notions of deference.271 But, in his last 
article on the subject, he argued different approaches to review should be adopted in relation 
to ‘human rights’ and ‘public wrongs’.272 In relation to human rights (whether under 
enumerated bills of rights or common law situations where rights are engaged), he suggested 
proportionality be adopted as the principal methodology; but while proportionality should 
operate as a single unitary standard of review, proportionality and deference are necessarily 
interwoven such that a sliding scale of review operates. On the other hand, in relation to public 
wrongs (where the question is about public bodies acting illegally or ultra vires, absent any 
direct issue of human rights), he argued in favour of Wednesbury unreasonableness operating as 
the sole ground of review for abuse of discretion. In particular, he suggested variegated forms 
of unreasonableness became redundant because variegation was only justified where human 
rights were engaged; while variegation of unreasonableness was not necessary, he continued to 
acknowledge a role for (absolute) non-justiciability. 
The dividing line he promoted lay between ‘human rights’ and ‘public wrongs’, with the 
human rights side including both cases in which human rights instruments are directly applied 
and those common law cases where human rights issues arise collaterally. He argued 
proportionality and deference should apply to the human rights domain, but that the side of 
public wrongs be governed by the traditional conception of Wednesbury unreasonableness, 
 
270  ibid 458. 
271  See eg Michael Taggart ‘Reinventing Administrative Law’ in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), 
Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart 2003) 311, 334 fn 144; ‘The Tub of  Public Law’ in David 
Dyzenhaus (ed), The Unity of  Public Law (Hart 2004) 455, 466. 
272  Taggart, ‘Proportionality’ (n 105). 
120 
 
shorn of its intensive iterations.273 The effect of this thesis would be to impose a categorical 
distinction through the centre of the system of judicial review. Variable intensity in its explicit 
form would be banished from the domain of public wrongs, but would be at the forefront of 
judicial methodology in the domain of human rights. In the end, the categorical methodology 
of traditional administrative law prevails in most of its traditional domain. 
Taggart’s common law orientation, combined with his continuing preference for the 
categorical, means he can be described, using King’s label, as a ‘restrictive institutionalist’.274 
Institutionalists are concerned with the relative competence of the courts to adjudicate; 
restrictive institutionalists, while rejecting abstract formalism, prefer the retention of some 
categorical distinctions to take account of judicial competence: ‘The net social consequences 
of employing bright-line rules (even if occasionally arbitrary) may be superior to allowing multi-
factoral judicial weighing to take place on a case-by-case basis.’275 Taggart’s concession to 
bifurcate judicial review and to deploy Wednesbury unreasonableness and proportionality in 
clearly demarcated domains is particularly illustrative.  
C Tom Hickman (I): evolving but discrete standards of legality 
Hickman’s approach to the variation of intensity of review is two-fold and does not fall neatly 
into the different schemata. First, he makes a case for continuing a categorical approach, where 
grounds of review supply the general framework for judicial review and influence the intensity 
of review indirectly; to this extent, he exhibits some support for the grounds of review schema. 
Secondly, within a doctrinal schema, he promotes the notion of deference in non-doctrinal 
form, where factors suggestive of restraint are taken into account merely as a function of weight 
in adjudication (this is explained below, under the rubric of contextual review).276 
In the context of the doctrinal debate about whether proportionality ought to be adopted 
as a general ground of review (which he rejects), Hickman shows a continuing commitment to 
categorical grounds of review and is dismissive of flexible doctrines which modulate the 
 
273  ibid 477. For similar approach, see Jeff  King, ‘Proportionality’ (2010) NZ Law Rev 327, 259. King recently 
advocated the partial deployment of  proportionality, as a sometimes alternative to Wednesbury 
unreasonableness and its high threshold. He bases his ‘halfway house’ solution on the premise that 
proportionality generally involves more searching judicial scrutiny. King has also advocated the 
development of  doctrinal principles of  deference: see ch 4 pt III. 
274  Jeff  A King, ‘Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint ’ (2008) 28 OJLS 409, 430.  
275  ibid 431. 
276  See ch 5 pt IIIC. 
121 
 
intensity of review explicitly.277 His position here is influenced by the distinction he draws 
between standards of legality and standards of review.278 We can recall that, for analytical but 
not normative purposes, Hickman draws a distinction between rules or principles directed at 
the administration that must be complied with, over-and-above the express terms of the 
statute, on the one hand, and requirements directed at the court about how they review 
compliance with those rules and principles, on the other. He prefers a focus on the former 
rather than the latter, which approximates more the grounds of review schema. 
In particular, he is sceptical about attempts to fashion monolithic ‘flexible meta-principle(s) 
of substantive review’.279 Variability should operate, not in terms of the depth of judicial 
scrutiny, but in terms of standards of legality (viz limits on power) which must be adhered to 
in different circumstances: bad faith, reasonableness, proportionality, strict necessity, or 
absolute prohibitions. According to Hickman, the identification of the applicable standard 
should take categorical form, based on the particular context.280 That is, he rejects – for reasons 
of legal certainty, legitimacy, and transparency – the notion of sliding scales (whether standards 
of legality or review).281 Generalised standards or grounds, where the intensity is manipulable 
on a case-by-case basis, operate as undesirably as ‘opportunities for unstructured judicial 
discretion’.282 For example, Hickman is critical of Craig’s notion of variable intensity 
formulations of proportionality. This effectively makes proportionality ‘an empty vessel’, he 
argues, allowing the courts to ‘simply decide whether in the particular context the merits of 
one side “press harder” than those on the other’.283 Hickman’s objections here are somewhat 
overstated though. In particular, he concedes that, even with a focus on categorical standards 
of legality, the burden of justification that must be met by the administration under each 
standards varies.284 Although cast in terms of differing norms, variation to the burden that must 
be met implicitly affects the intrusiveness of the judicial supervision. His concerns about the 
variable nature of the review process and judicial discretion is equally applicable to his preferred 
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categorical approach for standards of legality as it is to a variable approach for standards of 
review.  
Much of Hickman’s scholarship focused on the Human Rights Act and the manner in 
which it, he argues, has transformed public law.285 His focus on human rights adjudication 
means his discussion of the legitimacy of judicial review is restricted to legitimacy in the context 
of protection of human rights norms under statutory bills of rights. He does not directly engage 
in the ultra vires debate, absent the rights paradigm. However, Hickman comes from a position 
consistent with the common law school (though he observes the language of ultra vires still 
remains prevalent amongst the judiciary).286 He characterises judicial review as an 
independently created bulwark against government misuse of power:287 
Administrative law itself – its existence, its ambit and its doctrines – is a judicial creation which 
has been forged by creative lawyers and judges in order to provide an effective remedy for 
government error and unfairness. ... [P]ublic law belongs to the judge in a way that private law 
does not; public law is in its very essence an assertion of judicial independence as a check on 
government. 
His theoretical orientation therefore demonstrates sympathy for the common law theory of 
judicial review. 
Hickman, however, subscribes to a collaborative model of judicial adjudication – what he 
calls ‘a dialogical fertile middle ground’.288 He rejects the notion of formal legality or pure legal 
formalism, which limits the courts’ role to enforcing the text and intentions of the legislature.289 
He also distances himself from theories of substantive legality, which characterise rights as 
higher law to be protected by the courts as fundamentals.290 A supporter of dialogical models 
founded on interaction between the judges and legislature, he favours a strong form of 
dialogue. He characterises dialogical theories as enabling the courts to ‘propose arguments of 
principle to other branches’ in relation to rights violations and associated issues of balance.291 
However, he argues against weak forms of dialogue which seek to limit the courts’ role in 
proposing arguments on a provisional basis and rely on acceptance or rejection by other 
branches. His strong dialogical approach extends the courts role beyond mere principle 
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proposing and mandates judicial resolution of these matters (but acknowledges that the line 
between when this is permissible or not is ‘impossible to draw’):292  
It is the courts’ function to determine questions of principle, but the various branches of the 
state do not merely counteract protectively but they also interact productively, such that when 
the courts recognise a degree of latitude for the political branches to make decisions that interfere 
with protected rights or where they avoid purporting to determine questions of principles and 
allow matters to remain within the realm of politics. 
Hickman aligns himself with the ‘liberal legalist’ school or close variants.293 Drawing from 
Partington, Hickman appreciates ‘the desirability and need for the exercise of public power’, 
rejects the idea that ‘public law should be seen exclusively in terms of control of such power’, 
and acknowledges a dual role for political and legal accountability (with a bias towards legal 
accountability due to the perceived inadequacy of political control).294 Hickman highlights the 
commitment of liberal legalists to the separation of powers: ‘Parliament establishes general 
rules of executive governance that are interpreted and applied by the courts [and] only by ... 
dividing the political and the legal ... can liberty effectively be protected.’295 However, he argues 
that the responsibilities of the different branches overlap and governance is ultimately a ‘joint 
project’;296 he images notions of give-and-take, collaboration and respect. Hickman goes on to 
endorse the metaphor of dialogue as representing this collaborative endeavour. ‘It ... reflect[s] 
the idea that the legal constitution can supplement rather than supplant politics.’297 
Ultimately, though, Hickman is reluctant to endorse any particular moral theory as 
providing the lodestar for the judiciary when participating in this collaborative enterprise. Law’s 
‘bluntness’ means the normative perspectives are numerous, ambiguous and overlap: ‘[L]aw 
reflects points of moral consensus and leaves plenty of room for the courts to adopt their 
moral intuition in future cases, without needing to accept a single moral theory.’298 
D Conclusion 
Scholars supporting a grounds of review approach present a more flexible and generous model 
of judicial review. Greater emphasis is placed on the judicial crafting of grounds, based on 
substantive values, and less weight is placed on linkages with the legislature. While the 
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legislature retains its trumping power, common law judicial authority and developments need 
not be sourced back to the legislature in order to obtain their legitimacy. Judicial intervention 
obtains its legitimacy independently and internally. 
But the methodology favoured still retains a categorical focus. The grounds of review, with 
their different and implicit depths of scrutiny, construct a role for the judiciary based on an 
abstract blue-print. While less limited and more nuanced than the role presented by a scope of 
review schema, it still has a formalistic character (despite Craig’s protests) in that it is based on 
pre-established categories of intervention and obviates the need for a normative justification 
to be articulated. Legitimacy is assumed, based on a pre-existing model of the state and law. 
Here, the scholars manifest slightly different visions of how those allocations ought to be 
drawn. Taggart tends to favour greater administrative autonomy and generally draws a more 
deferential schema, underscored by a strong separation of powers sentiment. In contrast, Craig 
tends to emphasize the judicial role in enforcing the rule of law and promotes a schema of 
grounds which is more interventionist.  
The key point here, and the commonality between these scholars, is a belief that the 
supervisory jurisdiction can and, should be, doctrinally structured on a pre-emptive basis. The 
depth of intensity and supporting normative arguments are capable on being expressed in an 
‘off-the-shelf’ manner through the proxy of enumerated grounds of review. Line-drawing and 
categorisation then becomes the workaday method of the judiciary, not normative 
argumentation.  
IV Normative Assessment 
When assessed against Fuller’s principles of efficacy, a grounds of review approach has 
considerable virtue. The expression of grounds in simplified and generalised form provides 
rule-structure, clarity, stability and guidance. But the approach also aims to openly acknowledge 
aspects of the judicial discretion involved, particularly in relation to evolution within the system. 
The indirect way in which the depth of scrutiny is settled means, however, some judicial 
judgements are not transparent, thus predictions about the extent of vigilance or restraint are 
difficult to make. Otherwise, the framework provides good guidance for judges and 
administrators, and is applied with a reasonable degree of fidelity. 
Generality 
The grounds of review schema – like its other categorical sibling, scope of review – is based in 
a regime of rules. The difference between the two lies in the abstractness or specificity of those 
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rules. A grounds of review approach favours a few generalised triggers for judicial intervention 
over a myriad of specific rules. 
In their most basic and practical sense, grounds of review are the bases on which 
administrative action can be ruled unlawful in judicial review.299 In other words, as Fordham 
explains them, a ground represents ‘the “flaw” which justifies the Court’s interference’.300 Lord 
Phillips, in one of the few judicial definitions, characterised the threefold set of grounds as a 
‘received checklist of justiciable errors’.301 The definition of grounds of review as the flaw or 
error justifying judicial intervention is consistent with their common expression in negative 
terms, as was the case with Lord Diplock’s formulation. Thus, the grounds meet Fuller’s 
expectation of generality in the articulation of rules.  
When expressed in their positive form, though, grounds represent the principles or norms 
that regulate administrative decision-making. The inverse of grounds of review may be 
characterised as ‘principles of good administration’ (Galligan), ‘norms of good public decision-
making’ (Cane) or ‘standards of legality’ (Hickman).302 Nothing particularly hangs on their 
negative or positive form, at least as the grounds are presently conceived. The failure to comply 
with a principle of good administration is treated as enabling the courts to intervene by way of 
judicial review (although, normatively, this need not be so).  
In terms of the mediation of the balance between vigilance and restraint, each of the 
tripartite grounds of illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality presents a fixed, but 
implicit, depth of scrutiny. In general terms, illegality and procedural impropriety enable 
correctness review, while irrationality poses a deferential standard. The classes of flaws of 
brought together under each ground share a similar depth of scrutiny. The applicable depth of 
scrutiny is dependent on the characterisation of the impugned norm; in other words, which 
ground of review is relied on. Hence, the descriptor of (categorical or doctrinal) grounds of 
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review.303 As with the scope of review model, classification is still the central judicial function 
that dictates the depth of review.304  
The traditional tripartite grounds continue, in many respects, to reflect the hallmarks of the 
‘classic model’ of judicial review.305 While Lord Diplock’s seminal speech in CCSU is heralded 
as significant in the systemisation of judicial review doctrines, the extent of change should not 
be overstated. As Harlow and Rawlings observe, ‘Lord Diplock’s three principles still conform 
largely to the classical grounds as they had evolved over the centuries’.306 Formal distinctions 
still dominate, although there is less emphasis on ‘rigid legal categories’.307 The difference lies 
in Lord Diplock’s attempts at developing generalised organisational principles from the 
doctrinal morass that existed previously.  
The doctrinal shape of the grounds of review is more general than seen under the scope of 
review approach. Each may be divided into various different and more particular sub-
principles. For example, illegality may be treated as capturing doctrines addressing matters such 
as error of law, improper purpose, relevancy, fettering of discretion and so forth. In this 
respect, the grounds have an aggregating function. This dimension was picked up by Lord 
Irvine in Boddington when he commended the way in which the tripartite grounds 
‘compendiously grouped’ the various types of challenges that could be mounted.308 Others 
have also emphasized the nature of the grounds as categories of more specific doctrines.309 
Allan goes even further and asks rhetorically whether the grounds of review are anything more 
than ‘labels [that] announce the conclusions of legal analysis’?310 Consistent with his preference 
for individualised judicial judgement over the application of general doctrine, he says 
pejoratively that ‘the settled grounds of review are really only conclusory labels for judgments 
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made on the facts of each case – judgments invoking controversial moral and political 
values’.311 The conclusory potential of the grounds echo, to some extent, the indirect and 
rhetorical style seen under the scope of review method.  
The final point about the nature of the doctrinal rules is the question of their intended 
audience.312 As noted earlier, the grounds of review have been articulated and applied as if they 
express public law norms and bases of judicial intervention simultaneously. In other words, 
these concepts are intertwined and conflated as a single (or series) of grounds of review. As 
Hickman notes, though, it may be helpful to distinguish between the two different functions 
of these public law principles, even though the different functions have ‘not been clearly 
distinguished, or even explicitly addressed, in case law’.313 Hickman amplifies this distinction 
when he adopts the language of ‘standards of legality’ and ‘standards of review’ for analytical 
purposes. He explains the terminology in this way. Standards of legality are the rules or 
principles that are principally directed as the administration; that is, those standards to be 
satisfied over-and-above the condition expressed in the empowering instrument. In contrast, 
standards of review, speak to the courts, not the administration, expressing how the courts 
determine whether standards of legality are breached. Thus, in relation to the illegality ground 
of review for example, the standard of legality represents the conditions set by the empowering 
statute.314 The corresponding standard of review imposed by the court in assessing compliance 
is correctness. ‘The question of whether the conditions of the statute had been fulfilled [is] a 
matter for the courts’, Hickman says – in contrast to interfering only if the administration’s 
‘understanding of the statutory requirements was unreasonable’.315 So, too, with procedural 
impropriety; the common law principle of natural justice operates as a standard of legality, 
while a correctness standard of review is adopted when assessing compliance. 
Irrationality review is more complicated. Hickman describes Wednesbury unreasonableness 
as (principally) a standard of review. For Hickman, Lord Greene’s statement that the courts 
can quash decisions that are ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have 
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come to it’ describes ‘how the courts should exercise their supervisory jurisdiction over the 
administration’, not ‘a substantive principle to which government decisions must conform’.316 
There is some force in Hickman’s analysis that Wednesbury speaks mainly of a standard of review 
through the injunction to the courts to exercise restraint. However, a standard of review only 
makes sense if it is related to a standard of legality, that is, a norm which the administration is 
charged with satisfying. While at times Hickman’s claim is that the tradition in English public 
law is to not impose substantive standards of legality, he tentatively concedes in a footnote that 
Lord Greene’s test may also implicitly recognise a standard of legality:317  
Counsel for the plaintiff had submitted that there was a duty on the authority to act reasonably 
and that the court should interfere where it considered that a decision was unreasonable. Lord 
Greene MR accepted that the ‘discretion must be exercised reasonably’ – a standard of legality – 
but went on to reject the submission that the court could interfere simply because this standard 
had not been met. He explained that, given the matter was assigned to the local authority and 
was within its ‘knowledge and expertise’, the courts would only intervene if the decision was 
unsupportable or the unreasonableness ‘overwhelming’.  
On this analysis, therefore, the standards of legality and review are both reasonableness.318 
This is consistent with the positive formulations of grounds of review and principles of good 
administration which proclaim an obligation on the administration to act reasonably. For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge that under the grounds of review schema, on 
an explicit level, the common law does not draw such a distinction and, on an implicit level, 
standards of review and legality are fused within the grounds of review themselves.  
Hickman’s distinction between standards of legality and standards of review is only 
employed for descriptive purposes. He expressly disavows any attempt to fashion the 
distinction in normative terms.319 However, my argument is that schemata that explicitly 
recognises the distinction may be valuable for the purposes of organising judicial review 
doctrines and determining the circumstances of judicial intervention. 
Even though the grounds of review purport to present prescribed and fixed depths of 
scrutiny, the grounds of review enable significant variability in judicial supervision. Judicial 
discretion is recognised in places in the schema but this is generally subordinate to the guidance 
provided by the rule-structure. That is, the generalised doctrinal structure of tripartite grounds 
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317  Hickman, Public Law (n 66) 103 fn 103. 
318  This analysis may therefore help explain the tautological nature of  Lord Greene’s statement, a point which 
is often used to condemn the Wednesbury test: Lester and Jowell (n 303); International Traders’ Ferry (n 101) 
452.  
319  Hickman, Public Law (n 66) 100. 
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is the centre-piece of the schema; judicial discretion infiltrates, latently, the classification 
process where the grounds overlap and operate, patently, in cases where the grounds emerge 
and evolve. Like the scope of review schema, the embrace of rules promotes generality, although 
the role of judicial discretion places a gloss on this virtue. 
First, there is a degree of blurring between the distinctions framing the traditional grounds, 
explicitly acknowledged by the schema’s concession to overlap. In such cases, this enables the 
depth of scrutiny to be modulated or manipulated, as explained in the doctrinal study. Taylor 
emphasizes the normative dimension to this task in the following metaphor:320 
An observer can walk around the outside at such a distance as to be able to see the whole of the 
building visible from each angle as the observer walks around it. As the observer walks, the 
building changes appearance. From some particular views it will look more pleasing and 
understandable to the observer’s eye and brain. The particularly pleasing and understandable 
views will become more and then less apparent as the observer walks. The art of choosing 
grounds of review is to identify the grounds that are the most pleasing and understandable on 
the facts and focus on them. Other grounds which are less pleasing and understandable but still 
somewhat pleasing or understandable can be added since these may well be the ones the judge 
finds most pleasing, but adding these grounds can be distracting.  
Secondly, we have seen other grounds evolve, along with continuing pressure for others to 
evolve or be reformulated (albeit they are at different stages of genesis). This enlarges the 
available suite of grounds, bringing more diversity to the supervisory task. The particular 
incentive to do so is to access a depth of scrutiny that is more intensive than the default 
deferential review under the irrationality ground. Once again, questions of classification arise. 
Access to the recognised emergent grounds is generally conditional; in order to rely on the 
ground, certain categorical pre-conditions must first be met. Assessment of whether those 
preconditions exist, provides a degree of judicial discretion and judgement about whether they 
are satisfied. 
Thirdly, in some respects, the departure from established standards of review found in the 
traditional grounds has seen the adoption of more open-textured and flexible touchstones for 
intervention, such as abuse of power, fair balance and so forth. In doing so, the reviewing task 
is imbued with more discretionary judgement, implicitly enabling greater diversity in depth of 
scrutiny.321  
For the purposes of assessing the generality of the regime, the significant aspect is that the 
variability and judicial discretion is both latent and patent. The primary judicial task continues 
to be categorisation, identifying the appropriate ground of review for the circumstances of the 
 
320  Taylor (n 154) [11.06]. 
321  See discussion of  contextual review (ch 5 pt II). 
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particular case. In this part of the judicial reasoning process, the determination of the depth of 
scrutiny is indirect and the judicial discretion is latent – although there is some recognition of 
overlap necessitating judicial judgement and choice. In contrast, the evolutionary and 
circumscribing aspects of the grounds of review schema more openly disclose a degree of 
variability and judicial discretion.  
Thus, the generality of the schema is relatively mixed, but is more favourable than seen in 
relation to scope of review. The method is grounded in rules. Judicial discretion is apparent 
and potent. There is some effort to give judicial discretion explicit doctrinal foundation, but 
aspects still remain latent. 
Public accessibility and transparency 
The generalised and systemised framework of grounds promotes accessibility and 
transparency. However, some aspects of the schema still disguise the factors determining the 
mediation of vigilance and restraint. 
The high point for accessibility and transparency is the set of generalised grounds of review. 
They provide a clear framework guiding the judicial task, supporting the virtues of accessibility 
and transparency. However, the indirect manner by which the depth of scrutiny is set – by 
categorisation – means this schema still relies on classification as a proxy for the conceptual 
factors dictating the appropriate depth of review and takes away from this degree of openness. 
Judicial justification is generally framed in the language or form on which the grounds are cast, 
not the underlying conceptual drivers of vigilance and restraint. 
The evolutionary aspects of the schema present a mixed degree of transparency. The ability 
to depart from the traditional and default grounds does not guarantee transparency about the 
conceptual basis for drawing the balance between vigilance and restraint differently. When 
judges engage recognised alternative grounds such as substantive legitimate expectations or 
proportionality, the focus tends to be the doctrinal pre-conditions which regulate the 
availability of these other grounds. For example, in the case of establishing a substantive 
legitimate expectation, it must first be established that an assurance was given in the nature of 
a promise (that is, triggering the prospect that the substantive expectation based on it may be 
protected); in the case of proportionality, enumerated rights must be implicated or the 
circumstances must involve the application of punitive sanctions. Thus, like the classification 
process, the motives for engaging the non-traditional grounds of review are not always 
apparent and the schema is not fully transparent; judges need only conclude that those pre-
conditions are established. 
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The fact the schema sets out a traditional and default framework perhaps creates, at least 
passively, an expectation of reason and justification when departing from the default position. 
Certainly, when emerging grounds are forged, judges usually provide extensive and developed 
reasons justifying the new basis for intervention.322 There is, though, no guarantee of the 
provision, nature or extent of the reasoning supporting evolutionary developments. For 
example, sometimes judges prefer to engage in more subtle doctrinal evolution to avoid taking 
dramatic steps or highlighting the new developments. Fordham identifies two main techniques 
whereby the evolution takes place incrementally through two phases: ‘temporary masking’ (an 
established principle is stretched to address a new problem but subsequently reinterpreted as a 
new principle) and ‘temporary divergence’ (a new principle is developed on a narrow basis and 
the existing orthodoxy is subsequently overruled in favour of the new principle).323  
That said, it can be argued that the tripartite grounds also have an explanatory function. The 
labels – whether conclusory or not – are instrumental in explicating judicial intervention in the 
circumstances. As Fordham says, the grounds of review are ‘the judges’ way of explaining when 
a public authority has overstepped the mark and when judicial intervention is warranted’.324 In 
this sense, the grounds operate as a rhetorical device, marking out in shorthand the basis for 
intervention. As judicial creations,325 the grounds represent an attempt to express in a 
generalised way appropriate balances between judicial vigilance and restraint.326 The grounds 
therefore have a legitimising function.327 The traditional grounds of judicial review represent, 
 
322  See eg the Court of  Appeal’s judgment in Coughlan (n 82) where it recognised substantive legitimate 
expectations in some case. The judgment is notable for the length and breadth of  the conceptual 
justification for the new ground of  review. This type of  conceptual reasoning can be compared with the 
more technical style of  reasoning associated with the incremental development of  doctrine in ‘bottom-up’ 
frameworks such as seen in Australia. 
323  Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (n 35) 353. The introduction of  legitimate expectation through R 
(Unilever plc) v CIR [1996] STC 681 and then Coughlan (n 82) is cited as one example of  temporary masking. 
The development of  injunctions against the Crown in Factortame (No 2) and M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 
377 is identified as an instance of  temporary divergence. 
324  Fordham, ‘Grounds’ (n 31) 199. 
325  Allan, ‘Foundations’ (n 256) 97 (regardless of  whether one subscribes to the ultra vires or common law 
school). 
326  Fordham, ‘Grounds’ (n 31) 199. 
327 On the centrality of  legitimacy to the judicial task of  shaping and applying judicial review doctrine, see 
Thomas Poole, ‘Legitimacy, Rights, and Judicial Review’ (2005) 25 OJLS 697, particularly 718-722; 
‘Questioning Common Law Constitutionalism’ (2005) 25 LS 142. Poole argues legitimacy is a ‘credible 
rationale’ for the exercise of  judicial review power (‘Legitimacy’, 719). Although Craig disagrees with 
Poole’s analysis of  legitimacy questions in relation to review of  cases involving rights, he still acknowledges 
the importance of  legitimacy; however, he suggests is cannot be disentangled from values; Craig, 
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according to received wisdom, balances drawn between vigilance and restraint that are 
legitimate; emergent grounds must surmount the legitimacy threshold before they are accepted 
as legitimate alternative expressions of judicial oversight. 
To illustrate, the underlying distinctions that infuse the grounds of review can be charted 
along two axes.328 First, a strong distinction between substance and process is evident. 
Procedural impropriety is separated from illegality and irrationality because it addresses how 
the decision is made, not the decision itself. Procedural impropriety, in Fordham’s words, ‘fits 
… with the notion of a truly supervisory jurisdiction’ – or, in the present language, ‘is legitimate’ 
– because it does not interfere with the substance or merits of the decision.329 This distinction 
can be seen in the oft-cited – but nowadays questionable – mantra from Evans:330  
Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless 
that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will … under the guise of 
preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power. 
Similarly, while irrationality addresses the substance of a decision, its inherently deferential 
threshold means judicial oversight is unlikely to dig into the substance of the decision. Both 
grounds have ‘a built-in merits-avoidance mechanism’, as Fordham puts it; ‘procedural fairness 
because it is by nature only procedural, irrationality because its formulation is designed to 
acknowledge a margin of appreciation.’331 Secondly, Fordham identifies a dichotomy between 
‘hard-edged’ and ‘soft’ questions.332 For those questions which, at least ostensibly, admit only 
a single and therefore ‘correct’ answer, it is treated as legitimate for the courts to substitute 
their view for that of the administration. In the English tradition, questions of law have been 
treated in this way and the resolution of questions of law remain the sole preserve of the 
courts.333 Hence, the strictness of the illegality ground of review. In contrast, matters such as 
fact, judgement or discretion are treated as soft questions – matters on which it is illegitimate 
for the courts to intervene when exercising their supervisory review function. Questions of law 
 
Administrative Law (n 43) 31; PP Craig, ‘Political Constitutionalism and Judicial Review’ in Christopher 
Forsyth and others (eds), Effective Judicial Review (OUP 2010) 41-42.  
328  Fordham, ‘Grounds’ (n 31) 188-193. See also Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (n 35) [45.1]. 
329  Fordham, ‘Grounds’ (n 31) 188. 
330 Chief  Constable of  the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155, 1165. 
331  Fordham, ‘Grounds’ (n 31) 189. 
332  The language of  ‘hard-edged’ was coined, as Fordham notes, in South Yorkshire Transport Ltd (n 59) 32.  
333  See eg Re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374; Bulk Gas Users Group Ltd v AG [1983] NZLR 129. 
Compare the Canada, where deference may apply (ch 4 pt IIB). 
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and the strictness of the illegality ground can be contrasted to soft questions and the deferential 
Wednesbury review under the irrationality ground. 
Each ground of review therefore has a central role in addressing questions of legitimacy of 
the judicial supervision, particularly its interventional legitimacy. Highlighting the trichotomy 
between review of fact, law, and discretion, Taggart says ‘the different standards of review in 
each category [of grounds] reflect functional, institutional, and pragmatic considerations, as 
well as legitimacy concerns’.334 Thus, the grounds do, to some limited extent, have a role in 
rationalising and explicating the basis for intervention. But the explanation is encrypted in a 
label and therefore lacks transparency. 
Prospectivity 
This schema, like the others, is generally prospective. There are aspects of the judicial 
adjudication where there is some retrospective effect, such as when judicial discretion in the 
classification task affects outcomes or when the evolution of emerging grounds acquires some 
purchase in particular cases. However, when viewed relative to the other schema, the 
retrospective effect is not significant. In particular, the evolutionary aspects of the regime are 
generally not dramatic; emergent grounds are few and their development tend to be 
foreshadowed before they are actually realised as accepted grounds of review. Adjudicative 
discretion may generate some retrospective effect but the schema seeks to minimise the latent 
judicial role by mandating aspects of it and making it transparent. 
Clarity 
The generalisation and systematisation of the grounds of review aid clarity, avoiding the 
quagmire of rules that has plagued the scope of review schema. The schema, on its face, aims 
to present a simple set of principles guiding the circumstances of intervention. It still seeks to 
promote consistency and predictability, which the criteria of generality seeks to produce. 
Although not rigidly constructed, the generalised and simplified grounds are designed to be at 
the forefront of the judicial task and to anchor the questions about whether to intervene or 
not. The adoption of doctrinal grounds, in lieu of conceptual reasoning, favours clarity over 
transparency; the conceptual basis for intervention is merely gestured to, in the form of labels 
which implicitly summarises the legitimacy of intervention in particular circumstances. 
 
334 Taggart, ‘Administrative Law’ (n 47) 82. 
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Clarity is not universal, however.335 The admission of overlap, the fact the grounds aggregate 
a series of more specific sub-grounds, and the role of emergent grounds mean the schema has 
greater complexity than seen at first blush and greater potential for inconsistency when 
examined more closely. Moreover, it leaves a distinct role for judicial discretion; however, in 
contrast to scope of review, this discretion is more apparent on the face of the schema. While 
there is some departure from the rule-regime ideal of simplicity, clarity and generality, the 
schema goes some way to expose the normative judgements involved.  
Stability 
The schema presents a reasonable degree of stability. For example, the tripartite grounds have 
endured since their original articulation in the early 1980s. As explained above, the regime 
provides for some evolution of the grounds. So far, the extent to which emergent grounds 
have been recognised is modest and limited. Other possible grounds remain inchoate, but are 
discussed because judicial review jurisprudence has sufficient flexibility to enable them to be 
explored and promoted in individual cases. The evolution of grounds tends to be measured 
and generational, rather than frequent and immediate. This means the evolutionary potential 
does not seriously compromise stability. However, relying on the inherent flexibility of 
common law review, this longer term evolutionary aspect may allow judges latitude and 
discretion to seek to deploy novel grounds with increased depths of scrutiny in occasional 
cases, notwithstanding a ground not yet receiving widespread endorsement. Regardless of 
whether the novel ground is embraced or disapproved in later cases, in the immediate instance 
judges may rely on the evolutionary potential to justify its deployment. Again, though, such a 
practice is not widespread and does not significantly undermine the stability of the schema in 
the way contemplated by Fuller’s virtues. 
Non-contradiction and coherence 
The rationale for the systematisation of doctrines into generalised grounds of review was 
schematic coherence. As explained above, Lord Diplock, in particular, was instrumental in the 
systemisation project; he proudly proclaimed the systemisation of administration law as the 
‘the great achievement’ of the English courts in his judicial lifetime.336 Lord Donaldson echoed 
the impact of the tripartite grounds, noting that they were formulated ‘in an attempt to rid the 
courts of shackles bred of the technicalities surrounding the old prerogative writs.’337 The 
 
335  See eg Jowell and Lester’s criticism of  the unreasonableness ground’s lack of  clarity: Lester and Jowell (n 
303). 
336  National Federation of  Self  Employed (n 22) 641. 
337  Guinness (n 131) 160 (Lord Donaldson). 
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purpose of the systemisation was to move judicial review doctrine beyond its doctrinal morass 
and to ensure a simple, unified, and coherent framework was adopted. As seen in the 
explanation of the nature of the rules above, the grounds of review approach is relatively 
successful in presenting a coherent structure. Moreover, the schematic coherence of the 
grounds of review approach is illustrated, in part, by the employment of the grounds by 
textbook writers. The systemised grounds allow the ‘orderly exposition’ of the bases of 
intervention.338 Indeed, an analogy is frequently found between the grounds and the chapter 
headings of textbooks.339 As Taylor explains, the grounds provide an analytical structure which 
is useful for instructive purposes; the groupings – or, again, ‘chapters’ – avoids the ‘unwieldy’ 
exposition of the bases of judicial intervention.340 Thus, the grounds of review performs well 
under this criterion.  
Non-impossibility and practicality 
The simplified, systemised nature of the generalised grounds also ensures litigation is 
reasonably practical. The litigation process is supported by the operation of the established 
tripartite grounds, in most cases. These operate as useful guides for the purpose of framing 
and arguing cases, although non-traditional grounds presents some challenges in the litigation 
process. 
The tripartite grounds usefully frame argument in administrative law courts. ‘The grounds 
of review are the arguments which a lawyer can put forward as to why a court should hold a 
public authority’s decision to be unlawful.’341 The way the grounds of review provide structure 
in litigation, assisting submissions or judgments to ‘focus on the factual features of the decision 
or action said to be reviewable’ has been acknowledged.342 This is recognised by the rules of 
civil procedure; claimants are required to identify the grounds on which a judicial review claim 
is made.343 The readily understood depth of scrutiny associated with the grounds flows into the 
evidential corpus required. Like scope of review, review for legality, procedural fairness and 
unreasonableness does not necessitate vast amounts of evidence or cross-examination.344 The 
 
338  See Boddington (n 29) 152. 
339  Le Sueur, Herberg and English (n 40) 226; Brind (n 4) 722; de Smith (5th edn) 294.  
340  Taylor (n 154) [11.02]. 
341  Le Sueur, Herberg and English (n 40) 226.  
342  Taylor (n 154) [11.02]. 
343  The Civil Procedure Rules Part 54 Practice Direction, cl 5.6(1) requires claimants to provide ‘a detailed 
statement of  the claimant’s grounds for bringing the claim for judicial review’. The Judicature Amendment 
Act 1972 (NZ) s 9(2)(b) require an applicant to state ‘the grounds on which the applicant seeks relief ’.  
344  David Abrahams ‘Conflicts of  Evidence in Judicial Review Proceedings’ [1999] JR 221; Harlow and 
Rawlings (n 9) 704. 
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symmetry between the standards of legality and standards of review – that is, their inverse 
relationship – assists in the deliberation process. Generally, the process of reasoning is simple 
and uncluttered. Judges attention is directed to the circumstances of the particular case, and 
need not engage in lengthy self-reflection about their own methodology or the applicable 
standards of review.  
The simplicity and straightforward nature of litigation is tested because these emergent 
grounds may unleash different methodologies and different degrees of scrutiny. More vigilant 
grounds, like proportionality or legitimate expectation, require greater attention to the 
justification advanced by the administration and greater examination of the reasoning and 
supporting evidential basis. The classic model of judicial review – expedited and tightly-focused 
in practical terms – does not fit this more vigilant approach. Meeting the evidential demands 
of greater scrutiny costs time and preparation.  
As an example, the Lab Tests litigation in New Zealand shows the growth of the court record 
and the enlargement of time associated with arguments of increased vigilance.345 The 
incumbent tenderer for diagnostic testing reviewed a decision of a district health board to 
award the contract to another provided. Amongst other things, it argued that the Court ought 
to adopt a ‘broad-based probity in public decision-making approach’ to reviewing the decision 
(an approach that was adopted at first instance but overturned on appeal). As a result, the 
judicial review hearing took 10 days to hear at first instance, and a further seven on appeal. The 
evidential corpus was large (68 affidavits and nearly 12,000 pages of documents) and written 
submissions lengthy (over 700 pages).346 Concern was expressed about the unorthodox length 
of the hearing, prompted especially by the more intensive standard of review and associated 
factual complexity. For example, Arnold J conceded the appeal court’s judgment was ‘a lengthy 
judgment, much longer than is desirable’ but pointed to the need to ‘examine the evidence in 
some detail’, in the light of the plaintiff’s claim for a supervisory approach which mandated 
‘almost indeterminate scope for intervention by the courts’; his view was that the ‘factual and 
other subtleties’ were ‘too great to be dealt with in what is supposed to be “a relatively simple, 
untechnical and prompt procedure”’.347 This can be compared to the experience and 
expectation of litigation under a classic model, where proceedings would be often heard in a 
day or so.348  
 
345  Lab Tests (n 169). See also Powerco (n 159).  
346  R (Rossminster) v IRC [1980] AC 952; Geary v Psychologists Board (2009) 19 PRNZ 415. 
347  Lab Tests (n 169) 344, referring to Minister of  Energy v Petrocorp Exploration Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 348. 
348  See further Harlow and Rawlings (n 9) 703-710 for the impact of  the expansion of  judicial review on the 
fact base of  proceedings. 
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The procedural style of litigation associated with increased scrutiny is markedly different 
and more involved; we can describe it as ‘plenary’ style of procedure, in contrast to the more 
modest ‘constrained’ style of procedure. The existence of two procedural styles raises the 
question of how the courts can accommodate each within the ordinary framework of review. 
In other words, practically, how can the courts modulate the quality of procedure in cases in 
which that is required? On the one hand, it is not desirable or feasible for the plenary style of 
procedure to be employed in every case. The costs associated with this would be significant. 
And presenting a full evidential corpus for intensive review in cases where traditional review 
only applies risks encouraging judges to engage in more vigilant review, without any normative 
basis. On the other hand, it may be difficult to anticipate those cases where increased scrutiny 
is justified; nor is it easily to demarcate evidence between low-intensity and high-intensity 
grounds, or to separate factually-dependent grounds from abstract grounds. This compromises 
predictability and therefore the lessens the clarity of the schema. 
That said, the conditional or partial nature of emergent grounds does ameliorate this to 
some extent. None of the emergent grounds is universal; as mentioned above, pre-conditions 
must be first satisfied before they can be reached and they have, to date, been relatively 
confined in operation. Thus, the courts must first be persuaded that the emergent ground is 
applicable in the circumstances of the particular case before the high-intensity procedural 
review is deployed. This limits, to some degree, the need for, and reliance on, high-intensity 
procedural review. However, these decisions are often not made at or before the substantive 
hearing of the case, diluting this gate-keeper function. It is possible that more sophisticated 
and robust examination of the claimed grounds of review at the preliminary permissions stage 
(where this is available) could improve this gate-keeping function and ensure the evidential 
corpus is commensurate with the realistically arguable grounds of review. However, there may 
be some reluctance to make judgements like this based on the sparse evidence available at 
preliminary hearings.  
Congruence and candour 
The grounds of review schema perform relatively well in term of congruence and candour. 
balancing a need for consistency with flexibility – and generally encouraging congruence and 
candour on the part of judges. However, the ability to manipulate some of the key 
classifications takes away from congruence and candour. As explained earlier, doctrinal 
classification can obfuscate the unstated normative reasons for the classification. 
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Hortatory versatility 
Finally, the grounds of review schema is well-suited as a hortatory framework. The hortatory 
function is exemplified by the production of the various bureaucratic manuals, such as the Judge 
Over Your Shoulder guides produced in England and New Zealand, based on the simplified and 
systemised grounds of review.349 The aim is to seek to improve awareness of the principles of 
good administration and promote compliance. The grounds of review are often cast in inverse 
terms to represent what have been described as principles of good administration or standards 
of legality.350 They represent norms which ministers, public bodies and officials must comply 
with when exercising discretion. In other words, the corollary of grounds of review enabling 
intervention on the basis of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety (as per Lord 
Diplock) is an obligation on the part of decision-makers to act legally, rationally and with 
procedural propriety. This helps explain the usefulness of the ground for bureaucrats and their 
prominence in administrative guidance.  
It is commonly observed that the number of administrative decisions which are subject to 
external review, particularly judicial review, is minuscule compared to the vast number of 
decisions actually made by the administration.351 Thus, the hortatory role is important because 
it has the potential to reach parts of the administration that are not frequently exposed to 
external review and supervision. Moreover, these principles of good administration may be 
utilised by other public functionaries which have a grievance-remedying role, such as 
ombudsmen, auditors or administrative tribunals. Again, the simple expression of three bases 
of intervention supports this function. 
The increasing complexity of the circumstances of judicial intervention, however, means a 
simple inversion of the grounds of intervention to articulate principles of good administration 
is no longer adequate. The growth in emergent grounds, with different depth of scrutiny review 
in different circumstances, creates tension between the statement of grounds in terms of 
standards of legality and standards of review. Take, for instance, the legitimate expectation 
ground. In some circumstances, defeating a legitimate expectation in a way that creates 
 
349  Treasury Solicitor, The Judge Over Your Shoulder (4th edn, 2006); Crown Law Office, A Judge Over Your Shoulder 
(2005). See Harlow and Rawlings (n 9) 734; Dawn Oliver ‘Judge Over Your Shoulder – Mark II’ [1994] PL 
514; de Smith (7th edn) 31. 
350  See text to n 302. For examples of  formalised accounts of  these principles, see United Kingdom 
Ombudsman, Principles of  Good Administration (2007) and European Union, Code of  Good Administrative 
Behaviour (2012). 
351  Cane, Administrative Law (n 299) 26. 
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resultant unfairness or an abuse of power justifies judicial intervention. As a standard of review, 
the intensity may be approximated to simple unreasonableness (or, as some argue, 
proportionality), if the circumstances justify; if not, the default Wednesbury unreasonableness 
standard applies.352 But how does this translate into a general standard of legality? The 
contingent and contextual nature of the ground inversion of the standard or ground does not 
readily translate into a general standard or norm that decision-makers should comply with. 
Instead, further reflection is required to elaborate a norm. Here, it is one of consistency or legal 
certainty (either acting consistently with promulgated policies or established practices on the 
one hand, or not reneging on promises or other assurances on the other) – this is the gist that 
runs through legitimate expectation. Thus there are some limits to the hortatory role of the 
grounds, particularly when the emergent grounds are engaged. 
V Conclusion 
The framework of grounds of review provides a few generalised grounds to guide, indirectly, 
the determination of the depth of scrutiny. Born out of Lord Diplock’s expression of three 
grounds, the tripartite formulation provides the structure for the later editions of de Smith’s 
textbook and continue to be orthodox in England and New Zealand. Some of the potential 
for the addition of more grounds has been realised and further potential remains.  
The articulation of standards, drawn from the common law without being dressed up in the 
cloak of vires or legislative intent, means the approach satisfies those from the common law 
school. However, those scholars supporting the approach prefer the expression of values be 
given some structure, crystallised in the form of key markers of judicial depth of review. 
The normative value of this approach comes from its attempts to simplify and systematise 
the basis of intervention, without pretending the generalisations are perfect or rigid. Thus, 
more abstract rules encourage coherence, congruence and practicality, without significantly 
diminishing generality. Elements of residual judicial discretion – sometimes unexposed – leave 
a gloss on the rule-based virtue of the schema, particularly its transparency, clarity and stability.  
 
352  See text to n 86 above. 
  
4  
Intensity of  Review 
I Introduction 
Intensity of review brings questions of the depth of scrutiny into the foreground. The hallmark 
of this style of review is the explicit calibration of the depth of review as a preliminary step in 
the supervisory process. The language and style of intensity of review is increasingly evident 
through the fifth, sixth and seventh editions of de Smith’s textbook although it has not yet 
eclipsed the organisational framework provided by grounds of review. 
This approach takes schematic form and also exists as a method within a particular doctrine. 
Its schematic form is seen most vividly in the Canada’s framework of explicit standards of 
review (most prominently before its recent rationalisation); under this framework the depth of 
review was calibrated explicitly based on forms of reasonableness and correctness review. 
Elsewhere in English and New Zealand judicial review, the methodology is evident in particular 
grounds or doctrines for substantive review. Notions of ‘hard look’, variegated forms of 
unreasonableness and structured forms of deference all exhibit the transparent mediation of 
the balance between vigilance and restraint, based on various constitutional, institutional and 
functional factors. While not yet assuming full schematic form in England and New Zealand, 
it is increasingly engaged on matters of substantive review and has the potential to provide a 
competing framework to other schemata like grounds of review. 
 Intensity of review draws support from both sides of the conceptual underpinnings debate 
about judicial review. Some from the ultra vires school acknowledge the categorical distinctions 
of formalism are unable to cope with the complexity of judicial review. For them, more 
conceptual reasoning is supported, but only when circumscribed by doctrine to ensure judicial 
values do not overtake legislative intent. This approach also finds favour amongst some from 
the common law school. While acknowledging the role judges have in articulating 
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administrative law norms and the circumstances of judicial intervention, they are also acutely 
aware of judicial limitations. Although the judicial judgement unavoidably takes centre-stage in 
the complex domain of administrative law, so too should the limitations of the judicial function 
– in this case, realised in doctrinal form.  
 Intensity of review scores highly on a number of the principles of efficacy. Transparency, 
coherence and candour are aided by the centrality of conceptual reasoning to the determination 
of depth of review. A rule-structure is present – and hence generality is honoured – but the 
focus is on rules about how the depth of review is to be determined. This brings a more open-
textured judicial methodology, making it more difficult to predict substantive outcomes. 
Although the approach tries to ameliorate this, the lack of certainty diminishes the 
prospectivity, clarity and practicality of the schema. 
II Doctrinal Manifestation 
I begin by tracing the language of intensity of review in de Smith’s textbook; absent from the 
first four editions, it becomes increasingly prominent thereafter. I then turn to the way the 
approach has provided the schematic form for Canadian administrative law for many years, 
before drawing out its role in relation to substantive review in England and New Zealand.  
A De Smith derivation 
The concept and language of ‘intensity of review’ makes a brief cameo appearance in the fifth 
edition, but gains a much stronger foothold in the sixth and seventh editions. The authors 
increasingly resort to the language of intensity of review for analytical purposes and embrace the 
notion that the depth of review modulates in different situations. But that the discussion of 
intensity of review still occurs within a general schema or framework of grounds of review. 
In the fifth edition, a number of paragraphs are dedicated to a discussion of intensity of 
review in the context of the unreasonableness ground of review.1 The concept is also alluded 
to in the discussion of justiciability and proportionality.2 In its formative appearance, its genesis 
is often attributed to the ‘margin of appreciation’ concept employed in European Community 
law and European Convention jurisprudence; the phraseology of intensity and margin/latitude 
are often used interchangeably.3  
 
1  De Smith (5th edn) 586-592.  
2  ibid 314 and 598-600 respectively. 
3  ibid, eg, 552, 605, 606. 
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Not nearly as developed as in the editions that followed, the commentary highlighted two 
circumstances – at different extremes – illustrative of the idea that the subject-matter of the 
decision under review may influence the threshold of intervention. Managerial and policy 
decisions involving calculations of social and economic preference were said to be an area 
where the intensity of review would be low.4 Two cases involving challenges to ministerial 
control of local authority expenditure were cited in support of this form of light-handed review: 
Nottinghamshire and Hammersmith.5 In both cases, the high degree of policy content supported 
this very deferential approach, along with the parliamentary ratification of the ministerial 
action.6 In contrast, Woolf and Jowell said the courts would ‘look significantly harder’ at cases 
involving infringements of human or fundamental rights.7 The seeds of the principle of legality 
are hinted at. Based on the Leech case,8 it was suggested (baldly) the courts would infer that, in 
the absence of clear authorisation, statutory powers were not intended to infringe fundamental 
rights.9 A lower threshold of unreasonableness is also alluded to. Relying on Brind, it was 
suggested that where legislation unambiguously confers a discretionary power to interfere with 
a fundamental right, ‘review is stricter’; rather than reasonableness analogous to perversity or 
absurdity being deployed, a simpler expression of reasonableness is adopted.10 Further, in one 
short, passing sentence, the possibility of ‘most anxious scrutiny’ is also referred to; cases later 
assuming greater significance, Bugdaycay and Smith, are dotted in a supporting footnote.11 
Finally, the variability of the standard of unreasonableness and intensity of review is most 
squarely identified in the context of statutory unreasonableness.12 Pointing to a number of cases 
where the approach to review a decision where the statute itself insisted the decision be 
reasonable, Woolf and Jowell concludes that depth of review adopted was diverse: ‘The term 
 
4  ibid 589-587.  
5  Nottinghamshire CC v Secretary of  State for the Environment [1986] AC 240, 247 and R (Hammersmith and Fulham 
London BC) v Secretary of  State for the Environment [1991] 1 AC 521, 597. See pt IIC. 
6  The significance of  a decision having a democratic mandate was expanded later in the commentary: de 
Smith, 590 (relevant to the assessment of  reasonableness, but should not be taken as conclusive proof, 
referring to Bromley London BC v Greater London Council [1983] AC 768; Secretary of  State for Education and 
Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014; Nottinghamshire (n 5); Hammersmith (n 5)).  
7  De Smith (5th edn) 588-590. 
8  R (Leech) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [1994] QB 198. 
9  De Smith (5th edn) 589. 
10  ibid. 
11  ibid 589 and fn 26. See pt IIC. 
12  De Smith (5th edn) 592. 
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“unreasonable”, in its Wednesbury or any other sense, is no magic formula; everything must 
depend upon the context.’13  
In the sixth and seventh editions, ‘intensity of review’ is given significant prominence and 
subjected to extensive analysis. Again afforded its own subsection in the rebranded section on 
substantive review and justification, the direct treatment of intensity of review grows to eight 
pages, along with a further half-dozen pages of comparative comment.14 As well as the extent 
of direct coverage increasing, the commentary itself highlights the centrality of intensity of 
review in substantive review. The terminology is also dotted throughout the commentary 
elsewhere.15 
In their introductory passage, the authors acknowledge and explain their avoidance of the 
style previously attributed to this ground: ‘unreasonableness’ and ‘irrationality’.16 The 
imprecision of these terms, tautological nature of unreasonableness, and the overlap with the 
emerging concept of proportionality are promoted as the reason for adopting the broader and 
more generic title of ‘substantive review and justification’.17 Pitched as engaging the substance 
of the decision and the sufficiency of its justification, the authors admit the importance of 
intensity of review – or rather, as they describe it, ‘the appropriate measure of deference, 
respect, restraint, latitude or discretionary area of judgement (to use some of the terms variously 
employed)’.18 
In their subsequent, extended commentary (under the heading ‘Intensity of Review’), they 
develop further the role of latitude and uniformity in judicial review.19 The authors endorse the 
principle of contextualism expressed by Lord Steyn in Daly and admit that the ‘willingness’ of 
the courts to invalidate a decision on substantive grounds will depend on a number of factors 
such as respective institutional competence and practical considerations.20  
 
13  ibid 593. 
14  De Smith (6th edn) 591-598; (7th edn) 635-642. 
15  De Smith (6th edn) 630-633; (7th edn) 685-689, notably referring to ‘deference’ and a ‘sliding scale of  
review’, along with R (Begbie) v Secretary of  State for Education and Employment [2000] 1 WLR 1115 (n 91) 
(proposing a proportionality assessment). 
16  De Smith (6th edn) 543; (7th edn) 585.  
17  De Smith (6th edn) 543-544; (7th edn) 585-587. 
18  De Smith (6th edn) 544 and fn 14; (7th edn) 587 and fn 14. The footnote to this passage equates the 
various terms to ‘intensity of  review’. 
19  Two questions are posed: ‘To what extent should the courts allow a degree of  latitude or leeway to the 
decision-maker? And to what extent should it be uniform?’: de Smith (6th edn) 591. While there is 
reference to uniformity, the commentary which follows makes it clear variability is embraced. 
20  De Smith (6th edn) 591; (7th edn) 635. 
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Significantly, intensity is depicted in terms of a complete schema. A number of different 
formulations of variable intensity were identified, from ‘full intensity review’ on the one hand, 
to non-justiciable decisions on the other:21 
FULL INTENSITY 
REVIEW 
STRUCTURED 
PROPORTIONALITY 
REVIEW 
VARIABLE INTENSITY UNREASONABLENESS REVIEW 
Depending on the nature of the subject-matter 
NON-JUSTICIABLE 
Court decides 
‘correctness’ and 
whether power abused 
Intensity of review 
may vary according to 
the context 
 
Burden of justification 
on public authority 
 
But adequacy of 
justification still 
required Anxious scrutiny 
unreasonableness 
review 
 
 
Burden on public 
authority 
Standard 
Wednesbury 
unreasonableness 
review 
 
Burden on claimant 
‘Light touch’ 
unreasonableness 
review 
 
 
Burden on claimant 
 
Full intensity, or correctness, review is described as arising in three main fields: (a) decisions 
made where no evidence exists to support it or an established fact is ignored; (b) decisions 
which offend the principle of consistency; and (c) some (but not all) decisions which 
undermine legitimate expectations.22 The authors recount that the language of ‘abuse of power’ 
is often employed in these cases, rather than the language of unreasonableness or 
proportionality.  
In-between the two poles of full intensity review and non-justiciability, a number of 
different manifestations of variable depth of scrutiny are plotted. ‘Variable intensity 
unreasonableness review’ is described as allowing the ‘broadest spectrum of intensity’; the 
authors explain that some cases require the courts to allow the administration ‘a degree of 
latitude’ or, in other words, ‘a sliding scale of review’.23 The authors identify the default position 
– ‘at the time of writing’ – is still the Wednesbury formulation of unreasonableness.24 They 
suggest there has been a subtle reformulation, a softening of the extremity of Wednesbury’s 
language to a simpler test of whether the decision falls ‘within a range of reasonable 
responses’.25 Lord Cooke’s promotion of a simpler formulation of the test (and his contempt 
for Wednesbury unreasonableness) is identified as being influential and a number of cases 
adopting this simplified approach are also recounted.26  
 
21  De Smith (6th edn) 592; (7th edn) 636. 
22  De Smith (6th edn) 592; (7th edn) 636. See discussion of  abuse of  power: ch 5 pt IID. 
23  De Smith (6th edn) 594; (7th edn) 638. 
24  De Smith (6th edn) 554 and 596; (7th edn) 596 and 640. 
25  De Smith (6th edn) 554; (7th edn) 596. 
26  De Smith (6th edn) 554 and fn 72; (7th edn) 596 and fn 73; citing, notably, Ala v Secretary of  State for the 
Home Department [2003] All ER (D) 283; Huang v Secretary of  State for the Home Office [2007] 2 AC 167. 
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On each side of Wednesbury unreasonableness, two further classes of case are described. The 
first is characterised as a form of ‘heightened scrutiny unreasonableness review’, available 
where a decision interferes with a ‘fundamental right or important interest’.27 The deployment 
of ‘anxious scrutiny’ in Bugdaycay and the insistence of more extensive justification in cases 
involving human rights in Smith (both more prominent in this edition) were instanced, along 
with Brind and Saville where similar remarks are made.28 A further class of cases, described as 
‘light-touch review’, is identified within the rubric of variable intensity of review.29 
‘Considerable latitude’ – and, importantly, more deference than found in the default Wednesbury 
test – may be afforded to some administrative decisions.30 This class of case is equated with 
the triggering language of ‘outrageous’ employed in CCSU and ‘arbitrary’ in Pro-Life Alliance.31 
Oddly, the Nottinghamshire and Hammersmith cases referred to in earlier editions are not cited in 
this context; rather, they appear in an earlier more generic discussion on the constitutional 
context of substantive review.32  
 The treatment of light-touch review is relatively modest and quickly shades into a 
discussion of the principle of non-justiciability, which was identified earlier as the high-water 
mark in terms of judicial restraint.33 While it is said that ‘no power – whether statutory or under 
the prerogative – is any longer inherently unreviewable’, it is accepted that there are certain 
decisions which the courts ‘cannot or should not easily engage’.34 Two situations are identified, 
the first where the courts are ‘constitutionally disabled from entering on review’ and the second 
where ‘the courts lack relative institutional capacity to enter into a review of a decision’.35 A 
need for judicial caution is expressed on constitutional grounds in relation to policy matters 
requiring the weighing of social, economic and political preferences. Similarly, decisions on 
which the courts are ill-equipped to review are identified as being ‘not amenable to the judicial 
 
27  De Smith (6th edn) 594; (7th edn) 638. 
28  De Smith (6th edn) 595; (7th edn) 639; R (Bugdaycay) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [1987] AC 
514, 531; R (Smith) v Ministry of  Defence [1996] QB 517; R (Brind) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department 
[1991] 1 AC 696; R (A) v Lord Saville of  Newdigate [2000] 1 WLR 1855. 
29  De Smith (6th edn) 596; (7th edn) 640. 
30  De Smith (6th edn) 596; (7th edn) 640. 
31  De Smith (6th edn) 596; (7th edn) 640. 
32  De Smith (6th edn) 546; (7th edn) 589. 
33  De Smith (6th edn) 597; (7th edn) 641.  
34  De Smith (6th edn) 15, 597; (7th edn) 641 
35  De Smith (6th edn) 597; (7th edn) 641. 
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process’ (adopting the words of Lord Diplock in CCSU), based on institutional limitations.36 
The evaluation of matters of preference, matters on which the courts lack (relative) expertise, 
and matters which are polycentric are expressed as decisions which ‘are not ideally justiciable’.37 
Ultimately, the authors do not profess ‘any carefully calibrated theory’ about the circumstances 
in which the courts should recognise their constitutional and institutional limitations by 
adopting very deferential forms of review.38 But their animus towards non-justiciability as an 
absolute concept is obvious.39 
One form of proportionality, namely ‘structured proportionality review’, is also presented 
on the schema of variable intensity, between full intensity review and variable intensity of 
review.40 The identification of variable intensity in the context of proportionality fits with other 
analysis in the text of the nature of the proportionality review. Different roles are discussed: (a) 
the implicit potential role for proportionality at common law; (b) its established role for 
assessing whether limitations on rights are justified under the Human Rights Act 1998; and (c) 
its role in relation to directly effective European Community law.41 The latter two roles are 
explained as instances where structured proportionality applies. This form of review is 
characterised, on the one hand, as ‘more searching’ because of the closer attention to 
justification for the decision than found in reasonableness review.42 On the other hand, the 
authors acknowledge that proportionality does not displace the role for deference: ‘Varying 
levels of intensity of review will be appropriate in different categories of case’.43 Two instances 
of a more deferential approach are presented: decisions involving complex economic 
assessment European Community law cases,44 and Convention right cases involving social 
policy or questions of resource allocation.45  
 
36  De Smith (6th edn) 18, 597; (7th edn) 19, 641. 
37  De Smith (6th edn) 18; (7th edn) 19. 
38  De Smith (6th edn) 549; (7th edn) 592. 
39  At a number of  points, the authors argue the courts should be slow to relinquish their supervisory role, 
even in situations when faced with constitutional and institutional limitations: see eg de Smith (6th edn) 
17, 548-550 and 597; (7th edn) 21, 591-593 and 641. 
40  De Smith (6th edn) 592; (7th edn) 636. 
41  De Smith (6th edn) 584; (7th edn) 627. 
42  De Smith (6th edn) 593; (7th edn) 636; citing, notably, Tweed v Parades Commission for Northern Ireland [2007] 
1 AC 650. 
43  De Smith (6th edn) 592-593; (7th edn) 635-636. 
44  De Smith (6th edn) 593; (7th edn) 636; citing, notably, R (Astonquest) v Ministry of  Agriculture, Fisheries And 
Food [2000] Eu LR 371. 
45  De Smith (6th edn) 594; (7th edn) 636; citing, notably, R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of  State for 
the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 AC 295 and Begbie (n 15). 
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An alternative formulation, proportionality as a test of ‘fair balance’, is also discussed but, 
oddly, it is not specifically identified on the authors’ variable intensity schema. This formulation 
is described as mandating judicial intervention when disproportionate weight it placed on a 
consideration or a decision amounts to a disproportionate interference with a person’s rights 
or interests.46 It requires the defect to be manifest and requires a claimant to establish a basis 
for intervention. This style of (dis)proportionality is described as an ‘implicit explanation’ for 
judicial intervention under the unreasonableness ground.47 Its implicit relationship with 
unreasonableness perhaps explains its omission from the variable intensity schema; in any 
event, it lines up as a further instance of variability within proportionality, even if not explicitly 
presented as such by the authors.  
B Canada: standards of review 
Explicit calibration of intensity of review has been commonplace in Canada for many 
decades.48 Since 1979, Canadian courts have adopted a framework of variable standards of 
review, identifying the appropriate depth of review as a preliminary step in the supervisory 
process. As originally developed, it applied only to review for error of law; in the late 1990s, it 
was also extended to review of the exercise of discretion.49 Notably, unlike other Anglo-
Commonwealth jurisdictions, this means that deference also applies explicitly to questions of 
law – that is, resolving matters of interpretation is not regarded as being the sole constitutional 
preserve of the courts. 
 
46  De Smith (6th edn) 585; (7th edn) 629. 
47  De Smith (6th edn) 585; (7th edn) 629; citing, notably, R (Hook) v Barnsley MBC [1976] 1 WLR 1052; R 
(Uchendu) v Highbury Corner Justices (1994) 158 JP 409. 
48  For extended background to the development of  the framework, see DP Jones and AS de Villars, Principles 
of  Administrative Law (5th edn, Carswell 2009) 489-522; Audrey Macklin ‘Standard of  Review’ in CM Flood 
and L Sossin (eds), Administrative Law in Context (Edmond Montgomery 2008) 197; David Mullan, 
‘Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?’ (2006) AJ 42, 48-50; Michael Taggart, ‘Outside Canadian 
Administrative Law’ (1996) 46 UTLJ 649; Paul Daly, A Theory of  Deference in Administrative Law (CUP 2012) 
15-16. See also recent moves within this framework towards more contextual forms of  unreasonableness: 
ch 5 pt IIC. 
49  Procedural fairness is addressed separately; ie a correctness standard always applies, although the 
assessment of  the content of  the obligation sometimes mimics the assessment of  deference for 
substantive review: Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners [1979] 1 SCR 311; Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa [2009] 1 SCR 339; Mission Institution v Khela [2014] 1 SCR 502; Grant 
Huscroft, ‘The Duty of  Fairness’ in Flood and Sossin (n 48) 115, 135. For recent moves, where Charter 
rights are engaged, to subject some (individualised) administrative decision-making to reasonableness 
review rather than the traditional proportionality test, see Doré v Barreau du Québec [2012] 1 SCR 395.  
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Initially, in CUPE Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation, the Supreme Court identified 
two discrete standards of review – ‘correctness’ and ‘patent unreasonableness’ – mimicking the 
depth of review applied in England and New Zealand under the grounds of review schema.50 
In the late 1990s, the space between these two discrete standards was filled by an intermediate 
standard of review: ‘reasonableness simpliciter’.51 Again, this more vigilant form of 
reasonableness echoed the more intensive forms seen in England and New Zealand, setting a 
test for intervention ‘more deferential than correctness but less deferential than not patently 
unreasonable’.52 With the additional of this intermediate standard, the Supreme Court, as Jones 
and de Villars describe it, ‘effectively trad[ed] a toggle switch for a dimmer switch’.53 The 
Supreme Court encouraged a ‘functional and pragmatic’ approach to the settling of the 
appropriate standard, based on four key factors: (a) the presence or absence of a privative 
clause; (b) the comparative expertise of the decision-maker and court; (c) the purpose of the 
Act and provision in issue; and (d) the nature of the problem, namely whether it was one of 
law, fact, or mixed law and fact. As explained above, the Supreme Court in Baker also brought 
review for abuse of discretion (previously reviewable on a number of largely deferential 
grounds of review) within this framework.54 
This basic framework endured for over a decade, until the Supreme Court in Dunsmuir v 
New Brunswick collapsed the distinction between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness 
simpliciter.55 Following a major review of the jurisprudence on standards of review, the Supreme 
Court ruled the two standards of review should be: (a) correctness review; and (b) a ‘single 
form of “reasonableness” review’.56 In other words the different forms of unreasonableness 
 
50  [1979] 2 SCR 227. Matters which were ‘preliminary and collateral’ on which the decision-maker’s 
jurisdiction depended were reviewed according to the correctness standard. In contrast, other matters 
within the decision-maker’s jurisdiction, on which the legislature intended the decision-maker’s decision 
should be final, were assessed according to a patent unreasonableness standard.  
51  Canada (Director of  Investigation & Research) v Southam Inc [1997] 1 SCR 748 and Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister 
of  Employment & Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982. The Supreme Court had earlier toyed with the concept of  
a ‘spectrum of  standards of  review’ in Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of  Brokers) [1994] 2 SCR 557, 
although in that case, as Jones and de Villars note, ‘the Supreme Court actually only referred to two possible 
standards of  review – correctness and patent unreasonableness (which it selected)’; Jones and de Villars (n 
48) 490 fn 5. See also Macklin (n 48) 210. 
52  Southam Inc (n 51) [54]. 
53  Jones and de Villars (n 48) 490. 
54  Baker v Canada (Minister of  Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817, [54]. See ch 3 pt IIE above. 
55  [2008] 1 SCR 190. See generally David Mullan ‘Dunsmuir v New Brunswick’ (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 
117; Laverne Jacobs ‘Developments in Administrative Law’ (2008) 43 SCLR (2d) 1; along with the Supreme 
Court’s account in Dunsmuir ([34]-[42]). 
56  Dunsmuir (n 55) [45]. 
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were replaced with a unified, but context-specific, reasonableness standard.57 The Supreme 
Court indicated that this more generalised form of unreasonableness would be simpler and 
enable review in cases where justice required it.58 Notably, the majority rejected any suggestion 
of reverting to the pre-Southam ‘all-or-nothing’ days prior to the creation of the intermediate 
reasonableness simpliciter category.59 The new unified standard of unreasonableness is broader 
and would continue to capture the depth of review previously undertaken in the names of 
patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter. 
The Supreme Court in Dunsmuir retained a factorial approach to the determination of the 
appropriate standard (under the new regime, either correctness or unreasonableness), but with 
some modification. The factors were reiterated, with only subtle rewording.60 Notably, the 
Court said an ‘exhaustive review’ of the factors to determine the applicable standard was not 
required in every case.61 If existing jurisprudence ‘already determined in a satisfactory manner 
the degree of deference to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question’, this 
standard was to be applied;62 only if this ‘proves unfruitful’, is it necessary to analyse the 
mandated contextual factors to ascertain the applicable standard of review.63 A number of 
questions were marked out as ‘generally’ requiring correctness review: constitutional issues; 
general and important questions of law outside the primary decision-maker’s area of expertise; 
‘true’ questions of jurisdiction; and competing authority between specialised tribunals.64 In 
contrast, questions of fact, discretion or policy, a specialist tribunal’s interpretation of their 
 
57  ibid [34], [134] and [167]. 
58  ibid [43]. 
59  ibid [44]. 
60  ibid [64]. Alice Woolley ‘The Metaphysical Court’, (2008) 21 CJALP 259, 263-264 
61  Dunsmuir (n 55) [57].  
62  ibid.  
63  ibid. For subsequent discussion of  the scope of  the presumptive categories, see eg Smith v Alliance Pipeline 
[2011] 1 SCR 160; Canada (Canadian HRC) v Canada (AG) [2011] 3 SCR 471; Nor-Man Regional HA Inc v 
Manitoba Association of  Health Care Professionals, [2011] 3 SCR 616; Communications, Energy and Paperworkers 
Union of  Canada, Local 30 v Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd [2013] 2 SCR. 458; McLean v British Columbia (Securities 
Commission) [2013] SCC 67; Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) [2013] SCC 36. See 
generally Mullan, ‘Dunsmuir’ (n 55); Paul Daly, ‘The Unfortunate Triumph of  Form Over Substance in 
Canadian Administrative Law’ (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 317; Andrew Green, ‘Can There Be Too Much 
Context in Administrative Law?’ (2014) 47 UBC Law Rev 443; Paul Daly, ‘The Scope and Meaning of  
Reasonableness Review’ (2015) 52 Alta L Rev (forthcoming). 
64  Dunsmuir (n 55) [58]-[61]. The reference to jurisdiction was intended to be read narrowly and robustly, 
capturing the ‘the narrow sense of  whether or not the tribunal had the authority to make the inquiry’ – 
not the meaning that had ‘plagued’ jurisprudence for years ([59]). See Mullan, ‘Unresolved Issues on the 
Standard of  Review’ (2013) 42 AQ 1.  
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home statute, and cases involving privative clauses will ‘usually’ signal a reasonableness 
standard.65 While employing the language of categories, these presumptions do no repudiate 
the commitment to an intensity-centred approach. First, they represent situations where the 
factorial ‘analysis required is already deemed to have been performed and need not be 
repeated’.66 Secondly, the presumptions can be seen, as Mullan explains, as the application of 
precedent in circumstances when one or two factors are treated as being determinative.67 
Thirdly, they are generally indicative and rebuttable; that is, they are qualified by words like 
‘generally’ and ‘usually’.68 Finally, they apply in tandem with a factorial test, in the first stage of 
the supervisory process where the courts are required to explicitly consider the intensity of 
review that should be applied.69 Thus, so-called ‘categorisation’ in this context operates 
differently than, say, under the scope of review schema.  
The present Canadian approach, in summary, straddles the intensity of review and 
contextual review models. On the one hand, in the first instance, the intensity of review – either 
correctness or reasonableness – is settled explicitly; calibration is based on a set of factors and 
related presumptive categories. The tradition of bringing issues of deference to the fore and 
addressing them on a preliminary basis continues. On the other hand, if the unreasonableness 
standard is adopted, a second and further iteration is required. Unreasonableness is 
context-dependent, such that the depth applied in particular cases turns on the circumstances. 
This emphasis on contextual reasonableness review bears a stronger allegiance to the 
unstructured and circumstantial review seen elsewhere in English and New Zealand law, and 
is discussed in more detail below.70 
C England: heightened scrutiny, light-touch unreasonableness, and 
doctrinal deference 
English law’s experience with intensity of review, cast in its most explicit form, is most vivid 
in three particular areas. The first two instances involve variations to the reasonableness 
principle where the intensity differs from the traditional Wednesbury standard. First, a form of 
 
65  Dunsmuir (n 55) [51]-[54]. 
66  ibid [57]. 
67  Mullan, ‘Dunsmuir’ (n 55).  
68  See eg McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission) [2013] 3 SCR 895. 
69  See Green (n 63) (only ‘partial move to categories’); Diana Ginn, ‘New Words for Old Problems’ (2010) 
37 AQ 317 (‘halfway house’). Compare Paul Daly, ‘Form Over Substance’ (n 63). 
70  See ch 5 pt IIC. 
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heightened scrutiny under which decisions are scrutinized more deeply has been deployed, 
under rubrics such as anxious scrutiny, hard look and heightened scrutiny. Secondly, light-
touch review has also been relied on, presenting an even more deferential standard than 
Wednesbury. Thirdly, the depth of review in human rights adjudication is often acknowledged 
to be dependent on context and the proportionality calculus is frequently teamed with the 
notion of deference to reflect this. There have been some efforts to structure this process by 
giving the principle of deference doctrinal form (although the non-doctrinal expression of 
deference is presently preferred).71 
Heightened scrutiny 
The common law’s attempts to deviate from the Wednesbury form of unreasonableness have 
been well documented.72 One of the most heralded developments was the efforts taken to 
afford greater protection to human rights than evident in traditional administrative law. In the 
years before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, the courts began to develop more 
intensive forms of review under the unreasonableness rubric when (so-called73) ‘fundamental’ 
or ‘constitutional’ rights were engaged.74 
This lowering of the threshold of unreasonableness took a number of different guises. The 
concept of anxious scrutiny was seeded by the House of Lords in Bugdaycay.75 When considering 
a series of challenges to the refusal of applications for asylum by refugee, Lord Bridge said:76 
[T]he court must, I think, be entitled to subject an administrative decision to the more rigorous 
examination, to ensure that it is in no way flawed, according to the gravity of the issue which the 
decision determines. The most fundamental of all human rights is the individual’s right to life 
and when an administrative decision under challenge is said to be one which may put the 
applicant’s life at risk, the basis of the decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny.  
 
71  See ch 5 pt IID. 
72  See eg Tom Hickman, Public Law after the Human Rights Act (Hart 2010); Andrew Le Sueur, ‘The Rise and 
Ruin of  Unreasonableness?’ [2005] JR 32.  
73  For discussion of  the contested nature of  the adjective, see ch 3, n 66. 
74  Hickman, Public Law (n 72) 18 and 105; Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Taggart (n 73) 19; Michael Taggart, 
‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ [2008] NZ Law Rev 424, 433-435; PP Craig, ‘Substantive 
Legitimate Expectations in Community and Domestic Law’ (1996) 55 CLJ 289, 292; Michael Fordham, 
‘Surveying the Grounds’ in Peter Leyland and Terry Woods (eds), Administrative Law Facing the Future (OUP 
1997) 184, 197. 
75  Bugdaycay (n 28) 531. 
76  ibid 531. See also Lord Templeman’s remarks (537). These sentiments were subsequently echoed by Lord 
Ackner in Brind (n 28) 757. 
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The flexibility of the unreasonableness principle, along with the need for the administration to 
provide greater justification in cases where human rights are affected, was also acknowledged 
in Smith, where service men and women sought to overturn a policy preventing gays and 
lesbians from serving in the military:77 
This Court may not interfere with the exercise of an administrative discretion on substantive 
grounds save where it is satisfied the decision is unreasonable in the sense of being beyond the 
range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker. But in judging whether the decision-
maker has exceeded this margin of appreciation, the human rights context is important. The 
more substantial the interference with human rights the more the Court will require by way of 
justification before it is satisfied that the decision was reasonable… 
The Court accepted that the fact the policy concerned ‘innate qualities of a very personal kind’ 
and had a ‘profound effect on their careers and prospects’ weighed in favour of greater scrutiny 
of the basis for the policy.78 However, while this factor supported the need for increased 
scrutiny, it was not decisive; the judges did not engage in the probing analysis contemplated by 
that approach and dismissed the challenge. Other factors noted by the Court pointed towards 
a more deferential approach (such as significant policy content, limited judicial expertise on the 
issue, and legislature progressing reform of policy).79 One reading is that the countervailing 
values of both vigilance and restraint cancelled each other out.80 Regardless, the principle in 
Smith continues be relied on to support for intense scrutiny of the substance of the decision.  
This principle was built on and later characterised as a ‘sliding-scale of review’.81 For 
example, in Mahmood, Laws LJ commended the language of a continuum:82  
[A] fundamental right … is engaged in the case … There is … what may be called a sliding scale 
of review; the graver the impact of the decision in question upon the individual affected by it, 
the more substantial the justification that will be required. It is in the nature of the human 
condition that cases where, objectively, the individual is most gravely affected will be those where 
what we have come to call his fundamental rights are or are said to be put in jeopardy. 
 
77  Smith (n 28) 554 (adopting the submissions of  Pannick QC, counsel for the service men and women). For 
subsequent endorsement, see eg Lord Saville (n 28) 872. 
78  Smith (n 28) 554. 
79  ibid 556. 
80  Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2009) 250; le Sueur, 
‘Reasonableness?’ (n 72) 39 and 42; Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Beyond the Rule of  Law’ [2000] PL 671, 682 (the Court 
‘paid lip service to heightened scrutiny’). 
81  Begbie (n 15) 1130; R (Mahmood) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 840, 849; R (Asif  
Javed) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2002] QB 129, [49]; Sheffield CC v Smart [2002] EWCA Civ 
4, [42].  
82  Mahmood (n 81) [16] and [19]. 
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Again, while the circumstances suggested increased intensity of review (impact on the 
applicant’s family life), even this deeper scrutiny did not lead to the vitiation of the decision 
(deportation of an illegal entrant).  
Since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, reliance on this approach diminished.83 
The more direct protection and intensive review under the Human Rights Act was seen as 
being more powerful than its common law equivalent.84 However, somewhat out of the blue, 
the Supreme Court in Kennedy v Charity Commission returned to, and explicitly embraced, the 
variable form of unreasonableness and more intensive scrutiny.85 In relation to the review, on 
substantive grounds, of the Charity Commission’s refusal to allow a journalist access to 
information about a particular charity, Lord Mance recorded that the ‘common law no longer 
insists on the uniform application of the rigid test of irrationality once thought applicable under 
the so-called Wednesbury principle’.86 A more contextual approach is required, he said, notably 
endorsing remarks from Lord Carnwath in an earlier case where he spoke of the determination 
of a particular ‘intensity of review’.87 The constitutional context in the case, particularly the 
principles of accountability and transparency raised, justified the Court ‘plac[ing] itself so far as 
possible in the same position as the Charity Commission’ when reviewing the request for 
information.88 In other words, the Court applies a style of correctness review – but one in 
which the Court may still give ‘weight’ to the Commission’s original evaluation.89  
 
83  See eg R (Gibson) v Crown Court at Winchester [2004] 1 WLR 1623; R (Razgar) v Secretary of  State for the Home 
Department [2004] 2 AC 368; R (da Silva) v DPP [2006] All ER (D) 215; R (OM) v Secretary of  State for Home 
Department [2012] EWHC 3395. For non-human rights cases, see eg IBA Healthcare Ltd v Office of  Fair Trading 
[2004] ICR 1364; R (Bradley) v Work and Pensions Secretary [2009] QB 114, [71]-[72]; R (Equitable Members 
Action Group) v HM Treasury [2009] NLJR 1514, [66] (review of  decisions to reject recommendations of  
Ombudsman). 
84  Elliott, Administrative Law (n 58) 249 and 252; le Sueur, ‘Reasonableness?’ (n 72) [9]-[17]. 
85  [2014] 2 WLR 808. 
86  ibid [51] (Lord Mance; Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption agreeing). See also [133] (Lord 
Toulson). 
87  ibid [53], referring to IBA Healthcare Ltd v Office of  Fair Trading [2004] ICR 1364, [90]-[92]. On this point, 
Lord Carnwath himself  stood by his then comments but noted that ‘the jurisdictional basis for the more 
flexible approach, and its practical consequences in different legal and factual contexts, remain uncertain 
and open to debate’ ([246]). Lord Mance also raised, but did not decide, whether proportionality (overlaid 
with varying intensity) may provide useful structure for the analysis ([54]). 
88  Kennedy (n 85) [56].  
89  ibid [56], [132]. This approach picks up the role of  the weight principle in contextual review (see ch 5 pt 
IID) but it is unclear whether the Supreme Court intended this to be a style of  review of  general application 
or merely a feature of  the more intensive depth of  scrutiny. 
154 
 
Light-touch review 
The second instance of the test for unreasonableness being treated as a sliding-scale of review 
is in the class of cases described as ‘light-touch review’.90 Sometimes described as ‘super-
Wednesbury’,91 the courts have occasionally applied an even more deferential test for 
unreasonableness than found in Wednesbury. The judicial focus is more on any flagrant 
impropriety on the part of the decision-maker, rather than any defects in the decision itself.92 
As noted earlier, it is possible to treat this as amounting to a variegation of unreasonableness 
or circumscription of the grounds of review; I prefer the former because the development of 
this method has generally been undertaken in the name of irrationality or unreasonableness.93 
In Nottinghamshire, presented with a challenge to the funding formula for local authorities 
ultimately approved by the House of Commons, Lord Scarman said the decision was ‘not open 
to challenge on the grounds of irrationality short of the extremes of bad faith, improper motive, 
or manifest absurdity’.94 Similarly, in Hammersmith, in the context of the capping of local 
authority charges by a minister ultimately approved by the House of Commons, Lord Bridge 
spoke of intervention only when the decision-maker ‘acted in bad faith, or for an improper 
motive, or [the actions were] so absurd that he must have taken leave of his senses’.95 In both 
cases, the high degree of policy and involvement of the elective body were critical factors 
supporting this very deferential approach.  
Doctrinal deference 
Since the adoption of the Human Rights Act, English courts have grappled with different 
devices to operate in conjunction with proportionality in order to recognise and reflect 
 
90  De Smith (6th edn) 596. 
91  Elliott, Administrative Law (n 58) 248. However, confusingly, the term is also used by a few commentators 
to describe more intensive forms of  unreasonableness: le Sueur, ‘Reasonableness?’ (n 72) 39; TR Hickman 
‘The Reasonableness Principle’ (2004) 63 CLJ 166, 186. 
92  De Smith, oddly, appear to equate the language of  ‘outrageous’ employed in CCSU v Minister of  Civil Service 
[1985] AC 374 and ‘arbitrary’ in R (Pro-Life Alliance) v BBC [2004] 1 AC 185. While these cases undoubtedly 
pose a high threshold, unlike Nottinghamshire (n 5) and Hammersmith (n 5) they are not markedly different 
from the Wednesbury. Indeed, there is no suggestion in his speech in CCSU that Lord Diplock intended 
that he was contemplating a threshold that differs from the Wednesbury approach from before. 
93  See ch 3 pt IIB above. 
94  Nottinghamshire (n 5) 247. See recently, perhaps, R (Rotherham BC) v Secretary of  State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills [2014] WLR(D) 338. 
95  Hammersmith (n 5) 597. 
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concerns about the legitimacy of judicial adjudication on human rights questions.96 Some 
manifestations of deference in this context emulate the intensity of review method (others, 
which are more unstructured are discussed later in relation to contextual review). 
Once the Human Rights Act became operative, the courts spoke of the need for some form 
of deference or respect towards the balance drawn by the administration on rights-matters.97 
Early cases tended to express the concept in terms of a ‘discretionary area of judgement’.98 
However, this zonal or categorical approach fell out of favour. Instead, in the Belmarsh Prison 
case, Lord Bingham said questions of deference were better seen in terms of a continuum:99 
The more purely political (in a broad or narrow sense) a question is, the more appropriate it will 
be for political resolution and the less likely it is to be an appropriate matter for judicial decision. 
The smaller, therefore, will be the potential role of the court. … Conversely, the greater the legal 
content of any issue, the greater the potential role of the court….  
This characterisation bears a strong analogy with the sliding-scale form of unreasonableness. 
An explicit role is marked out for the determination of the depth of review, the degree of which 
modulates along a continuum. This style of approach has been described by commentators as 
doctrinal deference.100 Laws LJ’s dissenting judgment in International Transport is also often cited in 
support of a doctrinal role for deference.101 He argued there ‘is a sufficient citation of authority 
from which to draw together the principles now being developed by the courts for the 
ascertainment of the degree of deference which the judges will pay, or the scope of the 
discretionary area of judgment which they will cede, to the democratic powers of 
 
96  Kavanagh, Constitutional Review (n 80) 240 (emphasis in original); Conor Gearty, Principles of  Human Rights 
Adjudication (OUP 2005) 141-14 (unusually preferring the terms ‘judicial restraint’ or ‘institutional 
competence’ in relation to whether protected rights have been infringed; but ‘judicial deference’ in relation 
to the remedial choice under ss 3 and 4). 
97  See PP Craig, ‘The Courts, the Human Rights Act and Judicial Review’ (2001) 117 LQR 589, 589-595. 
Notably, the courts eschewed the European Convention concept of  ‘margin of  appreciation’ developed 
by the Strasbourg court to reflect the structural subsidiarity underlying the European system. See R 
(Kebeline) v DPP [2000] 2 AC 326 and Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, rejecting the language from Handyside 
v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737 and Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245. 
98  Kebeline (n 97) 380. See eg R v Lambert [2002] QB 1112, [16]; Brown v Stott (n 97) and R (Pretty) v DPP [2002] 
1 AC 800, [2]. 
99  A v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68, [29].  
100  Hickman, Public Law (n 72) 172; Jeff  A King, ‘Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint’ (2008) 28 
OJLS 409, 411. See also Richard Gordon, ‘Two Dogmas of  Proportionality’ [2011] JR 18 and Alan DP 
Brady, Proportionality and Deference under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2012) 24. 
101  International Transport (n 66). The principles articulated by Laws LJ were later endorsed by other Court of  
Appeal judges: see eg Shala v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2003] INLR 349, [12] (Keene LJ) and 
A v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2004] QB 335, [40] and [81] (Lord Woolf  CJ and Brooke LJ).  
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government’.102 In the particular case, the existence of several factors weighing in favour of 
deference persuaded Laws LJ to reject a challenge under the Human Rights Act to a regime 
which penalised lorry drivers, on a reverse onus basis, for carrying clandestine illegal entrants 
into the country.103  
While the courts continue to afford deference to judgements made by the administration in 
some circumstances, manifesting that restraint in doctrinal form has since fallen out of favour. 
The current preference, expressed by the House of Lords in Huang, is for questions of 
deference, restraint or respect to be treated merely as matters of weight, without being given 
any particular form of doctrinal scaffolding.104 The nature and form of judicial deference or 
restraint continues, however, to be vigorously debated amongst the academy and bar, 
suggesting the last word may not have yet been spoken on deference in this context.105  
D New Zealand: variegated unreasonableness 
New Zealand courts have also promoted and deployed a number of different formulations of 
the reasonableness ground.106 Resorting to increased intensity of review based on a sliding scale 
or reliance on the intermediate category of unreasonableness is now commonplace in the High 
Court and, to a lesser extent, the Court of Appeal. Justice Wild’s endorsement of the concept 
of the sliding-scale of unreasonableness in Wolf v Minister of Immigration has assumed particular 
currency, despite the remarks at High Court level not yet receiving direct endorsement at higher 
levels.107 After canvasing domestic and overseas authority, he said ‘the time has come to state 
– or really to clarify’ that the tests for unreasonableness expressed in CCSU and its local 
equivalent, Woolworths, ‘are not, or should no longer be, the invariable or universal tests of 
 
102  International Transport (n 66) [81]. Laws LJ identified four key factors relevant to the assessment of  the 
amount of  deference to be applied; in general terms, democratic genesis, balancing or qualified questions; 
constitutional responsibility for subject-matter, and relative expertise. 
103  ibid [209]. Simon Brown and Parker LJJ both ruled, however, that Convention rights were breached by the 
regime.  
104  Huang (n 26). See also Animal Defenders (n 63) 33 (restraint as ‘weight’). See generally ch 5 pt IID. 
105  Notable members of  the doctrinal camp, include Jeffrey Jowell, Murray Hunt, Aileen Kavanagh, Alison 
Young and Paul Daly (see pt III). Those advocating non-doctrinal deference include Tom Hickman, TRS 
Allan and Richard Gordon (see ch 5 pt III). See also King, ‘Restraint’ (n 100). 
106  See generally Dean R Knight, ‘A Murky Methodology’ (2008) 6 NZJPIL 117; ‘Mapping the Rainbow of  
Review’ (2010) NZ Law Rev 393; Taggart, ‘Proportionality’ (n 74). 
107 [2004] NZAR 414. See also Baragwanath J’s articulation of  multi-layered expressions of  unreasonableness 
and substantive review: Ports of  Auckland Ltd v Auckland CC [1999] 1 NZLR 601; Tupou v Removal Review 
Authority [2001] NZAR 696; Progressive Enterprises v North Shore CC [2006] NZRMA 72; Mihos v AG [2008] 
NZAR 177. 
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“unreasonableness” applied in New Zealand public law’.108 Instead, Wild J commended an 
intermediate standard of simple unreasonableness, with the selection of the appropriate form 
depending on context.109 Other courts have also referred to or applied similar increased 
intensity of review under the reasonableness ground, adopting a variety of labels: ‘hard look’ 
or ‘anxious scrutiny’, ‘sliding scale’, or Wild J’s intermediate standard of reasonableness.110  
Appellate courts have so far been more coy about variegated unreasonableness. The Court 
of Appeal has occasionally remarked that unreasonableness must be treated as a contextual 
concept, something that inevitably varies in the circumstances.111 The Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed common law unreasonableness; the indications are that, on the one hand, 
the Court will readily accept that unreasonableness is contextual but, on the other hand, will 
be sceptical about attempts to structure that contextualism under rubrics like anxious scrutiny 
or sliding scales of intensity.112 
E Conclusion 
Intensity of review brings the mediation of the balance between restraint and vigilance into the 
foreground of the supervisory jurisdiction. Huscroft, speaking of the Canadian framework, 
distils the approach down to an explicit style of reasoning:113 ‘It is simply a means of structuring 
the discourse on deference.’ Openness in the reasoning and calibration process is prioritised, 
with conceptual considerations brought to the fore. 
In Canada the determination of the appropriate degree of judicial restraint (for many years, 
expressed in terms of forms of reasonableness and correctness, and based on a set of 
enumerated ‘pragmatic and functional factors’) is the first step in the supervisory process. This 
variegation of unreasonableness, and potential that the depth of review may be explicitly 
 
108  Wolf  (n 107) [47]; referring to CCSU (n 92) and Wellington CC v Woolworths NZ Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 
537.  
109  Wolf  (n 107) [47]. Wild J expressly pointed to the following aspects of  the decision: ‘[U]pon who made it; 
by what process; what the decision involves (ie its subject matter and the level of  policy content in it) and 
the importance of  the decision to those affected by it, in terms of  its potential impact upon, or 
consequences for, them.’ 
110 See eg Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf  Australia Pty Ltd [1998] NZAR 58 (‘hard look’); 
Pring v Wanganui DC [1999] NZRMA 519; B v CIR [2004] 2 NZLR 86; Huang v Minister of  Immigration [2007] 
NZAR 163; Wright v AG [2006] NZAR 66; S v Chief  Executive of  the Department of  Labour [2006] NZAR 
234; Dunne v CanWest TVWorks Ltd [2005] NZAR 577.  
111  See eg Waitakere CC v Lovelock [1997] 2 NZLR 385; Pharmac (n 110); Pring (n 110); Discount Brands Ltd v 
Northcote Mainstreet Inc [2004] 3 NZLR 619 (CA); Conley v Hamilton CC [2008] 1 NZLR 789. 
112  Knight, ‘Mapping the Rainbow of  Review’ (n 106). 
113  Grant Huscroft, ‘Judicial Review from CUPE to CUPE’ in Grant Huscroft and Michael Taggart (eds), 
Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law (University of  Toronto Press 2006) 296, 297.  
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modulated to take into account the circumstances, has also found its way into aspects of 
English and New Zealand law – particularly where human rights are engaged.  
III Conceptual Underpinnings 
The intensity of review schema captures those scholars that argue for an even more flexible 
and transparent approach to supervisory review. While still favouring a doctrinal approach, 
scholars such as Daly, Elliott, King, and Hunt contend that the inherently variable nature of 
judicial review ought to be manifest. The modulation of review ought to be embraced, either 
through explicit standards of review, continuums of intensity or explicit principles of 
deference/restraint. In doing so, a more complicated and normative judicial role is envisaged. 
Questions of legitimacy cannot be solved on a priori basis and must be confronted in individual 
cases; however, this must not lead to unfettered judicial discretion and the assessment of 
intensity of review must be structured, through doctrinal principles, in order that it reflects the 
limitations of the judicial role. 
A Paul Daly: tripartite standards informed by legislative intent 
Daly argues for the crystallisation of principles of restraint into doctrinal form, in the form of 
schema of three standards of review (like the former Canadian position). Notably, he rejects 
unstructured or non-doctrinal forms of deference (what he describes as epistemic deference). 
But legislative intent looms large in Daly’s normative framework. Selection of the appropriate 
standard, he argues, should be exclusively determined according to the legislative language and 
sources. Although he seeks to avoid such categorisation, his doctrinal framework is born of 
the ultra vires school. 
First, Daly only makes a brief explicit foray into the ultra vires debate, self-styling himself 
as ‘chart[ing] a middle course between two extremes’.114 For him, the common law school is 
too ready to ignore statutory provisions in the pursuance of principles of good administration 
based independently on the rule of law. On the other hand, he characterises the approach of 
the ultra vires school as being artificial in its treatment of legislative intent:115 
[I]f the ultra vires principle can be relied upon to justify any decision reached by a reviewing 
court, the judicial obligation to give effect to legislative intent may be dissolved into an elixir of 
judicial creativity. 
His approach, he contends, takes legislative intent more seriously, while still recognising that 
the responsibility for fashioning the principles of good administration falls on the courts. But 
 
114  Paul Daly, A Theory of  Deference in Administrative Law (CUP 2012) 290. 
115  ibid. 
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his embrace of legislative intent, the centrality of delegation theory, and the general tenor of 
his scholarship suggest a stronger alignment with the ultra vires school. The key ingredient in 
the determinant of the applicable judicial approach is the statutory text; to that extent, he 
echoes the analysis of modified ultra vires proponents like Forsyth and Elliott. ‘[T]he courts 
must give effect to legislative intent.’116 Not only is legislative intent the guiding principle for 
Daly, his conception of legislative intent is cast narrowly, based on the text: ‘[legislative intent] 
is the “formal specification of the act”..., not the literal intentions of the legislators’; in other 
words, ‘[w]hat is relevant is the language of the statute’.117  
Part of this might be explainable by the fact he approaches the principles of good 
administration, in some respects, with a partial lens. He locates his analysis in judicial restraint 
and deference, and assumes the courts have some role in reviewing the substance of 
administrative decisions.118 He excludes questions of procedural fairness on the basis that, 
according to him, the current orthodoxy provides that these are matters properly within the 
province of the judiciary on which the courts have the ‘final say’. The principles of good 
administration are negative in character, circumscribing the mandate of the courts to review. 
He does not address the positive dimension, namely, from where the courts acquire their 
mandate to review generally. This is consistent with the orientation of North American 
jurisprudence, on which he relies heavily, where judicial restraint is the starting point. This 
contrasts with Anglo-Australasian jurisprudence where scrutiny and intervention, expressed in 
generalised grounds of review, dominate.119  
Secondly, Daly’s preferred schematic model is based on the adoption of a doctrinal form of 
deference.120 He argues that existing judicial review doctrine which requires the application of 
a variable standard of review (namely, jurisdictional questions, interpretations of law, exercises 
of discretion, and political questions) should be reformed to reflect the three standards of curial 
deference. The model (or ‘ideal-type’121) he promotes for adoption in Canada, England and the 
United States manifests three variable standards of review: correctness, unreasonableness and 
manifest unreasonableness. He argues that existing judicial review doctrine which requires the 
 
116  ibid 38, 
117  ibid 43. 
118  ibid 3. 
119  For Daly’s own contrast between grounds and standards of  review, see ibid 258-262. 
120  ibid ch 4. 
121  ibid 288. 
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application of a variable standard of review (namely, jurisdictional questions, interpretations of 
law, exercises of discretion, and political questions) should be reformed to reflect the three 
standards of curial deference.122  
The legislative intent principle operates as the lodestar for his justification of deference and 
his development of a general schema. Variable intensity of review – which he supports – is 
justified (only) by legislative intent. In rare cases, where the legislative has directed a variable 
standard of review, the courts ought to apply this; similarly, in the absence of an express 
direction, ‘a variable standard of review may nonetheless be required, based on a proper 
consideration of the relevant statutory provisions’.123 He elaborates:124 
The process of interpretation of a statute may indicate that the legislature intended to delegate 
power for particular reasons; because the extent of the delegation of power and at least some of 
the reason for the delegation of power will be ascertainable from the state, reviewing courts 
should take them into account in developing general principles of review. 
Daly dismisses the separation of powers as providing an alternative justifying principle 
(drawing particularly on scholarship addressing deference in the United States).125 For him, 
(judicial) deference is the corollary of (legislative) delegation. It is the nature and extent of the 
legislative delegation of power to the administration which counsels in favour of judicial 
restraint:126 
First, because of the existence of a delegation of power to a delegated decision-maker, courts 
should adopt a secondary, reviewing stance relative to the delegated decision-maker. Secondly 
because of the existence of variable delegations of power, courts should follow an approach 
which is capable of varying from case to case. If powers of varying extent have been delegated 
to delegated decision-makers, courts should develop and follow a variable approach in general 
to judicial review.  
Thirdly, Daly argues a doctrinal form of defence is to be preferred and, specifically, to be 
preferred over what he describes as ‘epistemic’ or unstructured deference.127 He suggests it has 
the potential to ‘induce a greater degree of rigour on the part of reviewing courts’ and that 
doctrinal analysis is ‘a valuable means of giving guidance to judges as to how to fulfil the 
 
122  Like Canadian courts, Daly treats procedural fairness as sitting outside any deference regime. 
123  Daly (n 114) 37. 
124  ibid 37. 
125 ibid 44. 
126  ibid. 
127  In general terms, epistemic deference describes judicial restraint given effect to through the application, 
on an unstructured basis, of  weight and judgement by judges. See the discussion of  contextual review in 
ch 5.  
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substantive values underlying their legal system’.128 Daly is also quick to reject grounds of 
review as a possible means to give effect to deference, even though he admits that ‘they can 
perhaps be described as constituting an example of doctrinal deference in their own right’.129 
His main objections are that grounds are ad hoc, are too interventionist, and bear little 
relationship to legislative intent.130 Daly also summarily rejects deference deployed by reasoning 
directly from constitutional principle (in other words, instinctive or non-doctrinal deference, 
or what he labels ‘epistemic’ deference). For him, deference without doctrine it is ‘troubling’ 
and ‘carries with it the possibility of inconsistency and uncertainty’.131  
Finally, the selection of the appropriate standard of review should, Daly says, principally be 
informed by the extent of the legislative delegation. Legislatures delegate variable extents of 
power to public bodies and officials, which he says ‘counsels not only judicial restraint, but 
variable amounts of judicial restraint’.132 The corollary of this variable grant of authority is that, 
he argues, reviewing courts must adopt a variable or nuanced standard of review. The courts 
must respect the legislature’s choice to delegate authority to the administration and not to the 
courts.133 ‘A delegation of power to a delegated decision-maker’, he says, ‘functions as a 
directive to courts to follow a restrained approach.’134 However, if no delegation of power has 
been made, then no deference is required.135 And the plethora of types of administrative 
decisions, differing processes for making such decisions and various accountability 
mechanisms translates into ‘variable degrees of power’.136 Daly argues this variability mandates 
variable standards of review; otherwise, ‘the decision to delegate varying degrees of power 
would be undermined’.137 Ultimately, then, a conservative version of the separation of powers 
underscores his position. 
 
128  Daly (n 114) 34, 137. 
129  ibid fn 187 and 258-262. The ‘grounds’ he describe are numerous, beyond the tripartite formulation (261-
260). He also goes on to accept that grounds might still be useful as indicia of  unreasonableness (262). 
130  ibid 261.  
131  ibid 34. 
132  ibid 5. 
133  Daly argues delegation to the courts may happen in one of  two ways: directly (vesting the decision in them) 
or indirectly (providing for a de novo right of  appeal); ibid 54.  
134  ibid 55. 
135  ibid 54. 
136  ibid 55. 
137  ibid. 
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He adds that ‘practical justifications’, as evidenced in the statutory scheme, may also justify 
judicial restraint.138 Practical considerations related to the judicial function – such as expertise, 
complexity, democratic and procedural legitimacy – are often deployed to support a more 
circumspect judicial role.139 But Daly contends these matters should only influence the extent 
of curial deference if ‘it can plausibly be inferred that the practical justifications influenced the 
decision to delegate power’.140 Daly’s singular focus on legislative intent means he concedes 
the practical considerations relevant to curial deference are restricted to those that ‘can only be 
ascertained by means of a proper consideration of the relevant statutory provisions’.141 In other 
words, not only must a reviewing court assess the extent of the power delegated, it must also 
assess the reasons for the delegation.142 
Daly therefore presents an unusual mix: a commitment to an old-fashioned model of 
legislative intent based in a formalistic allocation of functions, but overlaid on top of modern 
framework for judicial adjudication. 
B Mark Elliott: starting point and adjudicative doctrinal deference 
A long-standing and passionate defender of the ultra vires theory, Elliott too favours a doctrinal 
approach to deference. His normative framework for giving effect to deference in doctrinal 
form is relatively formative and undeveloped, though he draws an interesting distinction 
between the types of deference which may arise in the supervisory process and a possible need 
for different treatment (starting point deference vs adjudicative deference). 
First, Elliott, together with Forsyth,143 has been instrumental in making a case for ultra vires 
being the foundation of judicial review. Legislative intent, they say, continues to be the 
foundation stone. It applies indirectly, though, through a presumption of compliance with the 
rule of law:144  
 
138  ibid 5. 
139  ibid ch 3, esp 72-134. 
140  ibid 72. 
141  ibid.  
142  ibid 70. The expertise and democratic legitimacy of  the delegated decision-maker, along with complexity 
of  the problem and procedural legitimacy, are to be taken into account, but in terms of  what was 
‘contemplated by the legislature’. He accepts that not every aspect will be evident in the statutory 
provisions, so ‘reliance on some background understandings will be necessary’. 
143  Christopher Forsyth and Mark Elliott, ‘The Legitimacy of  Judicial Review’ [2003] PL 286. However, 
Elliott’s scholarship nowadays tends to be more progressive and is less committed to the formalist 
endeavour than Forsyth. 
144  Mark Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of  Judicial Review (Hart 2000) 109. 
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[W]hen Parliament enacts legislation which (typically) confers wide discretionary power and 
which makes no explicit reference to the controls which should regulate the exercise of the 
power, the courts are constitutionally entitled – and constitutionally right – to assume that it was 
Parliament’s intention to legislate in conformity with the rule of law principle. This means that 
Parliament is properly to be regarded as having conferred on that decision-maker only such 
power as is consistent with that principle.  
However, the implementation of the legislature’s general intention – ‘transforming into detail, 
legally enforceable rules of fairness and rationality’ – is for the courts ‘through the incremental 
methodology of the forensic process’.145 This presumption is deployed by Elliott to distance 
himself from traditional ultra vires or direct legislative intent theory, particularly ‘the 
implausible assumption that Parliament directly intends the myriad of principles of judicial 
review.’146 However, Elliott is forced to acknowledge there remains an artificiality about this 
presumption.147 
The corollary of the ultra vires theory promoted by Elliott, even when modified from its 
stricter origins, is the centrality of a jurisdictional analysis: ‘[A]ll of judicial review is about 
jurisdiction: is the action under scrutiny within or outside the power of the decision-
maker?’148If within those limits, then the courts should not interfere; if outside, the courts 
should. The limits identified here by Elliott are not restricted to express legislative terms 
though; they also included general principles developed by the courts in accordance with the 
powerful, but artificial, legislative presumption. This requires Elliot to acknowledge that the 
expression of the constitutional principles which govern judicial intervention have inherent 
and intrinsic normative value independent of legislative intention. However, his attempt to 
draw some connection between those values and the legislature is aimed as presenting some 
form of harmonious constitutional order:149 
[S]uch an approach recognises the pervasiveness of the values on which the constitution is 
founded, such that judicial vindication of the rule of law through judicial review is seen to fulfil, 
rather than conflict with, the endeavours of the legislature. 
In other words, legislative intent operates, in his vision, as a legitimising device to promote 
collaboration rather than combat between the branches of government. 
 
145  ibid. 
146  Mark Elliott, Beatson, Matthews and Elliott's Administrative Law (4 edn, OUP 2011) 22. 
147  Elliott, Foundations (n 144) 24. 
148  Elliott, Administrative Law (n 146) 33. 
149  Elliott, Foundations (n 144) 113 
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Elliott’s scholarship has traditionally assumed the currency of a categorical framework based 
on grounds of review. However, his more recent work on the role of deference suggests a 
move away from existing legal division in favour of an explicitly variable approach, where the 
calibration of intensity of review takes centre-stage. 
The existing grounds of review and traditional dichotomies have featured prominently in 
Elliott’s scholarship and he has engaged in debates which assume the continuance of that style 
of reasoning.150 His ultra vires orientation often means the analysis also manifests a concern 
for the maintenance of the jurisdictional demarcation.151 Within that framework, Elliott has 
always been prepared to recognise the role that variability and deference plays in judicial 
review.152 
As mentioned, his more recent work takes an interesting turn though, away from the 
categorical towards the explicitly variable. On the question of variability or deference in relation 
to substantive review, he argues in favour of deference being afforded an explicit, independent 
and doctrinal formulation:153 
[I]t is necessary to move beyond a doctrinal focus which results ... in either a bifurcated approach 
or one wedded to a specific doctrine (eg proportionality), and to concentrate instead on 
calibrating substantive review by reference to the normative and institutional considerations 
which ought to properly shape it. 
Elliott’s doctrinal solution distinguishes between two different types of deference: (a) starting 
point deference; and (b) adjudicative deference. The former provides a framework for judicial 
supervision of substantive review; the latter is deployed within that framework.  
Starting point deference is explained as the judicial assessment of the appropriate operative 
standard of justification. In other words, what is the nature of the burden or benchmark that 
must be met by the decision-maker in any particular case? How exacting the benchmark is will 
vary according to the context, but Elliott argues that it ought to be seen as a function of ‘the 
 
150  See eg Mark Elliott, ‘Unlawful Representations, Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel in Public Law’ 
[2003] JR 71; ‘Legitimate Expectation, Consistency and Abuse of  Power [2005] JR 281; ‘Wednesbury and 
Proportionality’ [2002] JR 97; ‘Proportionality and Deference’ in Christopher Forsyth and others (eds), 
Effective Judicial Review (OUP 2010) 264. 
151  See eg Elliott, Administrative Law (n 146) ch 2. 
152  See eg Elliott, ‘Proportionality and Deference’ (n 150) ; ‘Judicial Review’s Scope, Foundations and 
Purposes’ [2012] NZ Law Rev 75. 
153  Mark Elliott, ‘Justification, Calibration and Substantive Judicial Review’ (working paper, September 2013) 
3. 
165 
 
nature and importance of the norm that is compromised by the impugned decision’.154 This 
assessment, he says, should be undertaken in a relatively abstract fashion, without ‘reference to 
case-specific considerations pertaining to the court–administrator relationship or the 
interaction of the impugned norm and the specific measure that conflicts with it’.155 Given 
doctrinal prominence, this assessment ought to be explicit and undertaken at the outset.  
Elliott is agnostic to whether starting point deference can be achieved by reliance on existing 
doctrinal grounds of review and their variants.156 He recognises that this may be possible, but 
has some doubts. He worries that their significance and extent to which they demarcate 
differing levels of intensity of review have been overplayed; further the conventional 
nomenclature ‘may serve to obscure more than it illuminates’.157 On the other hand, Elliott is 
anxious to avoid collapsing this assessment into unstructured contextualism, ‘depriving the law 
of any tangible structure or predictability’.158 Elliott considers the answer ‘lies ... in an attempt 
at calibration which exposes and harnesses the relationship between the underlying normative 
considerations and administrative law’s doctrinal superstructure’;159 however, the doctrinal 
shape for this calibration task is not developed, although it hints at some support for the 
variable intensity schema, where calibration takes place as a first stage by reference to a number 
of prescribed intensities. 
Elliott’s adjudicative deference arises, he says, in the second stage when the court is assessing 
whether or not that burden has been satisfied.160 It captures considerations of relative expertise 
and competence as between the court and the primary decision-maker; in other words, whether 
the decision-maker’s view should be respected or given particular weight because the decision-
maker is in a better position than the court to assess acceptability of the balance drawn. This 
may be a function of practical considerations (such as extent of expertise) and democratic 
legitimacy.161 This adjudicative deference is a variant of epistemic deference, where the views 
of others are given respect in the course of the deliberation process in an unstructured way. 
 
154  Elliott’s idea of  this assessment is more than simply a bald assessment of  whether ‘rights’ are engaged; he 
contemplates a more nuanced assessment about the ‘degree of  normative pull’ that applies; ibid 5. 
155  ibid. 
156  ibid.  
157  ibid 4. 
158  ibid. 
159  ibid 5. 
160  ibid 6. 
161  ibid 11. 
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Elliott seeds the idea that this could be given some doctrinal form, but does not develop how 
this should be done.162  
Elliott’s contribution is interesting because it seeks to marry the legislative intent theory 
with modern notions of deference, in a similar fashion to Daly. Elliott acknowledges the moves 
away from doctrinal mechanisms to define the respective allocation of authority and accepts 
more pliant and nuanced methodologies. 
C Murray Hunt: due deference elaborated across-the-board 
Hunt has spoken in favour of the adoption of a doctrine of due deference, not just in human 
rights adjudication, but also more generally throughout public law.163 He resists attempts to 
bifurcate judicial review into rights and non-rights categories and argues that a developed form 
of due deference is capable of bridging the two territories.164 Otherwise, he is coy on the ultra 
vires debate, preferring a collaborative approach to the legislative-judicial relationship which 
seeks to avoid the source of power question. 
First, as noted, Hunt has no enthusiasm for the debate about the source of constitutional 
authority for judicial review. This, he says, buys into the ‘alluring idea of “sovereignty” as a 
foundational concept’ and ‘a conceptualisation of public law in terms of competing 
sovereignties’.165 He labels the competing schools of thought, in relation to the debate as it 
relates to human rights, as ‘democratic positivism’ and ‘liberal constitutionalism’, with their 
claims for sovereignty of Parliament and the courts respectively. To the contrary, he argues, 
public power is dispersed and shared amongst a role of constitutional actors and questions of 
supremacy are inapt. Instead he promotes a collaborative enterprise: 166 
An alternative approach [is to] not seek to delineate respective boundaries of competence, or to 
decide who has the power to define those boundaries, but which begin from the premise that in 
today’s conditions both the courts and the political branches share a commitment both to 
representative democracy and to certain right, freedoms and basic values... 
 
162  Note, however, its infusion within the structured proportionality test, including its different application to 
the scrutiny of  factual issues and value-judgements within the test; Mark Elliott, ‘Proportionality and 
Deference’ (working paper, September 2013). 
163  Murray Hunt, ‘Sovereignty’s Blight’ in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), Public Law in a Multi-
Layered Constitution (Hart 2003) 337; ‘Against Bifurcation’ in David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Grant 
Huscroft (eds), A Simple Common Lawyer (Hart 2009) 99. For his earlier work on the role of  human rights 
in administrative law see Murray Hunt, Using Human Rights in English Courts (Hart 1997).  
164  Hunt, ‘Bifurcation’ (n 163). 
165  ibid 339. 
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He argues that it is more productive to abandon the language of sovereignty in favour of 
the language of justification. Public law discourse should ‘reconceive our conceptions of law 
and legality away from formalistic concepts such as the historic will of Parliament, the 
separation of power and ultra vires towards more substantive concepts of value and reason’.167 
Deference then becomes, he contends, the ‘crucial mediating concept’, where a primary 
decision-maker earns judicial respect or restraint through the force of their reasoning and 
justification. 168 
Hunt, accordingly, implicitly rejects an account of judicial review grounded in ultra vires or 
legislative intent, but his account of the judicial role is also qualified. The judicial supervisory 
role is self-limited by the concept of justification, grounded in democratic considerations. 169  
Secondly, Hunt has been a long-standing advocate – especially in relation to human rights 
adjudication – for the adoption an explicit and doctrinal notion of deference.170 When 
deference-talk became fashionable, he attempted to chart a middle ground, between the early 
‘no-go zone’ or non-justiciability type approaches on the one hand, and the strong objections 
to any role for deference on the other. He argues for a nuanced approach to deference, where 
restraint is settled on a case-by-case basis through reference to various factors. Notably, Hunt’s 
vision also dictates that particular prominence be given to the assessment of deference in 
judicial adjudication:171 
This will require the explicit articulation of a number of matters which at present are too often 
buried beneath inappropriate doctrinal tools: the sorts of factors that might warrant a degree of 
deference from a judicial decision-maker; the specific factors which are in play in a particular 
case; why the court considers that they require a degree of deference to a particular decision, or 
an aspect of it; and just how much deference the courts considers to be due in the circumstances. 
Notably, this contemplates the principles being expressed transparently in doctrinal form. 
Thirdly, in relation to the factors which influence the variation of intensity or application of 
deference, Hunt casts the net widely, identifying factors such as relative expertise, the degree 
of democratic accountability of the decision-maker and the existence of other accountability 
 
167  ibid. 
168  ibid. 
169  ibid. 
170  Hunt, ‘Sovereignty’s Blight’ (n 163). 
171  ibid 370. 
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mechanisms for any judgement made.172 Particular emphasis is put on the quality of 
justificatory reasons and the corresponding deference that may arise.173  
Finally, Hunt rejects a bifurcated public law as well. As one of Taggart’s former 
collaborators in the unity project,174 he laments Taggart’s concession to bifurcation. He argues 
that the unification of public law and reconciliation of methodologies within judicial review 
should not be abandoned.175 Again, he sees the solution in reason-giving, justification and due 
deference:176  
[T]o avoid bifurcation we must seek to enshrine a constitutional requirement to give reasons, to 
understand proportionality as a flexible methodology for ascertaining whether adequate 
justification for interference with fundamental values has been made out, and to redouble our 
efforts both to explain why public law needs a concept of due deference and to provide an 
account of it capable of constraining judges without collapsing into a non-justiciability doctrine. 
Hunt, therefore, is notable for promoting a vision of due deference, across-the-board, 
crystallised into doctrinal form. This approach is consistent with a number of other human 
rights scholars who have advocated a doctrinal form of deference in the human rights 
adjudication,177 along with the position of some other public law scholars.178 
 
172  ibid 353-354. See also Hunt, ‘Bifurcation’ (n 163). 
173  Hunt, ‘Sovereignty’s Blight’ (n 163); ‘Bifurcation’ (n 163) 114. On this point, Hunt echoes Dyzenhaus; see 
discussion ch 5 pt IIID. 
174  See eg Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Taggart (n 73). 
175  Hunt, ‘Bifurcation’ (n 163).  
176  ibid 120. 
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intertwined. While the sequential structuring of  proportionality provides the method for supervisory 
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proportionality is necessarily a variable standard ‘because it can be applied more or less deferentially’ and 
the intensity of  application ‘will vary according to the multiplicity of  factors which obtain in the context 
of  an individual case’. In her work, she then attempts to articulate the various grounds for judicial deference 
and contexts in which deference is most pronounced. See Kavanagh, Constitutional Review (n 80) 237; 
‘Deference or Defiance?’ in Grant Huscroft (ed), Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory 
(CUP 2008) 184; ‘Judicial Restraint in the Pursuit of  Justice’ (2010) UTLJ 23; ‘Defending Deference in 
Public Law and Constitutional Theory’ (2010) 126 LQR 222. Similarly, Young also promotes a doctrinal 
model where deference is framed in terms of  respect and where appropriate weight is given to the opinions 
of  the legislature or executive ‘when dealing with contestable rights-issues’. She argues that whether or not 
weight should be given depends an assessment of  institutional factors, such as the administration have 
greater knowledge or expertise or where their decision-making process has greater legitimacy. Young 
doubts the ability of  a non-doctrinal approach to deference to provide necessary coherence, arguing the 
doctrinal form ‘aims to make the judicial process more transparent, thus promoting a culture of  
justification in both judicial and administrative decision-making.’ See Alison L Young, ‘In Defence of  Due 
Deference’ (2009) 74 MLR 554; ‘Deference, Dialogue and the Search for Legitimacy’ (2010) 30 OJLS 815. 
178  See eg King, ‘Restraint’ (n 100) and Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Judicial Deference’ [2003] PL 592; ‘Judicial Deference 
and Human Rights’ in Paul Craig and Richard Rawlings (eds), Law and Administration in Europe (OUP 2003) 
67. King supports an ‘institutional’ approach to deference lying between a formalist model (lacking nuance 
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D David Mullan: effective and practical deference 
Mullan’s scholarship on deference is generally internally focused; that is, his contribution 
assumes the existence of a doctrine of deference (as has long been the case in Canada where 
his writing is generally grounded) and his analysis concentrates on operational aspects of the 
doctrine. He is generally supportive of the regime centred around deference, where the 
calibration of intensity is settled explicitly, although he is conscious of efforts to convert this 
into a fully contextual evaluation.  
First, Mullan has not directly entered the ultra vires vs common law debate which has 
occupied other jurisdictions. However, his leanings towards the common law school can be 
partly gleaned from his analysis of the constitutional pedigree of deference in Canada (although 
he observes that these constitutional considerations have not preoccupied the development of 
a deference framework).179 Mullan detects a possible tension between the principle of deference 
and the constitutional mandate of the courts in the Canadian constitution, suggestive perhaps 
of a judicial duty to assess all questions of law according to a correctness standard.180 However, 
he concludes that the prevailing view is that correctness review is not actually 
constitutionalised, at least for intra-jurisdictional questions, and endorses the Supreme Court 
decision which implies such a conclusion.181 
As a supporter of deference, Mullan is content for the courts to develop these principles 
independently, subject to the power of the legislature to provide otherwise:182 
[S]eemingly ... both the legislatures and the courts [are] free to develop common law principles 
as to the scope of judicial review... Included in this authority is the development of principles of 
deference without attracting constitutional attention. 
 
and constructed on abstract categories based on unrealistic distinctions) and non-doctrinal models (too 
reliant on judicial discretion, too unpredictable, and too open to accusations of  arbitrariness). Accordingly 
to King, institutionalists ‘focus on the comparative merits and drawbacks of  the judicial process as an 
institutional mechanisms for solving problems’ and argues the answer lies in recognising these limitations 
through the adoption of  deference (or, as he prefers to call it, restraint) in doctrinal form and the 
development of  principles to structure its application. Jowell, while advocating the development of  
additional (constitutionally informed) grounds of  review, he also recognises a need for an explicit and 
structured notion of  deference, endorsing for example the factors outlined by Laws LJ in International 
Transport. 
179  David Mullan, ‘Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?’ (2006) AJ 42, 47. He says: ‘In reality, the 
constitutional dimensions of  the issue had little to do with the emergence … and prevalence of  deference’. 
See generally David Dyzenhaus, ‘David Mullan’s Theory of  the Rule of  (Common) Law’ in Grant Huscroft 
and Michael Taggart (n 113). 
180  ibid 45. 
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His analysis is therefore consistent with the common law school.183 Indeed, he acknowledges 
the role that the rule of law occupies in Canadian administrative law jurisprudence and the 
potential for it to support different conceptions of the judicial role, either vigilant or deferential. 
He also notes that it is possible that a case for deference could be mounted on the basis of 
either parliamentary sovereignty (giving effect to ‘the legislature’s intention regarding the 
appropriate relationship between the statutory authority and reviewing court’) or the separation 
of powers (whereby deference could be justified by reference to ‘Canada’s constitutional 
tradition of a strong executive with broad prerogatives over policy-making’).184 In the end, 
Mullan leaves the constitutional arguments unresolved and assumes that some form of 
deference is constitutionally defensible. 
 Secondly, in terms of a preferred schema, Mullan stands as a qualified supporter of the 
deference-centred framework that which exists in Canada. ‘Operating at its best, the Canadian 
standard of review analysis ... does provide a sophisticated, constitutionally coherent regime of 
judicial review of administrative action’.185 In other words, he embraces the explicit modulation 
of depth of scrutiny that is synonymous with the variable intensity schema. Mullan justifies the 
deference regime on the grounds of institutional pluralism and administrative practicality. He 
argues ‘an increasingly diversified and pluralistic legal world’ means the courts cannot claim a 
monopoly on legal interpretation and application, especially relative to statutory authorities. 
Similarly, administrative regimes increasingly include error-correction and abuse-detection 
mechanisms, diminishing the need for a judicial supervisory role. Finally, mandating full-scale, 
resource intensive judicial supervision may not be the most efficient or effective means to 
achieves administrative justice.  
Thirdly, on the issue of the factors which ought to be influential, Mullan recounts the 
standard factors influential in the Canadian framework: legislative choice (that is ‘the right or 
entitlement [of the legislature] to put certain issues beyond the ken of the regular courts’, 
manifest in the purpose of legislation, privative clauses or conferral of broad and unstructured 
 
183  Although the convergence of  the schools mean the passage could be read either way, elsewhere Mullan 
has proclaimed his allegiance (without detailed explanation) to the common law school: David Mullan, 
‘The Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms’ in Linda Pearson, Carol Harlow and Michael Taggart 
(eds), Administrative Law in a Changing State (Hart 2008) 123, 126. 
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185  ibid 61. 
171 
 
discretion), comparative institutional competence and practical advantage.186 Mullan worries, 
though, that the Canadian system of calibration is too focused on legislative choice and 
expertise and too divorced from circumstances of the particular context in issue;187 his concern 
was partly ameliorated by some rebalancing of the factors to determine the standard of review 
and the adoption of a broad-church reasonableness standard of review in Dunsmuir.188 While 
Mullan employs Allan in support of his claim that closer attention ought to paid to the 
individual interests impugned by the decision in the particular context, one does not detect a 
strong desire to repudiate some sort of two-stage calibration process (whether in the selection 
of a standard of review or the determination of how deferential (or not) the application of the 
reasonable standard should be).189 Finally, Mullan commends Dyzenhaus’ framing of deference 
as respect and the need for the close attention to the justification advanced by the 
administration.190 But, unlike Dyzenhaus, Mullan discloses a preference for doctrine. He seems 
eager for a blueprint to be provided to the judiciary to guide the process of determining the 
degree of deference and to ensure the application of the reasonableness is faithful to the 
justificatory aims. 
Mullan is committed to the deference-project and the explicit calibration of intensity of 
review. He brings with this a penchant for doctrinal structure, conscious of the demands of 
contextualism but worries, too, about the dangers of too much judicial discretion and 
uncertainty.  
E Conclusion 
Support for an intensity of review schema is drawn from quite different theoretical domains. 
The transparent calibration of intensity of review, through doctrinal devices, finds favour from 
both sides of the ultra vires debate.  
On the one hand, there are those who continue to argue linkage back to the legislature is 
essential to the democratic legitimisation of judicial review. Here Daly and Elliott acknowledge 
the general trajectory away from the categorical towards more direct and circumstantial means 
 
186  David Mullan, ‘Deference from Baker to Suresh and Beyond’ in David Dyzenhaus (ed), The Unity of  Public 
Law (Hart 2004) 21, 52. 
187  Mullan, ‘Deference’ (n 179) 59. 
188  Mullan, ‘Dunsmuir’ (n 63) and ‘Unresolved Issues’ (n 64). 
189  On the former, see Mullan, ‘Deference’ (n 179) 60 (support for a framework which commences with ‘the 
identification in the abstract of  what standard of  review should apply’, with a ‘situational specific enquiry’ 
looking at the statutory basis of  the decision and nature of  the interests at stake). On the latter, see Mullan, 
‘Unresolved Issues’ (n 64) 76 and 81 (support for ‘intensity of  reasonableness review depending on 
context’, but a plea for ‘greater clarity’ about the practical application of  this contextual reasonableness 
standard). 
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of settling the depth of review, but are reluctant to repudiate the model of government that 
underpins the ultra vires. Instead, the judicial role is warned away from areas which they regard 
as unsuitable for judicial supervision – but through the consideration of essentially institutional 
factors which counsel different degrees of deference. Daly translates this into three differing 
standards of review, with selection based on an assessment of the legislative text. Elliott 
supports the project to construct operational principles to guide the process of calibration and, 
presumably, to maintain the linkages to legislative intent. However, he has yet to crystallise this 
into a normative schema, save for suggesting the task may be complicated by the fact that 
deference arises at two points in the supervisory process; in other words, the schema may need 
to differentiate between what he labels starting point deference and adjudicative deference.  
On the other hand, those with some sympathy for a common law position are also drawn 
to the explicit calibration of intensity under this schema. For example, Mullan continues to 
support a schema whereby the depth of review is modulated in individual cases, but by 
reference to a suite of doctrinal factors. Others who seek to avoid the ultra vires debate in 
favour of a collaborative legislative–judicial endeavour, like Hunt, also sign onto a schema with 
elaborated factors for settling the depth of review in individual cases.  
The factors that influence the calibration exercise are relatively common to all. An appraisal 
of the factors which speak to the legislative allocation of power, complexity, relative expertise 
and practical disadvantage – a mixture of considerations which reflect legislative supremacy 
and curial limitations. Those from the ultra vires school would emphasize the extent of 
discretion delegated to the administrative actor, while also considering issues of expertise and 
practicality evident in the legislative text. Those from the common law school would echo this 
set of considerations, but not find it necessary to ground the assessment in the terms of the 
statute. Hunt would also build in considerations which look to other means of accountability 
and the quality of the justification advanced by the administration.  
This group of scholars share a strong alertness to the limitations of the judicial oversight, 
along with a belief that these limitations are best addressed on a dynamic basis within the 
supervisory jurisdiction through the structuring of judicial discretion. As King observes, 
institutionalists ‘focus on the comparative merits and drawbacks of the judicial process as an 
institutional mechanisms for solving problems’.191 And, here, King’s label of ‘contextual 
institutionalists’ is apt;192 these scholars seek to develop tools – pliant doctrine directives – 
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which allow the limitations of the judicial oversight process to be recognised and reflected in 
the supervision process, without delimiting territorial exclusion zones.  
IV Normative Assessment 
Intensity of review moves away from an indirect and categorical approach to the explicit 
calibration of the depth of scrutiny and brings variability into the foreground. ‘[F]ormalist 
methodology of bright lines and either/or propositions [give] way to a balancing of multiple 
factors and a spectrum of possibilities.’193 Rules about how the courts ought to deliberate on the 
depth of scrutiny are favoured over rules which indirectly dictate particular depths of scrutiny.  
A degree of generality is still evident; as well as providing rules to guide the calibration 
process, the schema acknowledges, but seeks to structure, the judicial judgement. The focus 
on transparent deliberation about the depth of scrutiny means the schema brings transparency, 
coherence and candour. Moving the focus away from outcomes to method hinders 
prospectivity, clarity, stability and practicality. These virtues all depend on a degree of 
predictability, which cannot be guaranteed; the approach puts its faith in open reasoning to 
provide the necessary cues and desirable consistency, which has had mixed results.  
Generality 
The schema is doctrinal, in that its operation is governed by rules. However, the rules dictate 
the consideration of certain factors, rather than outcomes, and therefore rely on significant 
judicial discretion in the assessment of weight and influence when determining the appropriate 
depth of review. In some respects, therefore, the schema disappoints in terms of generality. 
However, the schema also seeks to ameliorate inconsistency and lack of predictability 
(circumstances which principle of generality seeks to avoid). 
There are three key aspects to the rule structure of this schema.194 First, there is the 
identification of the factors which should be taken into account. Secondly, there is the weight 
to be given to those factors in the overall mix. Finally, there is the translation of those weighted 
factors into a particular depth of scrutiny. Doctrine governs some, but not all, parts of that 
process; judicial judgement occupies an important role. 
On the first part of the process, there is a growing accord about the types of factors which 
should shape the balance drawn between restraint and vigilance.195 Factors such as relative 
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expertise and institutional competence are generally regarded as being appropriate drivers of 
the depth of review. The magnitude of the effect of the decision, particularly whether it engages 
questions of human rights, is implicitly treated as an important consideration (although some 
argue for a more nuanced account). Others emphasize more formal characteristics such as 
recognition of the legislative allocation of power and the nature of the particular impugned 
decision. Others are attentive to the availability of other accountability avenues. Finally, some 
argue that the cogency of the justification advanced by the administration ought to be taken 
into account. While there is an emerging set of considerations, it is important to note that there 
is, and will continue to be, debate about the factors which ought to be influential. Or how they 
should be expressed, given they overlap and sometimes draw out similar considerations. This 
may impact on the stability of the schema, which is discussed below.  
The Canadian approach has been to attempt to synthesize and generalise the factors that 
inform the appropriate degree of deference.196 Two of the key factors relied on during the high-
point of the pragmatic and functional era squarely placed issues of legitimacy on the agenda, 
namely, comparative expertise and the nature of the problem; the other two factors – privative 
clauses and the purpose of the provision – are nods back to legislative intent. For present 
purposes, the important point is that the factors which inform the judicial calibration of 
intensity are more directly connected to the conceptual basis for review. In other words, the 
factors are denotative, not reliant on proxies for their instrumentality. 
In England and New Zealand, the factors which drive the modulation have not been 
systemised and remain ad hoc. However, more vigilant supervision is usually supported by 
reference to the impact of the decision on an individual, particularly in terms of fundamental 
or human rights, or the engagement of some other higher-order norm. Those factors which 
condition restraint are generally centred on questions of judicial competence, in a relative sense, 
to adjudicate on the matter before them. Such factors include high policy content, a decision 
of a polycentric nature, particular administrative expertise on the issue, and so forth. Weight is 
also given to the nature of the judicial forum and administrative processes, particularly where 
the development of a policy or position is more legitimate if the product of a democratic 
process, or where other non-judicial processes provide adequate checks-and-balances against 
abuse. 
For present purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge that at least some or most of these 
factors ought to inform the calibration exercise. The focus of this thesis is principally on the 
method and form of the calibration exercise, not the resolution of conceptual questions about 
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which factors ought to inform that process of calibration. First, the latter question is a vast one 
beyond the scope of this project which requires consideration in its own right. Secondly, it is a 
question on which there is already a growing body of literature and analysis. Thirdly, because 
of the focus on the definition of these factors in this literature, there is a lack of attention to 
schematic aspects of modulation of intensity; hence, the focus of this thesis. The operation of 
a variable intensity schema does not, in general terms, differ based on the factors which feed 
into the schema. It is therefore possible to assume the existence of a suite of factors to test the 
operation of that schema, without definitively settling on the content of that suite of factors. 
Finally, the suite of factors have a traditional common law character, which means they are 
capable of definition and re-definition over time.  
The second aspect of the process is the question of the weight to be attributed to each 
factor when mediating the balance between vigilance and restraint. Like the traditional 
relevancy principle, the factors are treated like mandatory relevant considerations, that is, as 
matters which should be taken into account. It follows though that questions of weight and 
balance between the factors are matters for the decision-maker (here, the supervisory judge). 
Unlike the formalistic approaches under scope and, to a lesser degree, the grounds of review 
schemata, this schema does not attempt to construct strict rules or typologies. Other than 
marshalling the factors that must be taken into account, factorial tests generally do not specify 
the weight to be afforded to each factor.197 
Realised in its purest form, this schema recognises that weight, balance and counter-balance 
are contextual and the operational framework can do no more than ensure that judges turn 
their mind to these factors and reason through their influence. Some are critical of this 
approach. For example, Taggart worried about the absence of rules and lack of guidance and 
certainty.198 This is caused, he argued, by the fact that factorial tests are comprised of ‘lists of 
factors with contestable weights’.199 In other words, ‘the result is not determined necessarily by 
a majority of factors pointing one way’ and ‘[s]ome factors in some circumstances count for 
more in the balancing’.200 Similarly, others have argued that factorial tests are overly 
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complicated.201 The pre-Dunsmuir practice was sharply criticised for becoming ‘unduly 
burdened with law office metaphysics’.202  
This part of the schema departs from the ideal of general rules and instead utilises discretion; 
to this extent, it compromises generality. However, this is a deliberate compromise. Trying to 
develop rigid and universal rules simply revives the problems of categories that plagued the 
scope and grounds of review schema. The reliance on a model of relevant considerations, 
teamed with an obligation to explicitly justify their influence, acknowledges contextualism but 
also seeks to ameliorate loss of consistency, predictability and clarity associated with increased 
judicial discretion.  The method is one drawn from established judicial review principle. The 
courts themselves have assumed that relevant considerations and reason-giving go some way 
to encouraging consistency and predictability.203  
Secondly, once these factors are brought into the foreground and their application in 
particular cases is justified and reasoned, jurisprudence about their influence will develop and 
mature over time, enabling more consistent application. Taggart argued in favour of this style 
of mapping project: ‘We must get beyond simply talking about context and actually 
contextualize in a way that can generate generalizable conclusions’.204 He worried that 
otherwise ‘the law will continue to be rather chaotic, unprincipled, and result-orientated’.205 
Adoption as a general schema would therefore allow the common law to develop more 
precision as it evolves, thereby supporting a more disciplined approach. Appellate review will 
also be able to monitor the role the factors play. In principle, a balance is drawn, where the 
influence of factors assume a degree of predictability, without foreclosing on difference 
balances being struck in particular (especially unusual) cases.  
 The final part of the process turns to the practical translation of the balance between 
vigilance and restraint into a particular depth of review. This part of the process raises a 
particular issue about how precisely, as a matter of doctrine, a particular depth of review should 
be calibrated. There are two key ways the depth of review can be expressed: as a continuum of 
limitless possibilities, or as a number of pre-defined standards of review. We can describe them 
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as ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ scales respectively. An infinite scale allows the intensity of review to 
float or slide between two extremes, but without defining specific calibrations along the way. 
This is the essence of doctrinal developments which promoted, in general terms, more 
intensive (‘anxious’) scrutiny or a ‘sliding-scale’ of review,206 as well as the formative concepts 
of deference under the Human Rights Act.207 It is also the style of modulation evident in the 
second stage of the standards of review analysis in Canada, if reasonableness is adopted in the 
particular case.208 The lack of structure or precision in the calibration process also means there 
is little light between it and the contextual review schema which operates absent doctrine. In 
contrast, a finite scale seeks to define or label specific depths of review. This approach seeks 
to generalise the different intensity of review into different methodologies or judicial 
touchstones. It is evident in the pre-Dunsmuir regime in Canada, where a distinction was drawn 
between the patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter standards of review. It is 
also consistent with some of the efforts to variegate the unreasonableness ground into 
separately identified grounds or standards of review, such as super-Wednesbury review,209 or 
simple unreasonableness.210 
The different forms of calibration have different virtues. An infinite scale maximises 
adaptability and flexibility, but comes at the expense of generality (and clarity). A discrete scale 
emphasizes the reverse. In my view, a finite scale is more efficacious and has stronger virtue.211 
First, the schema needs to recognise the practical reality of the supervision task. Modulation is 
not an exact or precise science. Setting calibrations too finely may mean the distinctions 
become meaningless. Allowing the depth of review to be settled anywhere on an indeterminate 
continuum risks collapsing the calibration of intensity into mere judicial judgement, as seen in 
contextual review. When generalised into discrete standards, different methodologies become 
apparent. For example, the simple unreasonableness approach is understood to open up the 
scrutiny of the balance drawn by the decision-maker, in contradistinction to the traditional 
approach under the Wednesbury test.212 Likewise, super-Wednesbury focuses on the motivations 
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or propriety of the decision-maker (‘bad faith, corruption, or fraud’).213 Secondly, calibration 
by reference to generalised depths of review is more likely to exact control of the judicial 
discretion and ensure operational coherence. The existence of a few but distinct points on a 
continuum tends to structure the judicial discretion by restricting the number of choices 
available. In doing so, it downplays the instinct of individual judges and encourages consistency 
across the supervisory jurisdiction. The hope is that this, in turn, helps make the determination 
of the depth of scrutiny more predictable. As Le Sueur said of variegated forms of 
unreasonableness, this makes ‘it easier for there to be a principled and more certain approach 
to the court’s role’ and avoids ‘slithering around in grey areas.’214 Thirdly, generalised 
calibrations are more faithful to the principle of generality and do not unduly undermine 
flexibility. A move from a grounds of review approach to an explicit intensity of review 
approach unlocks the judicial lens and, in principle, allows context to determine a balance 
between vigilance and restraint, not formalistic categories. On a meta-level, panoptic flexibility 
is ensured; on a micro level, any loss of flexibility associated with limited precision is marginal.  
 Once the depth of review is settled an evaluative judgement is also settled, as the facts of 
the particular cases are assessed in the light of the standard of review. That is, rather than a 
structured method of analysis being imposed (such as with a proportionality calculus), the 
judicial method continues to be an ‘overall evaluation’.215 A judgement in the round is made, 
coloured in this model by a notional depth of scrutiny. As Fordham and de la Mare rightly 
acknowledge: ‘It is inescapable that the very fact of a substantive unreasonableness doctrine, 
wherever the threshold is to be found, will involve the Court in a degree of value-judgement.’216 
Significantly, the ‘formal veneer’ of Wednesbury is retained – perhaps, some argue, in order to 
bolster the legitimacy of more intrusive review.217 Some have argued the judicial method of 
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more intense reasonableness review mimics the essence of proportionality review, because it 
involves a candid assessment of the balance struck or relative weight applied.218 While there is 
a degree of truth to the analogy, the courts have been reluctant to equate anxious scrutiny or 
simple unreasonableness with the structured form of proportionality.219  
So while the regime involves a mix of process-style rules and judicial discretion, the method 
does not surrender to judicial whim. Structure and discipline are still imposed in the judicial 
method. While factorial tests are not determinate mathematical formula, the obligation to have 
regard to certain factors represses some judicial discretion. Calibration must be reasoned and 
reasoned explicitly.220 A culture of justification is imposed on judicial discretion. This mimics 
the same culture of justification that has been heralded as instrumental in checking and 
controlling administrative discretion.221 Similarly, while the assessment of the circumstances of 
the individual case are assessed in the round, the calibration of depth of review moderates any 
instinct on the part of judges to merely apply their own view. Of course, it can argued this is 
an abstract and weak control, because even different depths of review may not calibrate 
universally, and it may be difficult to assess when an articulated depth of review is not in fact 
applied in practice. These are fair criticisms. However, the model goes some way to address 
these concerns.  
Finally, the rule-regime is agnostic to the depth of review; it does not dictate particular 
outcomes. A curious feature of the current manifestation of this style of regime is that it has 
developed with different emphases in different parts of the Anglo-Commonwealth. In England 
and New Zealand it generally supports more vigilant review; in Canada, it is treated as 
counselling more deferential review. Much of this is attributable to the locus of its principal 
development. In England and New Zealand, variegation of unreasonableness has generally 
(but not exclusively) been adopted as a means to circumvent Wednesbury’s deferential threshold 
on substantive review. In contrast, the Canadian developments have promoted restraint on 
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legal or jurisdictional questions (and otherwise reinforced deference in relation to review of 
discretion).222 These different backdrops, though, give rise to different lexical character. The 
execution of this method of review in England and New Zealand is emblazoned with the 
language of ‘scrutiny’. However, in the Canadian context, the language of ‘deference’ 
dominates, as it does also in the particular sphere of human rights adjudication in England. In 
principle, though, the regime does not inherently favour, either way, vigilance and restraint – 
the open-textured nature of the regime leaves the full range of possibilities open. 
Prospectivity 
Like the other schema, the intensity of review schema is generally prospective because the 
regime governing judicial supervision is articulated in advance. However, the degree of judicial 
discretion in adjudication does create some retrospective effect. Again, this is a feature of all 
the schemata due to the circumstantial variability involved. The open-textured schema – based 
on a factorial test and weight – does intensify the effect somewhat, although, as discussed in 
relation to the principle of generality, the schema does seek to mitigate any lack of clarity and 
predictability associated with this.      
Public accessibility and transparency     
One of the key virtues of the intensity of review schema is the way it provides transparency in 
the judicial method. Rather than modulation of intensity operating in the shadows of 
categorisation or being collapsed into an instinctive reaction, the calibration exercise is brought 
into the foreground. The openness of the process by which the depth of review is set avoids 
resort to furtive techniques; judges are empowered to be candid and to grapple explicitly with 
the factors that influence the depth of review. This has a number of positive consequences. 
First, it is likely to ensure greater conformity between doctrinal outcomes and conceptual 
underpinnings. In other words, it improves the quality of decision-making. Secondly, it helps 
promote trust and confidence in the judicial process and enhances the legitimacy of judicial 
review. It helps remove a sense that doctrine is being manipulated in order to achieve particular 
outcomes; while it is probably inevitable that some scepticism will remain, the refrain of 
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candour and intellectual honesty that runs through this schema means it generally performs 
better than other schema on this point.223 
This style of review also seeks to clearly delineate first-order and second-order issues in the 
supervisory task. A distinction is drawn between ‘primary issues’ such as the propriety of some 
administrative action or the treatment of a citizen by the state and ‘second-order issues’ about 
the legitimacy of the courts to definitively adjudicate on such matters.224 Speaking to rights-
adjudication, Kavanagh adopts slightly different language: the assessment of the merits of the 
substantive legal issue – namely, whether rights have been violated or not – is described as the 
‘substantive evaluation’, while the assessment of relative institutional competence, expertise 
and legitimacy is described as the ‘institutional evaluation’.225 The separate distillation of 
principles informing the degree of deference in Canada was undertaken for ‘pragmatic and 
functional’ reasons,226 but those reasons echo the legitimacy issues driving the two-step method 
in other jurisdiction. The approach signalled ‘attention to context and issues of relative 
institutional context’.227  
While transparency is generally welcomed, it has been questioned whether candour might 
have some unintended consequences in this context. Endicott, for example, warns that ‘if 
judges did ask the pertinent questions … judicial review would be a battleground for competing 
understandings.’228 There may be a certain degree of truth in this observation. However, we 
should be cautious about placing too much significance on it for normative purposes. 
Competing understandings about the nature and purpose of judicial review are rife and cannot 
be avoided, whether the differences manifest themselves explicitly or not. Transparency and 
openness about those understandings are essential if we are to have any hope of working 
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towards a shared understanding and harmonising the differences – or, if agreement cannot be 
reached, acknowledging the impact of the lack of agreement.  
Clarity 
The clarity of the intensity of review schema is mixed. One the one hand, the method for 
mediating vigilance and restraint is clearly and simply articulated. It is to be determined based 
on the assessment of a number of relatively uncontentious factors. On the other hand, the 
implementation of that assessment is less clear, because it is reliant on the undefined judicial 
assessment of weight and influence based on the circumstances  
Again, it needs to be acknowledged that the application of the factorial test has been strongly 
criticised in Canada for its lack of clarity and cumbersome nature.229 The reasons for the 
confusion are, perhaps, complex. It has been suggested that the courts failed to deliver on the 
‘bold’ pragmatic and functional philosophy required under this approach and ‘slip[ped] into 
old ways of thinking’230 and that judges ‘have not actually internalized and committed to the 
principles underlying curial deference’.231 Or, alternatively, that some of the complexity is 
simply a natural consequence of the expansion of the framework into domains where the 
deference enterprise is inevitably complicated.232 Regardless, this open-textured but structured 
assessment has been challenging to implement.         
Clarity may be compromised further by the calibration of the depth of scrutiny. A finite 
scale with a few pre-defined degrees of intensity is more likely to present a clear and 
understandable basis for supervision and review. However, if an infinite continuum is 
favoured, then this compromises clarity further, as explained in relation to the principle of 
generality above. 
The language is relatively clear too. Expressed as standards of review, not legality, the 
orientation of the schema is on the judicial method, with variability and the mediation of 
vigilance and restraint assuming prominent roles. The language – such as correctness, 
reasonableness and non-reviewability – is faithful to this task. And it is neither unduly 
pejorative nor particularly obscure. 
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Stability 
This schema is relatively stable. The holistic nature of the schema means it can accommodate 
evolution within its framework without repudiating its methodological essence. Evolving 
conceptions about the role of certain factors and the influence of particular circumstances can 
be readily addressed in the factorial test, either through the articulation of factors to be 
considered or the weight they should be accorded. The relatively open-textured nature of the 
factorial test means significant rule-changes are unlikely.  
The judicial discretion in the framework, particularly as to the weight to be afforded to the 
different factors, does potentially create some potential for contemporary instability; however, 
as discussed above, the framework seeks to ameliorate this by aiming, through reasoning, to 
give this a more predictable character. 
Non-contradiction and coherence 
A strong feature of the intensity of review schema is its coherence. It presents a monolithic 
and consistent framework for the supervisory framework. A common methodology is utilised 
to determine the depth of review and it is flexible enough to accommodate different 
circumstances and contexts. In other words, it is comprehensive. This contrasts with other 
doctrinal methods under scope and grounds of review which utilise a range of different (and 
indirect) techniques to access different intensities of review. Although there is no central or 
overarching substantive principle evident, unity is achieved through a focus on relativity 
between the administration, as primary decision-makers, and the courts, as secondary 
reviewers, and the consequent modulation of intensity of review to reflect that relationship.  
Non-impossibility and practicality     
The intensity of review schema is generally practical, but presents a number of challenges. The 
method of calibration is transparent and therefore allows the evidence and argumentation to 
be focused on essential questions relating to the depth of intensity to be deployed. The explicit 
calibration focuses attention of the depth and modulation of review and the factorial approach 
provides doctrinal scaffolding to support deliberation on it.  
The first challenge lies in ensuring the two-stage approach does not become overly obsessed 
by the first stage, to the exclusion of the second stage. Calibration of intensity is important, but 
so too is the application of the appropriate standard to the facts of the case. Over-emphasising 
the standard of review carries risks. Judicial review doctrines which mostly concentrates on 
judicial methodology, without strongly elaborating norms for the administration, undermines 
its effectiveness. Again, the Canadian experience illustrates this criticism, particularly the 
consequential costs of uncertainty. For example, Binnie J in Dunsmuir was critical of the energy 
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devoted to the ‘threshold debate’ about which reasonableness standard should apply and 
argued that the courts should ‘get the parties away from arguing about the tests and back to 
arguing about the substantive merits of their case’.233 He lamented the ‘lengthy and arcane 
discussions’ about standards of review and the amount of ‘unproductive “lawyer’s talk”’ 
involved in resolving cases.234 His concern was expressed in terms of the financial costs to 
litigants, but the point resonates more generally in terms of the workability, predictability and 
coherence of the schema. Indeed, part of the criticism was based on the fact that an applicable 
standard often is not settled beyond doubt unless and until the Supreme Court rules 
definitively. As Binnie J noted that the outcome of cases ‘may well turn on the choice of the 
standard of review’, hence there is a significant incentive to litigate the standard or review 
whenever possible.235 
The second challenge is related and arises from the definition of the evidential corpus and 
nature of argumentation required for the second-stage of the supervision process. Both of 
these differ markedly based on what depth of scrutiny is mandated.236 Supervision which is 
focused on correctness requires great weight of evidential material to resolve it and the nature 
of argument is different because matters of secondary review and deference need not be 
addressed. In contrast, if a more deferential approach is adopted, the evidential corpus is more 
modest and the style of argumentation is more relative and respectful of the secondary nature 
of review.  
The challenges raised essentially relate to the timing and predictability of the calibration 
exercise. There are some ways to ameliorate these issues. First, we can look to strengthen the 
predictability of the calibration exercise. One of the steps taken to address this in Canada is to 
encourage better use of precedent to avoid the need for a full-blown standards of review 
analysis in each and every case, with some working presumptions also being developed.237 
These start to provide a degree of predictability, without foreclosing on a particularised 
assessment in tricky cases. In many respects, this builds on the idea of a flexible jurisprudence 
developing around the influence of the factors.238 Secondly, as explained above, the 
crystallisation of a framework that explicitly manifests variable intensity is expected to, over 
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time, allow the jurisprudence to mature and refine itself – with the hope that it therefore 
becomes more predictable and practical. 
Congruence and candour 
This schema encourage congruence in implementation and judicial candour. The absence of 
firm substantive rules, where the depth of scrutiny is set indirectly through categorical proxies, 
avoids the need for covert manipulation by judges. Fidelity to the schema is encouraged by the 
open-textured approach which brings the conceptual factors relevant to the depth of scrutiny 
to the foreground. The normative nature of the supervisory task is acknowledged and 
mandated. Variability, based on the circumstances, is encouraged but within a framework 
which seeks to channels and structure the mediation between restraint and vigilance. The 
constraints imposed on judges are more procedural than substantive; the primary obligation is 
to deliberate and justify the calibration by reference to the mandated factors. Thus, while the 
framework is open-textured and ‘malleable’,239 there is little incentive for judges to depart from 
the framework. 
Hortatory versatility 
This schema’s primary focus on the intensity or standards of review means it provides only 
weak hortatory guidance. The framework speaks to the judiciary and provides little guidance 
to the administration about the norms which should be respected by the administration. It is 
essentially a judicial charter. For example, noticeably understated in Canadian administrative 
law cases is a clear articulation of the norms and expectations applicable to decision-makers. 
There are few occasions on which the courts have elaborated the expectations on decision-
makers in general terms, and these are so rhetorical and ecumenical that they provide little 
value.240 Moreover, the concept of grounds of review – from which norms could implicitly be 
drawn – fell out of favour when the pragmatic and functional framework was extended in Baker 
from questions of law to include discretionary decision-making.241 The striking feature of 
Canadian administrative law jurisprudence is that the judicial rhetoric is heavily self-referential, 
even following the Dunsmuir reform. 
The intensity of review schema is still capable of sending some messages to the 
administration, but the missives are more subdued and cryptic. The modulation of review 
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intensity transmits judicial directives about the extent of administrative autonomy. As Halliday 
explains, a deferential judicial approach tells a public agency that it is empowered to ‘follow its 
instincts and preferences, and to have confidence in the finality of its judgements’.242 This, he 
argues, changes the nature of agency deliberations, obviating the need to look externally to the 
courts for guidance and allowing them to ‘be more introspective, develop their expertise and 
enjoy the broad scope of their own discretion’.243 In other words, law evaporates in favour of 
bureaucratic instinct. In contrast, when more interventionist review is deployed, public 
agencies are forced to ‘discover the courts’ preferences on pertinent issues and to take the lead 
from them’.244 Law’s influence survives, even when the judges are not present, as administrators 
seek to emulate their methodology and analysis. Thus, messaging which is predominantly 
framed in terms of modulation of judicial intensity resonates in terms of bureaucratic 
discretion: autonomy or hyponymy. But this messaging lacks the sophistication and precision 
needed in modern administrative law. 
The framework will still have some collateral value for other public functionaries, such as 
tribunals and Ombudsman, charged with the external review of administrative decisions. 
However, institutional differences – the nature of the reviewing body and its relationship with 
the administration – mean the approach will need to be tailored to those circumstances. In a 
general sense, therefore, the schema and the broad principles running through the calibration 
of intensity will be of some value for those reviewing bodies too. 
V Conclusion 
Intensity of review openly embraces the determination of the depth of scrutiny. Direct 
consideration of the factors influencing the balance between vigilance and restraint is favoured 
over attention to categories and form. The importance of context is acknowledged, but so too 
is doctrinal structure and reasoning. Rules still seek to guide, not through dictating outcomes, 
but through requiring transparent consideration and deliberation. This aims to strike a balance 
between adaptability of the judicial task and the limitations of the courts’ secondary role.  
Scholars supporting intensity of review acknowledge that the demands of context cannot 
be met by strict doctrinal categories, but they remain unwilling to allow the supervisory task to 
dissolve into judicial judgement alone. Hence, a case is made for doctrinal scaffolding to focus 
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the judicial assessment and to encourage reasoned elaboration. A culture of justification for 
judges too. 
The approach performs relatively well against the principles of efficacy. Its strength lies in 
its embrace of the conceptual factors governing the depth of review and the central role they 
assume. This encourages transparency, coherence and candour. Doubts about the 
predictability of outcomes – given the prominence of judicial judgement within the rule-
framework – means it scores less well in terms of prospectivity, clarity, stability and practicality.  
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5  
Contextual Review 
I Introduction 
Contextual review resists categorical approaches to judicial supervision. The strong refrain 
about context and its importance signals an emergent trend towards this open-textured and 
discretionary style of judicial supervision. This form of unstructured contextualism, where the 
judges assess the circumstances in the round without any doctrinal scaffolding to control the 
depth of scrutiny, finds some favour in some parts of English, New Zealand and Canadian 
administrative law. In its strong form, it suggests judicial instinct and discretionary judgement 
is, and should be, the essential litmus test for judicial intervention. In its weaker form, it 
captures doctrinal frameworks which are so open-textured that their essential feature is an 
overall evaluative judgement on the part of the judiciary. While not prominently featuring in 
de Smith’s textbook, this methodology has been promoted in the academic literature and there 
are a few comments in de Smith’s text that recognise its existence.  
The powerful judicial role in this schema means it draws its support from some scholars 
from the common law school or those recognising or supporting a stronger judicial role. 
Doctrine is seen as unsuitable for the supervisory task; normative reasoning is required and 
should be mandated. The rejection of rules means, however, it performs poorly against Fuller’s 
principles of efficacy. On a superficial level, it scores well in terms of clarity, coherence, and 
candour because the basis for intervention is plainly framed in terms of judicial judgement; but 
when that judgement is exposed and picked apart, even these virtues disintegrate. Judicial 
discretion prevails, without any guarantee of the underlying normative reasoning becoming 
apparent.  
189 
 
II Doctrinal Manifestation 
This approach has limited purchase, both in de Smith’s textbook and generally. I identify some 
seeds in de Smith, before providing some instances from New Zealand, Canada and England 
where the style of reasoning – a broad unstructured judicial judgement – is evident. This style 
operates, most obviously, within existing doctrinal constraints although it has the potential to 
be realised more broadly as a general lodestar for intervention as well.  
A De Smith derivation 
This style of review is, unsurprisingly, not prominently referenced in de Smith’s text. However, 
its character is recognisable from a few passages in the later editions. 
First, in the discussion of the constitutional context of judicial review, the authors discuss 
the balance stuck between certainty and flexibility. Reference is made to how many of the 
standards applied in judicial review are necessarily ‘open-textured’.1 The content of the values 
may not, the authors say, be defined with precision and ‘will always need to be accompanied 
by a recognition of the particular circumstances of a special case’.2 The circumstances which 
colour these standards are listed as ‘the breadth of the power conferred on the decision-maker; 
the conditions of its exercise; the availability of alternative procedural protections, and the 
fairness to the parties involved (and to others affected by the decision).’3 
Secondly, in the context of irrationality and substantive review, the authors seed the idea 
that the courts may engage in full intensity correctness review under the rubric of ‘abuse of 
power’.4 The concept is not developed in detail other than giving a handful of instances of 
when it may arise.5 They explain the absence of constitutional or institutional reasons for the 
application of any deference may mean the courts are ‘in as good a position as the primary 
decision-maker’, allowing them to ‘assess the relevant factors’.6 In some respects, the resort to 
the abstract label ‘abuse of power’ and injunction to the courts to review the decision in the 
round captures the notion of contextual review of the kind discussed below. 
 
1  De Smith (6th edn) 14; (7th edn) 17. 
2  De Smith (6th edn) 14; (7th edn) 17. 
3  De Smith (6th edn) 14; (7th edn) 17. 
4  De Smith (6th edn) 546, 592; (7th edn) 589, 636. 
5  Cases where no evidence for a decision exists, decisions offending against consistency, and some instances 
of  disappointing legitimate expectations are cited: de Smith (6th edn) 592; (7th edn) 636. 
6  De Smith (6th edn) 547, 550, 555; (7th edn) 590, 592, 598. 
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Thirdly, in a number of passages there is recognition of the role of deference, especially in 
its unstructured formulation, in relation to human rights adjudication.7 The Huang case, where 
the House of Lords endorse this approach to deference, is discussed on a number of 
occasions.8 Aspects of the discussion relate to the basis for such deference, but in a couple of 
places the unstructured and non-doctrinal nature of this style of deference is acknowledged.9 
For example, under the heading of ‘culture of justification’ and citing Huang, the authors say: 
Even where the courts recognise their lack of capacity or expertise to make the primary decision, 
they should nevertheless not easily relinquish their secondary function of probing the quality of 
the reasoning and ensuring that assertions are properly justified.  
They suggest that, when an equilibrium is to be drawn between competing interests, the proper 
approach is for the courts to show ‘respect’ to the balance struck by a ‘person or institution 
with special expertise in that area’.10  
B New Zealand: Cookeian simplicity and instinctive review 
Within New Zealand’s legal system, one finds a strong undercurrent of support for broadly 
framed and unconstrained supervisory review. This is undoubtedly attributable to the 
significance of Lord Cooke and his simplicity project.11 The preference for simplicity over 
complexity, substance over form, and discretion over structure continues to have a degree of 
currency today.  
Over many decades Lord Cooke promoted a model of judicial review that was shorn of 
formalism and technicalities. Instead he encouraged the notion that judges ought to retain the 
broad power to intervene to address injustice wherever it was seen. Lord Cooke’s simplified 
statement of the tripartite grounds has already been highlighted.12 His other targets were many: 
the language of jurisdiction and jurisdictional error (a ‘rather elusive thing’),13 formalist natural 
 
7  De Smith (6th edn) 587; (7th edn) 636. 
8  De Smith (6th edn) 547, 549, 555, 597; (7th edn) 590, 592, 598, 641. 
9  De Smith (6th edn) 549-550, 555, 597; (7th edn) 589-590; 598, 641. 
10  De Smith (6th edn) 597; (7th edn) 641; repeating a passage from Bato Star Fishing Ltd v Chief  Director of  
Marine Coastal Management (2004) 4 SA 490.  
11  Dean R Knight, ‘Simple, Fair, Discretionary Administrative Law’ (2008) 39 VUWLR 99; Michael Taggart, 
‘The Contribution of  Lord Cooke to Scope of  Review Doctrine in Administrative Law’ in Paul Rishworth 
(ed), The Struggle for Simplicity in the Law (Butterworths 1997) 189; Janet McLean ‘Constitutional and 
Administrative Law’ in Rishworth (ed), Struggle for Simplicity, 221; Philip A Joseph, ‘The Contribution of  the 
Court of  Appeal to Commonwealth Administrative Law’ in Rick Bigwood, The Permanent New Zealand Court 
of  Appeal (Hart 2009) 41. 
12  See ch 3, text to n 151. 
13  Bulk Gas Users Group Ltd v AG [1983] NZLR 129, 136.  
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justice (‘fairness’ to be preferred’),14 narrowed defined standing (echoing Lord Diplock’s 
condemnation of ‘outdated technical rules of locus standi’),15 and Wednesbury unreasonableness 
(a ‘tautologous formula’ and an ‘unfortunately retrogressive decision’),16 to highlight just a few. 
Emblematic of his style, of course, was his strong advocacy in support of ‘substantive fairness’, 
as a legitimate ground of judicial review, ‘shading into but not identical with 
unreasonableness’.17 Substantive fairness allowed judges, he said, to consider ‘the adequacy of 
the administrative consideration given to a matter and of the administrative reasoning’ and 
enabled ‘a measure of flexibility enabling redress for misuses of administrative authority which 
might otherwise go unchecked.’18 Consistent with this theme, he also signalled his support for 
Lord Donaldson’s analogous ‘innominate’ ground of review.19  
Others have since continued his campaign in favour of broad and unconstrained 
supervisory review. A few examples demonstrate his legacy endures. First, open-textured and 
discretion-laden judicial review doctrines continues to marshal strong support. Lord Cooke’s 
substantive fairness has already been mentioned; although the drive for a ground of that name 
has since diminished, the campaign has shifted to other doctrines.20 Others have echoed his 
support for a simplified and unified form of unreasonableness; Thomas J’s plea in Waitakere CC 
v Lovelock, for a simpler expression, being a notable instance.21 Similarly, the innominate ground 
from Guinness has been deployed, with the Court of Appeal recommending its ‘more flexible 
approach’ when reviewing quasi-public decisions of unincorporated bodies.22 This innominate 
 
14  Daganayasi v Minister of  Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130. 
15  Environmental Defence Society Inc v South Pacific Aluminium Ltd (No 3) [1981] 1 NZLR 216. 
16  R (International Traders’ Ferry Ltd) v Chief  Constable of  Sussex [1999] 2 AC 418, 452; R (Daly) v Secretary of  State 
for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532, 549.  
17  Thames Valley Electric Power Board v NZFP Pulp & Paper Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 641, 653.  See also Northern 
Roller Milling Co Ltd v Commerce Commission [1994] 2 NZLR 747. Despite Lord Cooke efforts in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, it failed to gain any real traction as ground in itself; see Joseph, ‘Commonwealth 
Administrative Law’ (n 11) 65. 
18  ibid. 
19  Robin Cooke ‘Fairness’ (1989) 19 VUWLR 421, 426; ‘The Discretionary Heart of  Administrative Law’ in 
Christopher Forsyth and Ivan Hare (eds), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord (Claredon 1998) 203, 
212; ‘Foreword’ in GDS Taylor Judicial Review (Butterworths 1991) iv; ‘Foreword’ in Philip A Joseph, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd edn, Brookers 2001) vi;  ‘The Road Ahead for the 
Common Law’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 273, 284. 
20  Dean R Knight, ‘Mapping the Rainbow of  Review’ (2010) NZ Law Rev 393. 
21  [1997] 2 NZLR 385, 403 (‘whether a reasonable authority acting with fidelity to its empowering statute 
could have arrived at the decision it did in the circumstances of  that case’). 
22  Electoral Commission v Cameron [1997] 2 NZLR 421. See also its recognition in Royal Australasian College of  
Surgeons v Phipps [1999] 3 NZLR 1; Health Authority Trust v Director of  Health and Disability Consumer Advocacy 
[2008] NZCA 67; Wilkins v Auckland District Court (1997) 10 PRNZ 395; Issac v Minister of  Consumer Affairs 
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ground therefore seems to have acquired greater currency in New Zealand than in England 
where it was first deployed.23 
Secondly, amongst the senior judiciary, there is little appetite for structured formulations of 
deference, either in substantive review at common law or in human rights adjudication under 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Much of the opposition is headed by the present 
Chief Justice, Dame Sian Elias, who has been a vocal critic of doctrinal forms of deference and 
variable intensity. She described deference as ‘dreadful’24 and said spectrums of 
unreasonableness were ‘a New Zealand perversion of recent years’.25 She has also rejected 
attempts to articulate structured forms of curial deference, both in judicial review cases,26 and 
in statutory appeals.27 Like Lord Cooke, she prefers simple and discretionary standards for 
intervention. ‘[T]here is no need for any amplification of reasonableness or fairness’, she said, 
as ‘both [take] their shape from context’.28 These sentiments have been echoed by other 
members of the Supreme Court.29 One particularly notable example is the rhetorical remark of 
Tipping J (in the course of oral argument), asking whether, as a judge, ‘in the end, you interfere 
if you think you should’.30 Again, this reflects the instinctive test for intervention expressed in 
the innominate ground. In addition, the concept of deference in human rights adjudication is 
relatively fledgling. In the leading decision on assessment of justified limitations under the NZ 
Bill of Rights Act, judges only made passing reference to any influence deference should have;31 
 
[1990] 2 NZLR 606; Taiaroa v Minister of  Justice (CP 99/94, High Court, 4.10.1994); Shaw v AG (No 2) [2003] 
NZAR 216; Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu v AG (CIV-2003-404-1113, 6.11.2003). 
23  See text to n 52. 
24 Ye v Minister of  Immigration (NZSC, transcript, 21-23 April 2009, SC53/2008)179 (Elias CJ), quoted in 
Knight, ‘Rainbow of  Review’ (n 20) 400. 
25 Astrazeneca Ltd v Commerce Commission (NZSC, transcript, 8 July 2009, SC 91/2008) 52. 
26  Discount Brands Ltd v Westfield (NZ) Ltd [2005] 2 NZLR 597, [5] (questions not ‘helpfully advanced by 
consideration of  the scope and intensity’).  
27 Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2008] 2 NZLR 141 and McGrath v ACC [2011] 3 NZLR 733. 
See Andrew Beck, ‘Farewell to the Forum Otiosum?’ [2011] NZLJ 269 and Edward Willis, ‘Judicial Review 
and Deference’ [2011] NZLJ 283. 
28 Sian Elias, ‘Administrative Law for Living People’ (2009) 68 CLJ 47, 48. See also Sian Elias ‘Righting 
Administrative Law’ in David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Grant Huscroft (eds), A Simple Common Lawyer 
(Hart 2009) 55.  
29  Knight, ‘Rainbow of  Review’ (n 20) 402. Further, the judgments in Austin and McGrath were judgments 
for the whole court. 
30  Ye (transcript) (n 24). 
31  Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1. 
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when mentioned, it was characterised as a general form of latitude, which may vary in the 
circumstances.32  
Finally, leading members of the academy and bar continue to crusade strongly in favour of 
simple and discretionary approaches to judicial supervision. For example, Professor Joseph 
speaks strongly against the ‘terminological congestion’ and ‘pedagogical confusion’ in judicial 
review.33 Part of his solution is exposing the ‘instinctive impulse’ as the chemistry of the judicial 
task (an approach discussed further below).34 Leading silk Francis Cooke applauds Joseph’s 
rationalisation,35 as well as speaking – in a similar vein to his judge father – about the 
importance of simplicity: ‘Notions of intensity simply obscure the real task, which is to ensure 
the law is being followed.’36 The small nature of the legal community mean such views are 
particularly influential. 
C Canada: broad church unreasonableness 
Canada’s long standing commitment to explicit standards of review has already been 
examined.37 The doctrinal prominence given to the calibration of intensity or deference means 
the regime is catalogued under the intensity of review model, with other approaches which 
seek to manifest intensity in a preliminary and structured fashion. However, one aspect of 
Canada’s post-Dunsmuir regime perhaps has greater affinity with the contextual review model. 
In particular, following the collapse of the different forms of unreasonableness, the new broad 
church formulation of unreasonableness presents a more discretionary and open-textured 
approach.38 Therefore, apart from cases where the correctness of review is appropriate, the 
determination of the depth of review takes an implicit and floating character. Bastarache and 
Le Bel JJ framed reasonableness review in classic terms:39  
Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that … certain questions that 
come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. 
 
32  See eg ibid [111] (Tipping J) and [268] (Anderson J). 
33  Philip A Joseph, ‘Exploratory Questions in Administrative Law ’ (2012) 25 NZULR 75, 81. 
34  ibid 74 and 101. 
35  Francis Cooke, ‘The Future of  Public Law in New Zealand’ in Administrative Law (NZ Law Society, 2011) 
75 (proclaiming Joseph ‘New Zealand’s own Voltaire’). 
36  Francis Cooke, ‘A Personal Word’ (2008) 39 VUWLR 15, 19. 
37  See ch 3 pt IIE and ch 4 pt IIB. 
38  Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190. See generally Paul Daly, ‘Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed’ (2012) 58 
McGill LJ 1; Mullan, ‘Dunsmuir’ (n 47); ‘Unresolved Issues’ (n 47); Gerald P Heckman, ‘Substantive Review 
in Appellate Courts Since Dunsmuir’ (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 751; Andrew Green, ‘Can There Be Too 
Much Context in Administrative Law?’ (2014) 47 UBC Law Rev 443. See ch 4 also pt IIB. 
39  Dunsmuir (n 38) [47]. 
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Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a 
margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions.  
They went on to say a reviewing court needs to be attentive to the quality of reasons and the 
diversity of outcomes:40 
[R]easonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and 
intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the 
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of 
the facts and law. 
The new category of unreasonableness does not, though, mandate more intensive review than 
previous.41 Deference was still a crucial ingredient to the supervisory task: ‘Deference is both 
an attitude of the court and a requirement of the law of judicial review.’42 Once again, the 
Dyzenhaus’ characterisation of ‘deference as respect’ was endorsed;43 the concept of deference, 
‘imports respect for the decision-making process of adjudicative bodies with regard to both the 
facts and the law’.44 In other words, issues of deference are resolved through the application of 
weight: ‘Deference in the context of the reasonableness standard therefore implies that courts 
will give due consideration to the determinations of decision-makers.’45 This approach, Bastarache 
and Le Bel JJ said, provided sufficient on-the-ground guidance, while still allowing review 
where justice required it.46 
It is fair to say, though, that the Dunsmuir approach modifies the location of the deference 
analysis. As Binnie J said in his separate reasons in Dunsmuir:47  
‘Contextualizing’ a single standard of review will shift the debate (slightly) from choosing between 
two standards of reasonableness that each represent a different level of deference to a debate 
within a single standard of reasonableness to determine the appropriate level of deference. 
Binnie J continued to highlight the amount of discretion the singular formulation of 
reasonableness provides. ‘“Reasonableness” is a deceptively simple omnibus term’, he said in 
 
40  ibid. 
41  ibid [48]. 
42  ibid. 
43  David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of  Deference’ in Michael Taggart (ed), The Province of  Administrative Law 
(Hart 1997) 279, 286; referred to in Dunsmuir, ibid [48] and previously endorsed in Baker (n 54) [65]; Law 
Society of  New Brunswick v Ryan [2003] 1 SCR 247, [49]. 
44  Dunsmuir (n 38) [48] (emphasis added). 
45  ibid [49] (emphasis added). 
46  ibid [43]. 
47  ibid [139]. See also David Mullan, ‘Dunsmuir v New Brunswick’ (2008) 21 CJALP 117, 134 (‘reasonableness 
is a standard that admits of  varying levels on intensity of  review depending on the context’); ‘Unresolved 
Issues on the Standard of  Review’ (2013) 42 AQ 1.  
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Alberta Teachers’ Association, ‘which gives reviewing judges a broad discretion to choose from a 
variety of levels of scrutiny from the relatively intense to the not so intense’.48  
Indeed, since Dunsmuir, the breadth of the reasonableness standard has become readily 
apparent; in successor cases in the Supreme Court, the effective depth of scrutiny has varied 
from something close to correctness, to ordinary reasonableness, to manifest (Wednesbury-style) 
unreasonableness.49 But rather than taking explicitly doctrinal form as in the pre-Dunsmuir days, 
the calibration of depth of review remains inchoate and at large. Reasonableness, in its post-
Dunsmuir form now ‘floats’ along an infinite spectrum of deference – a judicial method once 
condemned in the prologue to Dunsmuir.50 As the Court put it in Catalyst Paper, reasonableness 
‘is an essentially contextual inquiry’.51 
D England: review in the round and non-doctrinal deference 
The emblematic case for the strong form of contextual review is R (Guinness plc) v Panel on Take-
overs and Mergers, although its subsequent application is rare.52 Lord Donaldson spoke of the 
courts stepping in when ‘something had gone wrong of a nature and degree which required 
the intervention of the court’.53 The body subject to review – a private, unincorporated, self-
regulatory body – was described as unique and sui generis. The absence of a legislative template 
on which to base review meant the Court of Appeal was driven to generate a more generalised 
basis for supervising the Panel’s activities (in the particular case, the refusal to adjourn a hearing 
about a potential breach of the Panel’s code on take-overs and mergers). This justified review, 
 
48  Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association [2011] 3 SCR 654, [87]. See also 
Canada (AG) v Canadian HRC [2013] FCA 75, [12].  
49  Canada (Canadian HRC) v Canada (AG) [2011] 3 SCR 471; Alberta Teachers’ (n 48); Catalyst Paper Corp v North 
Cowichan (District) [2012] 1 SCR 5, discussed by Daly, ‘Dunsmuir’s Flaws’ (n 38). 
50  Ryan (n 43) [20] and [44]. After Dunsmuir, the majority in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa [2009] 
1 SCR 339 was anxious, though, to avoid the language of  a spectrum ([108]): ‘these are single standards, 
not moving points along a spectrum’; compare Binnie J: reasonableness is ‘a single standard that takes its 
colour from the context’ ([59]).  
51  Catalyst Paper (n 49) [18]. See also Khosa (n 50) [59]. 
52  [1990] 1 QB 146. See also R (Camelot Group plc) v National Lottery Commission [2001] EMLR 3. For cases in 
which it was acknowledged but not made out, see eg R (Niazi) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department 
[2007] EWHC 1495; R (A) v Lord Saville of  Newdigate [2000] 1 WLR 1855. See discussion the ‘innominate 
ground’ (ch 3 n 131) above. 
53  Guinness (n 52) 160. I have distinguished the Guinness approach from variegated forms of  unreasonableness 
because the Guinness approach has a broader ambit and more general character, unlike the forms of  
unreasonableness which try to express particularised degrees of  scrutiny. See ch 4 pt IIC above.  
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Lord Donaldson said, ‘more in the round than might otherwise be the case and, whilst basing 
its decision on familiar concepts, should eschew any formal categorisation.’54  
Recently, a member of the Supreme Court expressly commended the instinctive approach 
in extra-judicial remarks.55 Lord Carnwath dismissed the notion of sliding scales of intensity 
and Wednesbury’s traditional deferential approach; instead he confessed that while on the bench 
his approach was much closer the ‘characteristically pragmatic approach’ set out in Guinness.56 
In its weaker form, unstructured contextualism is also represented in England by the current 
approach to deference in human rights adjudication under the Human Rights Act. The genesis 
of different approaches to judicial restraint applied in the assessment of whether limitations on 
rights are justified was discussed earlier.57 In particular, doctrinal formulations which initially 
attracted some favour and continue to be supported by many scholars were identified. The 
present judicial approach to deference, however, has a non-doctrinal character.  
The ground was laid in Daly, with Lord Steyn’s now famous concluding remark about the 
nature of the proportionality test: ‘In law context is everything’.58 This signalled the move 
towards a free-floating principle of contextualism that was ultimately to colour the preference 
for a non-doctrinal form of deference through the weight principle. The leading authority on 
this point is Lord Bingham’s speech in Huang, with which all other members of the appellate 
committee in that case joined.59 The House was called on to determine the proper approach to 
be applied when appellate immigration authorities assessed whether the ministerial refusal of 
leave to remain breached applicants’ right to family life under the Human Rights Act.60 In 
essence, the House of Lords ruled that any questions of deference should simply be determined 
on a case-by-case basis in the ordinary way by applying ‘weight’ to the views of the 
administration. Lord Bingham was critical of attempts to structure these considerations by 
reference to various devices: ‘due deference’, ‘discretionary areas of judgment’, ‘margin of 
appreciation’, ‘democratic accountability’, ‘relative institutional competence’, and so forth.61 He 
 
54  ibid 159. 
55  Lord Carnwath, ‘From Judicial Outrage to Sliding Scales’ (ALBA Annual Lecture, November 2013) 19. 
56  ibid. 
57  See ch 4 pt IIC above. 
58  Daly (n 16) [28]. 
59  Huang v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167. 
60  Lord Bingham treated the question as the same for all authorities: the adjudicator, Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal, and Court of  Appeal. 
61  Huang (n 59) [14]. 
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said doing so had the tendency to ‘complicate and mystify what is not, in principle, a hard task 
to define however difficult the task is, in practice, to perform’.62 Instead, a non-doctrinal 
approach was preferred:63 
The giving of weight to factors … is the performance of the ordinary judicial task of weighing 
up the competing considerations on each side and according appropriate weight to the judgment 
of a person with responsibility for a given subject-matter and access to special sources of 
knowledge and advice. That is how any rational judicial decision-maker is likely to proceed. 
The language and label of deference was expressly disavowed: this weighing process ‘is not, in 
our opinion, aptly described as deference’.64 The preference for non-doctrinal deference and 
weight has been reinforced subsequently by the House of Lords and Supreme Court in a 
number of cases.65  
E Conclusion 
Under contextual review, normative reasoning is preferred over doctrinal reasoning. Joseph 
characterises the method in the following way:66 
The forensic exercise is ‘inherently discretionary’ and cannot be reduced to formulaic rules for 
producing predictable and mechanical outcomes. … ‘Has something gone wrong?’ is the litmus 
test for determining which cases are deserving of the court’s intervention, and cases which are 
not. 
In its strong form, a singular basis for intervention is posed, based on judicial judgement and 
instinct. In its weaker form, it recognises that context may require the courts to respect and 
give weight to the views of others, but avoids giving this restraint or deference any doctrinal 
form. This style of approach, while not widespread, appears in parts of Canadian, English and 
New Zealand jurisprudence. 
III Conceptual Underpinnings 
The contextual review schema, generally based on unstructured judgement on the part of 
judges, comes through in the scholarship of Allan, Joseph, Hickman and Dyzenhaus. All four 
are eager to eschew doctrinal frameworks to vary the supervisory lens; instead, they see matters 
 
62  ibid. 
63  ibid [16].  
64  ibid. 
65  See eg R (SB) v Governors of  Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100; Belfast CC v Miss Behavin’ Ltd [2007] 1 
WLR 1420; Animal Defenders (n 63) 33 (and, in that context, ‘great weight’); (R (Quila) v Secretary of  State for 
the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 621; R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of  Justice [2014] 3 WLR 200 [166]-[171], [348]; 
R (Lord Carlile) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60. See also Kennedy v Charity 
Commission [2014] 2 WLR 808 (correctness review, along with an emphasis on ‘weight’, in the context of  
common law unreasonableness review); ch 4 text to n 85 above.  
66  Joseph, ‘Exploratory Issues’ (n 33) 75, 79. 
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of deference or restraint as forming part of the ordinary course of judging in the particular 
context. However, the models they propose for judicial deliberation have different aspects and 
emphases.  
Allan argues it is the constitutional duty of the courts to assess the propriety of the 
administrative decisions in the circumstances of the individual case, based on rule of law 
principles. Joseph constructs supervisory review around the notion of a judicial instinct – an 
entirely unstructured approach to the assessment of the circumstances. Hickman argues in 
favour of the employment of non-doctrinal deference, in the form of a basic assessment of the 
weight to be given to the views of others, in human rights adjudication.67 Dyzenhaus also 
favours a non-doctrinal appraisal of a decision in context, but believes the focus ought to be 
the reasonableness (not correctness) of the relationship between the decision and its 
justification.  
A Trevor Allan: unstructured and normative contextualism 
One of the strongest advocates for unstructured contextualism – and against giving principles 
of deference or restraint doctrinal form – is Allan. The model of government and judicial 
methodology he promotes is based on a thick and judicially-enforced version of the rule of law 
with a qualified approach to legislative supremacy. His condemnation of absolute legislative 
supremacy takes him outside the usual terrain of the ultra vires debate.  
First, Allan is reluctant to be drawn into either of the main schools of thought,68 although 
he admits the constitutional foundations of judicial review is a question of great significance.69 
For him, ‘the match has been fixed’; the tacit agreement that ultimately parliamentary 
sovereignty trumps, he says, ‘threatens the coherence of the debate’ and leads to practically no 
difference between the two main schools.70 Allan argues that limits and conditions of legislative 
supremacy must also be debated and absolute sovereignty ought to be rejected. He would 
shuffle these questions into his contextual treatment in the supervisory process. 
Allan’s objection to the ultra vires theory, as well as its embrace of parliamentary supremacy, 
is the artificiality of legislative intent, although he accepts that statutory context can (and 
 
67  Compare his position more generally; see ch 3 pt IIIC. 
68  TRS Allan, The Sovereignty of  Law (OUP 2013) 229. Allan says a ‘misguided focus on competing sources of  
administrative law, characteristic of  legal positivism, has deflected attention away from subtle practicalities 
of  legal interpretation in particular circumstances’. 
69  ibid 211. 
70  ibid 221. 
199 
 
should) play a role in the supervisory jurisdiction. The ultra vires theory is to attempt to – in 
Allan’s view, problematically – reconcile legislative supremacy and the rule of law.71 The central 
presumption that Parliament intends the rule of law to be observed means any breach of the 
rule of law is treated as a breach of the limits of the power delegated to the decision-maker. 
The ‘standards of legality’ (grounds of review) cannot be engaged without the decision-maker 
losing their jurisdiction because the standards are treated as inherent limits on the power 
conferred; framed in terms of policing the boundaries of power, the ultra vires theory therefore 
presents no threat to parliamentary supremacy. But, Allan argues, this formal rationalisation 
provides inadequate substantive guidance or legitimacy because ‘the ultra vires doctrine is 
consistent with whatever limits on administrative discretion the court decides the rule of law 
requires’.72 In other words, the strong presumptive role of the rule of law effectively means 
Parliament’s authority, while absolute in theory, is practically constrained. The courts will, Allan 
argues, not acknowledge attempts by Parliament to confer unreasonable, unfair or unfettered 
powers.73 Further, Allan laments the pretence of the jurisdictional reasoning based on ultra 
vires and the grounds of review method; for him, this method is ultimately dependent on 
context and is inevitably manipulable:74 
The doctrinal heads and categories of public law are quintessentially markers for the role of 
constitutional principle in the appraisal of executive action. They indicate the nature of the 
argument necessary, in each case, to show that such action satisfies the demands of legality; and 
they obtain their concrete content from application to the circumstances of a specific complaint 
of illegality. 
Allan suggests that, if legislative supremacy is put to one side, the ultra vires theory is capable 
of being recast in narrower and more plausible terms – merely emphasising the link between 
judicial review and statutory interpretation.75 In other words, he is content for some emphasis 
to be placed on the specific statutory context in which the general grounds of review must be 
applied’.76 This is consistent, he argues, with his overarching conception of contextualism: 
‘judgements of fairness or reasonableness or proper purposes are necessarily attuned to all the 
circumstances’.77 And the latter necessarily includes judicial consideration of the statutory 
 
71  ibid 213. 
72  ibid 214. 
73  ibid, referring to the circumvention of  privative clauses as a prime example. 
74  ibid 237. 
75  ibid 215. 
76  ibid. 
77  ibid. 
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background (‘the enacted provisions and the policies and purposes that best appear to animate 
them objectives or policies of the statute’).78 
The powerful authority of the courts under Allan’s preferred model of contextualism is 
suggestive of the common law school. However, Allan takes issue with the impotence of the 
model and the common law label that comes with it. Allan observes that the grounds of review 
– ‘articulated and developed by judges’ – are part of the common law and ‘exemplify the 
common law’s commitment to constitutionalism’– a clear nod to the common law school.79 
At the same time, he dismisses the notion, generally accepted in the common law school, that 
these common law expressions of legality are subservient to the decree of the legislature. 
Drawing on Sir John Laws,80 Allan characterises the grounds of review as ‘constitutional 
fundamentals[,] ... impervious to any purported legislative abrogation’.81 As Parliament ‘invokes 
the idea of law’, when it makes law ‘it cannot logically repudiate the basic principle of legality’;82 
any conception of legislative intent must therefore, he says, operate consistently with the 
principle of legality and the rule of law. Hence, he argues, the common law and the ultra vires 
theories converge. Allan is also critical of the emphasis that the common law theory places on 
‘free-stranding criterion of administrative legality, independent of context’.83 Its proponents 
‘underestimate the pliability of the grounds of review, which in many cases serve mainly to 
summarize a finding of illegality closely dependent on all the circumstances’.84 Moreover, the 
common law approach is also a ‘threat to democracy’ because there is ‘[t]oo much emphasis in 
the independent operation of the common law, separately from statute’.85  
Despite the logic of his argument, Allan argues that his theory does not amount to common 
law prevailing over statute or vice versa; they are not external fetters on the grant of power.86 
Rather, he frames the principles of administrative legality or other constitutional norms as 
‘essential presuppositions’; in his language, they are ‘internal to the correct construction of the 
 
78  ibid. 
79  ibid 221. 
80  John Laws, ‘Illegality’ in Michael Supperstone and James Goudie (eds), Judicial Review (2nd edn, 
Butterworths 1997) 51. 
81  Allan, Sovereignty (n 68) 216 and 217. 
82  ibid 217. 
83  ibid 233. 
84  ibid 224. 
85  ibid 235. 
86  ibid 229. 
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legislative powers conferred’.87 Seeking to avoid the language of supremacy, he instead seeks 
to present an integrated approach. ‘Parliament and courts cooperate to preserve the integrity 
of liberal democracy.’88 He argues the Cart case (where the courts adopted a nuanced and 
residual review approach in the light of an alternative adjudicative structure, protected by a 
privative clause) demonstrated ‘the courts permit[ing] a statutory tribunal to exercise the 
authority (including interpretative authority) appropriate to the constitutional function 
conferred by Parliament in its legitimate democratic role’.89 In other words (although not in 
words Allan would use), a more deferential standard of review allowed the relative authority of 
the tribunal to be squared with the constitutional role of the court in relation to standards of 
legality. 
Allan’s solution to legitimacy question lies in contextualism: ‘[P]rinciples of legality must be 
sensitive to context.’90 The legitimacy of judicial review turns on its ‘manner of exercise’ as 
much as its underlying principles.91 Moreover, he characterises the dynamic and case-by-case 
‘integration of legislative aim and structure, on the one hand, and the constraints of legality, on 
the other’ as the raison d’être of public law adjudication.92 In other words, the principles and 
their application must ‘tread a delicate line between unwarranted interference with a public 
agency’s functions … and failure to protect the victim of abuse of power’.93 However, 
ostensibly inconsistent with this position, Allan maintains that the courts are still obliged to 
intervene if they conclude there has been an abuse of power, because, in his eyes, failing to do 
so would involve the courts ‘giving up on law’ and would amount to abdication of 
responsibility.94  
One of Allan’s central themes is hostility to judicial deference or restraint. He concedes, 
though, that while the common law grounds of review are fundamentally important, there may 
be a limited role for democratically-grounded restraint in some cases. In reality, this vanishes 
quickly. Allan suggests there may be instances when the courts may might need to exercise 
restraint or deference for reasons of constitutional legitimacy or institutional expertise; 
 
87  ibid.  
88  ibid 223. 
89  ibid, referring to R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2012] 1 AC 663. 
90  Allan, Sovereignty (n 68) 226. 
91  ibid 234. 
92  ibid 234. 
93  ibid 226. 
94  ibid.  
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however, he strongly resists that any consequent restraint be given independent doctrinal 
form.95 His claim is that these matters are, if one accepts his internal and contextual approach, 
already factored into the supervisory process. That is, an independent and external doctrine of 
deference is redundant. But the concession to contextual deference is hollow and is ultimately 
overshadowed by an injunction that the courts must step in to address abuse. 
Allan’s vision for judicial review, as developed above, is contextualism, rather than any 
specific schema or organising principles. Context is the essential mediating device; in Allan’s 
eyes, the contextual sensitivity of judicial review ‘dissolves’ any antagonism between the rule 
of law and parliamentary supremacy.96 Doctrine – whether in the form of grounds, categories 
or other structuring methodologies – is frowned upon; however the concept of grounds of 
review is not entirely obliterated and continues to serve a modest, subordinate role:97 
From an appropriately internal, interpretative stance, many of the distinctions and categories 
invented for analytical exposition lose their force – or at least serve only as very rough guides to 
the making of an evaluative legal judgement, dependent on all the circumstances. 
The essential commitment is to a judgement-based approach. While contextual review is seen 
by Allan as legitimate as acceptable methodology, he also acknowledges that it may benefit 
from having some explicit analytical reasoning added.98 To this extent, his model of judicial 
adjudication is not as instinctive as Joseph’s.  
A particular consequence of the instinctive approach is, for example, that Allan shows little 
interest in the debates between unreasonableness and proportionality, seeing little difference 
between the two.99 These grounds only operate as ‘convenient labels for a form of review that 
must press as far, in each case, as is necessary to satisfy the court ... that the action in question 
in truly justified’.100  
 
95  ibid 241. 
96  ibid 228. 
97  ibid 249. The contextual adaptability of  the principles of  legality/grounds of  review is a key part of  Allan’s 
logic that the common law principles are omnipotent and need not be seen as being suspended or curtailed 
by the legislature. Indeed, he rejects the characterisation of  his approach in terms of  a principle of  legality. 
For him, constitutional rights or fundamental norms are not capable of  abrogation; they are ‘an implicit 
condition of  the validity of  both administrative action and parliamentary enactment’ (243). 
98  ibid 242. 
99  ibid 244, suggesting there is no difference between the two: ‘a public authority that imposes a 
disproportionate burden on the relevant individual interests has necessarily acted unreasonably, 
overlooking (or disregarding) the special status of  those interests.’ Notably Allan expressly parts company 
with Lord Steyn in Daly on this point. 
100  Allan, Sovereignty (n 68) 246. 
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Allan rebels against efforts to give judicial deference any tangible and independent role, as 
noted earlier.101 First, he argues a separate doctrine is unnecessary in light of the contextual 
methodology he promotes:102 
The appropriate degree of deference is dictated, in each case, by analysis of the substantive legal 
issues arising. If properly conducted, the analysis will indicate the correct division of 
responsibilities between court and agency, making all due allowance for the exercise of 
administrative discretion and recourse to specialist expertise. That division of responsibilities is 
itself the outcome of legal analysis attuned to the special questions of legality arising; it cannot 
determine these questions, a priori, on the basis of general features of the separation of powers 
divorced from the specific constitutional context. 
Secondly, he rejects the suggestion that the courts ought to weight up the various factors 
relevant to deference in order to calibrate the intensity of review, even if done on a case-by-
case basis.103 Allan’s claim is that constructing deference in this way amounts to the abdication 
of the judicial function to determine the legality of the action. He would avoid the language of 
deference altogether (a court ‘does not “defer” to Parliament or Government in any ordinary 
sense of that term’); ‘deference’ for him merely marks the situation where an administrative 
decision is accepted by the courts as ‘fall[ing] within the proper scope of the relevant powers’.104 
True deference only arises where there is a range of outcomes that all meet the test of 
justification; only in those circumstances is it legitimate, he says, for a court to defer on 
constitutional or expertise grounds.105 
Thirdly, he objects to the development of standards of review or independent calibration 
of the supervisory lens. They are, in his view, cut from the same cloth and undermine the 
particularised contextual judgement he believes judges must deploy. He rejects Hickman’s 
distinction between standards of legality and standards of review: ‘the former ought to be a 
direct reflection of the latter.’106 He also criticises the notion that grounds such as 
unreasonableness and proportionality can be calibrated by reference to independent intensity 
 
101  ibid. See also Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review’ (2006) 65 CLJ 671, 675; ‘Deference, Defiance, 
and Doctrine’ (2010) 60 UTLJ 41. Young argues Allan’s position is mistakenly based on deference 
amounting to submission, rather than respect; Alison Young, ‘In Deference of  Due Deference’ (2009) 72 
MLR 554. 
102  Allan, Sovereignty (n 68) 268. 
103  ibid 269. 
104  ibid 269, 246.  
105  ibid 246. Allan is anxious to avoid equating this to the principle of  non-justiciability, which would violate 
his vision of  the judicial imperative to adjudicate (274). 
106  ibid 241. The distinction, ‘while useful perhaps for limited purposes of  exposition, is potentially misleading’ 
(250). 
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of review.107 ‘It supposes that the court must determine the appropriate form of review, within 
an available spectrum, on criteria quite separate from the issue of justification, which inevitably 
depends on all the circumstances.’108 
Allan’s essential complaint appears to be that crystallising deference involves double-
counting; the constitutional and expertise factors relevant to intensity of review are, in his view, 
already properly engaged in the particular question of whether the action is justified. That is 
not to say, though, that relative expertise might not limit the scope of a court’s enquiry or the 
constitutional values engaged are irrelevant. It is merely that these considerations do not need 
separate expression from the contextual evaluation of justification. Deference moves from a 
doctrinal or methodological consideration to an evidential and evaluative burden: ‘Judicial 
deference must be based on evidence and argument, in support of the decision or measure 
under review, that the complainant has not been able to effectively undermine.’109 Put another 
way, deference is explained as the ‘hesitat[ion] to condemn as unlawful’ (especially when, ‘examined 
in the light of relevant expert knowledge, applied to the facts by an appropriate crafted 
procedure’, the course of action may be demonstrated to be shown to be necessary and 
justified).110 In this form, the judicial circumspection is seen as a function of due process, which 
Allan argues is the quid pro quo for any judicial deference.111 That is, a public authority must 
deliberate on balance in the particular circumstance (not necessarily in a quasi-judicial way); if 
it fails to do so, then any subsequent claim that its decision was justified is less likely to satisfy 
the burden of persuasion for the courts. On this account, substance and process are necessarily 
intertwined. 
Behind the deference-sceptic analysis, Allan’s analysis discloses a number of factors which 
may weigh in favour of judicial restraint (albeit he would object to their abstract and separate 
identification and would admit them only as part-and-parcel of the individualised assessment 
of legality he proposes).112 For example, special deference to Parliament merely because it has 
elected status is improper, but sometimes Parliament’s ability to address questions of public 
opinion or confidence may put it at a relative advantage to the courts. The nature of the 
 
107  ibid 246. 
108  ibid. 
109  ibid 249. 
110  ibid 276 (emphasis added). Compare with Elliott’s ‘adjudicative deference’ (ch 4, text to n 160).  
111  Allan, Sovereignty (n 68) 262. 
112  ibid 272. See also Allan, ‘Deference, Defiance, and Doctrine’ (n 101) 51; ‘Human Rights’ (n 101) 688. 
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question may influence, though not merely because a question is complex or polycentric; only 
the existence of numerous lawful courses of action, following proper legal analysis, counsels 
restraint (and then only because the existence of ‘no uniquely right answer’ means a challenge 
basis on legality is misconceived).113 Considerations of democratic accountability – including 
the availability of other avenues to address the issue – are seen as improper and, again, as the 
abdication of the judicial obligation to adjudicate and uphold the rule of law.114 As mentioned, 
he is dismissive of attempts to articulate those factors in advance of the individualised 
analysis:115 
The extent to which consideration of expertise and competence should constrain or circumscribe 
judicial deliberation, however, must depend on all the circumstances; and the proper limits of 
judicial inquiry cannot be determined as an independent matter, divorced from the 
circumstances.  
Despite this, he observes that the differences between his non-doctrinal account and other 
doctrinal versions might not be as great as first appears.116 For example, he suggests that King’s 
institutional model of doctrinal deference does not differ much from his own non-doctrinal 
version (he singles out King’s model, but his comments are equally applicable to Hunt’s).117 He 
says King’s approach ‘offers a largely external, analytic description of an adjudicative process 
that, from an internal, interpretative viewpoint, is substantially “non-doctrinal”’.118 Although 
deference is given an explicit role, Allan argues that this approach means the calibration of 
intensity is not divorced from the particular context, thereby more resembling the non-
doctrinal contextual models.  
While Hickman and Allan share a preference for a fact-sensitive and non-doctrinal 
approach to deference, Allan objects to Hickman’s suggestion that the factors relevant to 
deference influence the judicial interpretation.119 ‘[S]uch factors operate legitimately only in 
determining whether the right is infringed in all the circumstances; they should not operate 
 
113  Allan, Sovereignty (n 68) 274. 
114  The constitutional duty of  the courts, he says, ‘is to decide each case, after hearing evidence and argument, 
in accordance with the reasons it finds persuasive’; Allan, ‘Human Rights’ (n 101) 683.  
115  Allan, Sovereignty (n 68) 275. 
116  Compare a similar observation from the opposite perspective from Taggart: ‘Proportionality’ (n 74) 456. 
117  Allan, Sovereignty (n 68) 280. 
118  ibid. 
119  Compare Hickman, Public Law (n 72). 
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independently, as second-order considerations that specify a distinct judicial approach or 
standard of review’.120 
So, in essence, Allan’s position on deference and the factors which may underscore judicial 
restraint is that these matters are ‘wholly internal to the ordinary legal question’ and fall to be 
determined ‘based on established tests of legality’; in other words, ‘there is no separate 
conceptual space for any doctrine of deference to occupy’.121 
B Philip Joseph: common law inspired instinctive judgement 
Joseph is one of the most vocal proponents of the contextual approach in its strong form. He 
crusades against formalism and rejects attempts to justify judicial intervention under legislative 
intent. His support of the common law and a judicially-enforced rule of law translates into a 
desire to free the judicial supervisory eye from any constraint; embraced, instead, is the ultimate 
non-doctrinal solution in the form of the instinctive impulse. 
First, Joseph is a die-hard common law theorist and argues vehemently against the ultra 
vires theory of judicial review. It is, he says, repeating Craig’s well-known objections, 
ahistorical, fictional and contrived.122 Instead, drawing on Allan, he promotes the rule of law 
as the legitimising and organising principle of judicial review: ‘Judicial review is founded on 
normative considerations of justice and the rule of law’, he says, mandating the courts ‘to check 
organised public power and to vouchsafe vital freedoms that promote individual human 
worth’.123  
For him, the rule of law is ‘a metaphor for principles of liberty and social justice and the 
“correct” organisation of the state (representative democracy and a system of independent 
courts)’.124 While aspirational and contested,125 the rule of law eclipses positivist legal method 
and releases a form of normative argumentation:126 
The rule of law represents the default ‘setting’ for guiding the judicial intuition where no 
applicable principle of law is directly in point. Constitutional norms remain partially 
 
120  Allan, Sovereignty (n 68) 276 fn 124. 
121  ibid 178. 
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indeterminate and obscured until actual situations of injustice arise. Such situations materialise 
fundamental principles in tangible form and give concrete definition to the rule of law. 
Notably, Joseph invests his faith in the judiciary and is not troubled by the definitional tasks 
being left to the judiciary. The ‘forensic mind-wrestle’ – the framing and testing of competing 
propositions – is an adequate legal method to solve the contestability and indeterminacy of the 
rule of law.127 
Secondly, in the administrative law context, Joseph’s emphasis on the rule of law and 
‘normative argumentation’ translates into what he characterises the ‘instinctive impulse’.128 The 
forensic exercise is ‘inherently discretionary’ and ‘[n]o amount of rule formalism can relieve the 
courts of their instinctual task in judicial review’, he argues.129 The limits of judicial intervention 
are ultimately a function of trust – we are asked to trust the cautiousness of the judiciary and 
their innate concern not to overstep the mark.130 
Although a strong advocate for the recognition of the instinctive impulse at the ‘nub’ of 
judicial review, Joseph is unable to unhook his normative vision from the comfort of the 
grounds of review schema. Even though the judicial instinct dominates, judges need to ‘fit 
applications for judicial review within an established ground of review’.131 The decision to 
intervene must be cloaked into the doctrinal schema to provide it with a degree of legitimacy 
– the charade of legal reasoning is preserved (despite Joseph’s condemnation of formalism and 
doctrinal method). This retention of some form of grounds of review schema by Joseph sits 
uncomfortably with his condemnation of doctrinal developments. Judicial review, particularly 
substantive review, has he says become a ‘pedagogical morass’.132 In the pursuit of ‘simplicity’, 
he argues that Wednesbury unreasonableness could simply be abandoned. He targets particularly 
the ‘terminological congestion’ associated with variegation of unreasonableness.133 For him, 
many of the standards express the same notion of more intensive review and ‘clutter the 
administrative law curriculum but offer no guidance to bench and bar’.134 Joseph toys with two 
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possible approaches to rationalisation – Taggart’s bifurcation and Craig’s proportionality – but 
in the end concludes unreasonableness should be dispensed with altogether in favour of his 
instinctive method. His complaint about the retention of Wednesbury unreasonableness is that, 
in its traditional low-intensity formulation, it never provides an independent basis for 
intervention. This, he argues, makes it superfluous (‘forensically parasitic’);135 he is only 
interested in the doctrine’s role in mandating intervention, not its role in tempering restraint. 
Proportionality holds more appeal to him, because of its structure, precision and sophistication. 
But he argues it, too, is redundant. Illegality and procedural impropriety (implicitly cast very 
broadly) cover the field.  
Ultimately, Joseph contends unstructured contextualism and the judicial judgement provide 
the answer, without any doctrinal glosses like deference which seek to delimit the constitutional 
and institutional competence of the courts. ‘The courts respect the ambit of administrative 
discretion and limits of the adjudicative role’, he says, ‘without imposing yet more distracting 
doctrine.’136  
C Tom Hickman (II): non-doctrinal deference in human rights 
adjudication 
Hickman curiously adopts a divergent approach on the intensity of review, as explained 
earlier.137 On the one hand, Hickman expresses a preference for categorical approaches to the 
determination of the applicable standard of legality (rejecting flexible forms of 
unreasonableness or proportionality). On the other hand, he goes on to argue in favour of non-
doctrinal forms of deference, particularly in the context of human rights adjudication. 
Hickman’s position on the former has already been explained; here we turn to his argument in 
favour of non-doctrinal deference and its parallels with contextual review. 
Hickman’s non-doctrinal approach to deference arises in his discussion of the narrower 
question of substantive review in human rights adjudication; that is, ‘how the standards of 
legality fall to be applied by the courts’, in the context of ‘applying Convention rights and 
constitutional common law rights’.138 Here, he resists efforts to give the principles underlying 
judicial restraint or deference any further doctrinal foundation.139 Instead, he argues it is up to 
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the courts to exhibit deference to the views of primary decision-makers on a case-by-case 
basis:140 
[T]he courts [should] take account of the various consideration that require [them] to give weight 
to the views of another person on a case-by-case basis, without needing to go through a process 
of categorisation and without needing to apply prescriptive principles to structure whether and 
how much weight to afford to them. ...[W]e can call this a non-doctrinal approach, since the task 
of the courts is not regulated by any doctrine, but is simply part of the ordinary business of 
judging. 
Doctrinal deference, he argues, ‘would at best unnecessarily complicate human rights litigation, 
and at worst would undermine human rights litigation’.141 He advances a number of reasons 
why a non-doctrinal approach is to be preferred. He argues that the application of weight is a 
familiar curial technique.142 ‘When [judges] recognise their lack of knowledge and competence 
relative to another person, they understandably give weight to their views.’143 But Hickman 
argues it is inappropriate to label this as ‘deference’, particularly because those judging have 
‘the responsibility of making up their own mind and [are] not relinquishing that responsibility, 
in substance if not form, by accepting the opinion of another after deciding that that person is 
in a better position to judge’.144 The terminology of weight is more faithful, he argues, to the 
curial technique. However, in making this observation, Hickman overstates the linguistic 
infidelity of deference, especially in light of the generally accepted framing of deference as 
respect, not submission. He is also critical of the apparent bluntness of deference (or that its 
language is suggestive of bluntness): it ‘fails to capture the way that the amount of significance 
afforded to others will vary’.145 Again, this claim is based on a false construct; (doctrinal) 
deference need not be binary in nature and is capable of being applied in a nuanced fashion. 
Hickman’s rejection of doctrinal deference and embrace of weight is underscored by three 
key reasons, all based on the ‘pervasive and inherently fact-sensitive nature’ of deference in the 
adjudicative process.146 First, he argues that the principles underlying deference can only be 
articulated as a high level of abstraction; they become, he argues, only ‘examples of where on 
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the particular facts and in particular circumstances and given the particular procedures, such 
superiority has been found to exist in a relevant respect, given the particular legal issue to be 
determined by the court’.147 In other words, reasoning from generalisations is unsafe. Secondly, 
doctrinal deference would, he repeats, be insufficiently nuanced to capture degrees of weight 
or deference arising from particular facts and issues; and, if it could, it is would be unduly 
complicated. Thirdly, the relative institutional capacity of the courts may vary within a case or 
across of range of cases, and again he argues that a doctrine of deference will lack sophistication 
to take account of this. For example, he observes that the procedures for determining an issue 
may vary (say, as a result of cross-examination or expert evidence), or the constitution of courts 
and supervisory tribunals may vary (say, through expertise-mandated appointments) and 
suggests a more responsive version of deference is required. 
While sharing Allan’s critique of doctrinal approaches to deference, Hickman parts 
company from Allan on how deference factors ought to be reflected in a non-doctrinal 
approach. In particular, Hickman disagrees with Allan’s parsing of deference factors in terms 
of external and internal and thus impermissible and permissible. Hickman argues that the 
distinction is ‘untenable’ and ‘unreal’.148 Hickman conveniently catalogues the permissible and 
impermissible ‘reasons’ for affording weight (that is, deference factors – although his non-
doctrinal orientation means he avoids such language).149 The reasons advanced by him are 
relatively orthodox and generally accord with those who have advocated a doctrinal form of 
deference in human rights adjudication.150  
The key factors he identifies are practical reasons supporting the application of weight. First, 
he argues relative expertise and experience is a permissible reason, but only if it is ‘relevant and 
superior in relation to a particular aspect of the decision’ – it cannot simply be assumed by dint 
of the office.151 Secondly, the rigour of the process by which the decision is made similarly may 
be a reason for deference, in that it may have enabled a decision-maker to assume particular 
expertise on a particular issue. Thirdly, the strength of the reasons given, Hickman argues, 
should not be a basis for affording weight; this would lead to circularity because the task of the 
courts is ultimately to determine whether or not those reasons ought to be accepted or 
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rejected.152 The nature and comprehensiveness of reasons may only serve as evidence of 
superior knowledge and expertise on the issues – but the latter should not be assumed from 
the former alone. Fourthly, the inaptness of the supervisory process to address the issues in 
questions is a permissible reason for weight, on the basis that it affects the relative expertise of 
the court to adjudicate.  
Notably Hickman is cautious about ‘constitutional’ reasons for affording weight.153 He 
argues that it should not be assumed that weight is afforded merely because the decision has 
been made by a democratic or representative body. That is, he rejects the automatic application 
of weight merely based on respecting the ‘allocation of functions’. However, he accepts that 
the particular nature of the primary decision-maker – its electoral or democratic character – 
may mean the courts should afford their determination some weight on the basis that it may 
have led to some superior expertise on the particular issue. The basis for this should, though, 
be ‘unpicked’ – deference should not be based merely on the ‘shorthand’ of democratic 
credentials and should be interrogated closely.154  
Hickman is also doubtful that the importance of the impugned right – ‘the fact that an 
administrative decision has a particular severe impact on an individual’ – is a direct reason 
against affording weight or deference to the primary decision-makers.155 As he sees it as the 
duty of the courts to adjudicate and this factor does not speak to relative expertise, Hickman 
deems it irrelevant. However, he concedes it may still have indirect influence. If a decision has 
grave impact, it may be ‘legitimate and appropriate ... for individuals on whose shoulder the 
decision falls to be made to make additional efforts to acquaint themselves with the relevant 
facts’.156 This may affect the relative expertise balance as the secondary decision-maker acquired 
‘enhanced decision-making capacities’.157 So, while the impact of the decision on an individual 
may not be a direct reason for deference per se, it may cause the courts to ‘modify their scrutiny 
and adopt their procedure’ thereby ameliorating any lack of expertise.158 
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Hickman’s approach to human rights adjudication (in contrast to his approach in relation 
to traditional judicial review) is based on a non-doctrinal formulation of deference: expressed 
in its most basic form, it is the ordinary application of varying weight being afforded to the 
views of others. 
D David Dyzenhaus: respectful, deferential and non-doctrinal appraisal  
Dyzenhaus is renowned for his account of ‘deference as respect’.159 His characterisation of 
deference in this way has been influential in the Canadian development of the deference-based 
framework.160 Like other contextualists, he favours non-doctrinal approaches to deference. 
However, he nominates a more reserved role for the judiciary and would charge the courts 
with reviewing administrative decisions according to a lens of unreasonableness, rather than 
correctness. 
Dyzenhaus is dismissive of the ultra vires/legislative intent vs common law debate.161 He 
argues the debate – and both sides of the debate162 – unduly founders in formalism, with little 
substantive difference between the two schools of thought. He characterises it as a debate 
about ‘an issue that makes no difference’, which cannot therefore be resolved.163 He explains:164 
All the camps divide on is whether [common law] values are themselves the legitimating basis 
for review or whether legislative intent is what legitimates judicial reliance on those values. 
Both sides, he says, ultimately agree on the formal nature of the rule of law engaged in judicial 
review; namely, the conception of the rule of law ‘sketches very distinct roles for the different 
institutions of legal order, ... does not build in any moral values into its structure [and] maintains 
 
159  Dyzenhaus, ‘Deference’ (n 43) 286.  
160  See eg Canadian judicial endorsements at n 43 above. 
161  David Dyzenhaus, ‘Formalism’s Hollow Victory’ [2002] NZ Law Rev 525. For his contribution to the 
seminal symposium on this issue, see David Dyzenhaus ‘Form and Substance in the Rule of  Law’ in 
Christopher Forsyth (ed), Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart Publishing 2000) 141. 
162  Dyzenhaus labels the ultra vires/legislative intent and common law schools as ‘democratic positivists’ and 
‘liberal anti-positivists’ respectively; Dyzenhaus, ‘Deference’ (n 43) 280. Democratic positivists seek to 
uphold the primacy of  legislative will; law enacted by Parliament obtains its legitimacy from the 
accountability of  Parliament to the people. Anti-positivists, in contrast, emphasise the common law and 
its value; these values, typically liberal values, have legitimacy because they reflect the moral values of  the 
people and form a background against which legislation is to be interpreted. 
163  Dyzenhaus, ‘Hollow Victory’ (n 161) 550. See also Dyzenhaus, ‘Deference’ (n 43) 285. 
164  Dyzenhaus, ‘Hollow Victory’ (n 161) 528. 
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the integrity of the separation of powers, formally understood’.165 The debate therefore cannot, 
he laments, escape ‘Dicey’s “clammy spectre”’.166 
Dyzenhaus joins the common law school in their critique of the legislative intent school, on 
the usual grounds. He also rejects a ‘plain fact’ conception of the rule of law – that is, judges 
are supposed to ‘faithfully respect the content of what the legislature in fact decided’ – in favour 
of a value-based conception of the rule of law committed to individual dignity (the former 
connoting the legislative intent school and the latter the common law school).167 But he goes 
on to say that the common law argument ultimately collapses into an ultra vires argument 
because it recognises Parliament’s legislative supremacy, something he says the common law 
school has provided no answer to:168  
[A]ny recognition that Parliament can formally exclude the operation of the common law is 
tantamount to a recognition that ultra vires remains the justification for judicial review. Since 
Parliament can assert itself over the judges, judicial review depends upon, and is therefore 
legitimated by, Parliament’s silence. 
Like Allan, Dyzenhaus is anxious that the debate about the constitutional underpinnings of 
judicial review be conducted without the shadow of legislative supremacy being cast over it.169 
He posits that, drawing on Pocock’s language, ‘consubstantiality’ might be a better way to 
conceive of the relative authority of the legislative and judiciary; in order words, ‘both 
Parliament and the judiciary are engaged in the same task of using reason to give expression to 
a common order of fundamental values.’170 Dyzenhaus is therefore drawn to the notion of an 
‘internal morality’ of law, compliance with which is essential for law-making authority.171  
Moreover, Dyzenhaus argues formalism – and legitimacy accounts based on separation of 
powers – cannot describe the complex reality of administrative law.172 In particular, he takes 
issue with the formalism, and the artificial process–substance dichotomy, which underlies the 
 
165  ibid 527. He complains the theory of  the rule of  law is ‘on the one hand substantive – a theory of  judicial 
review built on the values of  the common law – and on the other hand purely formal – a theory about 
Parliament’s authority to do anything it pleases’, with both camps conceding the formal component has 
the ‘upper hand’ (539).  
166  ibid 528, drawing on Stephen Sedley, ‘Foreword’ in Michael Taggart, The Province of  Judicial Review (Hart 
1997) vii, viii. 
167  David Dyzenhaus, ‘Dignity in Administrative Law’ (2012) 17 Rev Const Stud 87, 104. 
168  Dyzenhaus, ‘Hollow Victory’ (n 161) 538. 
169  ibid 555. 
170  ibid 555, citing JGA Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (2nd edn, CUP 1987) 271. 
171  Dyzenhaus, ‘Hollow Victory’ (n 161) 556, drawing on Lon L Fuller, The Morality of  Law (Yale UP 1964) ch 
3. 
172  Dyzenhaus, ‘Hollow Victory’ (n 161) 528. 
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tripartite grounds of review, as generalised and systematised by Lord Diplock.173 In the context 
of illegality, Dyzenhaus is particularly concerned about formalism’s claims of a judicial 
monopoly on legal interpretation and a legislative monopoly on law-making – both of which 
are problematic for him because they fail to recognise the administrative state as having a 
legitimate role within the legal order.174 He also condemns Wednesbury unreasonableness as a 
‘toothless ticking exercise’, driven by what he describes as the ‘rationality paradox’.175 While the 
courts have asserted the independent power to review decision for rationality – inescapably 
moving them into the substantive domain – they cannot avoid the fact that their sense of 
rationality is modelled on ‘the way in which judges think decisions should be made’; hesitant 
about then stepping into the shoes of the administration on matters of substance (‘impos[ing] 
judicial standards of rationality’), the courts have de-powered the standard for intervention 
(that is, they have ‘creat[ed] a non-legal test for illegality’).176 
Dyzenhaus’ template for administrative law is based on a single standard of review: 
reasonableness.177 The courts should, he says, interrogate the reasons for the decision and 
relationship with the conclusion reached.178 But, unlike Allan, his proposed trigger for judicial 
intervention has a deferential flavour:179  
The court should therefore intervene only if it is prepared to discharge the onus of showing, not 
that it would have reached another decision, but that the decision is not reasonably supportable. 
While the supervisory lens is calibrated according to reasonableness, Dyzenhaus still 
acknowledges that this will, in effect, enable variable intensity across a wide range of 
modulation, that is, ‘more or less intense scrutiny of the reasons, depending on the nature of 
the interest at stake.’180  
 
173  ibid 543-549. 
174  This is influenced by the Canadian context where the idea of  a judicial monopoly on resolving questions 
of  law has long since evaporated; see ch 4, text to n 48. 
175  Dyzenhaus, ‘Hollow Victory’ (n 161) 548. 
176  ibid 549. 
177  Dyzenhaus, ‘Dignity’ (n 167) 109. 
178  ibid. 
179  Dyzenhaus, ‘Deference’ (n 43) 304. He says the courts should not apply a correctness standard, ‘a question 
that would permit them to first work out the answer and then check to see whether the official’s answer 
coincided without any need to inspect the reasons offered by the official’; Dyzenhaus, ‘Dignity’ (n 167) 
113.  
180  Dyzenhaus, ‘Dignity’ (n 167) 113. 
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He is critical about the continuing ubiquity of a ‘mantra-like’ taboo against ‘reweighing’ or 
‘review on the merits’.181 This prohibition, he argues, is impossible to observe, is founded on 
the misapprehension of a plain fact model of legislative intent, and is inconsistent with the 
reason-giving duty that lies at the heart of the culture of justification. The courts ‘must ask 
whether the official’s reasons do justify the conclusion – and that cannot be done ... without 
considering whether the official gave appropriate weight to important factors.’182 He is 
therefore in agreement with scholars like Craig who proclaim that substantive review 
necessarily involves an assessment of weight.183  
Responding to concerns about undue judicial activism and discretion, Dyzenhaus’ relies on 
an abstract ideal to temper the judicial judgement. Initially, Dyzenhaus posited the value of 
equality as the supervisory lodestar;184 however, he subsequently modified this to dignity (with 
equality remaining as an indirect value).185 The substantive focus on dignity – while abstract – 
sits awkwardly with the lens of reasonableness though. The substantive overlay risks 
encouraging correctness review where fidelity with the dignity objective is assessed – thereby 
undercutting the focus on the reasonableness of the justification proffered. If a dignity 
touchstone is intended to be instrumental in ameliorating judicial discretion then it must have 
substantive influence (over-and-above merely providing a conceptual basis for the focus on 
the justification); it is left unexplained how the multiple mandates can be harmonised in 
practice.  
The adoption of the reasonableness standard, Dyzenhaus says, necessarily reflects and 
subsumes reasons for deference (expressly referring to the allocation of the task to a tribunal 
not a court, a tribunal’s proximity to the dispute, and its expertise).186 He argues the requirement 
of reason-giving and justification makes his approach inherently democratic;187 the essence of 
citizenship is ‘the democratic right [of those governed] to require an accounting for acts of 
public power’ and the ability of the governors to ‘offer adequate reasons’ is central to the 
justification of public power. Put another way, the rule of law, ‘depends in the first instance on 
 
181  ibid 110. 
182  ibid 113. 
183  See text to n 255 above. 
184  Dyzenhaus, ‘Deference’ (n 43) 305. 
185  Dyzenhaus, ‘Dignity’ (n 167) 104. 
186  Dyzenhaus, ‘Deference’ (n 43) 304. 
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the ability of the legal order to bring the excesses of politics to the surface, and force those 
who wish to violate fundamental democratic values to be explicit about it.’188  
So, ultimately, Dyzenhaus echoes other contextualists to the extent he strips the supervisory 
task of detailed doctrinal constraints in favour of universal judicial judgement, assessed in the 
particular circumstances. However, he differs from them to the extent that the universal 
standard or instinct is more deferential: namely, reasonableness par excellence. 
E Conclusion 
Contextual review translates into non-doctrinal approaches to judging.189 Judges are mandated 
to make their own assessment in the circumstances. Absent doctrinal directives or guidelines, 
the appraisal is undoubtedly normative. Judges are called on to deploy visions of administrative 
justice by reference only to constitutional principles such as the rule of law. And the diverse 
conceptions of the rule of law and administrative law lead to different versions of this appraisal. 
The most prominent non-doctrinal proponent, Allan, emphasizes a rule of law which is 
sensitive to context. A sceptic of legislative supremacy and consequential critic of a loaded-
ultra vires debate, he argues it is the duty of the courts – acting under law – to address any 
abuses of administrative power they perceive. Deference for him only operates residually, 
where law runs out, in relation to a range of options all of which pass scrutiny under the rule 
of law; only then may the courts defer to the administration’s choices. In other words, 
correctness review. Joseph similarly promotes, again by reference to the rule of law, a model 
of judicial review where the courts make a judgement about whether to intervene based on the 
circumstances as a whole. Here, correctness review takes the form of an instinctive judgement. 
Hickman is also eager to strip the judicial supervisory lens of constraint, at least in relation to 
human rights adjudication. Instinct is cloaked in a traditional adjudicative language though. 
Any deference is manifest in the form of the affording of weight to the views of others; while 
Hickman identifies a number of reasons why courts should be deferential (generally based on 
relative expertise), the process of doing so is left to the implicit weighting process. Finally, 
Dyzenhaus also seeks to strip the supervisory process of detailed doctrinal constraint. But he 
favours a more deferential enquiry: rather than a correctness assessment, Dyzenhaus argues 
 
188  David Dyzenhaus and Evan Fox-Decent, ‘Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction’ (2001) 51 UTLJ 
193, 241. 
189  King recognises a non-doctrinal version of  restraint, as a counterpoint to the formalist and institutionalist 
approaches; Jeff  A King, ‘Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint’ (2008) 28 OJLS 409, 411. While 
not a supporter of  the non-doctrinal approach, King suggests that this approach is neither wild nor 
unorthodox and perhaps captures how many courts operate.  
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for the relationship between a decision and its justification to be subjected to an assessment 
based on its reasonableness (informed by the abstract notion of human dignity). 
IV Normative Assessment 
Contextual review captures, as mentioned earlier, two types of method. First, it manifests itself 
in a strong form, where the terms of intervention are cast in the broadest terms so as to capture 
the instinctive impulse of judges. Secondly, it has a weaker form, where the emphasis is on 
context rather than doctrinal reasoning; the decision about whether to intervene is framed in 
terms of deliberation about the nature of weight and respect that ought to be afforded to the 
views of the primary decision-maker. Measured against Fuller’s virtues it performs poorly – 
unsurprisingly, because its eschews rule-structure. 
Generality 
This method is highly sceptical about rules seeking to guide the judiciary’s supervisory eye. 
Both forms of contextual review avoid doctrine, but there are subtle differences in the way the 
(extra-legal) judicial task is conducted.  
In its strong form, this form of judicial supervision can be equated with, as Joseph labels it, 
an ‘instinctive impulse’.190 Shorn of any constraints or limiting parameters, the task of the 
supervising judge is to assess, in the round, whether there is any basis for judicial intervention. 
Joseph argues it is this inarticulate premise – not principles or doctrines or curriculum – that 
lies at the heart of the judicial role.191 Characterising it in its baldest form, the method can be 
described (whether colloquially or pejoratively) as a ‘sniff test’:192 
An impugned decision may invite a demonstrable reaction; a decision, viewed in the round, may 
be ‘whiffy’. Seasoned litigators apply the ‘sniff test’ where the decision-making goes palpably 
awry.  
The method can also be cloaked in more law-like terms, such as ‘overall evaluation’,193 the 
innominate ground,194 and ‘abuse of power’.195 But the essence is the same. Everything is up 
for grabs, in the light of context and circumstances: judicial review reduces to ‘what the whole 
 
190  Joseph, ‘Questions’ (n 33) 74. See also Joseph C Hutcheson, “The Judgment Intuitive” (1929) 14 Cornell 
LR 274 (‘judicial hunch’). 
191  ibid 74. 
192  ibid 77. 
193  ibid 79. See also Joseph, ‘Ultra Vires’ (n 122) 371. 
194  See text to n 52 above. 
195  Joseph, ‘Questions’ (n 33) 77. See text to n 4 above. 
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shebang is’.196 The forensic exercise is ‘inherently discretionary’, Joseph says; ‘[n]o amount of 
rule formalism can relieve the courts of their instinctual task in judicial review.’197  
Thus, it is based on discretion, rather than rules, and unashamedly so. Seen pejoratively, the 
schema enables and commends ‘palm tree justice’;198 extensive judicial discretion such as this 
was criticised by Lord Scarman in Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs: ‘Justice in [developed] societies is not 
left to the unguided, even if experienced, sage sitting under the spreading oak tree.’199 
The variability of this method is self-evident. Strong form contextual review is inherently 
discretionary, with infinite possibilities of depths of review. While unstructured normativism 
associated with contextual review frees the reviewing eye from formal restraints, it does not 
explicitly manifest a particular intensity of review. To the extent that curial discretion is not 
limited by any doctrine, there is a degree to which this form of review promotes more intensive 
supervision. The judge may decide for themselves whether there is any basis for intervention. 
However, the method of review may also result in review which is, in substance, still deferential. 
This will not be dictated or assured by law’s immediate structure. Instead, it will turn on the 
values and vision of the reviewing judge – especially as administrative law lacks a generally 
mandated purpose and objective. While other methods of review inevitably enable the judicial 
method to also be influenced by the reviewing judge’s values (sometimes covertly), the 
contextual model tends to amplify those values because its essence is constructed around value-
judgements. That said, proponents of this method all seek to colour the value judgement by 
reference to higher-order principles such as the rule of law (Allan and Joseph) and 
equality/dignity (Dyzenhaus). The abstract and/or contested nature of these principles may, 
however, limit their influence relative to individual judicial values.  
In its weaker form, contextual review manifests deference in terms of respect and weight. 
Context and circumstances dominate, but doctrinal structure is eschewed. Unlike its stronger, 
instinctive sibling, deference takes a deliberative role in the judicial process. That is, the 
importance of the notion of deference is acknowledged. However, it is not marked out for 
special treatment. Instead, it is introduced implicitly into the balance, through the familiar 
practice of attributing weight to the views of others.  
 
196  ibid 80. 
197  ibid 75, 80. 
198  The palm tree justice metaphor is drawn from Judges 4:5 (‘And she dwelt under the palm tree of  Deborah 
between Ramah and Bethel in mount Ephraim: and the children of  Israel came up to her for judgment.’) 
199  Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142, 168. 
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This method is described in different ways. In contradistinction to the doctrinal deference 
camp, it has been described as ‘non-doctrinal deference’.200 Daly adopts the label ‘epistemic 
deference’, again in contrast to doctrinal deference.201 Allan draws a helpful distinction in the 
nature of the deliberative process: this method adopts a ‘single-level integrated analysis’, rather 
than a ‘two-level theory of adjudication’.202 All these descriptors seek to capture the notion that 
questions form part of the ‘ordinary business of judging’, where any variation in the depth of 
review is settled implicitly on a case-by-case basis through existing judicial methods.203  
Thus, weight and respect are at the centre of this weaker form of contextual review. 
Epistemic deference means, Daly argues, ‘the paying of respect to the decision of others by 
means of according weight to those decisions’.204 The language of ‘weight’ is perhaps confusing 
though because, as Hickman explains, weight is also used to described that balancing of 
countervailing factors. In the context of ‘affording weight’ to those with greater relative 
expertise and knowledge, as was the case in Huang, the process is more akin to respecting 
another’s views.205 Indeed, this method appears to strongly embrace and adopt Dyzenhaus’ 
famous characterisation of ‘deference as respect’.206  
The language differs a little in the Canadian context, even though the method is similar. The 
Canadian courts start from an environment of deference, rather than scrutiny first and 
foremost. While respect and weight are still central to the supervisory method, the 
reasonableness enquiry poses the question of whether the administration has presented 
sufficient justification to warrant deference. As the majority in Dunsmuir said, ‘reasonableness 
is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within 
the decision-making process’;207 the courts must pay ‘respectful attention to the reasons offered 
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or which could be offered in support of the decision.’208 This process has been characterised a 
as ‘burden of justification’, something that is more or less demanding depending on the 
circumstances.209 Equally, though, this exhibits similar characteristics to the affording of 
weight. The view of the administration are afforded instrumental weight, as and when the 
courts are satisfied that the administration has advanced sufficient justification in support of 
them (although the extent of justification required varies in different contexts).  
The style of review also enables significant variability in the depth of review. The 
deployment of deference or variability through the vehicle of weight does not dictate particular 
depths of review. Anything is possible. There can be more or less scrutiny, depending on the 
context and circumstances. ‘Weight is, by its very nature, variable.’210 
In both its strong and weak form, contextual review strongly prioritises adaptability and 
flexibility over consistency and predictability. The banishing of doctrinal structure opens the 
field to judicial intervention. Under this schema the courts have an imprimatur to intervene as 
and when they assess it is necessary. But this has a vivid trade-off with consistency and 
predictability. The triggers for intervention are an individualised judicial assessment about 
whether the circumstances justify intervention – thresholds which are difficult to predict and 
prone to inconsistent outcomes based on the preferences of different judges. Proponents of 
this approach are not troubled by this though. For example, Joseph’s embrace of the instinctive 
impulse is openly dismissive of the value of predictability in the judicial function.211  
With the absence of doctrinal scaffolding, contextual review must look to other methods 
to provide guidance and bridle judicial discretion. However, these methods are generally 
amorphous and weak. Judicial discipline remains the principal controlling mechanism. Joseph, 
for example, argues that the impulse is tempered by the implicit constraints of the ‘judicial 
mindset’;212 namely, a ‘judge’s knowledge and experience of the law, the disciplines of the 
judicial role and the commitment to do practical justice’.213 He argues that ‘[d]emocracy 
imposed limits to the acceptability of judicial review’ weigh heavily on judges, meaning matters 
such as the separation of powers and relative expertise must be factored in. ‘The imperative to 
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uphold the rule of law legitimises judicial review but does not condone judicial usurpation.’214 
Sometimes judges may ‘experience the instinctual impulse’, Joseph explains, but still may decide 
not to intervene ‘for fear of overstepping the judicial function’.215 To these implicit constraints, 
he adds the need to follow the instinctive impulse with the language of law, that is, the 
expectation that the instinctive impulse will be cloaked in ‘familiar administrative law 
language’.216 We are encouraged to trust the judiciary’s – ‘generally … pragmatically cautious’ 
– judgement.217  
The difficulty with these constraints is that they are not manifest – we are asked to trust 
judges to get things right, without any obvious comfort being provided. As is evident in both 
the doctrinal and theoretical discussion in this thesis, the concepts of law, justice and the key 
principles of public law (such as sovereignty, the separation of powers and the rule of law) are 
contested. Judicial figures are not homogeneous. While these matters may cause judges some 
pause on an individual basis, their ability to promote consistency and predictability is poor. In 
days gone by when most judicial applications were heard by a common bench or small pool of 
judges,218 consistency and predictability arose from the stable personnel charged with 
adjudication. But nowadays the number of superior court judges has expanded and is drawn 
from judges with increasingly diverse backgrounds and an array of different experiences.219 
Thus, contextual review does little to ameliorate the absence of rules and to promote 
consistency or predictability. 
Public accessibility and transparency 
Contextual review gives the appearance of judicial candour and honesty, but the mediation of 
the balance between vigilance and restraint remains latent. The identification and application 
of the depth of review need not be a feature of judicial reasoning and exposition.  
Strong form contextual review, which channels the judicial impulse, does not provide an 
open and transparent basis for judicial intervention. It is imbedded in the mind of the judge. 
While the judicial impulse that there is something awry that requires judicial attention is 
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colloquially candid, it does not disclose a legal or intellectual justification for overturning a 
decision. Law’s style and language is eschewed in favour of sensation and human reaction. The 
result is a trigger which is internal and individual to the judge. While sincere, it is not lucid. Any 
value of candour is lost because the language of law is shunned and the basis for intervention 
is not translatable for external observers. Sure, judges may still seek to express the nature of 
the instinct in their reasons, but the sniff test does not dictate they do so. 
Indeed, the judgement about intervention risks being explained ex post facto, with the 
veneer of law-like justifications that did not directly inform the original decision to intervene; 
in other words, reverse-reasoning. As explained above, Joseph argues in favour of the judicial 
instinct being subsequently justified through the language of law. While he argues the 
instinctive impulse provides ‘insight into the true nature of judicial review’, he later qualifies 
himself by suggesting judges should still ‘fit applications for judicial review within an 
established ground of review’.220 This is a confession of support for the principle of reverse-
reasoning:221 
Has something gone wrong that calls for judicial intervention and correction? If the answer is ‘yes’, 
the judge must translate the instinctual impulse into ‘legal’ language that can explain and justify 
the court’s intervention. The judge must identify a recognised ground of review and show how 
the decision-maker has failed to comply with the law…  
The potential dissonance between instinct and principle is also seen in Laws LJ’s unusually 
candid judgment in Abdi.222 An issue arose about whether the applicants’ claim to a legitimate 
expectation, founded on an administrative policy, that their application for asylum would be 
determined in the United Kingdom prevented their deportation. The doctrinal test for 
legitimate expectation – ‘abuse of power’ – mimics the approach of contextual review.223 Laws 
LJ admitted that he was inclined to determine the case ‘on the simple ground that the merits 
of the Secretary of State’s case press harder than the appellant’s’.224 However, his Honour 
described it as ‘very unsatisfactory’ to conclude on that basis: 
The conclusion is not merely simple, but simplistic. It is little distance from purely subjective 
adjudication. … It is superficial because in truth it reveals no principle. Principle is not in my 
judgment supplied by the call to arms of abuse of power. Abuse of power is a name for any act 
of a public authority that is not legally justified. It is a useful name, for it catches the moral 
impetus of the rule of law…. But it goes no distance to tell you, case by case, what is lawful and 
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what is not. I accept, of course, that there is no formula which tells you that; if there were, the 
law would be nothing but a checklist. Legal principle lies between the overarching rubric of abuse 
of power and the concrete imperatives of a rule-book. 
Laws LJ’s candour is to be applauded. But his remarks expose the potentially venal nature of 
the judging process. As Poole says, it points to a ‘decision based upon an assessment of the 
arguments presented by counsel, and/or judicial instinct, propped up ex post – almost 
laughably – on the vague invocation of even vaguer principles.’225 The deployment of 
‘principled patina’ does not disguise the original instinctive judgement.226 Thus, where 
contextual review takes its nakedly instinctive form, we have reason to be sceptical about any 
reasons which accompany the decision to intervene. 
Weak form contextual review, which is built around the weight principle, performs slightly 
better due to weight typically being a concept expressly deliberated on by judges. Again, the 
mediation of the balance between vigilance and restraint is largely latent. The variation of 
intensity does not necessarily take explicit form. Variation and deference are not showcased 
under this method. The dominant ingredient is the weight to be afforded, based on the 
circumstances. However, as the judicial process of weighting has a deliberative dimension, the 
factors informing the weight afforded will often merit mention in the judicial reasoning 
process. To this extent, the weak form of unstructured contextualism parts company with its 
stronger sibling. But here using weight as an anchor has limitations. First, even within existing 
judicial practice, the application of weight can have a relatively amorphous character, as 
discussed earlier in relation to the intensity of review schema. Secondly, the schema does not 
demand transparency; it is merely incidental. Explicit deliberation on the factors influencing 
weight, and therefore the depth of scrutiny, is not guaranteed. 
Moreover, while this form of contextual review is anchored by an existing legal device 
(weight), it is still strongly informed by judicial discretion and judgement.227 Notably, Hickman 
links weight directly back to the judicial instinct: it is ‘something that courts do instinctively as 
part of the exercise of judging’.228 Indeed, Hickman suggests it is something that any rational 
decision-maker does when presented with a person who has knowledge and expertise that the 
decision-maker lacks. ‘When they recognise their lack of knowledge or competence relative to 
another person, they understandably give weight to their views.’229 This connection to judicial 
 
225  Poole, ‘Deep Blue Sea’ (n 222) 40. 
226  ibid. 
227  King, ‘Restraint’ (n 189) 411. 
228  Hickman, Public Law (n 72) 135 (emphasis added). 
229  ibid 137. 
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instinct suggests a reasonable degree of synergy between the strong and weak forms of this 
supervisory method. Given this discretion, it is again inevitable that the weight or latitude to 
be afforded is, at least in part, dependent on the self-perception of the judicial role and 
corresponding values. 
Prospectivity 
Like the other schema, no direct issues of retrospective rules apply. However, because this 
schema performs poorly in terms of generality and clarity (due to the prominence of judicial 
discretion and lack of predictability), the inevitably retrospective effect of judicial adjudication 
becomes more acute. 
Clarity 
The contextual review schema scores relatively poorly in terms of clarity, both in its strong 
instinctive form and its weaker form as weight and respect. Here, the concern lies in the lack 
of certainty arising from reliance on value and indeterminate standards or triggers for 
intervention. The incorporation of general standards was not condemned out of hand by 
Fuller.230 ‘Common sense standards of judgement’ – ordinary language that has meaning 
outside law – are treated as acceptable means of providing clarity, especially where the nature 
of the subject-matter is not suitable for more specificity. However, he warned against too 
readily employing standards, when these standards are capable of conversion into rules with 
greater clarity – otherwise, the elaboration of meaning is delegated, undesirably, to adjudicative 
bodies to determine on a case-by-case basis.231  
Here, where contextual review is equated with generalised standards like abuse of power or 
unreasonableness (framed in its abstract, meta formulation), their use does not meet the 
expectations demanded. While the adoption of standards such as these – or the colloquial 
judicial instinct – mandates a clearly stated judicial trigger for intervention, the case-by-case 
style that results brings vagueness and indeterminacy to the supervisory task, generating a lack 
of legal certainty about its operation and its likely outcomes.  
Similarly, resort to weight and respect in the weaker form of contextual review also brings 
a lack of clarity. Notions of weight and respect, while not foreign concepts in themselves, do 
not promote legal certainty. The influence of other views or the extent of respect to be afforded 
by the reviewing judges remain a discretionary judgement: both in terms of whether to give 
 
230  Lon L Fuller, The Morality of  Law (Yale UP 1964) 64, instancing standards such as ‘good faith’ and ‘due 
care’. 
231  ibid. Here, Fuller highlights the instances the problematic use of  the standard of  ‘fairness’ in commercial 
dealings. 
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weight or respect and, if so, how much. Again, as explained above, predictability is not 
enhanced by this method.  
Stability 
This schema does not make explicit provision for evolution or modification of the rules. This 
is because the framework adopts contextual judicial discretion at its core. Changes to judicial 
philosophy or the accommodation of novel circumstances present no impediment to this 
schema – they are readily accommodated internally within the existing judicial methodology, 
conditioned by instinct or weight and respect. Again, though, the lack of explicit instability 
does not mean this schema performs well under this criterion; as discussed under other criteria, 
the prominence of unarticulated judicial discretion means, in effect, those affected have little 
ability to predict outcomes and are faced with the potentially shifting sands of judicial 
judgement. 
Non-contradiction and coherence 
As is evident, contextual review rejects schematic structure, at least from a doctrinal 
perspective; there is no attempt to promote coherence through legal devices. Traditional legal 
techniques which encourage consistency, connectedness and unity of approach and doctrine 
are absent. To this extent, this schema appears incoherent.  
An alternative view, though, is that the singular criterion for interference – albeit cast in 
terms of instinct or other abstract values – has a certain neatness about it. While the absence 
of legal doctrine means the singular criterion is not amplified, the existence of a meta-principle 
governing judicial intervention manifests unity, even if it is drawn in esoteric terms. On the 
other hand, unity and coherence tends to erode in implementation. As discussed above, the 
practical application of this standard is prone to much more individual interpretation by judges 
based on their personal preferences and values. The discretionary nature of judgement risks 
inconsistency and coherence being collapsed as individual judges apply this standard in 
different ways. Coherence is difficult to produce, given the lack of law.  
Non-impossibility and practicality     
On a simplistic level, contextual review is eminently practical. On its face, simplicity in the 
supervisory lens is suggestive of simplicity in procedure. Unconstrained by doctrine seeking to 
circumscribe the judicial eye, procedural restrictions become unnecessary as de novo review is 
encouraged. It follows that the evidential corpus should not be restricted, else something that 
may trigger the judicial instinct could be lost. Filtering the lines of argument and analysis is left 
to the judicial gut-instinct: ‘Has something gone wrong that calls for judicial intervention and 
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correction?’232 While simple in form, this entails a plenary style of procedure and evidence, with 
consequent costs.  
On a deeper level, the workability of this schema is undermined by its enigmatic character. 
The supervisory process is reactive and adversarial, not inquisitorial. For the power of the 
judicial instinct to be harnessed, litigants must provide evidence which piques or alleviates the 
judicial interest, along with argument which explains it. But this is dependent on a reasonable 
degree of alignment between litigants and the supervisory judges – hence unpredictable ‘gut-
feelings’ dominate.  
How then do litigants – private plaintiffs and state actors – shape their case in anticipation? 
The lack of predictability risks litigants bombarding the courts with the highest order of 
evidence in every case, and extending the argumentation accordingly. No stone is left unturned. 
This has significant procedural implications in terms of the cost and length of hearings. A 
prudent plaintiff will have no choice but to seek to advance each and every argument that 
might trigger a judge’s instinct. Faced with wide-ranging arguments that are difficult to 
anticipate, a prudent defendant will be forced to similarly mount a wide-ranging defence. This 
has the potential to ratchet up the evidential corpus required in any particular case. 
So too with the style of argument. The standard involved is ultimately abstract – dependent 
on the intuition and values of individual judges. So much turns on the type of judge allocated 
to the particular case, a factor which is often not known in advance of the hearing. While 
realists rightly argue that this is a feature of all adjudication, the schema amplifies this problem 
because it does not limit or structure the judicial personality. The absence of doctrine means 
there is no legal scaffolding to limit, anchor or structure the dynamics of argument. The judicial 
predilections shape the argument in a way which litigants must be prepared to meet.  
Moreover, the instinctive approach risks removing the language of law, in which advocates 
are trained and skilled. If judicial deliberation need not be expressed in or be constrained by 
law, then so too the argument of advocates.233  
Congruence and candour 
Like adherence to the other principles of efficacy, contextual review presents the appearance 
of congruence. However, at a deeper level its operation is more troublesome.  
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The embrace of the judicial instinct and the resort to the judicial assessment of weight and 
respect mean incongruence is unlikely to specifically arise. But that is because the ‘rules’ capture 
and manifest the judgement made on implementation. Thus, there is unlikely to be any 
separation between the two. Candour is encouraged and, indeed, given a prominent place with 
the supervisory process – but to the exclusion of declared rules.  
To the extent that reasoning and deliberation is recognised within this schema (at best in a 
limited fashion), it brings with it the risks of reverse-reasoning, as discussed above. If this 
results, then the reasons risks masking the true basis for intervention, disclosing a lack of 
judicial candour.  
Hortatory versatility 
Contextual review does not manifest clear educative principles which are capable of being 
deployed elsewhere or performing the hortatory role. Adjudication is value-based and 
normative; the absence of doctrinal principles means the schema does not readily provide a 
means to educate or structure bureaucracy in other contexts. The legal methodology is 
unspecific and internal to the supervisory judge. The method is one grounded in higher-order 
values, such as the rule of law, rather than operational principles. The heavily contested nature 
of the rule of law means it does not send clear messages. The emphasis on abstract values over 
doctrine comes at a cost. As Harlow and Rawlings notes, the hortatory role of judicial review 
is threatened by the ‘imprecise application of … imprecise principle[s]’.234 They sympathise 
with complaints from the administration that some principles of judicial review are too vague, 
contextual or uncertain, such as is apparent under contextual review: ‘[T]he “intuitive 
judgement” of courts can be difficult to fathom, let alone predict!’235 Similarly, Halliday warns 
that the impact of judicial review on the administrative attenuates if doctrine fails to send 
consistent and clear messages, particularly when the doctrine is ‘uncertain and contingent on 
context’.236  
Here, the judicial methodology is circumstantial and normative. It generates little, if any, 
operational guidance for the bureaucracy. Its emphasis is on judicial-rightness, deployed in ex 
post facto review in particular cases. While over time, it might be argued, the corpus of cases 
may manifest trends about when the judicial instinct is engaged, this still may not provide 
reliable guidance. First, it is reliant on the very thing contextual review objects to – the 
generalisation of principles over the circumstantial assessment in particular cases. Secondly, 
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contextual assessment cannot guarantee consistent and coherent outcomes, because the 
judicial instinct is by definition circumstantial. Inconsistent and contradictory outcomes and 
trends may result. 
V Conclusion 
Under the contextual review approach, normative reasoning is heralded and doctrinal structure 
condemned. Based around a broad judicial assessment of whether anything has gone wrong 
which justifies intervention, unstructured normativism can be seen in a number of aspects of 
Anglo-Commonwealth jurisprudence: the judicial hunch, the innominate ground, the abuse of 
power principle, non-doctrinal deference and umbrella forms of unreasonableness. It is 
supported by some from the common law school and others who champion a potent and 
explicitly normative role for the courts. Assessed against the principles of efficacy, 
unsurprisingly, it performs poorly. Its rejection of doctrine in favour of normative judicial 
judgement or instinct is anathema to Fuller’s conception of the rule of law.  
 
 
 
  
6  
Conclusion 
I Introduction 
At the outset, I introduced the modulation of the depth of scrutiny in judicial review in terms 
of the mediation of the balance between vigilance and restraint. On the one hand, the courts are 
called on to rule on primary issues such as the propriety of administrative action or the 
treatment of a citizen by the state.1 This generates a judicial impulse to be vigilant, to ensure 
the action or treatment is appropriate and justified. On the other hand, the supervisory or 
review function of the courts raises second-order issues about the legitimacy of the courts to 
definitively adjudicate on such matters. The judicial process may be ill-suited for the 
determination of the primary issues raised. For example, the relative knowledge or expertise of 
the administration may be superior, the judicial processes may not adequately accommodate 
the breadth of the issues raised, or it may be more legitimate for the propriety of the 
administrative action to be settled through more democratic processes. This counsels restraint 
on the part of the reviewing judge. Hence, the courts must mediate this tension between 
vigilance and restraint.  
But, as we have seen, this tension is necessarily dynamic. The vast terrain of administrative 
law brings before the courts a wide array of different actions, decision-makers and 
circumstances. The equilibrium drawn between restraint and vigilance is conditioned by, and 
must accommodate, these differences. It is not possible to generalise in any meaningful way 
 
1  For the difference between ‘primary issues’ and ‘second-order’ issues, see Thomas Poole, ‘Legitimacy, 
Rights, and Judicial Review’ (2005) 25 OJLS 697, 709. See also Peter Cane, Administrative Tribunals and 
Adjudication (Hart 2009) 142 (performance vs supervision).  
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where the equilibrium should be drawn. ‘[C]ontext is everything’, perhaps more so here than 
in any other area of law.2  
In this thesis I have focused on different ways the courts can mediate this balance between 
vigilance and restraint. In particular, I have drawn out four schemata – scope, grounds, intensity 
and context – which exhibit different methods for modulating the depth of scrutiny. Analysing 
the schemata across three dimensions – doctrinal, conceptual, normative – my aim has been 
to assess the different strengths of each approach. I return to these three dimensions and 
consider the conclusions that I have reached about the different schemata. 
II Doctrinal Manifestation 
Over the last 50 years and more, the manner in which English and other Anglo-Commonwealth 
courts have mediated the balance between vigilance and restraint has evolved significantly. My 
study of these jurisdictions over this period – aided by reference to the language and structure 
of one of the leading judicial review textbooks – has identified four different approaches to the 
modulation of the depth of review: scope of review, grounds of review, intensity of review, 
and contextual review.  
The scope and grounds of review schemata are both built around the indirect and categorical 
modulation of the depth of scrutiny. The classification of a decision or defect into certain 
categories or bases for review ultimately determines the balance between restraint and vigilance. 
Scope of review depends on numerous complex distinctions, many of which are difficult to 
apply with fidelity. Grounds of review simplifies and systematises the categories, to present 
generalised grounds more in the nature of overarching principles of good administration.  
The approaches of intensity of review and contextual review embrace a more direct and 
circumstantial approach. The context of the case, broadly framed, determines the depth of 
scrutiny and thus whether judicial intervention is justified. This brings the modulation of the 
balance between vigilance and restraint to the foreground and showcases the extent of judicial 
discretion and variability involved in judicial review. The difference between the two 
circumstantial approaches lies in the role of doctrine. The intensity of review schema provides 
scaffolding for the calibration of the depth of review and the deployment of the supervisory 
lens. While recognising the supervisory jurisdiction, in effect, captures a full range of 
 
2  R (Daly) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532, [28]. For discussion of  the rise of  
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Michael Taggart, ‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ [2008] NZ Law Rev 423, 450; Timothy Endicott, 
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possibilities between restraint and vigilance, contextual review abandons doctrine in favour of 
judicial instinct, judgement and the assessment of weight.  
A key observation from this study is the fact that variability in the depth of scrutiny is 
omnipresent. Modulation of the depth of review is a prominent feature of all Anglo-Commonwealth systems 
of judicial review. This is a basic point but one that should not be lost sight of in the often heated 
debates about techniques of variable intensity. It is the manner in which it is expressed which 
differs across those jurisdictions, not the fact that the depth of review is modulated.  
Some other patterns can be identified, although the jurisdictional diversity makes it difficult 
to draw out strong trends over time. First, the doctrinal form that filled the first edition of de 
Smith’s textbook has fallen out of favour, except in Australia. Tightly framed doctrinal 
categories are no longer regarded as suitable for signalling the circumstances in which the 
courts are prepared to intervene. Despite their appearance, the key distinctions are too unstable 
and the multifarious categories too complex. The rule-structure creates a disconnect between 
expression and application, and masks the extent of judicial discretion involved. Only Australia 
continues the abstract formalism of old. However, there is perhaps a tacit understanding that 
this is more about dressing up the reasoning in ritual, the language of jurisdiction and so forth 
must be employed to express the conclusions to (unstated) more normative reasoning. 
Secondly, the extent of the departure from this original method differs depending on the 
jurisdiction in focus. The moves away from scope of review to grounds of review in England 
and New Zealand are modest. Some of the character of scope of review remains, especially the 
emphasis on the indirect and categorical modulation of the depth of scrutiny. Simplification, 
rationalisation and greater emphasis on general principles (legality and rationality) over rules 
(jurisdiction and vires) mark out the difference between the definition of the categories. 
Canada moved to direct and circumstantial approaches to the calibration of the depth of 
review, elements of which can also been detected in particular parts of English and New 
Zealand law. The more open-textured methodologies – more sensitive to the influence of 
context – provide a greater role for constitutional, institutional, functional and procedural 
considerations to directly influence the closeness or otherwise of forensic scrutiny.  
Thirdly, a pattern – albeit inexact – can be detected in the preferred style of reasoning: from 
doctrinal, to conceptual, to normative. The scope of review approach embeds an ostensibly 
formal approach to doctrinal reasoning. The grounds of review approach is framed by 
categorical doctrine, but is more generalised, more open-textured and leaves some space for 
conceptual reasoning. Intensity of review brings conceptual reasoning to the foreground, 
openly encouraging the consideration of constitutional, institutional and functional demands; 
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normativity is unavoidable but needs to be structured. Contextual review whole-heartedly 
embraces normative reasoning. 
Fourthly, these general trends are punctuated by emphasizing context and, correspondingly, 
the dynamic of the judicial method. The growth of the modern administrative state and the 
proliferation in the way in which public power is exercised have required more nuanced and 
sophisticated judicial supervision. Witness the greater prominence given to the notion of 
variable depth of review, the growth in circumstantial approaches to the determination of the 
depth of review, and refinement of the potential balances between vigilance and restraint. Blunt 
tools are no longer fit for purpose. 
Finally, the linkages between the jurisdictions are stronger than they appear on the face of 
the doctrine. The diversity of form gives the appearance of difference or disconnected 
jurisprudence. However, the schemata I have identified allow us to reconcile and connect the 
different approaches, while still being alert to their difference. For example Australia is regularly 
shamed for being out-of-step with Anglo-Commonwealth jurisprudence but I detect greater 
variability in method and stronger resemblance to it cognate jurisdictions, once the veneer of 
abstract formalism is pierced and understood. Similarly, the prominence of the language of 
deference in Canadian law, while off-putting for some, is simply a different means of expressing 
the conceptual dynamics that underscore the categorical approaches elsewhere. 
That is not to claim that the jurisdictions exhibit a unified jurisprudence though. Their 
relationship is more in the nature of a syndicate bound by a common aim (mediating vigilance 
and restraint), some unique ideas, and some borrowed practice – creating a loose association 
of jurisdictions exhibiting some family resemblance. Hence, the usefulness of the de Smith 
textbook in providing a centre-point of the analysis, anchored in the English experience but 
recognising the connections and divergence elsewhere in the Anglo-Commonwealth. 
In marking these key trends, I am equivocal about the role of human rights in developments 
in the manner by which depth of review is modulated. Trends associated with judicial restraint 
and vigilance are traditionally traced by reference to human rights. In particular, increased 
judicial scrutiny tends to be associated with increased attentiveness to fundamental rights and 
the growth of a culture of human rights protection. While I do not discount the role of human 
rights as a catalyst for some developments, I do not align human rights with particular schemata 
or approaches. In the context of my focus on the manner by which the depth of review is 
modulated, the influence of human rights is less directly correlative. Human rights have 
brought an extra layer of complexity to the mediation of vigilance and restraint. Greater judicial 
vigilance, especially on the merits, begins to strain the secondary nature of judicial review and 
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brings an acute focus on the limitations of the judicial role. The need to recognise these 
limitations – constitutional, institutional and functional – has encouraged some changes to the 
style of reasoning noted above. Human rights have been but one catalyst of change.  
III Conceptual Underpinnings 
Doctrinal diversity is matched by conceptual diversity. The different schemata which manifest 
the modulation in different ways can be justified from a range of conceptual perspectives. I 
have examined the different ways scholars have sought to legitimise different approaches to 
variability in judicial review and sought to align those arguments with the different organising 
schemata. Through the lens of the meta-level debate about the constitutional underpinnings 
of the system of judicial review as a whole, I have sought to distil the conceptual arguments 
supporting the different mechanisms which modulate the depth of scrutiny. The original 
debate on the conceptual underpinnings of the system itself has provided a rich debate from 
which to address the latter question. Higher-order legitimacy and legitimacy of the aspects of 
the minutiae are related, although not necessarily directly aligned. But the analysis generates a 
number of conclusions.  
 First, the constitutional underpinnings debate generally distributes into three groupings: 
the original two schools (ultra vires vs common law – both under the shadow of legislative 
supremacy), along with those who reject the debate’s concession to ultimate legislative 
supremacy.  
The ultra vires school is grounded in formalism and, unsurprisingly, its scholars argue in 
favour of stronger linkages between the judicial methodology and legislative mandate. Judicial 
discretion is to be minimised. In categorical schemata, this means the ultra vires formalists 
(Forsyth; Aronson) generally favour the drawing of strict and narrow categories, ultimately 
labelled and linked back to Parliament through the (purported) legitimising device of ultra vires. 
In more contextual schema, those from the ultra vires school (Daly; Elliott) take on a more 
progressive character and are prepared to move away from rigid categories. However, there 
remains an emphasis on the structuring of judicial discretion in order to downplay the influence 
of the particular circumstances of the case. This school dislikes the substantive or normative 
reasoning that a dynamic, case-by-case approach requires. A free-ranging judicial eye upsets 
the balance of the constitutional order and steps on the toes of a sovereign Parliament. If a 
line-drawing, categorical approach is no longer sophisticated enough to address the modern 
demands of the administrative state, then the answer is modest doctrinal evolution. The 
conceptual basis of the old categories need to be brought to the foreground, and should to be 
deployed carefully and strictly applied in a way that still respects the division of duties of old. 
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Structured judicial evaluation, teamed with a legislative lodestar, is a concession – a modest one 
– to administrative law’s evolving modernity and contextualism. 
In contrast, the common law school exhibits more faith in the judicial role and readily 
admits the influence of substantive values. In the categorical domain, these scholars (Craig; 
Taggart) embrace generalised and evolving grounds of review, albeit to differing degrees. 
Normative argumentation by judges is fine, but generally only in relation to the architecture of 
judicial review. In other words, judicial review may evolve and redefine itself on a systemic 
basis. But this does not translate into unfettered judicial authority and judgement. The specific 
directives of the legislature must still be respected. The institutional morality of the system itself 
is still better expressed in a carefully designed blueprint for judicial supervision.  
In the more contextual domain, some common law scholars (Mullan) favour more 
individualised treatment, whereby the depth of review is modulated in individual cases, but by 
reference to a suite of doctrinal factors in a compromise between generalism and the 
particularism. So, while the calibration of intensity is brought to the foreground, its deployment 
continued to be controlled, not by the drawing of categories, but through a moderated and 
transparent reasoning process. Factors, settled on an abstract and systemic basis, must be taken 
into account, reasoned through, and balanced. The limitations of the supervisory jurisdiction 
(relative expertise and practical disadvantage) are factors which are readily identified as 
influential, along with factors which are reflective of institutional arrangements (legislative 
allocation of power and existence of other means to enable accountability) and the gravity of 
the effect on the individual concerned.  
Others (Joseph; in part Hickman) trust the judicial judgement to get things right: either 
through instinctive reaction to the circumstances of the case or the ordinary assessment of the 
weight to be given to the views of others, driven by the rule of law but implicitly respectful of 
judicial inadequacies and overreach. No need for doctrine to guide or complicate. 
Contextualism unfettered.  
Those who stand outside the standard terms of engagement of the ultra vires debate (Allan; 
Dyzenhaus) object to the assumption of legislative supremacy. They charge the courts with the 
general defence of the rule of law, without any formal or particularised doctrinal matrix as 
guidance. Again, contextualism dominates; an appraisal of all the circumstances is required. But 
there is some divergence about the intensity of this assessment, between a de novo assessment 
of consistency with substantive liberal values or a reasonableness assessment of the reasoning 
and justification informed by the notion of dignity. Hunt’s orientation is perhaps a little 
unusual. He too is anxious not to be drawn into the competing parameters of the ultra vires vs 
235 
 
common law debate, but then argues in favour of elaborated and detailed regime of due 
deference. 
Thus a number of key points of contest can be identified. First, differences are evident as 
to whether the appropriate depth of scrutiny can be generalised for particular classes of 
decision or whether an individualised and circumstantial assessment is required. Secondly, if 
individualised assessment is required, the role of doctrine is disputed: some argue deliberation 
ought to be guided by doctrine; others suggest it falls for consideration in the round as part of 
context. Thirdly, and related to the role of doctrine, should the determination of the depth of 
scrutiny be subject to judicial reasoning and justification, or can it be left to the judgement or 
instinct of judges? Finally, the appropriate degree of precision is subject to debate. Should the 
categories defining the depth of scrutiny be cast tightly or more generally? Should the depth of 
review be expressed as a sliding scale, defined trigger-points or discrete standards ? Or should 
depth be conditioned solely by abstract, overarching values? As we have seen, these questions 
involve trade-offs between different normative values. 
IV Normative Assessment 
Each of the different schemata has been assessed using Fuller’s principles of legality, with a 
range of results. The employment of Fuller’s principles is justified on the basis that the 
definition of judicial methodology in the supervisory jurisdiction is akin to rule-definition and 
rule-application. Thus, one way of assessing the normative value of the different schemata is 
to measure the schemata against orthodox rule of law expectation about the efficacy of rules. 
This does not ignore judicial review’s role in promoting administrative propriety and delivering 
administrative justice. The inherent variability of judicial review, across all schemata, leaves the 
achievement of that goal open. The focus here has been on the manner in which that variability 
is expressed, not its existence.  
The criteria – generality, public accessibility and transparency, prospectivity, clarity, stability, 
non-contradiction and coherence, non-impossibility and practicality, congruence and fidelity, 
and hortatory versatility – provide a basis for testing the effectiveness and virtue of the different 
schemata. Performance against Fuller’s criteria varies; some schemata perform better than 
others in some respects but worse in others. As noted at the outset, some trade-offs are 
inevitable. However, isolating these different aspects allows us to expose these trade-offs and 
be cognisant of their impact.  
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In general terms, their performance can be depicted as follows: 
 
 Scope  
of Review 
Grounds  
of Review 
Intensity  
of Review 
Contextual 
Review 
Generality Mixed 
High—Low 
High Medium Low 
Public accessibility 
and transparency 
Mixed 
High—Low 
Medium High Low 
Prospectivity 
 
High High Medium Medium 
Clarity Mixed 
Medium—Low 
Medium Medium  Mixed 
High—Low 
Stability Mixed 
High—Low 
Medium Medium  Medium 
Non-contradiction and 
coherence 
Low Medium High Mixed 
High—Low 
Non-impossibility and 
practicality 
Medium High Medium Low 
Congruence and 
candour 
Low Medium High Mixed 
High—Low 
Hortatory versatility 
 
Low High Medium  Low 
 
Those schemata build around doctrinal categories perform best (subject to some caveats) 
in terms of generality and prospectivity. These schemata condition the supervision task by the 
promulgation of categories (viz rules) which dictate the depth of scrutiny in particular cases. 
However, there remains a danger that the doctrinal rules merely camouflage judicial discretion. 
This is especially acute with the scope of review schema because the undue complexity and 
conceptual dissonance provides incentives to escape the formalist categories. The formalised 
categories therefore risk being conclusory only, as labels attached after the fact in order to 
justify and legitimise more normative reasoning. The grounds of review schema is less prone 
to this covert manipulation, but only because its categories are less rigid and value-based 
variability is sanctioned to some degree. The intensity of review schema also relies on rules, but 
rules which structure the judicial calibration of the depth of scrutiny, rather than dictate the 
depth of scrutiny to be applied in particular cases. Contextual review repudiates any need for 
rules or law. Instead, instinct, judgement, and respect regulate judicial decisions about whether 
to intervene, based implicitly on the mediation of the balance between restraint and vigilance. 
Public accessibility and transparency is similarly enhanced by those schemata which favour the 
expression of rules, namely scope, grounds and intensity of review. However, in some cases, 
this is undermined by the extent of judicial discretion; unless explicitly reasoned, the judgement 
compromises the transparency of the schema. The intensity of review schema, while open-
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textured, urges the reasoned elaboration of the calibration of review and performs well. The 
grounds of review schema encourages explicit judicial deliberation in some circumstances, but 
frequently leaves the determination of the depth of review to the opaque classification exercise. 
The ostensibly formal reasoning of the scope of review schema is tainted by its amenability to 
subversion by unstated normative influences. Contextual review creates a rule-void and 
therefore maximises judicial discretion. In its stronger formation as instinct, any transparency 
is lost, hidden in the hunches of judicial figures; in its weaker form of weight and respect, there 
remains space for judicial reasoning to be explicit, but there is little schematic guarantee of this.  
Clarity, along with non-contradiction and coherence, depend on the extent to which the schemata 
present clear, understandable, predictable and harmonious legal regimes. Scope of review 
suffers from rule-based complexity, indeterminacy and paradox; this lack of clarity and 
coherence is further exacerbated when overlaid with possible judicial contrivance. The grounds 
of review schema was championed in order to present systematised simplicity and therefore 
clarity and coherence. This is achieved, to a large degree, by the tripartite formulations of the 
heads of intervention; however, reliance on classification in circumstances of overlap and the 
role of contingent and emergent grounds complicate this simplicity and add a gloss of 
uncertainty. Intensity of review identifies a clear and coherent process for determining the 
depth of review, but its application and outcomes are less certain. Contextual review has a 
degree of coherence: the naked reliance on judicial instinct or judgement presents, in a formal 
sense, a singular litmus for judicial intervention, therefore avoiding any contradiction or 
incoherence. However, the absence of law and prioritisation of judicial discretion makes 
outcomes uncertain, unpredictable and inevitably inconsistent. 
The objective of stability does not raise significant issues because each schema is assessed in 
isolation, assuming its prevalence as an organisational schema. However, in a marginal sense, 
those schemata incorporating large doses of judicial discretion – intensity of review and 
contextual review, and, latently, scope of review – manifest a degree of instability. Further, the 
explicit recognition of evolution of grounds under the grounds of review schema provides 
some instability; however, evolution tends to be generational and the degree of changeability 
is not undue.  
In the context of self-developed judicial methodologies, non-impossibility and practicality 
focuses mainly on the workability of the different schemata in the litigation and adjudication 
process. The two-track nature of scope of review means the ostensible practicality of the 
formalised rule-system, based on defined categories of intervention, is undermined by the 
amorphous role of judicial discretion. While the schema appears to be based on formal 
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distinctions, resolvable without resort to much evidence, the reality is that litigants must also 
confront the possible impact of more normative and value-laden argumentation. The grounds 
of review schema is heralded for its forensic simplicity, at least when argumentation takes place 
on the territory of the traditional grounds of review. The practicality is tested a little, though, 
when argumentation roams into the realm of emergent grounds, where greater depth of 
scrutiny – and thus greater evidence – characterises the adjudicative task. The more 
circumstantial schemata (intensity of review and contextual review) provide less advanced 
substantive guidance about the appropriate depth of scrutiny, making it more difficult to 
predict the nature of the evidence, forensic analysis and argument. Contextual review presents 
little, if anything, to ameliorate the open-textured nature of the supervisory task. The intensity 
of review schema seeks to off-set the open-textured evaluation by providing some doctrinal 
scaffolding to guide its operation. At its strongest, a set of mandated considerations inform the 
calibration exercise and the depth of review is calibrated by reference to a finite continuum of 
possibilities, presenting clear reference points and distinct supervisory tasks. While not 
eradicating procedural uncertainty, this goes some way to making the nature and shape of the 
supervisory task more predictable. Other formulations of intensity of review, such as with an 
infinite continuum of depths of review, suffer from the same impracticality concerns as 
contextual review. 
The congruence and candour of the schema – the extent to which the legal regime and its rules 
are honoured in application varies. Scope of review performs poorly, with its complexity and 
conceptual dissonance, encouraging latent manipulation of the critical distinctions which 
determine the depth of review. The grounds of review schema performs better. Its simplified 
framework, open tolerance of variability and potential for normative evolution provides less 
incentive for incongruence, although the classification task in relation to overlapping grounds 
may still camouflage judicial discretion. The intensity of review schema brings the underlying 
conceptual drivers of the vigilance–restraint dynamic to the foreground and leaves their weight 
and influence to the supervisory judge. In doing so, congruence and candour on the part of 
judges is strongly promoted, with the courts ultimately empowered to make a normative 
assessment in the light of those factors. Contextual review is more enigmatic. On the one hand, 
the regime embraces the judicial instinct and judgement, avoiding any incongruence; on the 
other hand, the absence of rules means any congruence is artificial. Moreover, if reasons for 
intervention are given, the prioritisation of the judicial hunch encourages reverse-reasoning – 
distracting from congruence and candour. 
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Finally, hortatory versatility examines the suitability of the norms generated on judicial review 
as guidance in other administrative law domains. Those schemata generating complex and 
confusing sets of rules (scope of review) or generating no rules as all (contextual review) 
perform poorly against this criterion. Intensity of review fails to generate specific norms or 
values that are readily applicable elsewhere; however, it does give some – albeit perhaps cryptic 
– indication about administrative autonomy (both the circumstances where it arises and the 
factors informing it). The best performing schema is grounds of review. It has an established 
practice of articulating administrative norms for domains beyond judicial review; the emergent 
grounds are less lucid and slightly counteract the hortatory guidance though. But generally the 
norms articulated under the grounds of review schema have a strong and helpful reach beyond 
the supervisory jurisdiction. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it becomes apparent that the grounds of review and 
intensity of review schema are generally the strongest performing schemata. As I noted at the 
outset, however, it is not my intention to commend one of the schemata based merely on the 
greater compliance with the most factors. First, the characteristics tend to overlap and are not 
necessarily equivalent or additive. Secondly, trade-offs inevitably arise and do not get captured 
in a mere numerical count. Thirdly, the schemata are drawn from existing jurisprudence, 
described in the terms by which they are generally applied; the normative task is not so 
constrained and can readily accommodate some amalgamation of some features of each 
schema.  
The analysis is important, though, as it exposes the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different approaches and allows us to better understand the compromises each method 
involves. For example, a marked difference is evident in structuring the circumstantial 
assessment of the depth of review through doctrine. Under the intensity of review framework, 
transparency, coherence and congruence are enhanced by the way the judgement about depth 
is framed by rules; these virtues are lost if the judgement dissolve into the judicial hunch or the 
inconspicuous application of respect and weight. 
The normative dimension employed here is also useful for analysing aspects internal to each 
schema. For example, the intensity of review schema has considerable value but the clarity and 
predictability is compromised if an infinite scale of review is adopted, rather than a few discrete 
and recognisable calibrations. 
The analysis also allows us to explore other combinations and possibilities. For example, 
one possible approach is to seek to amalgamate the methods found in the grounds and intensity 
of review schemata. That is, a generalised statement of grounds could be incorporated into the 
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supervisory task in combination with the explicit determination of intensity. The grounds of 
review would then provide a presumptive framework, with corresponding depths of scrutiny; 
however, when the context demands otherwise, a more generalised assessment of the depth of 
scrutiny is enabled. Thus, the grounds of review provide default analytical anchors, but the 
open-textured virtue of intensity of review is retained. This increased predictability and 
guidance greatly improves clarity and practicality. Giving the judicial discretion a more 
secondary and residual role in atypical cases also marginally improves generality, prospectivity 
and stability. The retention of generalised principles of good administration also improve the 
hortatory versatility of the schema. This doctrinal solution emulates the distinction Hickman 
draws between standards of legality and standards of review (albeit Hickman intended this to 
be only descriptive, not deployed in normative frameworks). The key distinction is that the 
former identify norms which administrators ought to respect, while the latter address the 
method by which the courts review compliance. Incorporating both standards of legality and 
review allows for the development of presumptions in order to ameliorate uncertainty. On the 
one hand, presumptions provide a degree of predictability which make the forensic process 
more predictable. On the other hand, some presumptions (as opposed to rules or rigid 
categories) retain judicial discretion and explicitly allow the particular circumstances to be given 
effect to if that is necessary. Overall configuration requires further reflection but this is one 
example of how the analysis here can be usefully deployed. 
V Conclusion 
The mediation of the balance between vigilance and restraint is a fundamental feature of 
judicial review of administrative action in the Anglo-Commonwealth. Modulation of the depth 
of scrutiny is ubiquitous in the system of judicial review, but takes different shapes and forms. 
These different shapes and forms risk obscuring the variability of the judicial lens in the 
supervisory jurisdiction. The isolation of the key schemata for mediating the balance between 
vigilance and restraint allows us to confront the question of how we – judges, lawyers, litigants, 
bureaucrats and scholars – might best have conversations about the appropriate depth of 
review in particular cases. The normative question about depth of review should not be clouded 
by disagreement about the basis for calibrating the depth of review.  
In this thesis I have identified the key schemata in Anglo-Commonwealth judicial review 
over the last 50 years (and beyond) that have been used to modulate the depth of scrutiny. I 
have identified their conceptual foundations and exposed their commonality and differences. 
I have then judged the schemata against rule of law-based criteria in order to assess their 
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efficacy. In my study, the grounds of review and intensity of review schemata display the 
greatest efficacy, albeit with emphasis on different virtues.  
The main value of this analysis, however, lies in isolating the strengths and weaknesses of 
the different approaches and identifying the various compromises they involve. The hope is 
that this analysis helps illuminate questions about the manner by which the depth of review is 
modulated in judicial review and allows our conversations to return, more fruitfully, to 
normative questions about the appropriate depth of review in particular cases. 
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